

BITI IZ VAN

Ka redefinisanju
kulturnog identiteta Srbije

Publikaciju *BITI IZ/VAN – Ka redefinisanju kulturnog identiteta Srbije*
realizuje **KULTURKLAMMER – centar za kulturne
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TO BE FROM/OUT

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Uvod Ubrzana globalizacija, migracije i procesi političkih i kulturnih integracija Evrope aktuelizovali su pitanje kulturnog identiteta i postavili ga u fokus međunarodnih odnosa, ali i društvenog dijaloga, kako u pojedinačnim zemljama, tako i na nivou cele Evrope. Dosledno tome, pronašanje načina za očuvanje autentičnog kulturnog identiteta i njegovo usklajivanje s dominirajućim – evropskim identitetom u nastajanju – postalo je predmet različitih naučnih disciplina i polja istraživanja i jedan od najvažnijih zadataka javnih politika u velikom broju evropskih zemalja.

Posmatrana u datom kontekstu, ali i kao zemlja koja je zakoračila na put evropskih integracija i prihvatile poziciju da se u konkurenциji desetine drugih, manjih ili većih država, bori za svoje osobeno mesto u zajednici evropskih zemalja, Srbija je pored nužnosti za sprovodenjem brojnih promena i transformacija društveno-političkog uređenja i modela državne ekonomije, suočena s izazovom repozicioniranja na međunarodnoj sceni. U vezi sa tim javila se i potreba za redefinisanjem kolektivnog identiteta koji je poljuljan državnim i društveno-političkim diskontinuitetom i gubitkom dotadašnjeg vrednosnog sistema usled raspada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, a definitivno izgubljen tokom društveno-političke i ekomske krize tokom 1990-tih.

Paralelno s krizom identiteta koja je u srpskom društvu prisutna već gotovo dve decenije, tekao je proces opadanja ugleda i formiranja negativne slike o Srbiji u njenom bližem i daljem okruženju. Višegodišnja izolacija i zatvorenost zemlje, medijska manipulacija i nekritički odnos prema ulozi Srbije u ratovima na teritoriji bivše SFRJ tokom 1990-tih, te nespremnost vladajućeg režima, društvene elite ali i većine građana da preuzmu odgovornost za politiku konflikta i ratova, samo su neki od faktora koji su doprineli narušavanju ugleda zemlje i nastanku njene negativne reputacije. S druge strane, nakon 2000. godine nespremnost za reflektivno i kritičko preispitivanje bliske prošlosti, istorijskih narativa i kolektivnog sećanja na kojima je građen kolektivni identitet tokom 1990-tih, značajno su usporili promenu aktuelne spoljašnje i unutrašnje percepcije Srbije.

Kulturni identitet predstavlja društveni konstrukt koji je kao takav zavisan od različitih faktora i okolnosti, koji se konstantno menja i uvek iznova generiše i koji pored mnogih svojstava koja potiču iz različitih elemenata unutar određene kulture, uključuje i odnos prema drugim kulturama. Stoga je razumljivo zbog čega javni dijalog i kritičko preispitivanje ključnih faktora u formiranju kolektivnog (kulturnog) identiteta, pored ostalog, mora da obuhvati i odnos prema drugim kulturama, a samim tim i videnje i percepciju drugih.¹

¹ R. R. Božović, Kulturni identitet u globalnoj integraciji, Sociološka Luča I/1, 2007.

Jednodimenzionalna prezentacija kulture i jednodimenzionalno komuniciranje kulturnog identiteta Srbije doveli su do toga da raznovrsnost njenih kultura i njima pripadajućih identiteta postane sasvim nevidljiva i irelevantna u domenu spoljnih odnosa. Kada je u pitanju unutrašnji razvoj srpskog društva, takav pristup je ugrozio očuvanje i negovanje multikulturalnosti kao bazične vrednosti savremenog gradanskog društva i eliminisao njen značaj kao potencijalno veoma važnog generatora u formiranju kolektivnog identiteta.

Zato je u cilju promene negativne reputacije koju Srbija uživa i komuniciranja njenog specifičnog identiteta s nastajućim evropskim identitetom neophodno angažovanje svih društvenih aktera i polja društvenog života, kao i kreiranje politika i strategija repozicioniranja zemlje. Takođe, pored stvaranja odgovarajućih konteksta za redefinisanje kulturnog identiteta i međunarodnog statusa zemlje, podjednako je važno omogućiti participaciju građana u datim procesima. To podrazumeva otvaranje zemlje, omogućavanje veće mobilnosti njenih građana i intenzivnu kulturnu saradnju i razmenu, ali i uključivanje predstavnika emigracije u pomenute procese i pružanje mogućnosti svim zainteresovanim da se bolje upoznaju s izvorima savremenog kulturnog i društvenog identiteta Srbije i pruže doprinos redefinisanju njihovih aktuelnih odrednica.

Projekat SERBIE MOBILE_Između dva stajališta

Osnovno polazište projekta *SERBIE MOBILE – Između dva stajališta* predstavlja pitanje formiranja, komuniciranja i prezentacije savremenog identiteta Srbije, kako u zemlji, tako i van njenih granica, kao i pitanje doprinosa različitih socio-kulturnih grupa, kategorija i generatora njegovom formiranju. Realizacija projekta počela je 2008. godine i do sada su uspešno sprovedene dve njegove etape, obe fokusirane na preispitivanje kolektivnog identiteta Srbije u kontekstu aktuelnih evropskih integracija: Međunarodna letnja akademija (*Bez*)granični identiteti (2008) i publikacija *BITI IZ/VAN – Ka redefinisanju kulturnog identiteta Srbije* (2009).

Međunarodna letnja akademija (*Bez*)granični identiteti (Beograd, 25-31. avgust 2008) je organizovana uz podršku Ministarstva za dijasporu Republike Srbije, ERSTE Bank a.d. Novi Sad, Austrijskog kulturnog foruma Beograd i Francuskog kulturnog centra u Beogradu. Akademija je zasnovana na pretpostavci da bi uključivanje migranata i predstavnika dijaspore u procese redefinisanja savremenog društvenog i kulturnog identiteta Srbije i njene promocije na međunarodnoj sceni moglo postati moćan instrument u promeni negativne slike zemlje i kvalitetnoj prezentaciji i afirmaciji njenih kultura i identiteta van njenih granica – njena veza sa bližim i daljim okruženjem.

Kao rezultat Akademije pokazalo se da postoji veliki broj predstavnika/ca dijaspore iz Srbije koji kontinuirano ulaže izuzetne napore da promeni sliku Srbije u svojoj mikro-sredini. U pitanju su uglavnom mladi ljudi koji svojom bogatom, dinamičnom i višedimenzionalnom interakcijom sa drugim kulturnama (kroz umrežavanje, kulturne aktivnosti, stručni rad), mogu doprineti započetim procesima modernizacije zemlje, a njihov angažman može postati obogaćujući element kulturnog identiteta Srbije. Na žalost, njihova zalaganja su zanemarena ili još češće nisu prepoznata kao važna u zemlji njihovog porekla.

Konačno, diskusije i razgovori vođeni tokom Akademije doveli su do zaključka da je neophodno uvodenje sistematičnog, stručnog i multidisciplinarnog

pristupa, kako u prezentaciji kulturnog nasleda i savremene umetničke produkcije i komuniciranju kulturnog identiteta van granica Srbije, tako i u predstavljanju i omogućavanju veće vidljivosti delovanju predstavnika/ca dijaspore u zemlji. Na taj način bi se emigrantima pružila mogućnost da bolje upoznaju i u svoj individualni identitet inkorporiraju i neke od generatora kulturnog identiteta zemlje za koju su vezani poreklom i postanu njegovi aktivni prenosnici van njenih granica. Participacija iseljenika u procesima redefinisanja i tumačenja identiteta i statusa zemlje bi datim procesima doprinela pre svega tako što bi omogućila da oni postanu prepoznati kao važan činilac u poboljšanju reputacije zemlje na međunarodnom nivou, ali i da novi identitet obuhvati i važan konstitutivni element kao što je percepcija i videnje „drugih“.

Publikacija *BITI IZ/VAN – Ka redefinisanju kulturnog identiteta Srbije* predstavlja pokušaj pružanja doprinosu otvaranju javnog prostora za preispitivanje i dialog na temu kulturnog identiteta kao važne odrednice u procesima gradenja ugleda zemlje i bitnog konstitutivnog elementa kolektivnog identiteta. Cilj publikacije je da doprinese identifikovanju kako zadataka javnih politika i aktera u procesu redefinisanja kulturnog identiteta Srbije, tako i utvrđivanju vrednosnog okvira i ključnih generatora u njegovom formiraju. Pored toga, osnovni koncept publikacije se zasniva na težnji da, kroz uključivanje viđenja i perspektiva onih koji su „izvan“, olakša prepoznavanje i utvrđivanje adekvatnih metoda i pristupa u komuniciraju identiteta Srbije.

Publikacija obuhvata izabrane eseje polaznika Međunarodne letnje akademije (*Bez)granični identiteti*, zatim stručne tekstove relevantnih stručnjaka/inja u različitim društvenim disciplinama i oblastima istraživanja, kao i rade po jedinim umetnika/ca čiji radovi korespondiraju s temom publikacije.

Analizirajući i preispitujući koncept i održivost jedinstvenog evropskog identiteta, različite kulturne i umetničke prakse i pristupe usmerene na integraciju i usklađivanje specifičnih kulturnih identiteta s nastajućim ev-

ropskim identitetom, zatim izazove i zadatke javnih politika i aktera, značaj različitih faktora i činilaca u formiranju i komuniciranju savremenog identiteta Srbije, cilj publikacije je da doprinese informisanosti javnosti o višedimenzionalnosti procesa građenja ugleda zemlje i da podstakne aktivan odnos zemlje ka redefinisanju sопственог identiteta i međunarodnog st-tusa, a to znači kroz aktivno uključivanje svih nas u date procese.

KULTURKLAMMER – centar za kulturne interakcije je organizacija civilnog društva, osnovana 2007. godine, koja kroz različite forme kulturnog i umetničkog delovanja podstiče integraciju i aktivaciju kulturnih resursa u održivi razvoj društva. Stručnim pristupom u radu, inovativnošću i međunarodnom saradnjom organizacija teži da izazove pozitivne promene u društvu, pre svega kroz podsticanje angažovanog i kritičkog razmišljanja i odgovornog delovanja svih društvenih aktera.
www.kulturklammer.org



(Bez)granični identiteti – višezačnost pojma

Moj način da to učinim bio je da pokazem da razvoj i održavanje svake kulture zahteva postojanje drugog, različitog i kompetitivnog alter ego-a. Konstrukcija identiteta – jer, po mom misljenju, identitet, bilo Orijenta ili Okcidenta, Francuske ili Britanije, iako je očigledno skladište različitih kolektivnih iskustava, predstavlja u krajnjoj liniji konstrukciju – podrazumeva konstrukciju suprotnosti i „drugosti“, čija je aktuelnost uvek predmet neprestane interpretacije i re-interpretacije njihovih razlika u odnosu na „nas“. Svako doba i svako društvo nanovo stvara svoje „Druge“. Daleko od toga da bude statican, vlastiti identitet ili identitet „drugoga“ dugotrajan je istorijski, socijalni, intelektualni i politički proces, koji se odigrava kao utakmica koja uključuje pojedince i institucije u svim društvima. **Edvard Said***

* Edvard Said, Orijentalizam, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd, 2000.

DA LI IDENTITETI UBIJAJU?

„Niko nije spreman da umre za Evropu!“ Ovo deluje kao razumna i u potpunosti istinita izjava. Međutim, kada sam je čula pre nekoliko godina, bila je izgovorena kao kritika.

Ovakav stav nije izneo vojnik pokušavajući da odbrani svoj posao ili ponos svoje profesije, već moj kolega, stručnjak u oblasti političkih nauka, koji se bavi proučavanjem evropskog identiteta.

Iako smatram da je njegova izjava u najmanju ruku neprimerena ako ne i šokantna, ipak moram da priznam da je izgovorivši je pokrenuo važnu temu. Za kolektivni identitet je svakako značajno kada su ljudi spremni da podnesu žrtve za svoju političku zajednicu. I, na žalost, takve žrtve su neophodne da bi se održao politički sistem. Ljudi treba da se odreknu nekih ličnih interesa zarad dobrobiti celog društva. Ukoliko ne učine to dobrovoljno, potrebno je naterati ih na to. Međutim, nijedan stabilni politički sistem se ne može održati isključivo na primeni sile. Ovo pogotovo važi za demokratske sisteme, koji su u idealnim uslovima definisani samovladavinom ljudi. Očigledno je da „ljudi“ ne dele uvek ili ne često, iste interesu. Zbog toga uvek manjine moraju da prihvate odluke većine. Ali, zbog čega bi morali to da čine, zbog čega se ne pobune ili napuste zemlju, ako ne zbog činjenice da sebe definišu kao deo naroda s kojim dele kolektivni identitet.

Kolektivni identiteti su neophodni za političke sisteme, i novi politički entiteti moraju da teže formiranju kolektivnog identiteta svojih građana – bilo da su u pitanju veće unije konstituisane od prethodno nezavisnih država, kao što je Evropska Unija, ili manje zajednice država koje nastaju od bivših većih političkih entiteta, kao što su države nastale od nekadašnjih republika Jugoslavije ili Sovjetskog Saveza.

Međutim, činjenica da su identiteti neophodni ne znači da su oni, sami po sebi, „dobra stvar“. Naprotiv, oni su opasni i potencijalno vode ka agresiji.

Definišući ko smo i ko nam pripada, automatski definišemo i ko nam ne pripada, ko je isključen, ili, u najekstremnijim slučajevima, određujemo one koje smemo ili koje smo u obavezi da ubijemo, budući da, očigledno, glavni cilj ratova nije umreti za svoju zemlju, već ubiti za nju.

Šta se može učiniti povodom ovog višezačnog koncepta kolektivnog identiteta koji se ne može zanemariti zbog svoje neophodnosti, ali koji nije ni poželjan zbog opasnosti koje može proizvesti? Jedan od mogućih i trenutno široko razmatranih odgovora na ovo pitanje jeste koncept *konstitucionalnog patriotizma* koji je razvio Jirgen Habermas. Prema tom konceptu, kolektivni identiteti ne bi trebalo da budu zasnovani na pretpostavljenoj zajedničkoj kulturi ili sADBini, već na zajedničkoj političkoj volji, ili, preciznije, na zajedničkom demokratskom razumevanju društva.

Ovaj odgovor je po više osnova prihvatljiv. Baziran je na najvažnijoj funkciji kolektivnih identiteta u demokratijama, a to je razvijanje političke volje i političkog delovanja. U pitanju je relativno otvoren koncept – nije potrebno da se neko rodi u zajednici da bi postao njen deo – i, istovremeno, racionalan koncept, koji se zasniva pre na zajedničkim idejama nego na zajedničkim emocijama.

Najčešća kritika ovog koncepta zasnovana je na argumentima o njegovoj ekstremnoj nerealnosti, o tome da ignoriše svakodnevnu stvarnost snažnih emocija protiv onih koji ne pripadaju – na osnovu etničke pripadnosti, religije ili kulture, a ne na osnovu političkih razlika. No, normativni koncept ne mora da opisuje iskustvenu realnost, on ima sopstvenu vrednost, pre svega jer ukazuje na ciljeve ka kojima treba da streme demokratski orijentisane politike.

Ali, da li je *konstitucionalni patriotizam* zaista poželjan politički cilj? Iako je svakako otvoreniji od kulturalističkih definicija, ovaj koncept je ipak isključujući koncept, koji izuzima one koji svoje političko delovanje ne

zasnivaju na demokratskim idejama. Ovaj vid isključenja je posebno problematičan kada su u pitanju savremena društva u kojima je nedostatak demokratskih vrednosti i tradicija postajao sve prisutniji razlog za isključenje i diskriminaciju. Stoga je demokratija videna kao jasan koncept kome se neko može priključiti ili ga ne usvojiti. Očigledno je da ovo nije slučaj. Većina savremenih političkih sistema sebe naziva demokratskim. Za neke od njih može se reći da je ovo političko „brendiranje“ samo paravan, npr. samo održavanje izbora u nekim društvima se koristi kao argument da su ona demokratska, čak iako su izbori održani s puno nepravilnosti. Postoji mnogo primera nesuglasica u tumačenju demokratije u okviru kojih svaka partija može pružiti dobre razloge za legitimitet sopstvene pozicije: Da li su uistinu demokratski procesi „demokratičniji“ od reprezentativnih? Da li demokratija može da uključuje prava grupe, ili da li treba da bude zasnovana samo na pravima pojedinaca? Koja prava manjina treba da budu zaštićena od odluka većine? itd.

Demokratija je u mnogim aspektima pokazatelj kome se mogu pripisati različiti sadržaji. Ovi sadržaji su otvoreni za osporavanje – i to je verovatno ključna vrlina demokratskih sistema. Tako, svaka definicija demokratskih identiteta, kao npr. i *konstitucionalni patriotizam*, mora da ostane otvorena za osporavanje. Nasuprot Habermasu, tvrdila bih da to osporavanje ne mora da bude što racionalnije i neemotivnije. Svakako smo iskusili mnoge tragične rezultate uplitanja emocija u politiku – nacionalni i nacionalistički konflikti, genocidi i uspeh populističkog prava u Evropi, samo su neki od primera. No, da li nas ta iskustva zaista uče da emocije treba zabraniti u politici? Zašto bi se iko bavio politikom ako ne iz snažnih osećanja prema nekim političkim temama?

Tako, ponovo treba da se zapitamo na koji način bi trebalo da se bavimo složenim konceptom kolektivnog identiteta. Možda je prvi i najvažniji korak upravo uočavanje i prihvatanje te složenosti kao neminovne. Ne samo da na teorijskom nivou treba da usvojimo neophodnost i opasnosti od kolektivnih

identiteta, već treba da se uhvatimo u koštač sa identitetima kada se suočimo s njima „napolju, na ulicama“. U mnogim slučajevima ovi identiteti nisu posebno poželjni, oni su obično nacionalno ili čak nacionalistički definisani, oni podstiču rigidna izopštavanja i često nisu otvoreni za razložni diskurs.

Kako god, i to je dobra vest, oni ne predstavljaju prirodnu datost, nisu zasnovani na primarnim korenima – oni su konstruisani, pre svega od strane nacionalnih država i njihovih različitih komponenti, kao što su nacionalne kulture i obrazovni sistemi. Ovi konstrukti su dokazali neverovatnu stabilnost tokom dugog vemenskog perioda, i čak su se proširili na države kojima je nedostajala snažna sopstvena nacionalna tradicija. S druge strane, oni se mogu menjati – i zapravo, oni se konstantno menjaju.

Evropski identiteti su i dalje relativno slabi, ali se stoga razvijaju ne tako što zamenjuju nacionalne identitete već se preklapaju sa njima. Takođe, građani zemalja koje teže pristupanju Evropskoj Uniji rekonstruišu svoje osobenosti shodno ovom cilju, često žonglirajući s nekim od njih koje su morali da razviju tokom svog života – kao građani bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza ili bivše Jugoslavije (uključujući sve karakteristike komunizma ili socijalizma, nasuprot kapitalizmu i imperijalizmu itd.), kao građani mlađih nacionalnih država i kao budući evropski građani. Povrh toga, emigranti i njihova deca moraju da pronađu način da povežu identitete vezane za zemlju njihovog porekla s onima iz svakodnevnog života.

Ovo su stresni i teški procesi, ali putem njih fluidnost i višežnačnost identiteta postaje deo svakodnevice običnih građana. Ovo vodi ka prilično drugaćijim konceptima samospoznaje pojedinaca, ka većoj otvorenosti ili ka još rigidnijoj reafirmaciji individualnog identiteta, ka individualnoj i kolektivnoj samorefleksiji ili, jednostavno, ka zabuni.

U svakom slučaju, ovi procesi otvaraju nove prostore za debate i diskusije. Čak i oni koji se protive isključivanju i diskriminaciji mogu pronaći razloge

da dovedu u pitanje postojeće okvire identifikovanja, da preispituju naizgled očigledne koncepte – i, u najboljem slučaju, da započnu debate o demokratskim načinima bavljenja identitetima.

Nema razloga težiti tome da ove debate budu isključivo racionalne. Protičenje izuzimanju i diskriminaciji može biti podjednako emotivno kao što je često i sama diskriminacija. Postoji, međutim, mnogo razloga da poželimo da se ove debate ne završavaju pitanjem ko je spremam da umre ili ubije zbog bilo kog razloga ili osećaja pripadnosti. Umesto toga, apsolutno poželjan ishod bi bio da građani voljno provedu deo svog života politički osvešćeni i delujući u pravcu otvorenih i dinamičnih konceptualizacija kolektivnih identiteta.

Monika Mokre je angažovana kao istraživač u Institutu za studije kulture i istraživanje pozorišta Austrijske akademije nauka. Članica je brojnih strukovnih i profesionalnih udruženja i mreža, a predaje na sledećim univerzitetima: Innsbruk, Salzburg, Beč, kao i Univerzitet muzike i izvođačkih umetnosti u Beču. Oblasti kojima se u svom naučno-istraživačkom radu bavi su sledeće: evropska demokratija i javna sfera, evropske integracije, evropsko upravljanje, kulturna politika i finansiranje umetnosti, menadžment u kulturi, medijske politike i studije roda. Monika Mokre je bila jedna od predavača na Međunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji (*Bez*)granični identiteti.

EVROPSKI I(LI) NACIONALNI IDENTITET – SOCIOPSIHOLOŠKA RAZMATRANJA*

viševekovno nastojanje evropskih naroda da od geografskog pojma načine i političku zajednicu. Međutim, situacija je u mnogome komplikovana. Prvi pomeni Evrope se mogu naći tek početkom XV veka kada je ona ugrožena ozbiljnim upadom istočnjačkog, azijskog Osmanskog carstva, a verovatno prvi jasniji pomen „Evrope“ kao jednog drugačijeg i homogenog prostora javlja se tek padom Carigrada 1453. godine (Šmale, 2003). Čak i tada, „Evropa“ je pojam karakterističan za elitu i književnike, naročito u doba romantizma i u počecima raspada Otomanske imperije kada se sve više potencira evropejstvo potlačenih i okupiranih naroda sa jugoistoka Evrope, prvenstveno Grčke kao predstavnika helenske kulture koja je postavila temelje evropske kulture. Borbe za oslobođenje Grčke praćene romantičnim zanosom jednog Bajrona, i političkim uticajem britanskog premijera Vilijema Gledstona, po prvi put uvode u rečnik sukob civilizacija i kultura, baziranih na pomeranju istočne granice Evrope prema Bosforu (Todorova, 1999). Ipak, prava istorija evropske ideje zaista počinje osećajem ugroženosti Evrope, ma kako se ona shvatala, od strane neevropske Turske koja padom Carigrada i zvanično postaje, geografski, deo Evrope. Prve ideje o ujedinjenoj Evropi direktno slede i posledica su pada Carigrada. Češki kralj Jirži Podjebradi sredinom XV veka sačinjava plan o savezu Češke, Francuske, Burgundije i Venecije sa otvorenosću za uključivanje drugih članica u ovaj savez (i sve ovo pola milenijuma pre stvaranja Evropske Unije). Nadalje, ova „Evropa nacija“ imala bi svoju saveznu Skupštinu na kojoj bi sve članice imale *ravnopravno* pravo glasa. Naravno, i ova ideja Evrope, kao i sve druge do kraja XIX veka imale su u sebi

Istorija Evropske ideje

Jedna od osnovnih zabluda kada se govori o Evropi jeste da je koncept Evrope kao opšteprihvaćenog pojma postojao od vajkada i da je konstrukcija Evropske Unije nakon Drugog svetskog rata samo ozvaničila

* Rad u okviru projekta “Psihološke karakteristike društva u tranziciji” koji finansira Ministarstvo nauke i zaštite životne sredine Republike Srbije.

jednu dozu lične koristi, te bi u ovom slučaju, Češka sačuvala svoju nezavisnost i svoj položaj u evropskom prostoru. Dugo iza toga, ideja Evrope i u delima poznatih filozofa kao što je Erazmo Roterdamski i u delima političara kao što je Pjer Diboa, bila je u stvari vezana za uspostavljanje mira na tlu Evrope. Ovakvo videnje evropske ideje ne može se svakako nazvati istorijom političkog ujedinjavanja Evrope koje nastaje tek sredinom prošlog veka, ali ono predstavlja osnovu za razmišljanje o jedinstvenom evropskom prostoru koji će imati svoju snagu i koji će tom svojom veličinom biti spreman da odvrati sve potencijalne zavojevače koji bi želeli da otkinu makar mali deo ovog kontinenta. Naravno, osnovna ideja ovakve „integracije“ jeste bila mir među evropskim narodima koji su do pada Napoleona bili mnogo češće u sukobima nego u dobrom odnosima (Šmale, 2003). Potvrdu ove ideje „evropskog mira“ daje i shvatanje da taj novi sistem država po Maksimilijanu de Betini, vojvodi od Silija, treba da počiva na zajedničkim zakonima i statutima, zakletvama i obavezama, i naročito na slobodi trgovine i rešavanju sukoba na opštoj Skupštini svih država. Gotovo neverovatno zvuči da su ove Silijeve ideje nastale skoro pet stotina godina pre donošenja prvog Evropskog Ustava (ili preciznije, Ustava Evropske Unije).

U periodu između dva svetska rata dolazi do prvi pokušaja povezivanja privrednika iz Evrope, i ta ideja o povezivanju privrede ostaje kao osnova i današnje Evropske Unije (kao temelj današnje Evropske Unije navodi se stvaranje Evropske zajednice za ugalj i čelik iz 1951). Zanimljivo je da je čelik bio osnova saradnje evropskih država (Francuske, Nemačke, Belgije i Luksemburga) i između dva svetska rata što govori o tome da je današnja Evropska Unija nastala na pragmatičnim osnovama i da tek u naše vreme počinje da menja svoju ulogu – od industrijske i ekonomske zajednice postaje zajednica naroda i kultura (Karls, 2004).

Zašto je ovaj kratak istorijski pregled ideje evropskog ujedinjenja do Drugog svetskog rata toliko bitan za današnje pitanje Evrope i evropskog identiteta? Ako se setimo mišljenja nekih sociologa (Smit, 1992; Molnar, 1997) da svaki

identitet nastaje na sukobu i poređenju između dva naroda, onda je jasno da se i evropski identitet kalio i budio iz sukoba Evrope sa Ottomanskim carstvom, naročito kada je kod ljudi sa evropskog kontinenta počela da sazревa ideja da je Ottomansko carstvo uljez u Evropi i da svojom kulturom i religijom pripada Aziji. Iz toga i proizlazi podrška „okupiranim“ delovima Evrope da zauzmu svoje mesto u porodici evropskih naroda i oslobode se od azijskih okupatora. Pomalo apsurdno s obzirom da je danas Jugoistočna Evropa (sa malim izuzetkom Grčke) još uvek dalje od Evrope i evropske zajednice naroda od svih drugih delova evropskog kontinenta. Nadalje, i nakon Drugog svetskog rata, ideja stvaranja ujedinjenog evropskog prostora je bila pod značajnim uticajem odbrane evropskog načina života i evropskog uticaja u svetu pod naređenjem sve agresivnije i bezobzirnije politike Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, naročito nakon pada Berlinskog zida i propadanja jedine istinske protivteže američkom imperijalizmu. Pri tome, razvoj evropskog, kao i novih nacionalnih identiteta nije, iako je kulturna elita uglavnom bila veliki protivnik američke kulturne industrije i američkog industrijalizma u celosti, nikada podrazumevao osećaj superiornosti već pre želju za multikulturalizmom (Berendse, 2003).

No, čini se, na kraju, da odgovor na pitanje ko su Evropljani nije gde su granice Evrope, već gde se nalaze ljudi koji se osećaju Evropljanima. Dakle, gde to žive ljudi koji sebe nazivaju Evropljanima, koji o Evropi maštaju ili je „slikaju i klešu u kamenu“ (Šmale, 2003). Jednom rečju, od doba prosvetiteljstva do Drugog svetskog rata, postojala je predstava Evrope kao kulture, kao specifične evropske kulture, a od Drugog svetskog rata pažnja se sve više usmerava na Evropu kao identitet (Šmale, 2003) ili evropski identitet.

Evropska ideja od Drugog svetskog rata

Ideja zajedničkog evropskog prostora nakon Drugog svetskog rata može se svesti, mada ne u potpunosti, na istoriju Evropske Unije. Naime, nakon Drugog svetskog rata, tada su pobedničke sile uvidele prednosti stvaranja jedinstvenog evropskog privrednog prostora i jednog evropskog tržišta. Takođe,

gubljenjem kolonija u Africi, i sve većim jačanjem Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Kanade, a nekoliko decenija kasnije i azijskih zemalja, prvenstveno Kine i Japana, Evropa prestaje da bude centar sveta i njena veličina koja je do XX veka bila nesporna, odjednom se svodi na teritoriju malo veću od Kanade ili Kine. Upravo je i to jedan od razloga zašto se na ovim prostorima počinje razvijati jedna nova ideja, ideja zajedničke identifikacije za novu Evropu olicenu u zajednici, kao pokušaj da se mnoštvo malih država ujedini u jednu veliku, ili makar da ujedine svoje ekonomije u želji da pariraju ekonomijama onih zemalja koje su se sve brže razvijale.

Ideja Evropske Unije je u početku bila mnogo više ekomska i politička ideja, a Adenauerov poziv za zajedničkom kulturom počinje da se ozbiljnije razmatra tek kasnije u razvoju ove zajednice.

Koliko je Evropska Unija evropska?

Šta je u stvari „Evropa“? Koje su granice Evrope? Da li se danas Evropom može nazvati Evropska Unija (uz možda dodatak dve ili tri države koje čekaju svoj red na ulazak u EU) ili je Evropa mnogo širi pojам od Evropske Unije? Dakle, koje su to karakteristike Evrope koje je ne samo određuju, nego je i razlikuju od ostalih regiona u svetu?

No, i ako se složimo da nije potpuno jasno da li se danas pod pojmom Evropa podrazumeva politička zajednica država koje pripadaju Evropskoj Uniji, ili se pod Evropom podrazumeva geografska i kulturna zajednica nastala na zajedničkoj istoriji i kulturnom nasleđu, činjenica ostaje da je evropska integracija nakon Drugog svetskog rata olicena u stvaranju Evropske Unije zaista dala jedan zama-jac integraciji evropskog kontinenta i postavila osnovno pitanje koje se postavlja u vezi sa evropskim identitetom - Da li postoji sociopsihološki pandan nacionalnom identitetu koji bi bio vezan za Evropu ma kako se ona shvatala? Ideja približavanja naroda Evrope koja se nameće u Evropskoj Uniji od njenog nastanka je prvenstveno bila bazirana na zakonima, pravilima i institucionalnim pitanjima, a veoma malo na pitanjima kulturnog približavanja naroda. Čak i

danasm se ipak kod većine običnih građana evropska kultura izjednačava sa zapadnom kulturom koja stoji nasuprot afričkom barbarizmu ili orientalnom despotizmu. Ovakva evropska kultura omeđena je Platonom, NATO-om, naukom i vladavinom prava („Plato, NATO, science and the rule of law“; Piterze, 1991). I sam Entoni Smit, kao specifičnosti Evrope vidi nekoliko područja: lingvističko područje, kulturnu geografiju i teritorijalni simbolizam (uz sve one probleme geografskog određenja Evrope o kojem je bilo reči), područje „drugoga“ odnosno ne-Evropljana (o kojem je već bilo reči u ovom radu) i kao četvrto područje, naravno, religija (kao neislamska i nejevrejska) (Smit, 1992). Ako se zadržimo na ovom poslednjem, onda se opet u određenje evropskog upliće i pitanje razlika između hrišćanskih religija na tlu Evrope koje su neretko veće nego razlike između nekih hrišćanskih religija i islama, odnosno judaizma (ne treba zaboraviti da je do kraja XV veka dobar deo Španije bio pod vlašću muslimana i Jevreja i da su ti delovi Španije važili za najtolerantniji deo tadašnje Evrope).

Dva shvatanja evropskog identiteta - Evropa kao država i Evropa kao kultura

Pitanje stvaranja evropskog identiteta zaokuplja pažnju istraživača tek nešto više od tri decenije. Jedno od osnovnih razmatranja jeste da li Evropska Unija kao prvenstveno politička tvorevina, ima mogućnosti da stvari jedan novi identitet, bez obzira da li će razvoj tog identiteta ličiti na period nastanka nacionalnog identiteta ili će ići nekim drugim putem. Sve manje spora ima oko toga da i evropski identitet, kao i nacionalni, može imati oblik političkog, građanskog identiteta i(lj) kulturnog identiteta (Rise, 2003; Bruter, 2003). U tom smislu, obično se u obzir uzimaju dve verzije stvaranja identiteta (Fosum, 2002):

Konstitucionalni patriotism – Ovaj pojam je u društvene nauke uveo Habermas početkom 1990-tih i njegova ideja leži u tome da je osnova poštovanja prava i demokratskih vrednosti utemeljena u ustav i sistem autoriteta koji je dat na političkom nivou. Građani su međusobno povezani ne zajedničkim prepolitičkim vezama kao što je to kod nacije, već prihvatanjem demokratskih vrednosti i ljudskih prava. Ovakva vrsta identiteta jeste post-

nacionalna i ipak slabija nego što je to nacionalni identitet. Osnova ove vrste lojalnosti jesu *prava* i osobe sa kojima se stupa u interakciju vide se kao nosioci tog prava. Slično raspravi o pravima manjina, i ovde se insistira na individualnim pravima koja su osnova personalne autonomije. Pa ipak, da bi se razvio konstitucionalni patriotism, prava su neophodan, ali ne i dovoljan uslov. Reprezentativne institucije, različita zakonodavna tela i živo civilno društvo su neophodnosti u formiranju demokratske volje i prava.

Izražena različitost – pojam koji je u nauku uveo Čarls Tejlor i koji je poslužio da se objasni identitet u kompleksnim, multinacionalnim i multietničkim društvima. Ovo shvatanje govori o prihvatanju različitih shvatanja identiteta od strane zajedničke države. To prihvatanje ima tri faze:

- prva faza, u multietničkoj državi ne postoji saglasnost o tome šta je država i čemu služi. Različitost jezika, etniciteta i kultura stvara različite kolektivne ciljeve o tome gde društvo treba da ide;
- druga faza podrazumeva prihvatanje ovih različitih kolektivnih ciljeva od strane države i pokušaje da se svakom od njih udovolji kroz dozvoljavanje da svaka različita grupa zadrži svoj osećaj različitosti;
- treća i poslednja faza omogućava grupama koje se osećaju različitim da aktivno pokušavaju da održe svoj osećaj različitosti tokom vremena (Fosum, 2002).

Tako kroz ove faze uspostavljanja različitosti, grupe ili kolektivi koji osećaju sopstvenu različitost počinju da deo svoje vezanosti prenose sa sopstvene grupe na neku nadredenu grupu koja omogućava ovakav razvoj razlika. Ova teorija stvaranja identiteta negira mogućnost dovoljnosti prava za razvoj društva. Ona ističe da osećaj vezanosti za naciju ili bilo koju nadnacionalnu tvorevinu stvara i osećaj dužnosti i obaveza prema toj grupi.

Pitanje evropskog identiteta je naročito postalo važno u vreme unifikacije Evrope i naročito zato, jer pokušaja ujedinjenja bilo je i u ranijim vekovima,

što je mogućnost ujedinjene Evrope danas realnija no ikada ranije u istoriji. Razvoj modernih sredstava komunikacije, proces globalizacije kulture, pa donekle i jezika, izaziva priličnu ambivalentnost kod većine ljudi na tlu Evrope - s jedne strane, oni bi hteli da prihvate nove tendencije i nove vrste zajednica, ali se plaše da li će one uspeti da odgovore na njihove potrebe i interese jednako dobro kao druge vrste zajednica, prvenstveno nacija. Osnovni problem ovog konflikta između nacionalnog i evropskog koji postoji u praksi jeste to što razvoj zajedničkog kulturnog prostora na tlu Evrope ne prati tako brzo stvaranje političkog prostora (Smit, 1992).

Iako se političko pitanje Evropske Unije veoma često postavlja u Evropi, ali i šire, negde od kraja Hladnog rata, veoma malo pažnje posvećeno je psihološkim i kulturološkim pitanjima. Gotovo sva razmatranja ujedinjenja evropskog prostora su se svodila na razmatranje političkih i ekonomskih posledica. I ono malo istraživanja koje je radeno uglavnom je bilo nedovoljno dobro operacionalizovano i metodološki pogrešno postavljeno. Pitanje koje se nameće ovde jeste i to da li je uopšte moguće napraviti jednu kosmopolitsku kulturu koja bi u osnovi bila postnacionalna? Dalje, ako se i stvori jedna kosmopolitska kultura u Evropi, da li će ona biti sličnija nastanku kulture Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, ili će pak biti nešto potpuno novo u istoriji? Izgleda najverovatnije da će ona imati izgled mešavine ova dva pristupa, a istovremeno neće biti ni replikacija SAD modela, ali neće biti ni potpuno nova. Ideja Evropskog projekta mora biti negde na razmedju nacionalnih buđenja i globalnih kulturnih aspiracija. Drugim rečima, ona mora biti unekoliko globalna, ali istovremeno mora poštovati i nacionalne specifičnosti (Smit, 1992). Dalje pitanje koje iz ovoga proizlazi jeste da li je osećaj evropejstva samo prost zbir različitih nacionalnih identiteta ili je taj osećaj nešto više od proste mešavine svojih delova?

Nastavljujući ideje razlikovanja građanskog i kulturnog dela identiteta, možemo navesti i podelu po kojoj evropski *građanski* identitet počiva na stepenu u kojem osobe sebe vide kao stanovnike evropskog političkog sistema,

čija pravila, zakoni i prava imaju uticaj na njihove svakodnevne živote. Ovo odredenje je u stvari veoma slično Habermasovom odredenju konstitucionalnog patriotizma.

Kulturno odredenje evropskog identiteta bazira se na osećaju da su nam drugi Evropljani bliži nego ne-Evropljani te se ona ne zasniva na političkom sistemu već na ljudskoj zajednici. Ovaj osećaj povezanosti sa ostalim stanovnicima Evrope može imati i oblik zamišljene zajedničke istorije, kulture, tradicije, političkih i moralnih normi (Bruter, 2003).

Drugo bitno pitanje, koje smo već dotakli u priči o isticanju razlika između Evrope i Evropske Unije, jeste da li je evropski identitet snažnije izražen u zemljama koje i formalno pripadaju „Evropi“ (odnosno, Evropskoj Uniji), ili pak sama objektivna, opšteprihvaćena pripadnost Evropi nije odlučujući faktor za to da li se osoba oseća kao Evropljanin ili ne. Odgovor na ovo pitanje možemo dobiti samo ako uporedimo izraženost evropskog identiteta u različitim zemljama, ali istovremeno je potrebno koristiti isti instrument. Upravo na tim principima je urađeno nekoliko istraživanja u toku 2003. i 2004. godine na teritoriji Norveške, Srbije i Hrvatske (Mihić i Mihić, 2005; Kamenov, Jelić, Huić, Franceško, Mihić, 2005). Ideja je bila, između ostalog, uporediti rezultate dobijene u ovim istraživanjima sa rezultatima istraživanja u Velikoj Britaniji i Italiji (Cinirela, 1997). Rezultati pokazuju da članstvo u Evropskoj Uniji nije bitan faktor izraženosti evropskog identiteta. Dakle, osećaj pripadnosti Evropi je više subjektivan i baziran na nekim drugim aspektima, a samo članstvo u Evropskoj Uniji nije dovoljno jak faktor da kod ljudi poveća izraženost evropskog identiteta.

Veza nacionalnog i evropskog identiteta

Za kraj ovog rada smatram bitnim da se da makar delimičan odgovor na pitanje da li su evropski i nacionalni identitet međusobno isključive kategorije identiteta. Sukob nacionalnog i evropskog je mnogo dublji i stariji nego što je stvaranje Evropske Unije kojim je ovaj odnos samo pojačan i doveden

konačno u centar pažnje. Sukobi evropskih naroda u XIX i naročito u XX veku jesu bili izraz nacionalizama, ali s druge strane nakon gotovo svakog od tih sukoba, pojam Evrope i evropskog identiteta je postao jači. Ponekada je taj osećaj evropejstva išao i do ekstrema kao u slučaju nacional-socijalizma u kojem je Evropljanin (i opet bez svog zlog *alter ego-a*, Balkanca i pravoslavca oličenog u Rusiji) smatran jedinim pravim naslednikom sveta, nastavljačem blistave grčke, rimske i italijanske renesansne kulture, predodredenim da vodi svet u zlatno doba. No, iz ovog apsurda se nakon najkrvavijeg rata na tlu Evrope izrodila jedna nova ideja, ideja koja je i posle šezdeset godina još uvek nova, sveža i s velikim šansama da opstane, ideja ujedinjenja Evrope u jednu zajednicu, sa jednom zajedničkom kulturom i jednom zajedničkom historijom. Sama Povelja fundamentalnih prava Evropske Unije kaže da „Unija doprinosi očuvanju i razvoju zajedničkih vrednosti uz poštovanje različitosti kultura i tradicija naroda Evrope, kao i nacionalnih identiteta država članica i organizovanja njihovih zvaničnih vlasti na nacionalnom, regionalnom i lokalnom nivou“ (Fosum, 2002).

Takođe, i danas se nacionalisti uglavnom pozivaju na nespojivost i ekskluzivnost nacionalnog naspram evropskog identiteta. Oba zajedno ne mogu postojati, smatraju oni. Ako prihvatimo da postoji sukob, makar prividni, ako ne i realni, između nacionalnog i evropskog identiteta onda on, bar delimično, proističe iz toga da se nacija vidi kao bezgranična, organska, kulturna zajednica, i da je Evropi kao prvenstveno političkom konstruktu teško da se bori protiv ove iracionalnosti. S druge strane, sukob je manji, ako se i nacija vidi kao racionalna zajednica zakona i kulture unutar određenih granica. Ova druga opcija koja je više prihvaćena, makar u Zapadnoj kulturi, omogućuje osobi da odabira svoj identitet i da ga menja u zavisnosti od situacije (Smit, 1992).

Najzad, ako sumiramo sve rečeno o odnosu nacionalnog i evropskog identiteta možemo zaključiti da oni mogu, kao uostalom i svi drugi višestruki identiteti, biti u nekoliko mogućih relacija:

Prvo, identiteti mogu biti ugnježdeni, tako da jedan od identiteta bude jezgro identiteta, a da svi drugi budu u koncentričnim krugovima oko njega raspoređeni. U ovoj konstelaciji, u jezgru je nacionalni ili regionalni identitet, a ostali se nalaze oko njega, gde bi evropski bio verovatno najveći, spoljni krug ovako postavljenog identiteta.

Druga opcija jeste da se identiteti preklapaju i da većina, ali ne i svi, članovi jedne grupe budu članovi i druge grupe. Ovakva podela identiteta podrazumeva da se kod nekih članova jedne nacionalne grupe istovremeno javlja i osećaj vezanosti za Evropu, ali ovakav način vezanosti često može rezultirati u konfliktu unutar uloge osobe koji se manifestuje u snažnom prihvatanju jednog i odbacivanu drugog identiteta.

Treći put razmišljanja o evropskom i nacionalnom identitetu jeste onaj koji liči na „mramorni kolač“. Naime, i nacionalni i evropski identitet su delovi jednog kolača i stoga su snažno izmešani i nerazdvojivi. Nemoguće je razdvojiti tako jasno kako prve dve teorije predlažu, gde prestaje nacionalni, a gde počinje evropski identitet. Jedan utiče na drugi i oni se međusobno mešaju (Rise, 2003), a ako se prisetimo reči Fredrika Barta po kojem se etnički identitet može menjati u vremenu, onda je jasno da danas u mnogim državama Europe evropski identitet postaje deo nacionalnog i često je nezamisliv nacionalni identitet bez osećaja vezanosti za Evropu (Dženkins, 2004).

Da li će se neki od ovih modela pokazati primenljivim jeste na istoričarima, a zašto ne, i sociologima i psihologima da procene u budućnosti.

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Vladimir Mihić je asistent-predavač i kandidat za odbranu doktorske teze na Katedri za psihologiju Univerziteta u Novom Sadu. Učestvovao je u različitim istraživanjima posvećenim pitanju formiranja evropskog identiteta, kako u Srbiji, tako i u širem regionu bivše Jugoslavije. Oblasti njegovog istraživanja obuhvataju sledeće: politička psihologija, stereotipi i predrasude, psihologija grupa, društveni identitet. Vladimir Mihić je bio jedan od predavača na Međunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji (*Bez*)granični identiteti.



POSTSOCIJALISTIČKI IDENTITETI, TRANSFORMACIJE I PREDSTAVLJANJA

nastajućim, novim evropskim identitetima. To je i bio razlog zbog koga sam temu „postsocijalističkih identiteta“ izabrao kao predmet radionice koju sam vodio u okviru Međunarodne letnje akademije (*Bez*)granični identiteti, održane u Beogradu od 25. do 31. avgusta 2008. godine. Svrha radionice je bila da omogući diskusiju i razmatranje različitih pristupa u bavljenju socijalističkom prošlošću u zemljama istočne Evrope, kao i da ilustruje najveće izazove usklađivanja postsocijalističkog i „evropskog“ identiteta u istočnoj Evropi. Iako je radionica bila fokusirana na procese formiranja identiteta Bugarske tokom protekle dve decenije, predstavljeni su i primeri iz različitih zemalja istočne Evrope, u kojima su se odvili slični procesi transformacije identiteta.

Radionica se sastojala od četiri segmenta koji su obuhvatili predavanja i diskusije posvećene različitim aspektima sećanja, predstavljanja i nasleđa komunističkog perioda u istočnoj Evropi. Prva sesija *Prekinuta sećanja / Trajna sećanja: Sećanje na socijalizam kao izvor za formiranje postsocijalističkog identiteta* je bila fokusirana je na različite probleme u vezi sa definisanjem i konceptualizacijom komunističkog perioda i na promenljiva značenja socijalističke prošlosti u zemljama u regionu. Predmet posebnog interesovanja u toku radionice je bilo *prekinuto sećanje* na socijalizam u istočnoj Evropi (uslovljeno vremenskom distancom, smenom generacija, smanjenjem političke relevantnosti, itd.), i trajanje istog – onako kako je prisutno u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji, u ličnim reminiscencijama, političkom evociraju, itd. U toku sesije akcenat je bio stavljen na uticaj sećanja o komunističkom periodu na ozivljavanje i predstavljanje nacionalnih istorija nakon pada komunističkog režima, na postizanje etičke i političke distance u odnosu na blisku prošlost,

Pitanje postsocijalističkih identiteta, njihove transformacije i prezentacije bilo je predmet mog interesovanja tokom godina. U svim postsocijalističkim zemljama to je bila važna tema u diskusijama o procesima evropskih integracija i harmonizacije nacionalnih tradicija sa

kao i na preklapanje tih istorija sa sećanjima akumuliranim tokom perioda postsocijalističke tranzicije.

U fokusu druge sesije *Predstavljanja prošlosti „u tranziciji“: Spomenici, muzeji i istorijske interpretacije na postsocijalistički način* su bile vizuelne transformacije nastale nakon kraja socijalizma u istočnoj Evropi i teškoće prilikom predstavljanja socijalističke prošlosti posle 1989. Sesija je uključivala pregled ključnih procesa transformacije obeležja sećanja i muzejskih izložbi na temu komunističkog perioda u istočnoj Evropi, zatim pregled novih značenja koja su im dodeljivana nakon pada komunističkog režima i novih formi koje su stvorene da bi govorile o prošlosti u „postocijalističkom“ maniru. Budući da su imali veoma značajnu ulogu u uspostavljanju socijalističke moći i sticanju legitimiteta date ideologije kroz propagandu, spomenici i muzeji su preuzeli ključnu ulogu i u označavanju promene simbolike komunističkih režima u istočnoj Evropi, njihove destrukcije, uništavanja ili preoblikovanja što je postalo karakteristično za procese gradnje kulture sećanja i restrukturiranja kolektivnih identiteta posle 1989. Prikazujući primere različitih spomenika i muzeja u regionu (spomenici vojnicima sovjetske armije, ideološkim figurama, partizanima i antifašistima, nacionalnim herojima, izložbe socijalističkih i revolucionarnih pokreta, itd.), sesija je potcrtaла teškoće koje nastaju prilikom „prilagođavanja“ prethodnih ideoloških oznaka novim političkim kontekstima i novim nacionalnim praznicima i proslavama koji su se u njima razvili. Posebna pažnja je posvećena spomenicima i muzejima posvećenim žrtvama totalitarnih režima, i više značnim vidovima žaljenja i komemoracije koje su često podrazumevali. Glavni akcenat sesije je bio na potencijalu spomenika i muzeja da reflektuju promene istorijskih, političkih i kulturnih identiteta, kao i mehanizme oblikovanja identiteta, što može poslužiti kao dobra polazna tačka u istraživanju načina za redefinisanje kulturnog identiteta Srbije danas.

Treća sesija *Živeti sa „socijalističkim nasleđem“ u „postsocijalističkom svetu“* bila je posvećena funkcionalizaciji i davanju smisla ulozi socijalističkog nasleđa u politikama koje se odnose na kolektivne identitete danas. Tokom sesije je

obraden čitav spektar tema i pitanja koja otvaraju prostor za diskusiju: o opsegu i definiciji pojma „socijalističko naslede”; o njegovom permanentnom prisustvu u urbanom okruženju, različitim vizuelnim formama i svakodnevnom životu; o paradoksima onoga što „socijalističko naslede” jeste i nedostatka konsenzusa oko njegovog značenja. Predstavljanjem primera iz različitih zemalja regiona, prezentacija je stavila akcenat na promene stavova vezano za postojeće materijalne tragove socijalističkog perioda i na pokušaje da se oni interpretiraju kao „naslede”, zatim na industriju turizma koja se razvija oko komunističke prošlosti i „komodifikaciju” njenih ostataka i na isprepletanost nostalgijske, ironije i groteske u stvaranju proizvoda nasledja, itd. Potcrtavajući različite nivoe (lokalni, regionalni, nacionalni, itd.) javnih politika u oblasti „socijalističkog nasledja” u istočnoj Evropi, sesija je ukazala na dimenziju kontinuiteta i diskontinuiteta s komunističkim periodom, i prusutnost te teme u procesima građenja novog evropskog identiteta.

Centralna tema poslednjeg segmenta radionice bila je *Od „postsocijalističkih identiteta” do „evropskih identiteta”*. Među glavnim temama koje su obrađene u toku ove sesije bilo je i pitanje promene perspektive u odnosu na socijalističku prošlost i njenu postepenu ponovnu upotrebu kao resursa nasledja, zatim pitanje ponovnog građenja „nacionalnih identiteta” u postosocijalističkim okvirima, kao i pitanje izazova koje donosi konstruisanje „evropskog” identiteta na socijalističkim osnovama. U okviru sesije je predstavljen pregled postsocijalističkih realnosti sa kojima su suočene različite zemlje istočne Evrope tokom poslednje dve decenije (politička i ekonomska kriza, socijalni problemi, migracije, korupcija, itd.) s naglaskom na predstavljanje konfuzije nastale oko učvršćivanja kolektivnih identiteta. Period posle 1989. otvorio je niz pitanja o ponovnom građenju identiteta u „postsocijalističkim” okvirima: kako uspostaviti distancu u odnosu na postsocijalistički period, a da se ne izgube sećanja na težak proces „tranzicije”; kako iskustva socijalizma i postsocijalizma pretvoriti u resurs aktuelnih kulturnih politika; kako sačuvati autentični kulturni identitet i onaj formiran na osnovu skorašnjeg istorijskog iskustva u kontekstu multikulturalizma i globalizovanih kultura s kojima se danas suočavamo.

Bez namere da obezbedi odgovore na postavljena pitanja, radionica je izazvala živu diskusiju o ulozi sećanja i materijalnih obeležja komunističkog perioda u savremenim kulturnim politikama i praksama. Zajedničko mišljenje učesnika/ca radionice je bilo da je bliska prošlost niša koja pruža mogućnost ne samo za istraživanje i predstavljanje, već i za bolje razumevanje nečijeg identiteta i za njegovo pretvaranje u činioca današnjih kulturnih interakcija. Komparativne putanje koje smo pratili u različitim istočnoevropskim zemljama potvrdile su izuzetan diverzitet u prevladavanju iskustava iz bliske prošlosti, kao i značaj održavanja kolektivnih referenci koje ne bi bile limitirane „nacionalnim“, već bi bile otvorene ka evropskom kulturnom prostoru. Iskustvo traume koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje iskusile tokom socijalističkog i postsocijalističkog perioda će, u sve dinamičnijem i globalizovanijem svetu, dobiti značenje koje teško možemo zamisliti ili predvideti danas. Izraziti diverzitet s kojim se danas suočavaju savremena društva je ono što može, manjim i većim nacijama u istočnoj Evropi, pružiti priliku da pronađu umirenje nakon decenija turbulencija u bliskoj prošlosti i da pruže svoj doprinos raznovrsnom skupu kultura i identiteta. Duboko sam uveren da je podsticanje i održivost „(bez)granične“ različitosti moguće u svim istočnoevropskim zemljama, uprkos izazovima s kojima ih suočavaju socijalističke i postsocijalističke realnosti.

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PROBLEM IDENTITETA KROZ PRIZMU VIDEO UMETNOSTI U BIVŠOJ JUGOSLAVIJI

Gubitak kolektivnog identiteta u bivšoj Jugoslaviji

Pitanje identiteta, u svim svojim konceptualnim okvirima, bilo je jedno od najčešće pokretanih pitanja u postsocijalističkim ev-

ropskim zemljama posle pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine. Ideološki pomak i dominantna društvena parada bili su veoma snažni faktori koji su počeli da preoblikuju društveni prostor u ovim zemljama, što je rezultiralo društveno-političkim, ekonomskim i drugim krizama koje su podstakle ozbiljna sukobljavanja građana. Ključni problem do koga je došlo bio je gubitak starog kolektivnog identiteta, što je dovelo do toga da se građani sami nose sa novim pokretačkim silama koje su počele da „proizvode“ društveni prostor nudeći nedefinisane izbore modela za identifikovanje. Rezultat toga bio je povratak na istorijski starije kolektivne identitete, pre svega one etnonacionalne i verske. Period koji je građanima bio potreban da prihvate proces društvenog preobražaja potrajan je veoma dugo i imao je svoje uspone i padove u svim postsocijalističkim zemljama koje su postale članice Evropske Unije ili su na listi čekanja za pridruživanje Uniji.

Slučaj Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije bio je najspecifičniji, budući da se taj preobražaj nije odigrao mirnim putem. Već posle smrti predsednika Tita 1980. godine, društveni sistem radničkog samoupravljanja počeo je da se urušava. Stari socijalistički sistemi vrednosti i ideologija „bratstva i jedinstva“ su nestajali, tako da su promene kolektivnog identiteta bile neizbežne. Novoformirane oligarhije koje su došle na vlast u svim republikama socijalističke Jugoslavije zloupotrebile su činjenicu da je građanima bio neophodan novi identitet i da se identifikuju sa političkim, nacionalnim ili drugim programima i ciljevima. U takvoj situaciji, kada je pitanje kolektivnog identiteta zamagljeno i postalo zbumujuće za većinu građana, bilo je veoma lako okrenuti se jednom prenaglašenom nacionalnom identitetu i „ponovnom otkriću“ etničkog identiteta kao „starijeg“ od identiteta drugih susednih nacija.

Dokaz za ovu tvrdnju nalažen je u bogatoj nacionalnoj istoriji, tako da je proces recikliranja nacionalnih mitova, uglavnom onih iz perioda Srednjeg veka, u većini republika bivše SFRJ počeo da snažno uobičava javno mnjenje posredstvom svih medija.¹ Istorija je stoga „shvatana kao aktivna sila koja određuje korene nacija, pothranjuje konstitutivne mitove etničkih zajednica i osnažuje nacionalne identitete.“²

Zbog preovlađujuće „nacionalne svesti“ koja je dovela do etnifikacije republika u SFRJ, izgubljena je šansa za odabir civilnog umesto čisto etničkog društva. Bilo je očigledno da državni aparati ne mogu da posreduju između zajedničkog državnog identiteta i usko definisanih nacionalnih identiteta koji su se medusobno nadmetali i bili u koliziji.³ Posledica toga bio je neizbežni raspad zemlje praćen etničkim sukobima, budući da nove republike nisu bile u stanju da nađu zajedničke interese diplomatskim putem.

Konfuzija oko novih identiteta

Posle raspada Jugoslavije, novoformirane nacionalne države pošle su svaka svojim sopstvenim putem u društvene transformacije koje su obuhvatile puni pomak ka ekonomiji slobodnog tržišta i privatizaciji nekadašnje „društvene svojine“. Iz perspektive njihovih novih društvenih sistema, postojala je zajednička tendencija ka obnovi verskih identiteta s jedne strane, i ka usponu neoliberalnog ili predatorskog kapitalizma sa druge strane.

Premda je tokom tih godina paradigmata mitološke fabule uglavnom zamenjena mnogo pragmatičnijim

¹ Od svih srpskih konstitutivnih mitova, mit o Kosovu bio je najprisutniji u vaskrsnim etnonacionalnim narativima i fantazmagorijama; on označava simbolički gubitak nezavisnosti Srpskog carstva u korist Ottomanskog carstva i ukazuje na „izbor“ carstva nebeskog „cara“ Lazara kao na pravi put i izbor kada je reč o srpskom nacionalnom karakteru. Nacionalna pripadnost Miloša Obilića, jednog od najmitskih likova, koji je ubio turskog cara Murata u bici na Kosovu 1389. godine, sada se osporava u stručnoj literaturi, a najnovija tvrdnja o tome kako je on zapravo bio albanski vitez po imenu Miloš Kopilik dolazi sa albanske strane. Slična, čak i paradoksalnija situacija, mogla se videti kada se radilo o makedonskom „prisvajanju“ Aleksandra Velikog, čija će velika statua na konju uskoro biti postavljena u glavnom gradu Skoplju, čiji aerodrom već nosi njegovo ime.

² Božidar Slapšak, „Promene prošlosti u društvu koje se menja“, Republika, br. 64/1993, 15-31, mart (str. 16)

³ Vesna Pešić, „Rat za nacionalne države“, u: Srpska strana rata, 1. deo, priredio Nebojša Popov, Samizdat B92, Beograd, 2002.

modelima identifikacije koji su nuđeni građanima, konstantna neizvesnost i iščekivanje da budu realizovani magloviti društveni ciljevi u tim zemljama činili su pojedinca pasivnim, letargičnim i sprečavali su ga da aktivnije učestvuje u zbivanjima u društvenoj areni.

Ako sada prespektivu pomerimo na globalni kontekst u koji su te nove zemlje zakoračile, možemo zastupati tezu da se nova paradigma društvenih odnosa odražava u pojavi nadnacionalne hegemonije, u okviru koje kretanje svetskog kapitala, robe i usluga širom sveta prevazilazi snage i granice nacionalnih država. Ovaj vid suvereniteta, koji su Hart i Negri⁴ opisali kao pomalanje jedne nove Imperije, zapravo je evropska koncepcija na kojoj se zasniva evrocentrizam, a razvila se u isto vreme kao i modernizam. Poslednja proširenja Evropske

Unije, do kojih je došlo 2004. i 2007. godine, kao i težnja da se tu na kraju priključe i preostale države „zapadnog Balkana“, daju nam pravo da razmišljamo o Evropi kao o geopolitičkom odrazu tog novog vida suvereniteta, ali i kao novom mogućem kolektivnom identitetu koji će biti formiran u budućnosti.

Dok se proces globalne integracije ubrzavao, neke od zemalja koje su nastale od jugoslovenskih republika još uvek nisu stvorile koherentan model identifikacije i homogenizacije za svoje građane. U tim državama nastalim posle međuetničkih sukoba, zapravo se odvijaju različiti društveni procesi, stvaraju se različite društvene realnosti koje bi se mogle okarakterisati kao protodemokratske, uz prisustvo fenomena prvobitne akumulacije kapitala i „privatizacije“, što je jedini proces koji ih uključuje u mrežu globalnog toka kapitala. U raskoraku između borbe za pročišćavanjem i odbacivanjem nasleđa i balasta prethodnih ideooloških konstrukcija, i suprotstavljanja ulaženju u globalne procese i prilagođavanju tim procesima i novom poretku suvereniteta, postoje brojni putevi i mnogi mogući modeli identifikacije.

⁴ Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Dok smo sa jedne strane svedoci neodoljivog širenja neoliberalnog kapitalizma, s druge strane imamo glasne kritičke stavove sa pozicija etnonacionalne, klerikalne, a nadasve antimoderno nastrojene ideologije. Ova šizofrena pozicija istovremenog postojanja predmodernih, „anticivilizacijskih“ pokreta i najnovije faze „predatorskog kapitalizma“ u društvima koja se upinju da dosegnu nivo evropske demokratije, makar i po cenu prihvatanja neoliberalne politike, dodatno otežava stvaranje kolektivnog identiteta i homogenizaciju građana oko nekih modela identifikacije.

Kratka istorija video umetnosti u Jugoslaviji

Na samom početku video produkcije u bivšoj Jugoslaviji sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, umetnici iz kruga konceptualista bili su prvi koji su počeli da eksperimentišu ovim medijumom.⁵ Tokom čitave ove decenije, video produkcija stalno je bila u međusobnoj vezi sa „novom umetničkom praksom“ (akcije, performansi i konceptualni radovi) i bila je pod njenim snažnim uticajem. Prema Jerku Denegriju, postojale su dve glavne strategije i dva pristupa ovom mediju: jedan koji je bio pod uticajem analitičke umetnosti i odražavao je sam taj medijum i njegov kapacitet za umetnost, i drugi, koji se okrenuo društvenim pitanjima koja su interpretirana „narativno ili metaforički“.⁶ Prva strategija koju je istakao Denegri bila je vezana za analitički pristup umetnika sedamdesetih godina, i odnosila se prevashodno na probleme samog umetničkog jezika, dok je druga strategija reflektovala još jedan bitan aspekt, tj. „govor u prvom licu“ i naglašavanje subjektivnosti umetnika i njegove samorefleksije.⁷ Pri tome, jedan od dominantnih načina izražavanja u ovom novom medijumu bio je video performans, gde su u fokusu bili ličnost, i posebno telo umetnika.⁸ To konkretno interesovanje i ta tema, prema Helmutu Fridelu, bili su, globalno uvez,

⁵ Među najistaknutijim umetnicima bili su: Marina Abramović, Braco Dimitrijević, Radomir Damjanović Damjan, Sanja Ilevković, Dalibor Martinis, Raša Todosijević, Neša Paripović, Goran Trbuljak, itd.

⁶ Jela Denegri, „Video-umetnost u Jugoslaviji 1969-1984“, u: *Videosfera video/društvo/umetnost*, priredio Mihailo Ristić, Radionica SIC, Beograd, 1986.

⁷ Ibid, str. 127.

⁸ U početnoj fazi, video je bio samo sredstvo za dokumentovanje performativnih činova umetnika, ali su kasnije performansi konceptualizovani posebno za medijum videa.

⁹ Helmut Friedel, „Video-Narcis – Das Neue Selbstbildnis“, u Videokunst in Deutschland 1963 – 1982, Wulf Herzogenrath ed., Verlag Gerd Hatje, Stuttgart), prevedeno u:

Helmut Friedel „Video-Narcis – novi autoportret“, Videosfera video/društvo/ umetnost, Op. cit. str. 105

¹⁰ Ibid., str. 107

¹¹ Raša Todosijević, „Video“ u Videosfera video/društvo/umetnost, Op. cit. str. 179.

¹² Denegri spominje da je preloma tačka bila emitovanje video rada slovenačkog umetnika Mihe Vipotnika na TV Ljubljana. Moglo bi takođe da se istakne da je ovaj fenomen bio najprisutniji u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj tokom osamdesetih godina. Video umetnost se takođe pojavila u TV emisijama, a najznačajnija je bila "TV Galerija" na TV Beograd, koju je inicioirao Nebojša Đukelić, a kao urednica vodila Dunja Blažević. Ješa Denegri, "Video-umetnost u Jugoslaviji 1969-1984", u: Videosfera video/ društvo/umetnost Op.cit. str. 126-27.

¹³ Nuša i Srećo Dragan, "Traženi pogled Nuše i Sreće Dragan ili radost dvostrukog ulaska našeg videa u umetnost osamdesetih godina – postmoderna, new wave, nove slike, subkulture – je velika", u: Videosfera video/društvo/ umetnost, Op.cit., str.177-78. Umetnici su bili pioniri videa i proizveli su prvi video rad u Jugoslaviji 1969. godine.

jedan od glavnih aspekata od samog početka upotrebe videa u umetnosti, i tako je stvoren novi vid autoportreta.⁹ Fenomen „video autoportreta“ snažno je naglašavao ličnost, individualnost, kontemplaciju i imaginaciju.¹⁰

„Pionirski“ period video umetnosti u SFRJ u sedamdesetim godinama obeležen je interesovanjem umetnika za konceptualne a ne tehničke aspekte videa i procesa snimanja. To potvrđuje izjava Raše Todosijevića: "Svoje video-radove napravio sam bez posebnog zanimanja za tehničku stranu tog medija, za sam proces proizvodnje i onih spektakularnih mogućnosti manipulisanja elektronskom tehnologijom. Video me je zanimalo više kao prenosnik psiholoških i mentalnih aktivnosti kojima je u osnovi stran svaki tehnički egzibicionizam".¹¹

Tokom osamdesetih godina javljaju se umetnici koji su se specijalizovali za produkciju video radova. Oni su posebnu pažnju poklanjali karakteristikama samog medija i tehničkim aspektima produkcije. Njihova snažna veza sa televizijom i orientacija ka kulturi mas medija, ali i nova vrsta naracije putem videa, obeležile su novu fazu razvoja video umetnosti u SFRJ.¹² Kako su to tvrdili slovenački umetnici Nuša i Srećo Dragan, novi tip videa napustio je eksperimente s medijumom, video performans, i pre svega potrebu avangardne umetnosti da promeni svet.¹³

Još jedan pomak tokom osamdesetih bio je vezan za povratak manuelnih umetničkih disciplina kao što su slikarstvo ili crtež, i povećano interesovanje umetnika za teme poput: mitologije, pseudoistorije, original-

nosti umetničkog dela; koje su reflektovane i u video radovima. Lik i telo umetnika i dalje su bili u fokusu, ali je u odnosu na prethodni period sedamdesetih umetnik preuzeo ulogu "glumca" na pozornici koja je ponekad bila orkestrirana kao video instalacija, gde su scenografija, koreografija, šminka i ostali elementi *mis-en-scene* doprinisili konstrukciji naracije.¹⁴

Krajem osamdesetih godina, produkcija video radova u Jugoslaviji je bila u opadanju, a početak devedesetih obeležili su etnički sukobi i „nestanak“ Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije u ratovima koji su usledili. Od tog trenutka možemo pratiti razvoj video umetnosti u svakoj od novoformiranih država ponaosob.¹⁵

Uprkos porastu video produkcije tokom protekle dve decenije i velikom broju tema kojima se bave umetnici iz regionalnih bivših Jugoslavija, u ovom tekstu odabrala sam da se usredosredim na jedan problem, problem identiteta, koji se može posmatrati kao jedno od ključnih pitanja u radovima mnogih umetnika.¹⁶

Tema identiteta najavljena je pojavom nove generacije umetnika u čijim su radovima uvek zastupljena konceptualna pitanja i koji biraju bilo koji medijum koji odgovara njihovim idejama. Da parafraziramo Džona Baldesarija, njima je video kao medijum bio poput bilo kog drugog medijuma – neutralan, poput olovke, i samo jedno od mnogih sredstava za izražavanje njihovih ideja, vizija i želja. Baldesari je tvrdio da nije važno reći „Ja samo snimam video“, već „Ovu ideju najbolje bi bilo izraziti u formi video rada“, a ta razlika u pristupu i stavu savršeno odgovara generaciji umetnika o kojoj je reč, oformljenoj krajem devedesetih godina. Kada se uporedi sa karakteristikama „video autoportreta“ iz sedamdesetih

¹⁴ Branislav Dimitrijević, "Povremena istorija – Kratak pregled video umetnosti u Srbiji", u: Video umetnost u Srbiji, Centar za savremenu umetnost – Beograd, Beograd 1999, str. 34. Dimitrijevićev argument se posebno odnosi na video radove Milovana De Stil Markovića i Viktorije Vesne Bulajić.

¹⁵ Kompleksnost razvoja novih (video) umetničkih scena i rast video produkcije tokom devedesetih godina u svih bivšim republikama SFRJ prevaziđa okvire ovog teksta.

¹⁶ Pri tome, naglasio bih specifičnu poziciju video scene u Sloveniji u odnosu na situaciju u ostalim republikama bivše Jugoslavije gde je turbulentni period ratova, migracija, ekonomske krize, i konačno krize identiteta ostavio snažan trag na sve sfere društva, uključujući i umetničku scenu.

godina, situacija u devedesetim godinama bila je izmenjena, i video radovi poprimali su jedan u većoj meri narativni, pripovedački manir i strukturu. Ovakva vrsta autoportreta ima jednu više socijalnu nego fizičku pozadinu, te bih stoga stavio naglasak na veliko I kada se radi o ključnom konceptualnom pitanju Identiteta, koje je više vezano za umetnikovo društveno biće, a ne samo za njegovo egzistencijalno ili mentalno biće.

U tekstu ću dalje analizirati video radove u kojima su najeksplicitnije izraženi razni aspekti identiteta i elementi procesa identifikacije, na primer, (etno) nacionalni identitet ili identitet konstruisan putem etničkih konflikata, ili pak umetnički identitet. Još jedna bitna zajednička karakteristika je to što se umetnici u svojim video radovima pojavljuju „lično“ i obraćaju se publici iznoseći svoje lične probleme Identiteta.

Tema identiteta u video umetnosti

Identitet konstruisan posredstvom etničkih konflikata – trauma, izmeštanje

Jedno od prvih paradigmatskih umetničkih dela koje se bavilo pitanjem posledica etnifikacije i obnove snažnog nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji bila je video instalacija *XY Ungeloest* Milice Tomić iz 1997. godine. Ovo delo bilo je izrazito politički motivisano, a umetnica je rekonstruisala zločin koji se dogodio 28. aprila 1989. godine, na sam dan proglašenja novog Ustava Srbije, kada je ubijeno trideset troje građana albanske nacionalnosti sa Kosova. Ovo delo predstavljalo je prekretnicu u karijeri Milice Tomić, kada je napokon uspela da se pozabavi društvenom sferom i da se nosi sa *traumatičnom stvarnošću* u svome radu, isprva na metaforičan način. Metod rekonstruisanja zločina kakav se primenjuje u nemačkoj TV seriji *XY Ungeloest* iz sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka poslužio je kao inspiracija umetnicu da sproveđe svoju sopstvenu istragu, prikupi sve informacije do kojih je moguće doći, naročito o tome kakvu su odeću žrtve imale na sebi kada su ubijene, što je sve korišćeno prilikom rekonstrukcije i simbolične inscenacije zločina u okviru ovog video rada, u kome 33 prijatelja umetnice, predstavnici srpske umetničke scene, noseći na sebi odeću kakvu su imale žrtve u momentu zločina, padaju i ostavljaju u snegu tragove svojih tela.

Raspad Jugoslavije i etnički sukobi rezultirali su velikim talasima migracija, i veliki broj ljudi svih nacionalnosti bio je primoran da se iseli i živi u izgnanstvu. Rad bosanske umetnice Maje Bajević upravo odražava takve isprepletane tokove ličnog života i političke realnosti i bavi se pitanjima kao što je konstruisanje identiteta posredstvom gubitka i izmeštanja. Izbijanje rata u njenom rođnom gradu Sarajevu 1992. godine zateklo ju je u Parizu, gde je studirala na Umetničkoj akademiji, što je snažno uticalo na njen lični život i odredilo na šta će se usredsrediti njen rad. Video rad Bajevićeve naslovlen *Želena, želena trava doma mog* (1997) prikazuje umetnicu kako korača po nekom travnjaku i pripoveda priču o stanu svoje bake u Sarajevu, pokušavajući da obeleži njezin oblik u prostoru na osnovu svojih prisećanja njegovih soba i nameštaja. Ton naracije je precizan, sveden, kao da umetnica namerno potiskuje sva osećanja i melanholiјu koje bi ova tema mogla podstaći, ali njen ritual rekonstrukcije doima se kao da ona pokušava da „materijalizuje“ sećanje na izgubljeni dom.

Isti problem izmeštanja, ali ovoga puta kao pitanje konačnog izbora pojedinca suočenog sa sukobima u svojoj zemlji, tema je video rada *Na putu ka Makedoniji/iz Makedonije* (2002) Irene Paskali, umetnice rođene u Makedoniji koja živi u Kelnu. Umetnica se vratila kući 2001. godine, u momentu kada je varnica etničkih sukoba pretila da se razbukti u plamen rata. Vrativši se, zatekla je svoje prijatelje kako se spremaju da napuste zemlju. Dilema sa kojom se umetnica suočila transponovana je u video rad, u kome Paskalijeva, noseći na sebi crvenu haljinu a u ruci crveni kofer, stoji ispred odjeljenja regularne vojske Makedonije, zatim leđima okrenuta, pa u stroju sa vojnicima, i najzad maršira naporedo s njima. „Vojnik će ostati u Makedoniji“, kaže umetnica, ali šta će biti s njom i kako ona da donese takvu odluku? Izbor izgnanstva i života u dijaspori odrediće kako njen lični tako i njen umetnički identitet.

Oktobra 2006. godine, mladi umetnik iz Bosne i Hercegovine Mladen Miljanović ušao je u prostor nekadašnje kasarne u Banja Luci da bi „služio

umetnosti“ devet meseci, kao što je „služio narodu“ u školi rezervnih oficira od oktobra 2000. do jula 2001. godine. Video rad *Služim umetnosti* (2007) dokumentuje čitav taj proces „samoizolacije“ i umetnikovu odluku da antropološki deluje posredstvom umetnosti. Odabir ovakvog metoda pokazuje da je umetnik svestan toga da bi njegovo stvaranje umetnosti trebalo da prirođeno odražava proces stvaranja njegovog ličnog identiteta (i njegovu neuspešnost), kao i posledice njegove pozicije u okviru sistema umetnosti i društva. Miljanović preispituje „tehnologije“ funkcionisanja subjekta u društvu, proces subjektifikacije u kome pojedinac određuje sopstveni identitet ubličavajući ga prema spoljašnjim centrima moći, i podtekst za političke i društvene strategije uticaja na pojedinca i na njegov život. Umetnik stoga analizira sopstveni identitet, način na koji se on menja i konstruiše, i okreće se pitanju svoje pozicije u društvu u kome deluje i modelima pozicioniranja u javnoj sferi. Miljanović na taj način, ponavlјajući lično iskustvo služenja vojske u formi umetničkog performansa u medijima i javnosti, kontekstualizuje svoju intimnu naraciju u široj društvenoj sferi i stvara sebi jednu novu vrstu javnog identiteta.

Preklapanje identiteta

Kada su iz republika bivše Jugoslavije nastale nove države, (etno)nacionalni identitet valjalo je utemeljiti posredstvom njegove posebnosti, čak jedinstvenosti, u odnosu na susedne narode. Najvažniji dokaz takve „konstitutivne“ posebnosti određene nacije nalažeđen je u jeziku, a po potrebi u njegovim modifikacijama i u novim državnim simbolima kao što su himna ili zastava. Makedonski umetnik Oliver Musovik pozabavio se ovim pitanjem u svome video radu *ĆžK* (2002), na primeru svog sopstvenog prezimena videnog kroz razlike između ortografije i fonetike makedonskog i srpskog jezika. U ovom video radu, Musovik drži jedno kratko „predavanje iz lingvistike“ u kome objašnjava kako, kada se radi o različitom izgovoru njegovog prezimena na srpskom i na makedonskom jeziku, do zabune zapravo dolazi zbog pogrešnog izgovora njegovog izvorno crnogorskog prezimena kada je napisano na makedonskom a čitaju ga Srbi. Ako je čitava ova

konstrukcija dovela do još veće konfuzije oko jezika i nacionalnih identiteta zemalja o kojima je reč, termin „preklapanje identiteta“, koji je uveo bugarski umetnik Lučezar Bojadžijev, mogao bi biti ključ za njegovo pojašnjavanje. Prema viđenju Bojadžijeva, do preklapanja identiteta dolazi kada dve nacije, ili pak više njih, „polažu pravo na istu ‘teritoriju’ istorijskih, kulturnih, društvenih, političkih, verskih, jezičkih, itd. iskustava i praksi koje svaka od njih smatra isključivo svojim“.¹⁷ Poenta njegovog stava je u tome da su ovakve tvrdnje zasnovane na emotivnom uticaju i lokalnim pričama, a ne na pragmatičnom istraživanju istorijskih činjenica. Problem nastaje kada se ovakve tvrdnje uključe u procese konstituisanja i izgradnje novih nacionalnih država, gde mogu biti potencijalni uzrok mržnje, pa čak i konflikta, ali mogu dovesti i do razumevanja i uvažavanja druge nacije. Paradigmatična priča koja dotiče pitanje „preklapanja identiteta“ u čitavom regionu Balkana, a koja govori o poreklu jedne melodije, u središtu je interesovanja filma *Čija je ovo pesma?* (2003) bugarske sineastkinje Adele Peeve. Putujući po regionu u potrazi za pričama o melodiji za koju je mislila da je bugarskog porekla, Peeva shvata da u svim zemljama Balkana – u Turskoj, Grčkoj, Makedoniji, Albaniji, Bosni i Srbiji može pronaći „dokaze“ o tome da se radi o „staroj lokalnoj pesmi“. Razlikuje se samo u formi, bilo da je reč o ljubavnoj pesmi, verskom napevu, revolucionarnoj pesmi ili vojnem maršu, ali u svakoj zemlji podstiče duboka osećanja i snažan nacionalizam.

¹⁷ Lucezar Boyadjiev,
Overlapping Identities,
1998 <http://www.cfront.org/cf00book/en/lucezar-overlapping-en.html>

Verski identitet

U bivšoj Jugoslaviji, konstitutivni društveni koncept bratstva i jedinstva zamislijen je kako bi se potpisnule sve etničke i verske razlike među njenim nacijama. Tema religije povučena je iz javne sfere i postala je gotovo tabu kojim nikо u jednoj komunističkoj zemlji nije smeо da se bavi. Tokom procesa nestajanja i raspada zemlje, religija je imala značajnu ulogu, nošena i isprepletana sa talasima etnonacionalizma i populizma u svim republikama

bivše Jugoslavije. U novoformiranim zemljama, vera se ponovo javila kao jedna od glavnih pokretačkih sila društva, bilo da se radi o islamu, pravoslavlju ili katoličanstvu. Crkve i džamije počele su da niču u mnogim gradovima, a prisustvo i uticaj religije u javnoj sferi stalno su rasli sa porastom broja građana koji su primili verski identitet, a sve je to dovelo do još snažnijih polarizacija u društvu. Ovaj brzi preobražaj bivše komunističke (ateističke i sekularne) države postao je pitanje kojim su se bavili mnogi umetnici.

Svojim video radom *Double Bubble* (2001), Maja Bajević daje snažan iskaz o ponovnoj pojavi verskog dogmatizma i o tome kako on oblikuje i infiltrira se u sve društvene slojeve u Bosni i Hercegovini. Razlika između *tehno* i *turbo* religije, kako ona to naziva, zasniva se na individualnim iskazima kao što su „Ne jedem svinjetinu“ ili „Ne pijem za vreme Ramazana, ali uzimam ekstazi“ u slučaju predašnjeg, ili „Učinio sam sve to u ime Boga“ u slučaju potonjeg verskog identiteta. Putem takvih eksplisitnih iskaza, datih u binarnoj formi, Maja Bajević razotkriva hipokriziju skrivenu pod maskom identifikacije sa određenom religijom, koja može biti samo izgovor za razne činove nasilja, agresije i brutalnosti.

Video rad Irene Paskali *Na ovom dnu* (2003) započinje sučeljavanjem Kurana i Biblije, svetih knjiga islamske vere i pravoslavnog hrišćanstva, dve dominantne religije u podeljenom makedonskom društvu. Ovaj video rad vodi nas kroz dokumentarni materijal o rušenju džamija i crkvi, snimke verskih obreda u tim svetilištima, isprekidane i naglašene sekvencama koje prikazuju autorku kako ponavlja te rituale. Paskalijeva naglašava sličnosti među tim religijama, koje su već vekovima deo istog tla, i zagovara potrebu za koegzistencijom i tolerancijom među verskim zajednicama.

Potpuno drugačije videnje pitanja verskog identiteta daje video rad srpske umetnice Vesne Vesić *Operi me i biću belja od snega* (1998). Ovaj rad takođe se može posmatrati kao video performans u okviru koga se kamera fokusira na uplakano lice umetnice koja čita psalme. Vesićeva se u svome radu bavi kategorijama

„unutrašnjeg“ i „čistog“, a „jednostavnost izražavanja... čvrsto je utemeljena u asketizmu i estetici istočne hrišćanske teologije i umetnosti“.¹⁸ Ovo nas navodi na zaključak da je stanje umetnice prikazano u ovom video radu rezultat religijskog iskustva. Čin vere doveo je do emotivne reakcije koja bi se mogla razumeti kao potreba za pročišćavanjem. Suze na licu umetnice mogle bi se pogrešno shvatiti kao tuga zbog beznadežne društvene situacije u zemlji, rata, sankcija, siromaštva i bede. Ta situacija neizbežno je uticala na stav umetnice, ali ja sam sklon da ovaj rad vidim kao krajnje lično izražavanje emocija, podstaknuto verskim osećanjima i identifikacijom umetnice.

Umetnik iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Damir Nikšić, pokreće važno pitanje konfuzije oko verskog i nacionalnog identiteta u kontekstu republike u kojoj je već u okviru socijalističke Jugoslavije stanovnicima dodeljen status nacije kao „Muslimanima“. Kada je tokom devedesetih godina došlo do snažnog ispoljavanja verskih identiteta, intelektualci u Bosni shvatili su da ih ova definicija nacije stavlja u uski okvir „etnoreligijske“ grupe, a ne u širi ili čak svetovni okvir nacionalnog identiteta koji bi mogao ponuditi termin Bošnjaci.¹⁹ U video radu *Da nisam Musliman* (2004), Nikšić sarkastično pristupa pitanju svoga versko-nacionalnog identiteta. Umetnik peva melodiju *Da sam bogat iz mjuzikla Violonista na krovu u njenom „autentičnom“ okruženju – na tavanu seoske kuće ispunjenom senom* – ali sa sledećim tekstrom:

...
Da nisam Musliman,
Ja ha didle didle, baba baba didl didle dam.
Komšije mi ne bi zapalile kuću
I okružile me bodljikavom žicom.
...

¹⁸ Jelena Vesić, predgovor katalogu izložbe Inside/Outside, održane u galeriji Zacheta u Poljskoj od 6. novembra do 3 decembra 2000.

¹⁹ Videti umetnikove argumente u eseju „Da nisam Musliman po nacionalnosti“, u: Dani br. 526, 13 jul 2007, str. 70-72.

Iza umetnikovog naizgled humornog tretiranja ove teme skriva se istinsko egzistencijalno pitanje koje je uticalo na život njegove porodice u Bosni, gde je njene članove rat naterao da „biraju stranu“ i izjasne se kao Srbi, Crnogorci, Hrvati ili Muslimani. Sam umetnik tvrdi da su, uprkos činjenici da on nosi ime koje bi moglo pripadati bilo kojoj od tih nacija, njegov „izbor“ načinili drugi, oni koji su ga smestili iza bodljikave žice. To

što je postao žrtva i identifikovao se sa „potlačenom
i slabijom stranom“ opredelilo je njegov identitet na
svim nivoima, inače bi, kako sam kaže, „mogao da se
bavi dizajnom u Sloveniji“.²⁰

²⁰ Ibid.

Umetnički identitet i pitanje sistema umetnosti

Problem umetničkog identiteta, ali i vorholovski shvaćenog uspeha, počinje da fascinira generaciju umetnika koja je formirana krajem devedesetih godina. Ovo pitanje moglo bi se analizirati kao društvena pojava u svetu umetnosti, a mladi umetnici često mu pristupaju ironično ili kritički. Posebno je (auto)ironična pozicija srpskih umetnika Vladimira Nikolića i Vere Večanski u njihovom radu *Kako postati veliki umetnik* (2001), u kome mlada i ne baš samopouzdana umetnica (Večanski) pokušava da pronade „recept“ kako da postane zvezda, a poučava je umetnik koji je njen uzor, guru i stručnjak za borilačke veštine (Nikolić). Razvijanje samopouzdanja tako postaje proces obuke, gotovo nalik mantri da mladi umetnici moraju da se svakodnevno usavršavaju.

Rad *Odaberi život* dvoje drugih srpskih umetnika, Žolta Kovača i Nikolete Marković, kombinuje strategije gotovo ispovednog pristupa u narativnoj strukturi i korišćenje fikcionalizovanog scenarija u kome umetnici pristupaju problemu umetničkog identiteta na ironičan način. Ispovest osobe koja je „zavisnik od umetnosti“ odvija se u maniru dokumentarnih priča o kriminalcima ili drugim delinkventima koji pred kamerom govore o svojim zločinima. Ova vrsta TV emisija bila je veoma popularna u vreme rata, u krajnje kriminalizovanom društvu gde su se spektakularna ubistva gangs-

tera dešavala gotovo svaki dan. Javnost je bila željna priča o „uličnim i ratnim herojima“ i spremna da sluša njihove „ispovesti“ prepune drastičnih i užasavajućih detalja.

Umetnik sa Kosova Jakup Feri bavi se istim ovim pitanjem u nekoliko video radova, na primer *Umetnik koji ne govori engleski nije umetnik* (2003) i *Spasi me, po-moži mi* (2003), u kojima on priča svoje priče „u kameru“ iz svoga doma/ateljea na jedan veoma opušten način. Prvi video rad polazi od amblematskog iskaza hrvatskog umetnika Mladena Stilinovića da umetnik koji ne govori engleski nije umetnik, da bi se nastavio zbujujućim Ferijevim pripovedanjem, naizgled na engleskom jeziku, ali bez ikakve povezanosti ili smisla. Feri ironiše i čak se podsmeva poziciji umetnika koji potiče sa marginalne scene i iz takvog konteksta, nesposoban da se izrazi i da sebe promoviše na globalnoj umetničkoj sceni. U drugom video radu, umetnik se obraća kustosima i kolekcionarima da bi podstakao njihovo interesovanje za svoj rad i nudi im svoje slike, crteže itd. na prodaju po veoma povoljnim cenama. Umetnikova „iskrena“ želja da „se proda“ bilo kome ko mu može obezbediti uspešnu međunarodnu karijeru ironičan je komentar igara moći koje se igraju u svetu umetnosti kojim upravlja tržište i „zabetoniranih“ hijerarhija u odnosima između umetnika i kustosa/kolekcionara, kao i samomarginalizujuće pozicije u koju katkada umetnici iz ovog regiona sebe ponizno stavljuju.

Naknadni komentar

Diskurs politike identiteta, globalno odražen u umetničkoj praksi, dospio je vrhunac devedesetih godina. Međutim, zbog posebnog kontekstualnog okvira i pojedinačnih biografija umetnika iz bivše Jugoslavije, ova tema prenela se i na početak 21. veka. Umetnici čija sam dela analizirao započeli su svoje karijere autorefleksivnim delima, a teme njihovih video radova bile su podstaknute njihovom unutrašnjom borbom za identitet koji nikada nije predodređen, već se konstruiše putem strukturnih procesa, a u ovom slučaju na njega su veoma uticale drastične promene u društveno-političkom kontekstu, kao i gubitak kolektivnog identiteta i traume doživljene zbog izmeštanja, ratova, ekonomске krize,

itd. Dok se prva decenija 21. veka bliži kraju, većina umetnika o kojima je bilo reči počela je da se bavi drugim temama u svome radu, prelazeći sa „introspektivnih“ pozicija i „autotopografskih“ video radova na analize širih društvenih pojava, premda sa istom kritičkom oštrinom kao i ranije.

Ovaj tekst izvorno je objavljen u: *Transitland. Video Art from Central and Eastern Europe 1989–2009*, Edit András (ed.), Budapest, Ludwig Museum – Museum of Contemporary Art, 2009, str. 57–68

Zoran Erić je istoričar umetnosti, kustos i predavač. Doktorirao je na Bauhaus Univerzitetu u Vajmaru. Trenutno radi kao kustos Centra za vizuelnu kulturu Muzeja savremene umetnosti u Beogradu. Oblasti njegovog istraživanja obuhvataju tačke susreta urbane geografije, prostorno-kulturalni diskurs i teoriju radikalne demokratije. Zoran Erić je bio jedan od predavača na Međunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji *(Bez)granični identiteti*.

PRELAŽENJE GRANICA: RAZVOJ RAZLIČITIH UMETNIČKIH STRATEGIJA*

Savremenu umetnost vidim kao interesantno polje za istraživanje, refleksiju, komunikaciju i razmenu, kao i za kritiku savremenog društva.

Mislim da je otvorenost ka upotrebi različitih medija u savremenoj umetnosti jedna od krucijalnih taktika koja omogućava da se bude preciznija/i i da se zaista pride temi na način koji zaslužuje, u skladu s njenim specifičnim kontekstom i ciljanom publikom. Kombinovanje različitih disciplina i različitih slojeva realnosti u umetnosti pomaže da se prevaziđu ograničenja striktnog profesionalizma, koja mogu biti kontraproduktivna i onemogućiti razvijanje novih modela.

U svojoj umetničkoj praksi odlučila sam da namerno odbacim produkciju radova za jednokratnu upotrebu zarad razvijanja serije strateških projekata u trajanju od po nekoliko godina. Ovakav pristup daje mi mogućnost da se upustim u konzistentnu i dublju analizu i razvitak tema kojima se bavim.

U vezi s tim, shvatila sam da ukoliko se želi dostići relevantan sadržaj, neophodno je aktivno se truditi da se prevaziđu ograničenja koja nameću pravila produkcije unutar umetničkog sistema. Izložbeni format, naravno transformisan u skladu sa specifičnom intencijom umetnice, samo je jedan od prostora gde se može naći samo jedan deo ciljane publike. Štaviše, pošto je umetnost plodno tlo za istraživanje različitih metodologija – poslednjih godina može se pratiti kako sarađuju vizuelna umetnost, performans, filozofija i politički aktivizam, informišući jedne druge i usvajajući koncepte – pogotovo u vezi sa upotreбom digitalnih medija i/ili revolucionarnih strategija. Ceo koncept “taktičkih medija” (*tactical media*) je ukorenjen u procesu međusobnog učenja, koji uključuje različite discipline.

* Ovaj tekst je deo eseja *Crossing Borders: Development of Different Artistic Strategies* koji je publikovan u knjizi New Feminism: Worlds of Feminism, Queer and Networking Conditions. Marina Gržinić i Rosa Reitsamer, urednice., Löcker Verlag, Beč 2008.

Ipak, sektor savremene umetnosti, i izvan klasičnog izložbenog prostora, prilično je limitiran kada je u pitanju delotvornost kroz akciju. Bez prisustva relevantnih teorija u umetnosti i filozofiji koje konstantno pomeraju sintaksu ka urgentnim socijalnim temama, ove strategije možda ništa ne bi mogle postići.

Iskustvo identiteta migrantkinje

Tokom *Ilegalnog prelaska granice* (jun 2000.) direktno sam se upoznala sa strategijama prelaska granica koje emigrantkinje koriste već decenijama. Prebegla sam preko slovenačko-austrijske granice, koja je u to vreme bila Šengenska granica i granica Evropske Unije. Dnevno je tu bivalo uhvaćeno prosečno devet „ilegalizovanih bića“ u neregistrovanom prelasku granice. Kao nastavak, počela sam da istražujem temu *Čekanje za vizu* (avgust 2000.). Naslov se odnosi na akciju čekanja u redu ispred austrijskog konzulata u Beogradu „bez rezultata“: od 6 sati ujutru do podneva stajala sam u redu sa stotinama ljudi, sa dvadesetak dokumenta i garantnih pisama, ne bih li aplicirala za vizu. U podne, ambasada je zatvorena, te sam podelila sudbinu poraza sa još stotinak onih koji su došli „prekasno“ ...

“Koristeći svoje telo u različitim kulturnim i društvenim kontekstima kao repliku na različite igre moći, Ostojić je neizbežno ušla u carstvo rodnog problema (gender troubles). Njena refleksija na teme roda je fokusirana na ekonomski i političke fenomene koji prate fantazam Evropske Unije koji dele mnoge zemlje istočne Evrope. U projektu *Tražim muža sa pasošem EU*, ona otkriva i ironizuje istinu o trgovini ženama, prostituciji, brakovima iz interesa i svim ostalim „prapratnim efektima“ tranzicije. U takvim uslovima ekonomija roda je neizbežno ekonomija moći nad telom. Samoironija ovog projekta je sadržana u namernoj

estetizaciji koju umetnica postiže upotrebom sopstvene slike za internet oglas: njen mršavo izbrijano telo i glava, bez tragova senzualnosti ili zavodljivog pogleda ili gestova, prenosi sasvim suprotnu vizuelnu poruku. Iz ovog sukoba tekstualnog poziva i vizuelne odbojnosti stvoren je jaz dvosmisljenosti.”¹

¹ Suzana Milevska, “Spectacle of the Invisible”, u:
NU, Nordic Art Review,
vol. III, br. 5/01, 2001.

U avgustu 2000. godine započela sam projekat *Tražim muža sa pasošem Evropske Unije*.² Posle objavljanja oglasa sa ovim naslovom, razmenila sam preko pet stotina pisama sa kandidatima širom sveta. Nakon šestomesečne prepiske sa nemačkim građaninom K.G. ugovorila sam naš prvi susret kao javni performans na livadi ispred Muzeja savremene umetnosti u Beogradu novembra 2001. Mesec dana kasnije zvanično smo se venčali u Opštini Novi Beograd. Sa internacionalnim Venčanim listom i ostalim potrebnim dokumentima aplicirala sam u Ambasadi Nemačke za vizu. Posle dva meseca dobila sam vizu za pridruživanje bračnom drugu, ograničenu na jedan ulazak i tromesečni boravak u Nemačkoj, te sam se preselila u Diseldorf, gde sam na račun sledeće vize zvanično bila nastanjena naredne tri i po godine.


² Tanja Ostojić, Looking for a Husband with EU Passport: www.scca.org.mk/capital/projects/tanja

U proleće 2005. moja trogodišnja viza je istekla, i umesto da dobijem dozvolu stalnog boravka, policija za strance mi je dala samo pravo dvogodišnjeg boravka. Posle toga K.G. i ja smo se razveli, i na otvaranju moje izložbe *Kancelarija za integraciju* u Galeriji 35 u Berlinu (jula 2005.), organizovala sam Žurku povodom razvoda (*Divorce Party*).

Da bih ostvarila svoja prava, koja su mi bila uskraćena važećim EU zakonima, eksplicitno sam primenila strategije protivne zakonu (kao ranije u *Ilegalnom prelasku granice*) radi ostvarivanja prava na slobodu kretanja, života i rada na različitim lokacijama...

Mediji i diskriminatorski zakoni konstanto apstrahuju migrante i često ih tretiraju kao jednu otudenu grupu. Aspekt ličnog i direktnog govora na suprot apstraktном, važan je deo mog rada. Prikazujem sebe u toj poziciji, u mojoj priči, kao što i kasnije prikupljam lične priče drugih koje srećem, da bi publika imala priliku da shvati složenost i dubinu teme, da se identificuje sa mnom, sa njima, sa nama.

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Do not hesitate to contact me with any further questions or details**

Rad na redefinisanju polja moje umetničke prakse

Tokom deset godina sam se obrazovala kao vizuelna umetnica, a bavim se performansom, pozorištem i na neki način politikom, ne dozvoljavajući da budem nadjačana tradicionalnim obrazovanjem u ovim oblastima, već radije težim tome da očuvam neku vrstu „amaterizma”. Jednostavno rečeno, prevodim i recikliram svoje akcije iz domena realnosti u situacionističke performanse, kombinujući ih sa diskusijom, zajedničkim večerama, video i foto projekcijama i intimnim razgovorima. Vremenom se ovi dogadaji pretvaraju u neku vrstu političkog kabarea u kom su posetioci *a priori* pozvani da uzmu učešće.

Moja *Integracijska večera* u Kanonhallen u Kopenhagenu decembra 2004. se ticala iste teme kojom se i danski premijer bavio toga dana u svojoj rezidenciji: Integracija. Naime, posle medijski senzacionalizovanog ubistva holandskog filmskog režisera Tea van Goga, integracija migranata je postala značajna tema u borbi za mišljenje javnosti u celoj Evropskoj Uniji. Dominantni zvanični diskursi su bili, i još uvek su, nacionalistički i kontraproduktivni.

³ U Danskoj su zakoni koji se odnose na migrante postali vrlo restriktivni, mnogo više nego u ostalim evropskim zemljama. Npr. ako je danska/i državljanka/-in venčana/venčan sa strankinjom/-cem, ona/on mora imati najmanje 21 godinu. Tek posle 7 godina braka sa danskom/im državljanjom/državljaninom, strankinja/stranac dobija mogućnost da dobije vizu da živi u Danskoj, na osnovu braka. Zato su Dandinje i Danci koji su u braku sa strancima uglavnom prisiljeni da žive u Švedskoj ili u matičnoj zemlji svojih partnerki/a.

Uz pomoć seta kostima koje sam kreirala i nosila tokom večere, predstavljala sam oličenje islama, seksa i terorizma – fenomena na koje se medijska mašinerija fokusirala da bi proizvodila konstantni spektakl straha. Mislim da sam uspela da pokažem da u ovom slučaju nema razloga za strah. Zbog ovog umetničkog događaja privukla sam pažnju štampe i dobila celu stranu u široko distribuiranim besplatnim novinama u Kopenhagenu. U intervjuu za *metroXpress* izjavila sam da je danski premijer pomešao asimilaciju sa pitanjem integracije stranaca. Integracija ne bi trebalo da bude jednosmeran proces, jer bi Danska samo mogla da se obogati novim kulturama.³

Moje koleginice/kolege iz razreda su bile/i veoma srećne/i u Školi nemačkog jezika

Do sada sam iskusila više različitih kurseva nemačkog i francuskog jezika za vreme boravka u tim zemljama. Kursevi su bili prilično skupi, i veoma frustrirajući, jer sam se posle svakog časa osećala kao posle pokušaja ispiranja mozga. Mnogi primeri iz knjiga, kao i oni koje su koristili predavači su bili banalni, a kako sam neke od tekstova smatrala nadrealnim, citirala sam ih na javnim "večerima poezije". Kao što se dalo pretpostaviti, nemačka publika je bila šokirana onim što je čula. Još jedan problematični prstup je taj da pored gramatičkih pravila, kursevi jezika nameću kulturu, s nagoveštajem da je u pitanju viša kultura od one iz koje učenice/i dolaze, koje god da je njihovo poreklo.

U izložbenom prostoru Halle für Kunst u Lineburgu instalirala sam *Školu za jezike*, pravu učionicu koja je funkcionalisala kao prostor za besplatan kurs nemačkog jezika za strance koji su živeli u toj oblasti. Pridružila sam im se na časovima. Naša profesorka, koja je bila upoznata sa alternativnim metodama predavanja, bila je vrlo motivisana i otvorena za različite teme i ritam koji smo predložile moje koleginice i ja. Tokom druge nedelje projekta, inicirala sam diskusije i organizovane intervjuje o temama integracije i migracije. Primio me je i gradonačelnik Lineburga kome sam iznela preporeuke vezane za temu mog istraživanja.

Tokom čitavog serijala *Prelaženja granica i Integracijskog projekta* (2000-2005), cilj je bio da se određeni aspekti realnosti uvedu u umetnost kako bi se njeni kanali iskoristili za širu transmisiju. Sve vreme sam učila kroz kompleksan proces razvoja ovog projekta i na osnovu toga sam donosila odluke o njegovim sledećim fazama. Prikljanjanje arhivskog materijala ispostavilo se kao veoma korisno za moj kontinuirani rad. *Arhiv Integracijskog projekta* (koji čini preko 80 sati nemontiranih video intervjuja, audio materijal, knjige, jedan esej, razgovori, dokumenti, fotografije, flajeri, brošure, itd.) je u posebnom odnosu sa tekućim istraživanjem. Kad god je *Arhiv* izložen kao deo Kancelarije *Integracijskog projekta* dostupan je svima koji su zainteresovani.

Medijski skandal

Rad *Prema Kurbeu (L' origine du monde – Poreklo sveta)* je predstavljen na rotacionim bilbordima na izložbi *EuroPart* u javnim prostorima Beča, koja je trebalo da traje od decembra 2005. do januara 2006. godine. Rad je uklonjen posle svega dva dana, kao posledica ogromnog medijskog skandala u trenutku kada je austrijski premijer trebalo da preuzme predsedavanje EU. Preko sto članaka i preko hiljadu komentara čitalaca svedočilo je o ovom skandalu na vrlo interesantan i kompleksan način. Poster veličine 3,5 x 4 metra je potom bio postavljen na fasadi Forum-a Stadtpark-a u Gracu od januara do marta 2006. godine.

U određenim istorijskim periodima nagost je izvrgavana u javnosti, ali je zbog svoje simboličke vrednosti u društvu često služila i kao prenosilac drugih poruka. Pored kompozicije i reference na naslov (*L' origine du monde – Poreklo sveta* Gustava Kurbea, ulje na platnu, 1866, 46 x 55 cm), kao i same slike, moje ukazivanje na Kurbea se odnosilo na njegovu poziciju umetnika direktno uključenog u klasnu borbu tokom Pariske komune, koji je verovao u emancipatorsku ulogu umetnosti u društvu. Njegova dela su zabranjivana za izlaganje, dok je sam bivao hapšen prevashodno zbog svog političkog angažmana. Slika *L' origine du monde* je bila skrivena preko 120 godina u privatnim kolekcijama, ali je predstavljena u postavci Muzeja Orsej (Musée d'Orsay) u Parizu od osamdesetih godina 20. veka.

Kad se osvrnem unazad, verujem da ova moja skorašnja interpretacija pomenute slike ne bi izazvala medijski skandal da plave gaćice nisu predstavljale EU zastavu u tako problematičnom momentu austrijske političke realnosti. U tradiciji mojih prethodnih radova, poput serije *Prelaženje granica* i *Integracijskog projekta 2000–2005.* zadržala sam svoj kritički stav u odnosu na politiku isključivosti i biopolitike u EU. Telo žene na slici – moje telo – telo je nekoga ko ne pripada EU teritoriji, nekoga ko govorи iz perspektive migrantkinje koja je diskriminisana jer nije državljanica tog elitističkog političko- ekonomskog prostora.



Pošto su zemlje Evropske Unije pojačale kontrolu nad ne-državljkama/ima, imigraciona policija sve učestalije nastavlja dugogodišnju praksu „proveravanja temperature postelje“ u brakovima sklopljenim između EU i ne-EU partnera...

Činjenica da mi je delo uklonjeno sa rotacionih bilborda u Beču izazvala je mnogo buke u umetničkim krugovima, u Austriji pogotovo. Bez sumnje, to je bio jedan oblik cenzure koja predstavlja opasnost za budućnost umetnosti u Austriji – pogotovo kada je u pitanju umetnost sa političkim sadržajem, kritička umetnost, umetnice i umetnici koji nisu iz EU, javno finansiranje umetnosti i uklanjanje ili zataškavanje ozbiljnih političkih sadržaja od očiju javnosti. Rad je postao još prisutniji u digitalnim medijima i publikacijama, koje su *a priori* javni prostori, i očigledno je da su tome sledile i pojedine konstruktivne i intelektualne debate, pored *mainstream* reakcije. Uklanjanje rada sa bilborda navodi nas da sagledamo apsurdnost i licemernost uklanjanja iz moralnih razloga, jer je taj čin služio samo za manifestovanje zvanične političke izvršne moći koji je zatim propao jer je zapravo multiplicirao sadržaj, dovodeći ga do najzabačenijih delova društva.

Sa još dve fotografije koje su bile na istim rotacionim bilbordima – *Nemoguća integracija*, od kojih na jednoj nosim kamuflažnu burku na ulicama Mančestera, a na drugoj crvenu tzv. terorističku masku – htela sam da omogućim vidljivost manjinama u EU, tematizujući apstrakciju i demonizaciju manjina koje kreiraju mediji, kao i stereotipe u „ratu protiv terorizma“. *Nemoguća integracija* je performans kreiran za feministički festival „[Prolog] Novi Feminizam / Nova Evropa“ u Mančesteru 2005,⁴ čiji je prvi deo izведен na ulici, a drugi u prostoru teatra Cornerhouse, samo dva dana nakon što je britanska policija ubila nevinog Brazilca u Londonu, kao deo uz nemirujuće realnosti „rata protiv terorizma“. Taj performans, u okviru koga je predstavljena i moja interpretacija slike *L'origine du monde*, izazvao je provokativnu i napetu diskusiju.

⁴ [prologue] new feminism / new Europe, Izložba u Cornerhouse, Manchester: www.cornerhouse.org/art/info.aspx?ID=239&page=0

U vezi sa bilbordima nije postojala nikakva namera da se umetnici bave temom poput „reklama za EU”, već da se pre pozovu, budući da iznose individualna stanovišta, da rade na promeni evropske biopolitike, koja bi trebalo da bude otvorena za sve kritičke stavove.

Tanja Ostojić je nezavisna umetnica performansa, interdisciplinarna umetnica i kulturna aktivistkinja. Rodena je u Jugoslaviji (Srbija), studirala je umetnost u Beogradu i Nantu, trenutno živi u Berlinu. Ostojić uključuje sebe u situacionističke performanse i koristi različite medije u svom umetničkom istraživanju, ispitujući, na taj način, društvene konfiguracije i odnose moći. Prvenstveno radi iz perspektive žene migrantkinje i pristup primenjen u njenim radovima je određen političkim pozicioniranjem, humorom i uključivanjem primaoca.

Tanja Ostojić je bila jedna od predavača na Medunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji (*Bez*)*granični identiteti*.

SRPSKI RADNIK – MIGRANT U EVROPI XX Veka – od gostujućeg radnika do transnacionalnog preduzetnika

Međunarodne migracije, i njima obuhvaćene migracije radnika, predstavljaju fenomen koji je u stalnom porastu. Interdisciplinarna priroda fenomena migracija ogleda se u činjenici da se discipline poput ekonomije, sociologije, političkih nauka i istorije sve bave, na sebi svojstven način, razjašnjavanjem ovog fenomena uvodeći različite tipologije, podatke i nivoe analize.

Evropa beleži dugu i raznovrsnu istoriju migracija, koja se sastoji od različitih seoba unutar pojedinačnih zemalja, migracija sa istoka na zapad u XIX i XX veku, kao i onih sa zapada na istok koje su počele pre oko četrsto godina.

Još od početka XX veka države-nacije su postajale sve više i više opterećene kontrolom svojih državnih granica i identifikovanjem svojih građana. Kao rezultat, uvedeni su pasoši i vizni sistem, kao i različite politike u oblasti *migracije i naturalizacije*. Iako su međunarodne migracije radnika, trgovina i promet dobara na međunarodnom nivou doprineli sveukupnoj dobrobiti i napretku u XIX veku, migracije su sve više i više doživljavane kao pretnja nacionalnom identitetu i bezbednosti.

Sve do izbijanja Prvog svetskog rata 1914. međunarodne migracije su prvenstveno bile posledica kolonizacije i ekonomskih faktora, kao i loših uslova života i nezaposlenosti u zemljama iseljenja.

Međutim, posle Prvog svetskog rata pojavile su se nove forme migracija, dostižući svoj vrhunac posle Drugog svetskog rata kada su milioni ljudi primorani da napuste svoje domove. Prisilne migracije, dislokacije i bekstva igraju veoma značajnu ulogu u kontekstu evropskih migracija.

¹ Michael Joseph Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies (1979) CUP, England, Cambridge

² U naprednim industrijskim društvima segmentiranje tržišta rada odnosi se na primarno tržište rada s bezbednim uslovima zaposlenja, relativno visokim zaradama i standardima društvenog osiguranja, i na sekundarno tržište rada s niskim platama, niskim standardima osiguranja i teškim uslovima rada. Budući da radnici-državljanini ne žele da prihvate poslove sekundarnog tržista rada, za obavljanje ovih poslova se zapošljavaju imigranti. Pod ovim uslovima rastuća potreba za radnicima na sekundarnom tržištu rada verovatno dovodi do povećanja imigracije.

³ Regulativa admisije, migracijske politike i zakoni o emigrantima moraju se uzeti u obzir pri analiziranju kretanja ljudi.

⁴ Heinz Fassman and Rainer Münz (eds.), European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications (1994) Aldershot, Hants, England, Brookfield

⁵ Gurak Douglas T. i Fe Caces, Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems (1992) Oxford, England, Clarendon Press

Šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina XX veka, usled rapidnog rasta zapadnoevropskih ekonomija i tzv. programa gostujućeg radnika/Gastarbeiter započete su migracije radnika iz zemalja južne Evrope u nekoliko zapadnoevropskih država (npr. Nemačka, Austrija, Švajcarska i Švedska). Američki ekonomista Majkl Džozef Piore¹ tvrdi da je *potreba za radnikom u segmentiranim tržištima rada*² glavni razlog međunarodnih migracija radnika.

U mnogim slučajevima migracije radnika koje su posledica potreba tržišta rada su podržane vladinim programima zapošljavanja ili bilateralnim ugovorima. Zbog toga su takva migracijska kretanja obično podsticana političkim ciljevima i zakonskom regulativom³ zemalja iseljenja i useljenja. Tipičan primer za ovo predstavljaju iseljenja radnika iz južnoevropskih zemalja u Nemačku kasnih šezdesetih godina XX veka. Po Hajncu Fasmanu i Rajneru Mincu⁴, 1,3 miliona jugoslovenskih (te, takođe, i srpskih) radnika je zaposleno od strane napredujućih zapadnoevropskih zemalja, prvenstveno Nemačke.

Migracije radnika su takođe predmet naučnog polja sociologije koje se fokusira na migracije koje se protežu kroz prostor i vreme. Ulogu društvenog umrežavanja kao esencijalne osnove kontinuiranog toka migracija radnika su prepoznali Gurak Daglas T. i Fe Caces⁵. Na središnjem nivou, ova tzv. lančana migracija delimično objašnjava razvoj enklava gostujućih radnika i formiranje emigrantskih zajednica u društvu u koje su došli.

Nasuprot navedenim razlozima, može se reći da društvene, političke i ekonomске veze između zemalja iseljenja i zemalja useljenja predstavljaju važan faktor, ponekad čak i preduslov za migracijska kretanja radnika.

Kao posledica aktuelnog procesa uvećavanja EU i globalizacije (moglo bi se reći da je proširenje EU deo procesa globalizacije!), razvio se novi profil radnika-migranta: transnacionalni preduzetnik s transnacionalnom umreženošću. Ovaj novi profil radnika-migranta često podrazumeva dvojezičnost, dvojno državljanstvo, vezanost za dom u dve zemlje, često se lako transponuje između različitih kultura i prati ekonomske, političke i kulturne interese što zahteva simultano prisustvo u dاتим oblastима. Ovom novom kategorijom „hibridnog ili polu-radnika migranta“ do sada se nije adekvatno bavilo na akademskom nivou. Štaviše, mnogi emigranti iz bivše Jugoslavije koji su na to bili prisiljeni – danas poznati pod nazivom dijaspora (prvobitno smatrani izbeglicama) – se mogu smatrati trećom grupom radnika migranata.

Vrlo malo se zna o sve tri grupe. Postoji obimna literatura o gostujućim radnicima iz Turske, i to bi takođe mogao biti razlog zbog koga je ova odredena grupa migranata (pored toga što predstavlja najveći deo populacije gostujućih radnika u Nemčkoj) započela proces stvarne integracije u nemačko društvo. Tema gostujućih radnika iz Srbije (i bivše Jugoslavije) bila je više sporadično obradivana u oblasti društvenih nauka⁶, dok dijaspora i transnacionalni migranti i dalje predstavljaju relativno nove fenomene. Ko su novi transnacionalni preduzetnici? Da li su oni inventivni odgovor druge generacije gostujućih radnika na nezavidnu situaciju u koju su ih postavile i zemlje

⁶ Pascal Goeke (“Transnationale Migration” (2007), Transcript, Bielefeld, Nemačka) jedan je od nekoliko sociologa koji se bave gostujućim radnicima iz bivše Jugoslavije, dok Predrag J. Marković analizira gastarabajtere kao faktor modernizacije Srbije (“Gastarbeitors as the Factor of Modernization in Serbia”, 2/2005, History of the 20th century). Sociološkinja Maja Korać ukazuje na nedostatak kontakta između izbeglica i gostujućih radnika u zemljama useljenja u svom članku (“Living ethnicity in exile”, Gender, Identität und kriegerisch er Konflikt (2004), LIT Münster, Nemačka). U umetničkom svetu pitanje gostujućih radnika iz Srbije u poslednje vreme postaje predmet sve veće pažnje – npr. Noa Treister Art Interventions – The Return of the Gastarbjeters (2008) Požarevac, Srbija.

u kojima žive i zemlje njihovog porekla? Ili, ovu grupu prevashodno čine novi emigranti koji su napustili zemlju tokom jugoslovenskih ratova? Koja bi mogla biti njihova uloga u građenju reputacije Srbije i uspostavljanja veza i odnosa među državama? Na ova i druga pitanja bi se moglo odgovoriti ukoliko bismo inicirali multidisciplinarno akademsko istraživanje o poziciji srpskih gostujućih radnika u zemljama njihovog useljenja i odnosu između pomenute tri grupe migranata.

Rastislava Mirković je završila Interdisciplinarne studije kulture i magistrirala na grupi za Istočnoevropske studije na Freie Universität u Berlinu. Oblasti interesovanja: manjine i migracije u jugoistočnoj Evropi. Živi i radi u Berlinu. Rastislava je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije *(Be)granični identiteti*.

(BEZ)GRANIČNI IDENTITETI

Stojim u redu, čekajući da uđem. Čovek mi kaže: „Isprave, molim.“ Pokazala sam mu malo parče plastike na kojem je nešto napisano. Klimnuo je glavom, i ušla sam.

Toliko ličnih isprava imam ovih dana:
„Ja sam muzičar, pевам сасвим добро.“
„Pišem pesme, ja sam pesnik.“
„Slikam, ja sam slikar.“
„Kuvam, ja sam kuvar.“
„Pričam priče, ja sam pripovedač.“
„Imam troje dece, ja sam majka.“
„Perem sudove, ja sam ljudska mašina za pranje sudova.“
Prestala sam da brojim ko ili šta sam...

Ne sećam se ko je počeo igru, ko je postavio granice, kada i gde... ko bira koji identitet se koristi u kojoj situaciji, i zašto.

Ponekad se zbunim sa svim tim ispravama i pokažem „mašina za pranje sudova“ umesto „student“ gospodri u studentskoj službi, i ona me pogleda sumnjičavo. Pitam se zašto...

Nikada nisam rekla nešto što nije istinito, pa čemu onda takav pogled, gospodo?

Čini mi se da smo istrajni u sopstvenim naporima da opišemo taj pojam koji se imenuje kao “identitet” sa svakim nanosom reči. Pitam se da li smo predodređeni za neuspeh...

Da li smo zaista toliko egocentrični da ne shvatamo da davanjem imena svakodnevnim aktivnostima, svojim vrlinama, sposobnostima itd, polako, malo


po malo skidamo slojeve onoga što čini ili bi moglo činiti naš identitet... Učeni smo da prvo sagledamo sliku u celini, a da se potom koncentrišemo na njene delove. A opet dužni smo sebi da se držimo segmenta, i onda, uko-liko smo dovoljno zainteresovani ili radoznali, pokušaćemo da istražimo i ostale segmente slike i da, konačno, sastavimo ovu slagalicu koja se naziva "ljudsko biće".

Čudno je kada počneš da razmišљaš o tome kako smo se razvili i, ako zaista to jesmo učinili, u šta smo se to razvili, jer na kraju dana odlazimo u krevet ne razmišljajući niti osećajući da smo jedno, a ne nešto drugo, bilo šta, a ne nešto. Tada zatvaramo oči i ostavljamo misli s onim "Ništa", nastavljujući da sanjamo o boljem danu.

I da li su naši brojni identiteti uspeli da nas ugroze? Da li postepeno prestajemo da postojimo svim ovim pokušajima da definišemo ono što smo? Da li se zadovoljavamo s tim divnim "ništa" zbog toga što je toliko uobičajeno i ne deli nas niti cepa na komade?

Ne možeš imati deo "ničega"; ništa je uvek "celina".

„To sam što sam”; a **ti**?



Iva Kolundžija je studentkinja Fakulteta primenjenih umetnosti u Beogradu. Njena interesovanja se kreću u rasponu od istraživanja različitih umetničkih medija i aspekata urbane kulture, umetnosti u javnom prostoru, do zaštite životne sredine i istraživanja različitih fenomena modernog društva. Kroz svoju umetničku praksu, ali i kroz angažovanje u realizaciji brojnih građanskih/omladinskih akcija i međunarodnih projekata Iva potvrđuje svoje interesovanje za pitanja vezana za građenje civilnog/demokratskog društva u Srbiji i poboljšanje njene reputacije na međunarodnom nivou. Iva je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije (*Bežgranični identiteti*).

STUDENTSKI IDENTITET

Nije lako ukratko opisati utiske sa prošlogodišnje letnje Akademije (*UN*)*Limited Identites* – sedam dana interesantnih predavanja i radionica, kao i sedam večeri zanimljivih razgovora ne mogu se sažeti na dve stranice.

Budući da je glavna tema našeg sastanka bio fenomen identiteta, pokušaću da sumiram svoja iskustva koristeći upravo taj pojam.

Tokom Akademije dosta smo razgovarali o nacionalizmu i internacionalizmu u kontekstu problema identiteta Evrope i Srbije u Evropi. Kada mislim o Akademiji godinu dana kasnije (kao i o drugim sličnim događajima u kojima sam imao priliku da učestvujem), čini mi se da se tokom Akademije ispoljavao jedan poseban vid evropskog internacionalnog identiteta: mislim na studentsku kulturu, na kulturu „evrostudenata”.

Obično kada se govori o studentskoj kulturi misli se na film, muziku i pozorišne predstave čiji su autori i/ili konzumenti studenti, ili kao što je to slučaj u nekim kafićima u mom gradu u Poljskoj, pridev „studentski” se vezuje uz jeftino pivo. Za mene je naša letnja Akademija dokaz da pojам „studentska kultura” ima i drugi smisao. Naravno, ne nameravam da u ovom kratkom eseju tačno definišem što ovaj pojам za mene znači, već bih želeo da skiciram nekoliko situacija sa Akademije, koje ukazuju na to ko su „evrostudenti”.

Prva slika. Razgovarali smo, ne sećam se tačno gde. U razgovoru su učestvovali: devojka iz Rumunije koja studira u Nemačkoj, devojka iz Srbije koja studira u Londonu, devojka iz Holandije koja studira u Danskoj. Naravno, razgovor se vodio na engleskom.

Druga slika. Profesor iz Portugala je govorio o odnosu Portugalaca prema Evropskoj Uniji i prema problemu emigracije. Zatim je počeo razgovor. Iako nije bilo nijednog studenta

iz iberijskih zemalja, ljudi su postavljali pitanja i diskusija je bila veoma interesantna.

Treća slika. Prvog dana se samo nekolicina od nas od ranije poznavala, no većinom smo bili jedni drugima nepoznati. Takva situacija ipak nije ometala želju da se brzo združimo i da diskutujemo.

I poslednja slika – skoro svi su ujutru čeznuli da popiju kafu. Zbog čega? Jer je „noćni život” bio intenzivan. Zašto? Akademija je trajala kratko, ljudi su bili veoma interesantni i nije bilo mnogo vremena za gubljenje na san.

Sve to pokazuje otvorenost, sposobnost za komunikaciju, slobodu u druženju, a koji takođe označavaju mogućnost ozbiljne saradnje u budućnosti. To su znaci mobilnosti, radoznalosti i spremnosti za kontakt sa drugim ljudima, bez obzira na njihovo poreklo.

Zašto ističem da je to studentski identitet? Naravno, nisu svi učesnici Akademije bili studenti – no apsolutna većina nas je u svom životu bila u kontaktu sa raznim tipovima kulturno-obrazovnih institucija (kao na primer univerzitetom) i aktivno je koristila (ili stalno koristi) iskustvo koje pruža studiranje. Čini mi se da jednostavno ljudi o kojima govorim teže za znanjem i društвom, a u Evropi je univerzitet institucija koja stvara takve mogućnosti mladima.

A šta je za mene najvažnije u tom studentskom identitetu? Mislim da je on dokaz teorije da identitet nije monolitna struktura, nego hibrid koji vezuje različite elemente i ideje. Pojedinac može da oseća identitet „evrostudenta” a da pri tom ne prestaje da bude Srbin ili Englez, Beogradanin ili Londonac, poput ljudi iz dijaspore, za koje identitet građanina zemlje u kojoj žive ne isključuje njihovu pripadnost kulturi zemlje porekla. Možda je i to bilo naj-

interesantnije tokom cele Akademije: naš boravak u Beogradu sam po sebi je bio najbolja potvrda onoga što smo čuli tokom predavanja.

Tekst je originalno napisan na srpskom jeziku.

Tomaž Evertovski je student srpske i poljske filologije na Univerzitetu Adama Mickijevića u Poznanju u Poljskoj. Više puta je boravio u Srbiji u okviru različitih međunarodnih programa i razmena. Tomaž je bio jedan od polaznika Medunarodne letnje akademije *(Bez)granični identiteti*.

PODELJENI IDENTITET ODREĐEN SLOVENSKOM I ALBANSKOM KULTUROM

Ova priča o kulturnom identitetu se odnosi na ulogu političkih sistema, ideologije i nacionalnih programa u njegovoј destrukciji. Međutim, kada je reč o kulturnom identitetu, može se reći i da politički režim daleko od toga da ga ruši, već predstavlja najznačajniju snagu u njegovom kreiranju i rasprostiranju. Ova priča se zasniva na drugaćijem razumevanju pojma „identitet” u odnosu na njegovo poimanje kao individualnog ili kolektivnog posedovanja.

Veliki broj diskursa, definicija i teorija koji se tiču ove teme reflektuju njegovu kompleksnost i višezačnost.

Teorije fokusirane na makro nivo posmatraju identitet kao stanje društvenog reda i stabilnosti u svakoj zajednici, dok se na mikro nivou od identiteta očekuje da obezbedi odgovor na pitanje ko ili šta smo (Ristić, 2007:186).

Identitet tako, kao i jezik, nije samo opis pripadanja određenoj kulturi; on je neka vrsta kolektivnog blaga/nasleda lokalnih zajednica. Međutim, takođe je utvrđeno da je on nešto osetljivo, nešto što se treba zaštititi i sačuvati i što se može izgubiti.

Daleko od toga da je identitet nežan cvet koga državne institucije, politički sistemi, evropeizacija i globalizacija uništavaju. Naprotiv, identitet je u ovom tekstu sagledan kao rastuća moć lokalne kulture koja pruža otpor centrifugalnoj sili različitih shema (v. Tomlinson, 1999).

Nasleđe

Prvi put kada sam počela da se interesujem za Jugoslaviju imala sam pet godina. Do tog dana sam znala samo za dražavu pod tim imenom, koja je za mene predstavljala samo poznati naziv na geografskoj mapi Evrope.

Bio je to uobičajen dan; šetala sam sa majkom po kraju u kome smo živele kada ju je gospoda, koja je bila moj lekar, oslovila sa “Slobodanka”. Bila sam iznenadena čuvi da žena naziva moju majku drugim imenom. Jedino ime moje majke koje sam do tada znala bilo je Mili, dok mi je ime Slobodanka bilo potpuno nepoznato. Zbog toga sam pitala majku zašto ju je žena tako oslovila, a ona mi je odgovorila da joj je to pravo ime. Taj detalj je probudio u meni mnoga pitanja na koja sam nestrpljivo očekivala odgovor. Postepeno je majka počela da mi priča o svojoj porodici. Objasnila mi je poreklo svoga oca, koji potiče iz Cetinja, grada u Crnoj Gori. Nastavila je sa detaljima o selidbi njene porodice u Albaniju tokom XIX veka i o tome kako su jugoslovensko državljanstvo zadržali do 1970. U to vreme aktuelan monokratski režim u Albaniji zabranjivao je strancima boravak u zemlji, proglašavajući ih ili osudujući kao državne neprijatelje. Zbog toga je moj deda bio prisiljen da jugoslovensko državljanstvo zameni albanskim i da promeni prezime izbacivanjem slova Ć/Ç¹. Tako je prezime Stanić ili Staniç promenjeno u Stani, zadržavajući specifično značenje i za albanski i jugoslovenski lokalni kontekst. Reč “stani” je u albanskom društvu vezana za pašnjake i skloništa u kojima se stado stoke napasa tokom leta, dok se u jugoslovenskom društvu reč “stani” dovodi u vezu s kolibom ili malom kućom.

¹ Ć se piše i izgovara u albanskom jeziku, a u srpskohrvatskom jeziku se piše Č.

Majka je proširila priču o svom imenu Mili objašnjavajući mi da je to ime koje se koristi od milja, izvedeno od jugoslovenskog izraza „mila” što znači „draga”. Nadimak joj je dala dadijla, koja je takođe bila iz Crne Gore, ali je tokom vremena ime “Mila” postalo dobro za prikrivanje identiteta stranaca. Dodatno, pošto je bila pripadnica komunističke omladine, morala je da predupredi svaku marginalizaciju, tako da je ime “Mila” pretvoreno u “Mili”.

U određenom trenutku usvojila sam majčin i svoj novi identitet. Ona je sakrila svoje poreklo i identitet od svojih kćerki jer nije bilo bezbedno istaći svoje hibridno nasleđe.

Sredinom sedamdesetih godina XX veka pojedinac/ka u socijalističkim republikama na Balkanu bio/la je prisiljen/a da se identificuje sa nacijom, ili da bar izgradi svoj identitet na osnovu nacionalnog, koji je bio u bliskoj vezi sa državom-nacijom. U vezi sa tim, Nashehi vidi oba, i naciju i nacionalni identitet, kao dve ključne tvorevine evropskog modernizma. Razmišljanje na evropski način je viđeno kao mišljenje isključivo u okvirima nacionalnog identiteta i modela država-nacija. To je rezultiralo u činjenici da se Evropa sastojala od država-nacija, što je zatim vodilo ka diskriminaciji, izopštavanju, krivičnom gonjenju manjina, ka ratovima i prisilnoj assimilaciji, što u Jugoistočnoj Evropi ni do danas nije u potpunosti prevaziđeno (2003:7; l. c. Ristić, 2007:187).

Od trenutka kada je Jugoslavija prodrla u moju ličnost, nacija je za mene bila zemlja mojih predaka. Jugoslovenski identitet bio je nešto što smo majčina porodica i ja prosto „posedovali”, nešto poput uzinemirujućeg egzistencijalnog imetka, nasleda i koristi od kontinuiteta sa prošlošću.

U tom smislu, tokom detinjstva počela je da me privlači jugoslovenska kultura, slovenska muzika koju sam slušala na radiju, jugoslovenski pejzaži koje sam gledala u časopisima i na jugoslovenskoj televiziji.

Postojali su periodi u Albaniji kada je bilo izuzetno teško zadovoljiti potrebe za obrazovanjem, ukoliko to nisu bila interesovanja koja su mogla biti zadovoljena sadržajima već ekstremno cen-

² U nekim delovima teksta citiram Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, objavljen 1995, jer može da posluži kao odličan opis ekonomске i moralne situacije u albanskom društvu tokom osamdesetih godina XX veka (Halili, 2004:31).

zurisanim od strane diktatorske vlade. Primitivizam i provincijalizam, ugrožavanje osnovnih ljudskih prava pojedinca, kao što su sloboda govora i sloboda organizovanja, su bili prisutni u literaturi, muzici, filmu, zabavi, na radiju, u štampi i na televiziji. Krizu sistema vrednosti pratila je duboka kulturna kriza (v. i Memorandum, 1995:114; l. c. Halili, 2004:5)².

Međutim, teška vremena povećavaju interesovanje masa za različite strategije opstanka kao što su ilegalna migracija, prebeg, besktvo, a u kojima predvode iskustva Albanaca tokom opisanog istorijskog perioda. Bekstva su bila svojstvena za ljude iz svih društvenih slojeva i podrazumevala su različite akcije, od fizičkih do mentalnih prelazaka granice³. Zapravo, bekstva izvedena fizičkim prelaskom granice su bila limitirana u broju zbog velikog rizika u pograničnim područjima, dok su bekstva preko mentalnih i kulturnih granica bila veoma rasprostranjena.

Kao rezultat, tokom ranih osamdesetih godina XX veka Albanci su izumeli brojna rešenja ne bi li stekli uvid u savremeni svet, konstruišući tajno mnoge aparate koje su često improvizovali hrabri elektroinženjeri. Najpopularniji aparat je bio prijemnik koga su stanovnici prestonice nazvali „kanočja“ – kutija, ili „grupi“ – grupa. Reč je o maloj aluminijumskoj kutiji ispunjenoj kondenzatorima sa podešavajućim tjunerom koji prima UHF talase, kratke radio talase⁴. Sprava *kanočja* je izgledala kao nazadan izum, ali je bila veoma dobra za prijem signala stranih televizija poput jugoslovenske, italijanske i grčke.

Svakako, tokom komunističkog perioda albanska TV nije nudila previše zabavnog programa. Veliki deo televizijskog materijala, filmovi i progami, bili su u funkciji komunističke propagande, štaviše program se emitovao samo u određenim satima. Zvanična ideologija koja je umesto stvarnog socijalističkog programa nudila prazne političke proklamacije, a koja je generisana od strane ograničenog, provincijskog mentaliteta, naširoko je rasipala sposobnost da zadobije srca i umove ljudi (Memorandum, 1995:II4; l. c. Halili, 2004:5).

³ Tokom komunističke dominacije (1945–1990) u Albaniji, monokratija je bila vezana za socioekonomski separatističku strategiju. Emigracija je bila ilegalna, zapravo jedino mišljenje o emigriranju je bilo da je ilegalno, i proglašeno je zabranjenom aktivnošću. Oni koji su uspeli da ilegalno emigriraju smatrani su izdajnicima, a posledice tog čina su bile surovosti nad njihovom rođinom; podsticali su režim policijskog terora, hapšenja, egzile (Canco, 2005:141). Ipak, mnogi mladi ljudi su pokušali da ilegalno pređu jugoslovensku granicu različitim putevima – vodom, zemljom i sl.

⁴ Sprava je zapravo bila model dekodera koji je ugrađen u običan televizor. A tjuner za kratke talase je bio sličan izum daljinskom upravljaču.

⁵ Da bi se oduprle turskoj vlasti, nacije u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i Albaniji su razvile jaku etničku homogenost solidarnost i izolaciju visokog stepena. Budući da nije bilo institucionalnih mogućnosti da se dela na nacionalnom nivou, ljudi iz bivše Jugoslavije i Albanije su moralni da se oslonе na svoje najbliže (porodicu), što je jedan od razloga zašto nacionalni identiteti i svest nisu mogli da se održe kroz vekove. Zato su građeni u tesnim porodičnim vezama (distingktivne strukture), dok je odvajanje od svega toga strano. U korelaciji sa tim prenaglašenim značajem i odobravanjem primarnih grupa (porodica), davan je manji značaj, štaviše pružan je otpor prema državi kao takvoj (državne institucije, političke organizacije i podela ljudi u skladu sa njihovim profesijama) (Golubović 1995:58–59; l. c. Irena Ristić 2007:191).

⁶ Tokom dugog perioda Crna Gora je pripisivana srpskoj teritoriji, tako da je crnogorska priroda permanentno karakterizovana religioznom i srpskom vrstom, štaviše smatrali su sebe delom srpske nacije. Crna Gora je uvek branila ideal slobodne srpske nacije (Udovicki, 1998:25–29).

Tako sam tokom osamdesetih godina XX veka, kao i mnogi moji sugradani, provela detinjstvo slušajući jugoslovensku muziku sa radija, gledajući televizijske emisije i filmove jugoslovenskih autora. Ustvari, bila sam bolji gledalac jugoslovenske televizije nego albanske.

Na taj način je mlada generacija počela da se upoznaje s kulturom svojih suseda, najpre sa srpskohrvatskim jezikom. Malo pomalo, poznavanje je prerastalo u divljenje i dopadanje. Poštovanje je kulminiralo do te tačke da je poseta zemlji ili bilo kojoj republici Jugoslavije smatrana dogadajem. Poseta SFRJ bi pružila mogućnost da se iskusi sve što je bilo zabranjeno u albanskoj socijalističkoj domovini i, naravno, u isto vreme bi informacije dobijane putem televizijskog ekrana postale stvarne.

Jugoslavija je smatrana zapadnoevropskom državom, tj. zemljom koja pripada zapadnoj kulturi. Taj identitet je bio usko povezan s vrednostima liberalizma jer je posedovao snažnu urbanu identifikaciju, i suprotno od onog svojstvenog Albaniji, nije bio zasnovan na pojmu nacije već građanina. S druge strane, bivša Jugoslavija, kao tradicionalna zemљa, geografski je pripadala Evropi ali nije nužno delila sve vrednosti koje se smatraju evropskim. Njen identitet je takođe bio zasnovan na okrenutosti otomanskom nasledu (što se može smatrati istorijskim okolnostima koje deli s Albanijom) koje je uticalo na današnju sudbinu bivših jugoslovenskih država i njihovih suseda⁵ (v. i Ristić, 2007:190).

I pored mog crnogorskog porekla i majčinih rođaka koji žive u Podgorici i u Beogradu⁶, nikada nisam imala priliku da posetim Jugoslaviju tokom peri-

oda komunističkog režima. Međutim, tokom detinjstva sam se povezala s jednim brojem dece iz Jugoslavije čiji su roditelji bili činovnici u ambasadi SFRJ. U to vreme (kasne 1980-te) diplomatski odnosi između Albanije i Jugoslavije su se pogoršali, te je prijateljstvo između mojih malih srpskih drugara i mene konstantno zabranjivano od strane agenata državne bezbednosti, koji su nama i našim roditeljima pretili optužbama za špijunažu i delovanje protiv albanske komunističke vlade. Takve tvrdnje su mogle odvesti moje roditelje u zatvor, a roditelji mojih drugara bili bi deportovani iz Albanije. Zapravo bi bio potreban još jedan esej da se opišu sve avanture kroz koje smo moji prijatelji iz Jugoslavije i ja prolazili da bismo bili zajedno, a da ne pominjem pomoći koju su nam pružale naše porodice.

U međuvremenu su prošle godine. Početak 1991. za Albance je označio novu fazu političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih promena. Napokon, Albanci su slavili pad komunizma i početak nove epohe. Posle više od pola veka odvojenosti od zapadnog sveta, nacija je mogla entuzijastično da se nada stvaranju „ujedinjene evropske kuće”⁷ (Gleni, 2000:634). Preko noći su sloboda i demokratska prava zamenili diktaturu i cenzuru. Albanci posvećeni jugoslovenskoj kulturi su se uključili u prevodenje termina kao što su demokratija, sloboda govora, kao i prelazak centralizovane ekonomije u kapitalističko tržište.

⁷ Javna izjava Mihaila Gorbačova

S druge strane, političke, društvene i ekonomske promene su se prethodno desile i u Jugoslaviji. Posle 1992. ime Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije je nestalo, koncept ujedinjene nacije se progresivno raspadao. Duboka kriza jugoslovenske ekonomije i političkog života uzrokovala je „katastrofalan ishod kao što je raspad jugoslovenske države” (Memorandum, 1995: 95; l. c. Halili, 2004:5). Republike su se postepeno odvajale i ostvarivale autonomiju, videći jedini izlaz u stvaranju nezavisne države. Stoga su politika i ekonomija svake zemlje bile koncentrisane unutar svoje nacije.

Dodatno, na međunarodnom nivou se slika jugoslovenskog kulturnog modela rasparčala, shodno svojoj tradiciji koja se razlikovala od zemlje do zemlje. Neke nacije su se zbog svojih istorijskih okolnosti okrenule ka zapadnoj kulturnoj dominaciji, dok je većina primarno oblikovala svoj identitet na balkanskim korenima, uključujući i otomansku kulturu. Tako se za albansku javnost jugoslovenska kompaktnost jednom za svagda srušila, kao što je jugoslovenski mit izbledeo. Za Albance kao i za međunarodnu javnost, činjenica da je ta zemlja tokom više od pet decenija mogla da održava međuetničku harmoniju iz koje se potom razvila etnička i religijska mržnja koju je pratilo rat, je bila vrlo maglovito objašnjenje.

Zapravo, uprkos postojećih etničkih i religijskih razlika, bivša Jugoslavija nije bila samo konstitucionalni ili legalni diksurs, već je iznad svega predstavljala zajednicu vrednosti, zasnovanu na zajedničkoj istorijskoj судбини njenih nacija i pogodenosti sličnim socijalnim, ekonomskim i političkim problemima (Skendi, 1980:ix). Konsekventno, ovo znači da jugoslovenske vrednosti nisu bile vezane za specifično etničko, lingvističko, sociokulturno, institucionalno, istorijsko ili geografsko zajedništvo, već za one apstraktne vrednosti, koje su postojale uprkos svim pomenutim odrednicama koje su drugačije u svakoj zemlji.

Godinama kasnije (oko 1999) počela sam da posećujem nekoliko nezavisnih država bivših republika SFRJ. Svakako, emocije su bile veoma uzburkane. Posebno mi je otkrivanje Crne Gore i Srbije pružilo osećaj „doma”, možda u skladu s jednom albanskom izrekom koja govori da „krv/poreklo privlači”. Kako god, osećanja su bila preterana. U Crnoj Gori i Srbiji sam osetila jake emocije jer je identitet koji je ostao prikiven, malo pomalo dopunjeno kombinacijom osećaja slobode i jednakosti. Osećaji slobode i jednakosti su dva stuba formiranja moje ličnosti u detinjstvu. Identifikacija s konkretnim geografskim prostorom, kao što je Crna Gora, i posebno s Cetinjem, može se posmatrati kao krucijalna vrednost iz koje proističu principi mog samoodređenja: rođenje – koje stvara veze sa majčinom porodicom; kultura – koja formira

moju individualnost, duhovnu i emotivnu; pravoslavna vera, srpskohrvatski jezik i svest o zajedničkom identitetu baziranom na zajedničkim vrednostima u okvirima iste kulture (Polak, 2004:31; l. c. Ristić, 2007:188).

Diktatorski režim nije mogao da eliminiše ove faktore koji su oblikovali moj identitet. Naprotiv, oni su postali jači, zbog toga što je nostalgija za teritorijom predaka ostala primetno živa. Frekventnim posećivanjem Crne Gore i upoznavanjem Srbije na akademskom nivou, kompletirao se i artikulisao proces oblikovanja mog identiteta.

Međutim, moja putovanja u Srbiju i učešće u različitim događajima u njenoj prestonici, izazvala su polemike i primedbe mojih prijatelja u Albaniji, koje su izražene u formi stava da je Srbija komplikovana i opasna zemlja. Zapravo i Albanija je, kao i Srbija, na osnovu iskustava i percepcija spoljnih posmatrača često determinisana kao komplikovana i opasna. Ove činjenice dovode do stava Todorove koji kaže: "Stereotipizacija Balkana i njegova redukcija na elemente primitivnih društava uvek je (ne)namerno isticana od strane zapadnih donosilaca odluka. Slika te konstrukcije je imala vrlo malo zajedničkog sa samopercepcijom ljudi koji žive na Balkanu. U svakom slučaju, konstrukt „balkanskog identiteta“ u medijima i javnom prostoru je bio dominantan i bez sumnje je imao izvesnog uticaja na samo-percepciju ljudi koji žive na Balkanu." (1997).

U datom kontekstu, mnoge istorijske okolnosti su oblikovale današnje odnose između Srbije i Albanije. S obzirom na njihovu zajedničku istorijsku prošlost koju su često obeležavali konflikti, izvesna "srbofobija" se razvila među Albancima. U srži njihove istorije ležalo je viševekovno iskustvo rata protiv multietničkih zajednica, stranih vladara: rimskega careva, vizantijskog vladara i otomanskog sultana. Njihova istorija pod stranim osvajačima odvojila je Slovence od Albanaca, dok ih je vezivala zajednička potreba za eliminisanjem okupatora. Međutim, albanska percepcija Srbije se menjala kroz vekove, evoluirajući od simpatija (1389. su se zajedno borili protiv

⁸ Epska pesma koja se tiče Kosovske bitke, koju pevaju tradicionalni Srbi i albanski pesnici. Štaviše, tokom otomanske dominacije albanski klanovi su pružili doprinos obrani pravoslavnih manastira u kosovskom regionu (Uđovički, 1998:28).

⁹ Konflikt između Srba i Albanaca počeo je u XVI, XVIII veku; Srbi krive Albance za masovne emigracije Srba koji su pošli na sever (Uđovički, 1998:28).

Turaka Otomana u Kosovskoj bici⁸) do konflikta⁹, straha i mržnje (1912. i 1913. kada su Crnogorci izvršili invaziju na Skadar i Kosovo, nakon koje su sledila razaranja i masakri nad Albancima; 1999. rat i srpska strategija genocida na Kosovu). Nakratko, uzdizanjem komunističkog režima u Albaniji skriven je mit o staroj mržnji, što je dovelo do zbližavanja s bivšom Jugoslavijom. Međutim, situacija nakon 1999. i rata na Kosovu razdvojila je Albance od Srba dok je došlo do jačanja odnosa sa ostalim bivšim republikama SFRJ.

U periodu 1981–1999, od masovnih demonstracija Albanaca na Kosovu do NATO bombardovanja Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, teško je naći ubedljiv dokaz o tome u kojoj meri su intelektualci i akademska javnost učestvovali u nacionalnim i nacionalističkim diskursima. Zapravo, u samoj suštini albansko-srpske naučne debate o istoriji Kosova leži pitanje o tome ko je prvi naselio ovu regiju. Tok rasprave se može videti u Memorandumu Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti napisanom 1986. i u Platformi za rešavanje nacionalnog albanskog pitanja Albanske akademije nauka iz 1999., kao i u mnogim knjigama i člancima (Halili, 2004:1–15).

Čak i sad, posle pada Miloševićevog režima 2000. i ostvarene autonomije Kosova, deo Albanaca gaji nepromenjenu averziju prema Srbima, dok drugi deo populacije teži ka upoznavanju Srbije. Tome se može dodati porast interesovanja gradana Srbije za upoznavanjem Albanije. Mnogi Srbi svake godine provode odmor u Albaniji, rušeci svoje predrasude i otkrivajući zemlju.

Zaključak

Poslednji deo teksta se odnosi na Međunarodnu letnju akademiju (*Bez granični identiteti* (Beograd, 25–31. avgust 2008), koja je pokrenula diskusi-

ju o pitanju stvaranja savremenog identiteta Srbije u kontekstu aktuelnih evropskih integracija. Srbija, Evropa i EU su bile tema brojnih debata i diskusija u akademskom okruženju, kreirajući svaki put različite i interesantne diskurse. Tokom radionica se konceptu srpskog identiteta prišlo iz vrlo različitih perspektiva uz podršku eksperata u različitim disciplinama i poljima istraživanja. Teorijski i konceptualni aspekti su kombinovani sa interesantnim studijama slučaja koje su bile fokusirane na različite države.

Proces konstruisanja identiteta Srbije se prilično razlikuje u poređenju sa primerima zemalja EU i drugih zemalja koje teže integraciji u Uniju. Novi identitet je kombinacija vrednosti i ideologija i mnogo osvrтанja na istoriju u cilju boljeg uvida u korene nacionalnih programa u terminima kao što su „nacionalna revitalizacija“ ili „nacionalno budjenje“.

Irena Ristić zaključuje da Srbija ima podeljen identitet. Po njoj, nacionalni identitet baziran na vrednostima i ideologijama, u Srbiji vodi ka dva relativno suprotna shvatanja nacionalnog identiteta i vrednosti i normi, od kojih je svaka zasnovana na dihotomiji identiteta; vekovima je Srbija oscilirala između istoka i zapada. Tako, ne postoji jedan konzistentan, već dva prekinuta nacionalna identiteta Srbije. Kao posledica, postoji dihotomija u celom društvu i njegovim institucijama (2007:190). U vezi s tim, Srbija neće moći da nađe svoj put ka Evropi dok ne stvori koherentan identitet i u potpunosti se ne posveti evropskim vrednostima. Vrlo je teško izgraditi srpski identitet, transnacionalni identitet u okviru EU, zbog toga što EU nema instrumente koje su koristile države-nacije da bi osigurale podršku svojih građana (zajednička istorija, jezik, simboli, itd.).

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Inis Shkreli je kandidatkinja za održanu doktorske teze iz oblasti antropologije umetnosti na Univerzitetu za evropske studije u Klužu, Rumunija. Po profesiji je etnomuzikološkinja i radi na Institutu za kulturnu antropologiju i studije umetnosti u Tirani, Albanija.

Inis je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije (Bez)granični identiteti.

O SMISLU IDENTITETA

„Ja nisam antropolog ili filozof, ali sam kao znatiželjno ljudsko biće, lekar i socijalni radnik, puno razmišljala o identitetima i šta zapravo znači ta reč – identitet.“

Kroz moju kancelariju su prošli mnogi ljudi, tražeći pomoć ili jednostavno savet kako da se snađu u postojećem zdravstvenom sistemu. Njihova imena, priče i imena njihovih bližnjih bila su klasifikovana u mom kompjuteru kao prazan prostor arhiva javne administracije. Imena. Da li je moguće reći da kompjuterizovani identitet u našem savremenom svetu predstavlja sveukupan identitet jedne osobe?

Nijedna od ovih baza podataka ne može pomoći da ljude jednostavno identifujemo kao Srbijance, pri čemu bi sledeće pitanje trebalo da bude: Šta je to zapravo srpski identitet?. Da li je dovoljno biti rođen ili živeti u Srbiji da bi se smatrao Srbinom? Da li je dovoljno posedovati srpski pasoš? Za administraciju jeste.“

...

“...koristim dve reči za našu nacionalnost: jedna je Srbi, a druga Srbijanci. U čemu je razlika? Dakle, Srbijanci su ljudi koji žive u Srbiji, a Srbi su ljudi istog porekla koji žive van administrativnih granica Srbije. Ovo je krucijalna tačka našeg identiteta. Da li smo mi zaista jednaki? Da li mi delimo istu budućnost postojeći i razvijajući se zajedno ili razdvojeno? Ovo pitanje je bilo i još uvek je deo svakog razmišljanja o identitetu.

Postojao je prljavi rat u Jugoslaviji i svet nas je izabrao za loše momke. To sam mnogo puta iskusila tokom raznih putovanja. Jednom sam bila u specijalnoj prostoriji pogranične policije sa tri radnika UNDP-a iz Pakistana i jednim stomatologom iz Irana. Naši profesionalni identiteti nisu mogli da nam pomognu – ono što je bilo bitno je bio samo naš nacionalni identitet.

Ukratko, o identitetima:

- oni su nam nametnuti, ne biramo ih svojevoljno;
- oni su promenljivi, u zavisnosti od jedne do druge kulture;
- postoji toliko identiteta koliko ljudskih bića na planeti;
- svaka osoba poseduje više identiteta.

Kako nam ovo može pomoći? Na taj način da svako treba da radi na sopstvenom razvoju ka ljudskom biću koje prihvata različitosti i uči u susretu sa nekim ili nečim novim, i koje želi da uzme učešće u mnogo važnijim dogadajima nego što su jedino rad i san. Mi utičemo na svet našim mislima, govorom i telom i moramo biti svesni toga da svaka stvar ima svoju posledicu.“

Ivana Šramke je savetnica u oblastima zdravlja i edukacije, kao i sertifikovana UNDP trenerica za projektni menadžment, trenutno u saradnji s univerzitetima regije Južnog Kavkaza. Osnovna polja njenog edukatorskog rada su projektni menadžment za javnu administraciju, sposobnosti međuljudske komunikacije, sposobnosti vođstva, razvoj tima i timskog rada, razvijanje svesti o važnosti timske saradnje među ljudima različitih preokupacija i sposobnosti.

Ivana je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije *(Bez)granični identiteti*.

SUSEDJSKE (I)STORIJE

Ovaj rad teži da istraži formiranje identiteta kao procesa kulturne razmene između susedskih zajednica posmatrajući ga iz perspektive usmene istorije. U vezi sa tim, rad zagovara da je kulturni identitet države ili nacije značajno uslovljen percepcijom od strane drugih, i preispituje kako zvanični diskursi mogu narušiti tu percepciju. Kratkim prikazom priče o mom dedi, pokušaću da demonstriram da usmeno pripovedanje prenošeno kroz generacije često protivreči politički korektnim verzijama i čuva sećanja na prijateljstvo i saosećanja tamo gde su autoriteti koristili govor agresije.

Kasnog novembra 1943. bugarske trupe, koje su se borile na strani Sila Osovina tokom Drugog svetskog rata, poslate su na Kosovo, blizu grada Prištine. Među regrutima je bio i moj deda Gančo Gančev, rođen 1920. u gradu Loveču, na severu centralne Bugarske. Bugarskim trupama, koje su bile iscrpljene i u nemogućnosti da napreduju, naređeno je da se povuku, međutim, tokom napuštanja fronta, moj deda je pogoden u nasumičnoj pucnjavi, i na nekoliko mesta ranjen gelerima koji su mu ozledili levu butinu. Pošto nije mogao da hoda sam, drug ga je odvukao do najbližeg rova, dok su se panika i haos mešali s mirisom krv i toplog gvožđa. Zbog velikog gubitka krvi moj deda se onesvestio, i potom, kada je povratio svest, mogao je da razazna siluete dva muškarca i jedne žene koji su pregledali leševe, tražeći oružje i dragocenosti. Kada su mu prišli, ispostavilo se da su to srpski partizani kojima je moj deda zatražio da ga fotografišu aparatom koji je nosio u ruksaku. Pomogli su mu da ustane i odhoda do njihovog kampa gde su mu previli nogu, i posle nekoliko dana oporavka, otpratili ga do graničnog grada Ćustendila, gde ga je doktor pregledao i demobilizovao. Kao izraz zahvalnosti, moj deda je poklonio svoj srebrni sat jednom od dvojice partizana, dok je fotografija njega kako leži u rovu još uvek u našem porodičnom albumu. Umro je kasnog novembra 2008, tačno šezdeset pet godina nakon što je spašen.

Kada se prisećam ove priče, uvek dodem do sledećih pitanja – Kako pamtim? Da li je zvanična istorija jedina verzija koju moramo uzimati u obzir

kada se pozivamo na prošlost? Kako kolektivni mitovi i sećanja modifikuju našu percepciju „drugih“? Šta će se promeniti?

Rođena 1978, išla sam u školu tokom kasnog socijalizma, koji je već bio narušen lažnom propagandom i apsolutnim nedostatkom posvećenja ideologiji. Nacionalizam razvijan iz opozicije ka otomanskoj vladavini je još uvek bio primenjivan kako bi se istakao kontrast između lokalne i nelokalne kulture. Na časovima istorije hvaljena je bugarska slavna prošlost, pomračena otomanskim represijom i kasnije revitalizovana tokom komunističke ere, dok su susedne zemlje pokrivane velom tištine zbog nerešenih teritorijalnih pitanja i lojalnosti Moskvi. Politika odvojenosti od zapadnog sveta koja je uključivala i nesvrstanu Jugoslaviju, težila je da zanemari sličnosti u običajima, jeziku i kulturi dok je naglašavala bugarsku bliskost Rusiji. Jugoslovenska kulturna politika je takođe isticala jugoslovensku unikatnost u istočnom bloku i okrenula se od svog istočnog suseda koji je zavisio od SSSR-a.

Socijalizam je srušen 1989. ostavljajući mnoga nelagodna pitanja u zvaničnoj istoriji, kao i kulturu disidentskih priča, kao skladište alternativnih odgovora. Bugarsko postsocijalističko društvo se suočilo sa izazovom pregovaranja sa svojom prošlošću kroz reviziju istorije i dopuštanjem da isplivaju nezvanični zapisi iz socijalističkog i presocijalističkog perioda. Tako su, uz potisнута проповедања о логорима за принудни рад, служби Државне безбедности и „Процесу препорода“¹ против бугарских Турака, почеле да се појављују и приče о zajedničкој балканској прошлости и да постављају пitanje о физички близким или непознатим суседима. Српска култура, на пример, са својим православним упориштем и словенским језиком чини се најблиским упркос претходно преценjenim manjim razlikama. Мит о „изабраном народу“, о Златном добу и виктимизација су очигледно играле значајну улогу у националном освећивању на Балкану, али су постали и извор манипулације и политичке propagande u kasnijim periodima. Detaljan pregled obrazovnih

¹ Възродителен процес - процес насилие асимилације над турском мањином у Бугарској у другој половини 1980-тих.

sistema u državama na Balkanu otkriva napore svake od zemalja da podstiče imidž slavne ali nacije-žrtve koja živi na svetoj zemlji, nasuprot imidžu agresivnih i retrogradnih „drugih“. Balkanske zemlje smatrale su identitetu su-

seda veštačkim ili proisteklim iz jedinog originala: sopstvene nacije. I s obzirom na to da je nacionalna bitnost razvijana na osnovu degradiranja najблиžih/ drugih², snaga nacionalnih mitova se povećavala kako se kulturna distanca među zajednicama smanjivala.

Kako možemo dovesti u pitanje monopol države-nacije nad preoblikovanjem etničkih i kulturnih identiteta? Možda bi se zvanične istorije, koje su ojačale nacionalnu koheziju balkanskih zajednica, ali su stigmatizovale razlike i obrisale tragove ne-domaćeg kulturnog uticaja, mogle uporediti s nezvaničnim pričama koje nužno ne osnažuju nacionalni ponos na račun „drugog“, već promovišu univerzalne vrednosti kao što su tolerancija i uzajamnost. Usmeno pripovedanja predstavljaju direktno iskustvo naših predaka koje je preneto sledećoj generaciji i time postaju emotivno obojena i intimna pre nego isključivo patetična. Ove vrednosti bi trebalo da otvore prostor za uvođenje tema uzajamnosti i zahvalnosti, dovodeći u pitanje tradicionalni pristup u međunarodnim odnosima.

² U originalu: closest
(br)other – igra reči
gde „drugi“ mogu biti
„braća“ (prim. prev.)

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Kalina Jordanova je diplomirala i stekla zvanje magistra psihologije na Univerzitetu Sv. Kliment Ohridski u Sofiji, 2002. godine, dok je 2007. magistrirala i na Grupi za Centralno i Jugoistočnoevropske studije na University College London – UCL u Velikoj Britaniji. Njeno profesionalno interesovanje obuhvata oblasti prevencije nasilja, rehabilitacije trauma i posleratnih psihosocioloških fenomena. Trenutno radi kao psihoterapeutkinja za žrtve nasilja, trgovine i torture nad ljudima i bavi se književnim prevodom dela sa srpskog na bugarski jezik.

Kalina je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije *(Bez)granični identiteti*.

PUTUJUĆI BIOSKOP

Ne možeš dotaknuti šta je u mom koferu.
Ako posegneš za slikama,
one nestanu i tvoja ruka
završi na njegovoj strani,
slike se rasprše mazeći tvoju kožu i
isparavajući kao dim.

Vidiš život koji se kreće
po belom prekrivaču,
rođenja i rođendane,
porodice i odmore,
ljubavi i venčanja,
smrti i sahrane.

Gledaš celu naciju
na dugačkom protestnom maršu kako pravi talase,
more ljudi igra uz ulicu.

Čuješ smeh, automobilske trube i pištaljke,
lupanje šerpi i lonaca.
Komadići revolucije uhvaćeni u kaleidoskopu, mozaik uspomena
umesto dnevnika i ništa drugo da se zabeleži.

Nela Milić je producentkinja angažovana u oblasti pozorišnih i vizuelnih umetnosti. Iza nje je petnaest godina duga raznovrsna karijera koja obuhvata umetničko i političko novinarstvo, produkciju umetničkog i dokumentarnog filma i ostvarenje u produkciji i programiranju kulturne industrije. Trenutno je doktorantkinja na Goldsmiths univerzitetu u Londonu (*Goldsmiths University*), gde se bavi proučavanjem grada kao mesta spektakla i kulture protesta. Piše za različite umetničke i sociološke časopise i gostujuća je predavačica na više univerziteta.

Nela je bila jedna od polaznica Međunarodne letnje akademije (*Bezgranični identiteti*).



Između dva stajališta - Ka redefinisanju kulturnog identiteta Srbije

*Pojam nacionalne kulture, koja je nekada smatrana osnovom nacionalne države i njenim najboljim ukrašom, postao je problematičan. Identitarne dezorijentisanosti pothranjene su globalizacijom i evropskom integracijom, kao i migracijama koje su nacionalne države pretvorile u uzburkana multikulturalna društva. Međutim, ukoliko nacionalne kulture uopšte treba da se uliju u amorfnu evropsku kulturu, kakva je njena priroda, profil i perspektiva, kako ona može sačuvati vitalnost i diverzitet svojih komponenti? Himerična slika oficijelne Evrokulture, preterano regulisane i uniformne, blede i dosadne, razlog je zbog koga se svakog vikenda održavaju konferencije i simpozijumi na ovu temu, širom kontinenta, dok većina Evropljana više brine o nezaposlenosti, inflaciji, zločinu i terorizmu nego o „vrednostima i normama“ evropske kulture. **Dragan Klaić****

*Dragan Klaić, Dry the Swamp of Ignorance; European Culture: a Task for the EU, Dutch weekly magazine Vrij Nederland, No 35, 28th August, 2004

KA ODRŽIVOM KULTURNOM IDENTITETU

Kolektivni (društveni i kulturni) identitet određen je kao samosvest pripadnika jedne grupe koja istorijski nastaje i razvija se u zavisnosti od kriterijuma koje ta grupa uspostavlja u odnosima sa drugim društvenim grupama. Stoga je održivi društveni i kulturni identitet neophodan uslov ne samo razvoja već i postojanja svakog savremenog društva. U njegovom odsustvu radi se o agregatu jedinki okupljenih u istom društvenom prostoru, a ne o zajednici koju odlikuje solidarnost uspostavljena na osnovu svesti o pripadanju (V. Y. Mudimbe, 1997). Zato se za sistematske aktivnosti društvenih aktera na stvaranju i održavanju koristi termin *politika identiteta*. Susreće se i sintagma *politička ekonomija identiteta* kojom želi da se naglaši funkcija kolektivnog identiteta kao dobrovoljno prihvaćenog okvira dominacije/kontrole nad distribucijom političke i ekonomske moći od strane pripadnika jednog društva (Bernštajn, 2005). Kolektivni identitet tako postaje osnova legitimacije društvenih elita, koje svoj vodeći položaj u društvu legitimišu argumentima koji su povezani ne toliko sa neposrednim političkim i ekonomskim interesima onih u čije ime vladaju, već pre svega sa autentičnom interpretacijom onoga što predstavlja kulturnu (simboličku) osnovu razlikovanja koja je razlog postojanja bilo koje društvene grupe, odnosno društvene zajednice.

Da bi se ova tvrdnja argumentovala dovoljno je kao okvir analize uzeti nekoliko država nastalih na tlu nekadašnje SFRJ. Od Slovenije i Hrvatske, preko Makedonije do Crne Gore. Sve one su razloge svog uspostavljanja kao društava koja imaju oblik suverene države dokazivale upravo argumentima koji su bili kulturno-istorijski, odnosno identitetski utemeljeni. Pri tom je u svakom pojedinom slučaju korišćen manje-više isti repertoar identifikatora: postojanje sopstvene države u prošlosti (srednji vek i još ranija istorija), crkvena organizacija koja je postojala jednom u prošlosti pa je potom obnovljena, standardni jezik koji se dovoljno razlikuje od onog kojim se služe susedni narodi i, naravno, čitav repertoar simbola (zastava, himna, grb, državni

praznici) koji treba da proces identifikacije učine što je moguće uspešnijim (Rae, H, 2002).

U društвima čije se trajanje, u manje-više neizmenjenom obliku i državno-teritorijalnom okviru meri stolеćima ili bar decenijama, pitanja društvenog i kulturnog identiteta postavljaju se pre svega u odnosu na izazove koje postavlja proces globalizacije koja dovodi u pitanje, u prvom redu, tradicionalne ekonomske, političke i kulturne temelje stabilizovane zajednice. Međutim, u društвima u kojima su i same prepostavke postojanja (granice, državni okviri, oblik vladavine...) u nedavnoj proшlosti više puta dovodene u pitanje, kao što je to slučaj sa većinom zemalja jugoistočne Evrope (uključujući i Srbiju) i nekadašnjeg Sovjetskog Saveza, pitanja identiteta imaju mnogo veći, moglo bi se reći vitalan značaj i pretpostavka su i samog njihovog konstituisanja. Na primeru postsovjetske Rusije može se demonstrirati ono što T. Lahusen označava kao proces "etnicizacije nacije", odnosno proces ute-meljenja zajednice na etničkim osnovama koji su ranije u ime novog "homo sovieticusa" bile namerno potiskivane i relativizovane (T. Lahusen, 1997). Do sličnih zaključaka dolazi i J. Milošević-Đorđević na osnovu empirijskog istraživanja nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji obavljenog 2003, s tim što ona etničke elemente nacionalnog identiteta, kao i neki drugi autori, naziva *primordijalističkim*. Razloge za to ona nalazi u diskontinuitetu (istorijskom, teritorijalnom i državnom) Srbije u prošlom stolеću (J. Milošević-Đorđević, 2005).

U društвima u kojima je proces konstituisanja, čak i samog teritorijalnog okvira države, još uvek u toku – a Srbija tu nesumnjivo spada – društveni i kulturni identitet predstavlja otvoreno pitanje na koje se odgovori traže u okviru strategija koje su koliko stvar izbora samih tih društava, toliko i posledica odnosa snaga i interesa spoljnih činilaca. Problem je utoliko ozbiljniji što – u evropskim, a potom i u globalnim okvirima u poslednja dva stolеća – upravo nacionalni identitet predstavlja osnovni (iako ne jedini) okvir identitetske orijentacije, i označava se kao *vodeći* identitet (E. Smit, 1999).

Uzastopni raspadi državnih zajednica na jugoslovenskom prostoru imali su, bez izuzetka, za rezultat dovodenje u pitanje dotadašnjih identitetskih okvira (H. Rae, 2002). Najpre je nestanak velike Jugoslavije, koja je bila nacionalna država Srba budući da su oni formalno ili faktički bili konstitutivni narod u bar četiri republike (sa izuzetkom Slovenije), na dnevni red stavio otvoreno pitanje njihovog novog manjinskog statusa i identiteta. To je dovelo do međuetničkih sukoba koji su imali obeležje etno-građanskog rata, najpre u Hrvatskoj a potom i u Bosni i Hercegovini. Potom je intenziviran konflikt na Kosovu koji je za rezultat imao intervenciju NATO-a i faktičko izdvajanje Kosova iz sastava Republike Srbije uz otvorene pregovore o njegovom budućem (i konačnom) statusu. U međuvremenu se nekadašnja SR Jugoslavija transformisala u državnu zajednicu Srbije i Crne Gore da bi nakon crnogorskog referenduma u proleće 2006. Crna Gora i Srbija postale dve nezavisne, međunarodno priznate države. To je bio završetak procesa tokom kojeg je Srbija bila u ulozi baštinika identitetskih simbola nekadašnje države. Najpre je i sam naziv SR Jugoslavija ukazivao na kontinuitet sa državom koja više ne postoji. Isto je važilo i za zastavu, himnu, državni grb... Tek 2003. sa nastankom već bivše državne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore nestao je i naziv države koja zapravo nije postojala već petnaestak godina. U međuvremenu su promenjeni zastava, grb i himna. Međutim, simbolički ostaci nekadašnjih identitetskih okvira Jugoslavije prisutni su na dva dokumenta – lične isprave, čija je funkcija u osnovi identitetska jer daju odgovor na pitanje *ko sam ja* – na ličnoj karti i pasošu.

Tako su osnovni konstituenti srpskog društva u istorijski veoma kratkom periodu bili više puta dovođeni u pitanje pa je jasno i da je kolektivni identitet građana Srbije pretrpeo duboke frustracije. Zato je njegovo rekonstruisanje zadatak od prvorazrednog značaja bez koga je nerealistično razmišljati ne samo o održivom razvoju i evropskoj budućnosti, već i o opstanku srpskog društva.

Okvir analize je do sada bio kolektivni identitet građana Srbije onako kako je bio definisan državnim okvirom, i njega treba razlikovati od etničkog identiteta

Srba i ostalih etničkih zajednica koje u Srbiji žive. Taj okvir, međutim, nije ni izdaleka dovoljan ako cilj treba da bude održivi razvoj srpskog društva. Stoga je u nastavku analize društvenog i kulturnog identiteta neophodno poći od temeljne činjenice da je Srbija, kao i skoro sva moderna društva, iznutra pluralizovana po više osnova i da njeni građani pripadaju različitim grupama koje predstavljaju osnovu konstituisanja odgovarajućeg – grupnog identiteta (S. Ting-Tumi, 1999). Pored rodnog, tu je još i etnički identitet, koji uz religijski i regionalni identitet predstavlja osnovu pluralizacije identiteta u svim savremenim društvima. Tome treba dodati i profesionalni identitet, budući da on – kao i sve ostale identitetske pripadnosti – predstavlja osnovu za povezivanje pojedinca i grupe koja se ostvaruje kroz pripadanje profesionalnim (staleškim) i sindikalnim organizacijama. One pak predstavljaju jednu od najvažnijih osnova za razvoj civilnog društva. Najzad, tu je i jedan još širi identitetski okvir čiji razvoj pripada budućnosti koju pokriva ova strategija održivog razvoja. Reč je o evropskom identitetu shvaćenom kao društveni i kulturni identitet.¹

¹ U radu The Demography of Growing European Identities (W. Lutz, S. Kritzinger i V. Skirbekk) objavljenom u oktobru 2006, pokazano je da postotak onih stanovnika EU koji sebe vide(i) kao Evropljane konstantno raste i to iz generacije u generaciju. Za okvir analize su uzete samo članice EU do njenog poslednjeg proširenja, dakle samo one u kojima je nacionalni, odnosno kolektivni identitet uveliko stabilizovan. Može se samo pretpostaviti da bi uključivanje u analizu i novih članica EU pokazalo manji stepen prihvatanja evropskog identiteta upravo zbog toga što se period konsolidacije njihovih kolektivnih/nacionalnih identiteta odvija u neposrednoj prošlosti.

Preveliko oslanjanje na kolektivne identitete, i to u prvom redu one etničke, nosi sobom opasnost ekskluzivizma koji se ispoljava kao etnocentrizam koji, uz potencivanje drugih, u prvi plan stavlja pripadnike svoje etničke grupe ili nacije. To dovodi u pitanje ne samo funkcionisanje, već, ponekad i ponegde, i samo postojanje složenih zajednica koje čine pripadnici više nacija ili etničkih grupa. Reč je o tendenciji koja, kada je dovedena do krajnosti, poprima formu „ubilačkih identiteta“ (A. Maluf, 2003). Za proces nastajanja državnih identiteta i etničke homogenizacije koja je u njegovoj funkciji H. Rae koristi sintagmu „patološka homogenizacija“,

² Tvrđnja da granica države postavlja jedinu legitimnu moralnu granicu (te je otuda logično da svi koji se nalaze izvan te moralne granice, ma na koji način ona bila određena, nemaju nikakvih na moralu zasnovanih obaveza i mogu da budu uklonjeni sa državne teritorije) jedina ima smisla, te je stoga jedino privatljiv "monopol države na pravo da definisiše identitet" (H. Rae, 14: 2002).

čije su manifestacije masovni egzodusi stanovništva u nekada heterogenim složenim državnim tvorevinama² (H. Rae, 2002).

U evropskim (Savet Evrope i EU) i svetskim okvirima (UNESCO) poslednjih desetak godina počinje da preovladava stanovište koji identitet, pogotovo one etničke, nastoji da sagleda u drugaćijem ključu. Reč je o konceptu *kulturnog diverziteta* ili kulturne raznolikosti, koja nasuprot ekskluzivnom shvatanju svog identiteta stavlja dimenziju njegove inkluzivnosti, tj. otvorenosti prema identitetima drugih (T. Benet, 2001). Koncept kulturnog diverziteta izrazito pogoduje manjinskim kulturama jer afirmaže strategije i pravne mehanizme (npr. Konvencija o zaštiti prava manjina i Konvencija o zaštiti i negovanju manjinskih i regionalnih jezika Saveta Evrope i Deklaracija o kulturnom diverzitetu UNESCO-a) koje pogoduju njihovoj zaštiti i unapređenju.

Dimenzija inkluzivnosti u slučaju kolektivnih identiteta, i pogotovo kada je reč o identitetima manjinskih zajednica, dobija na značaju s procesom širenja Evropske Unije. Nastajanje jedinstvenog ekonomskog, političkog i kulturnog prostora, čija je nužna prepostavka krajnje relativizovanje i čak ukidanje državnih granica što omogućuje slobodnu cirkulaciju roba, ideja i ljudi, za rezultat ima: 1. intenzivnu komunikaciju i kulturnu saradnju kultura evropskih naroda, 2. bitno olakšanu komunikaciju između matičnih kultura i kultura manjina koje žive na teritoriji neke druge zemlje. Utoliko su veći problemi zemalja kao što je Srbija koja je samo uključena u proces kvalifikovanja za članstvo u EU.

Zahvaljujući tome što etničke manjine nisu nabrojane u Zakonu o zaštiti nacionalnih manjina iz 2002, već su samo navedene odlike koje jedna grupa treba da poseduje da bi bila smatrana etničkom manjinom, može se prepo-

staviti da proces nastajanja i priznavanja etničkih grupa u Srbiji nije završen. Utoliko Zakon... jeste u funkciji *unmelting pot-a*, jer ne samo da ne sprečava asimilaciju postojećih manjina, već dopušta nastajanje novih manjina. Primeri Rusina/Ukrajinaca, Vlaha/Rumuna i Bunjevaca/Hrvata govore u prilog tome. U slučaju da je Zakon o manjinama ove tri etničke grupe definisao kao manjine čiju maticu predstavljaju Ukrajina, Rumunija ili Hrvatska, one bi bile prinudene da deo svog kulturnog diverziteta (jezik, običaji...) izbrišu i prilagode se kulturi naroda čija im je matičnost dodeljena. Zakonodavac s razlogom nije tako postupio i ostavio je slobodu izbora pripadnicima manjinske grupe. Oni mogu da biraju hoće li se opredeliti za autohtono poreklo ili će priznati postojanje matice. U sva tri slučaja se pokazalo da obe mogućnosti imaju dovoljan broj pristalica tako da nastaju oblici kulturnog i civilnog organizovanja u okviru svake od njih. Još je važnije da nema ekskluzivizma tipa i/ili već se javljaju udruženja koja okupljaju zagovornike i autohtone i matične opcije (B. Stojković i drugi, 2004).

Pored manjina koje su nastale na neki od tradicionalnih, prinudnih načina, koji uključuju masovna preseljenja ili promene granica nakon dobijenih/izgubljenih ratova, i koje su manje-više koncentrisane na jednom delu teritorije zemlje-domaćina, javljaju se i nove manjine. Njih čine oni koji su se na emigraciju odlučili uglavnom iz ekonomskih razloga. Za razliku od tradicionalnih manjina, oni, po pravilu, nisu koncentrisani na delu teritorije (kao npr. Srbi u Madarskoj ili Madari u Srbiji), već su disperzovani na mnogo širem prostoru. Reč je o dijasporičnoj manjini – Srbima, koji uglavnom žive u zemljama zapadne Evrope, SAD-u, Kanadi i Australiji. Problem očuvanja izvornog (srpskog) kulturnog identiteta se za njih postavlja na osoben način zbog toga što su, sa jedne strane, izloženiji asimilaciji jer ne žive u okruženju svojih sunarodnika, a sa druge strane, po pravilu su natprosečno obrazovani, što znači da raspolažu većim kulturnim kapitalom koji nose iz postojbine, a to je brana asimilaciji. To ne važi za njihove potomke, koji su socijalizovani u novoj sredini pa je proces njihove asimilacije mnogo intenzivniji (S. Džouns, 1999).

U društvima kao što je naše, u kojima se prethodni (komunistički) sistem vrednosti u potpunosti raspao, a novi, gradanski sistem vrednosti jedva da se i nazire, religija iznova nastoji da se uspostavi kao istovremeni osnovni konstituent kulturnog identiteta i osnova legitimisanja društva. Otuda povratak pravoslavlju. Nacionalna religija tako postaje deo kulturne mape koja predstavlja konsenzualnu sliku društva, dakle onu o kojoj postoji opšta saglasnost. Mediji je primajući znanju i publikuju u prvom redu vesti (i komentare) koji se u tu mapu uklapaju, dok se informacije koje dovode u pitanje konsenzualnost kulturne mape prečutkuju, marginalizuju ili tumače tako da mogu da se uklope u unapred datu značenjsku matricu i maksimalno smanje ili čak eliminišu neslaganje. Malo je verovatno, na primer, da će humanitarna akcija neke religijske zajednice (osim SPC koja se time uglavnom ne bavi) dobiti odgovarajuće mesto u medijima, jer se ona ne uklapa u negativni stereotip o sektama koji je već uspostavljen.

Reč je o problematizovanju kolektivnog identiteta srpskog društva, koji se definiše kao suma identifikacija od kojih svaka pojedinačno nema podjednaku težinu u odgovoru na pitanje: ko smo mi? To znači da kulturni identitet treba shvatiti kao kontigenciju (skup relativno trajnih identifikatora), a ne kao esenciju (koherentnu i stabilnu celinu).

Najzad, i sredstva masovnog komuniciranja su od veoma velikog značaja za oblikovanje, afirmaciju i održanje društvenog i kulturnog identiteta. To je demonstrirano tokom 1990-ih kada su državni elektronski kanali bili sistematski korišćeni kao promoteri nacionalističke politike. Nakon 2000. njihova uloga je umnogome izmenjena. Privatizovanje elektronskih medija – koje je započeto pa zaustavljeno – za rezultat ima njihovu profitnu orientaciju, i marginalizaciju programskih sadržaja koji pripadaju kulturi, koliko onoj savremenoj toliko i kulturnom nasledju. Utoliko je značajnija uloga javnog radiodifuznog servisa, čiji su način finansiranja (preplata a ne zarada od advertajzinga) i programski spektar (dva nacionalna TV i dva radio kanala i pokrajinski TV i radio kanali u Vojvodini) inicijalno oblikovni tako da on ima pozitivnu identitetsku funkciju kako u odnosu na nacionalni identitet tako i na identitete manjinskih zajednica.

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KULTURNA POLITIKA, NACIONALIZAM I EVROPSKE INTEGRACIJE*

Ključne reči: *kulturna politika, nacionalizam, multikulturalnost, dijaspora, kulturni kanon*

„Svaka definicija nacije koja se služi terminom zajedničke kulture predstavlja još jednu mrežu koja donosi bogat ulov: Ljudska istorija jeste i nastavlja da bude dobro obdarena kulturnim diferencijama. Kulturne granice su ponekad oštре, a ponekad nejasne; sheme su ponekad uočljive i jednostavne, a ponekad neuhvatljive i složene.“ (Gelner, 1997)

„Nacionalizam nije ono što izgleda, a ponajmanje nije ono što sam sebi izgleda da jeste. Kulture za koje on tvrdi da ih brani i oživljava, često su njegovi sopstveni izumi ili su izmenjene do neprepoznatljivosti. Pa ipak, nacionalistički princip kao takav, za razliku od svakog svog specifičnog oblika i individualno osobenih besmislica koje može propovedati, ima veoma duboke korene u našoj zajedničkoj trenutnoj situaciji, uopšte nije kontingenstan i neće lako biti opovrgnut.“ (Gelner, 1997)

Interes centralnoevropskih država za umetnost i kulturu je bio istorijski uslovljen. Značaj kulture i umetnosti je u vremenu nacionalnih budenja bio toliki da su novoformirane države-nacije (Poljska, Mađarska, Srbija...) umetnike, a posebno književnike (Petefi, Mickijević, Vuk Karadžić...), stavile na pijedestal „očeva nacije“, a jezik i kulturu cenile kao uslov očuvanja nacionalne samobitnosti i državne nezavisnosti. Socijalistički period je dalje doprineo da se ove veze između države i umetnosti još čvrše definišu, zloupotrebljavajući umetnost kao instrument ideologije. Doduše, sovjetcizacija kulture doprinosila je razgradnji specifičnosti nacionalnih kulturnih identiteta (Ukrajina, Belorusija, baltičke zemlje...) što je u zemljama koje su se 1989. osloboidle sovjetskog uticaja dovelo do nagle suprotne

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reakcije – ponovnog oživljavanja zahteva da se kultura sagledava pre svega kao pitanje identiteta. To je opet dovelo do toga da se književnici – nekadašnji disidenti – uključe u političke procese, a mnogi od njih, u prvom posttotalitarnom trenutku, dođu i na čelo svojih država (Dragićević Šešić, 1999) – Václav Havel u Čehoslovačkoj, a zatim Češkoj, Arpad Genc u Mađarskoj¹ – ili na različite pozicije u okviru vlade (obično ministri kulture ili informisanja): Milan Lukes u Češkoj, Nikolai Gubenko (SSSR), Izabela Čivinska² u Poljskoj, dok se albanski pisci dele između aktivizma u partijama na vlasti (Kic Blushi, Drter Agoli) ili partijama opozicije (Reshet Tozaj, Arben Imami)³...

Slično se desilo i u bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama koje su nakon osamostaljivanja pitanje povratka nacionalnim kulturnim vrednostima i specifičnim lokalnim tradicijama ispostavljale kao prvi zadatak kulturne politike, videvši u tome istovremeno i mogućnost evropskih integracija (dokazujući da je njihova nacionalna tradicija pre svega zapadno-evropska, oslonjena na katolicizam i evropski duh razvijan od renesanse preko baroka i prosvetiteljstva do moderne). Ipak, iako su umetnici bili aktivno uključivani u oblikovanje nacionalističkog javnog mnjenja, relativno mali broj je stekao visoke političke pozicije (Antun Vrdoljak i Hrvoje Hitrec u Hrvatskoj).

U Srbiji su ovi procesi bili delimično drugačiji prevashodno stoga što je raspad Jugoslavije doživljen kao cepanje nacionalnog korpusa („pogubno po srpstvo“), a ne kao prilika za „osamostaljenje“. Vlast suštinski nije

¹ Značaj Arpada Genga kao umetnika ali i političke figure pokazuje i činjenica da je čak pet različitih izvođenja njegove drame Medeja bilo izabrano za program festivala Mittelfest u gradu Cividale del Friuli, Italija 1996. godine. Svi pet predstava dolazile su iz centralne Europe.

² “Ja sam umetnica na odsustvu od odsustva i vratiću se svojoj profesiji kada za to dođe vreme. Čak i sada se osećam kao pozorišna rediteljka koja posmatra proces spolja. Pozorište je malo ministarstvo kulture, a ministarstvo kulture je jedno veliko pozorište. Ponuda za posao je bila iznenadnja, ali nisam mogla da propustim šansu da učestvujem u nečemu tako uzbudljivom: da budem u sred procesa nastajanja istorije, čak i da umešam svoje prste.” Isabella Czywinska (EUROMASKE, n.1/1990, str. 23)

³ Svi su oni očekivali na početku promena da će budući predsednik biti Ismail Kadare.

promenjena. Ipak, Dobrica Ćosić, kao disident nacionalista, sa oreolom žrtve socijalizma, postaje 1992. godine predsednik Jugoslavije, a Vuk Drašković, sa sličnih početnih nacionalističkih pozicija, stvara političku stranku Srpski pokret obnove, ali nastavlja disidentsku poziciju, koja se sada očituje u proevropskom stavu, što irritira tadašnji režim do te mere da je na njega organizованo i nekoliko atentata. Brojni su i drugi književnici u politici: Slobodan Rakitić, Brana Crnčević, te *Udruženje književnika Srbije* – adresa Udruženja, Francuska 7, postaje simbol nacionalističke kulturne politike i diseminacije jezika mržnje (uz Radio-televiziju Srbije i dnevne listove *Politika* i *Politika Ekspres*). To naravno dovodi do novog disidentstva – formira se *Beogradski krug*, a kasnije i *Srpsko književno društvo* i *Forum književnika* (odakle se opet regrutuje nova generacija umetnika i književnika aktivna u političkom životu nakon promena 2000. godine).

⁴ Mali iskorak predstavljao je period početkom 1995. godine kada su raspisani konkursi i kada se pokušalo sa promenom vrednosti putem TV kampanje „Lepše je sa kulturom“ koja nije imala nacionalna obeležja, već je za simbol uzeta figurina iz Lepenskog vira (neolit), a glas kampanji dao poznatiti glumac građanske i demokratske orijentacije – Ljuba Tadić. Međutim, avgusta 1995. iz Hrvatske stiže u Srbiju nekoliko stotina hiljada izbeglica, i svi pokrenuti projekti i programi bivaju zaustavljeni.

⁵ www.culturalpolicies.net, pristupljeno 20. septembra 2009.

⁶ “Heritage reminds us that we belong” – Nasleđe nas opominje da mi pripadamo (Samuel Jones, 2009).

S druge strane, u Srbiji, traganje i borba za „povratkom“ nacionalnim korenima i identitetu značila je, pre svega, oživljavanje slovenskih i pravoslavnih duhovnih veza, te stalno pozivanje na bizantijsku tradiciju i svetosavlje. Istovremeno, deo srpske kulturne javnosti tokom devedesetih godina XX veka pokušavao je da se uključi u procese evropskih integracija ističući zajedničke korene evropskih kultura i nužnost da se Srbija okrene budućnosti koja može biti samo evropska. To je dovelo do polarizacije kulturne javnosti i do stalnih oscilacija u konceptualizaciji kulturnih politika koje su devedesetih godina zastupale isključivo prvu opciju⁴, dok su u prvoj deceniji XXI veka nekoliko puta menjane orientacije u zavisnosti od ideologije stranaka koje su formirale vlast, a posebno onih koje su upravljale sektorima obrazovanja i kulture⁵.

Smisao kulturne politike jeste *očuvanje i razvoj kulturne baštine*⁶ i identiteta, ali danas ne više shvaćenog kao monolitnog, već pluralnog kulturnog identiteta – dakle, kulturnih identiteta – što omogućava ne samo suživot, već i dalji razvoj svih kulturnih procesa i većinskih i manjinskih grupa na jednoj teritoriji. Međutim, identiteti se ne čuvaju samo zaštitom, već pre svega podrškom kulturne politike *optimalnom razvoju stvaralaštva* u jednoj sredini jer samo novim vrednostima dela prethodnih generacija dobijaju smisao i značaj. A tek treći zadatak kulturne politike – *širenje krugova participacije u kulturi* (inkluzivnost) – istinski realizuje misiju očuvanja nacionalnih identiteta jer to onda podrazumeva da su kulturne vrednosti deo svakodnevice najšireg kruga ljudi. Stoga su ova tri zadatka kulturne politike u međusobnoj interakciji i tek njihovim ostvarivanjem izbegavaju se zamke identitarnih politika koje vode tzv. *ubilačkim identitetima* (Amin Maluf).

Promjenjeni diskursi kulturne politike svedoče o promenama perspektiva u savremenoj Evropi. Koncept države-nacije⁷ zamenjen je pojmom multikulturalne države koja u transkulturnoj Evropi podržava kulturnu različitost i ostvarivanje prava na kulturu pre svega na teritoriji za koju kao država ima odgovornost, a ne u odnosu na dominantnu etničku grupu (Robins K.). Doduše, ovaj teritorijalno zasnovan koncept kulturne politike (Dragićević M. i Dragojević S.) dovodi se u pitanje i u nordijskim zemljama u kojima trenutno vladajuće stranke ponovo vraćaju na scenu pitanje stvaranja nacionalnog kulturnog kanona (Duelund P., 2008), tj. etnički zasnovane kulturne politike. Očito je da su trenutno u Evropi dva procesa na delu u domenu kulture – onaj koji želi ostvarenje Europe kulturnih raznolikosti tako što će potcrtati specifičnosti nacionalne

⁷ Ipak se mora reći da je ovaj koncept i dalje jak u nasledenom institucionalnom sistemu. Tako je Venecijansko bijenale organizovano da se u paviljonima predstavljaju države, te je veliki problem izazvao zahtev Fonda za otvoreno društvo da se u okviru Bijenala organizuje i prvi paviljon romskih umetnika iz celog sveta. Ovo je bio presedan koji je Bijenale prihvatio zbog „političke korektnosti“ u dekadi Roma, a da je pri tom iskazalo strahove šta ako kurdska umetnici ispostave zahtev za posebnim paviljonom i ako se baskijski umetnici odluče za isto. Ipak, poslednjih desetak godina primetne su promene u institucionalnom sistemu i u kulturnoj politici, pa danas postaje sve više norma reprezentacija raznolikosti identiteta unutar jedne države-nacije.

⁸ Od XVI veka do danas, neprekidno traju iseljavanja sa područja centralne i istočne Europe. U poslednjih sedamdeset godina bilo je i nekoliko velikih „talasa”: Mađari 1956., Česi 1968., Poljaci i Rusi 1980-tih godina, gradani bivše Jugoslavije, a posebni Bosni i Hercegovine i Srbije 1990-tih, učinili su literaturu u egzilu značajnim korpusom istočnoevropske literature. Ona je čak krucijalna kad je u pitanju poljska kultura.

kulture (izgradnjom kanona), i onaj koji želi Evropu kulturnih raznolikosti i unutar svoje sopstvene države-nacije, ističući neophodnost uključivanja i akulturacione razmene sa svim manjinskim grupama koje žive na njenoj teritoriji.

Postoji, u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi, kao i na Kavkazu, još jedan značajan akter kulturne politike. Činjenica da su tokom XIX i XX veka brojne istočnoevropske kulture često uspevale da sačuvaju svoj kulturni identitet kroz dijasporu (politički nametnute migracije, ekonomske migracije)⁸, kao i da danas zapadnoevropske države afričkoj i azijskoj dijaspori u svojim zemljama daju sva prava očuvanja i zaštite sopstvenih nacionalnih identiteta, ponovo je aktuelizovala pitanje značaja dijaspore u savremenom kulturnom životu evropskih zemalja. Najviše, doduše, u postsocijalističkim zemljama (Jermenija, Letonija itd.) ali i u nekim „regionima“ zapadne Evrope, regionima iz kojih su se iseljavali stanovnici tokom XIX i XX veka zbog ekonomije, ali i etničke neravnopravnosti (Irska, Baskija itd.). Nova migraciona kretanja još više usložnjavaju ovo pitanje jer zajednice u dijaspori više nisu koncentrisane na određene teritorije, već su rasute širom sveta.

Dakle, međunarodne odnose na početku XXI veka karakterišu i procesi koji vode stvaranju sistema sveta (Tjeri de Monbrial, 2006), ali i veliki stepen neizvesnosti i straha od globalizacije koja, dakle, menja i ulogu dijaspore. Velike teorije nestaju, zamenjuju ih novi praktični modeli – novi inženjering međunarodnih odnosa. Ovi odnosi su u domenu kulture prešli put od spontanih akulturacionih procesa preko politike dominacije (kolonijalizma, namerne germanizacije, mađarizacije itd.) do kulturne razmene, saradnje, te danas i do novih oblika partnerstava i umrežavanja koja spajaju više ne toliko države koliko pojedince i grupe u različitim sre-

dinama. U tom smislu uloga dijaspore dobija novi značaj u međunarodnim odnosima jer kroz organizacije civilnog društva, uključujući se u različite mreže, programe i projekte, može imati veći značaj od zvanične kulturne politike u domenu međunarodnih odnosa koja se vodi politikama javnog sektora kroz multilateralne i bilateralne kodifikovane oblike saradnje.

Aktuelnost ovog pitanja u Srbiji podvlači činjenica da ne postoji konsenzus oko poimanja kulture ni u okviru nacionalne paradigmе ni u okviru koncepta društvenog razvoja. Te oscilacije u razumevanju vrednosti, koje su u osnovi kulturnog identiteta, ilustruju oscilacije u govorima održavanim na Vukovim saborima od tridesetih godina XX veka do danas (Đedović D.). Delo Vuka Karadžića jedan je od temelja upravo širokog i diverzifikovanog srpskog kulturnog identiteta, međutim, u svakom istorijsko-političkom periodu to delo je tumačeno iz različitih uglova: iz tzv. svesrspske (Kraljevina Jugoslavija), usko etničko srpske (II svetski rat i devedesete godine XX veka) ili socijalne paradigmе (u vreme SFRJ), da bi Meša Selimović analizirao samo deo kontroverzi, a i danas stoji otvoreno za različita tumačenja u Srbiji, i posebno u regionu.

„Od prvih dana Vukove borbe za reformu jezika i pravopisa pa sve do našeg vremena, naučnici, pisci, kulturni radnici i političari uporno se opredeljuju i izjašnjavaju za Vuka i njegova shvatanja o jeziku i pravopisu, ili ustaju protiv njih. To konfrontiranje, ne prestaje više od sto godina (...) Razlozi prihvatanja ili odbijanja vukovskog, narodskog, u osnovi seljačkog jezika, različiti su u raznim vremenskim razdobljima: u prvim decenijama XIX veka to je deo borbe za stvaranje nacije i slobodne srpske države; u vreme Nedićeva, a pogotovo Skerlićevo, počeci evropeizacije i intenzivnije urbanizacije Srbije pokrenuli su proces gradanske emancipacije i u ovoj sferi; u naše vreme, akumulirana duhovna i kulturna iskustva kao i neophodnost dostizanja evropskog pa i svetskog nivoa, zahtevaju bogatiji, razuđeniji, elastičniji jezik, sposoban da izražava složenu sveukupnost života i sveta a ne samo njegovu živopisnost, nijanse i prelaze a ne samo opšte celine, unutrašnji vid stvari a ne samo njihovu vanjsku sliku, višu i suptilniju or-

ganizaciju misli i apstrakcije a ne samo njihov elementarni izraz. Tako je spor oko jezika oživljavao uvek u prekretnim vremenima, kad se nešto bitno menjalo u našem društvenom životu.

Jedna sumarna rekapitulacija ovih borbi, prenja, su-protstavljanja, često surovih, gotovo uvek oštih, nije naodmet ni danas, kad pitanje jezika našeg vremena postaje veoma aktuelno.”⁹ (Selimović M., 1987)

⁹ Tekst je pisan 1967. godine, *primedba autora*

¹⁰ „Uverljiv način predstavljanja društvene stvarnosti“ (Robins, 2008).

Nacionalizacija kulture do koje je došlo tokom 1990-tih, a koja je počela još 1980-tih u tzv. periodu „nacionalne brige“, dovela je do nacionalne homogenizacije koja je kulturnu raznolikost videla kao problem i otvorila put ka političkom populizmu (Popov N.) i kasnijem „etnički čistom“...

Nacionalizacija je danas još više podvučena idealizacijom nacionalnog kulturnog integriteta, nacionalnog okvira kao sigurnosti¹⁰ (Robins, K. 2008) i uvodenjem samog termina nacionalno u svakodnevni život (nacionalna televizija, nacionalni dnevnik, emisija „Stanje nacije“, nacionalna ustanova itd.) Time se u stvari pokušava uspostaviti odmak prema tzv. „nenacionalnom“ periodu, dakle prema Jugoslaviji, posebno onoj socijalističkoj. Politika sećanja, politika očuvanja nasleda i politika identiteta danas u Srbiji zanemaruju i svesno brišu socijalističko naslede, čak i ono devetnaestovekovno (Samouprava Kragujevac). Barokno srpsko nasleđe Vojvodine se zanemaruje i „vizantizira“ (kapija manastira Krušedol postavljena 2009. godine, sagrađena je u stilu u kome je sagradena crkva manastira Žiče, i odudara i formom i bojom od baroka same manastirske crkve).

U procesu rekonstruisanja nacionalnog identiteta do koga dolazi širom Balkana dovode se u pitanje i naučno-istorijske interpretacije (npr. dolaska Slovena na Balkan, porekla Albanaca itd.), naučna utemeljenost

srpskohrvatskog jezika kao jednog sa više različitih jezičkih varijanti, postojanje određenih manjina i pravo na njihovu samoidentifikaciju (Vlasi u Srbiji i Rumuniji, Cincari u Rumuniji, Makedonci u Grčkoj itd.), a stvaraju se novi mitovi i nove zablude (paradigmatičan je primer prisvajanja Aleksandra Makedonskog i antičkih Makedonaca od strane savremene makedonske države). Nacionalnim manjinama se daje mogućnost da štite svoj folklor i očuvaju jezik, te je njihova samoidentifikacija često vrlo daleko od modernog identiteta njihove matice u savremenom trenutku, a časopisi podjednako neutraktivni i u zemljama u kojima nastaju i u njihovoj matici.

Politika zaborava je deo zvaničnih politika mnogih država (genocid nad Jermenima u Turskoj, građanski rat u Grčkoj, zverstva četnika u Srbiji – teme su o kojima se u tim zemljama ne govori), a politikom promovisanja i reprezentacije „nacionalne“ umetničke produkcije kulturna politika nastoji da tehnikratski doprinese „nacionalizaciji“ kulturnog identiteta. U toj politici identiteta ponovo se konstruiše tradicija, a da se pri tom stalno poziva na nova istraživanja, posebno zanemarenih istorijskih perioda (srpsko srednjovekovlje), na istorijska prava (Mađarska: pokret „64 županije“ koji polaže istorijsko pravo na 64 nekadašnje mađarske županije, od kojih je veliki deo danas u Rumuniji, Srbiji, Slovačkoj...), međunarodno pravo (Srbija prema Kosovu), na tzv. ličnosti žrtve (kanonizacija Stepinca u Hrvatskoj, potraga za grobom Draže Mihajlovića u Srbiji) itd.

Kada je „potrebno“ preskaču se i određeni istorijski periodi, pa se tako danas Srbija vraća ktitorskoj srednjovekovnoj praksi, a u potpunosti se potiskuje devetnaestovekovna tradicija zadužbinarstva. Tome mnogo doprinose i delovi dijaspore, posebno oni koji su u traumatičnim periodima napuštali zemlju, a onda gradili mitove i politiku sećanja oko određenih aspekata „velike“ nacionalne istorije, što lako vodi nacionalnoj megalomaniji i ksenofobiji, kao što je pokazao Jan Juzef Lipski u svom tekstu „Dve otadžbine – dva patriotizma“.

S druge strane, deo dijaspore kao i deo kulturne javnosti u svim zemljama Balkana rade na procesima evropeizacije kulture kroz evropeizaciju kulturne politike ukazujući da je uostalom nacionalni identitet u evropskim zemljama oblikovan u XIX veku zasnovan na četiri stuba od kojih su dva zajednička: grčko antičko naslede i italijanska renesansa (Makuljević N., 2006), a druga dva specifična: jezik (ponekad i alfabet) i etnički folklor. Tako su svi simboli novih nacija-država od XIX veka do danas preuzimali alegorijske, simboličke i epske reprezentacije uobičajene u „starijeformiranim evropskim kulturama“ i svoj obrazovno-kulturni sistem naslonile na evropsku tradiciju u svim domenima umetnosti. Istorija kulture u Srbiji pokazuje kako je orijentalne orkestre i instrumente zamenio češki Šlezingerov orkestar, kako su, relativno brzo, formirani muzeji, biblioteke, teatri, čitaonice, škole, sve po zapadno-evropskom uzoru – a u cilju stvaranja ustanova koje „reprezentuju“ nacionalni kulturni identitet.

Bugarski teoretičar Aleksandar Kjosef, provocirajući intelektualno javno mnenje Balkana koje usvojene evropske vrednosti ne dovodi u pitanje, ali danas širi strah i paniku i od globalizacije i evropskih integracija, uvodi termin *samokolonizirajuće prakse* da bi pokazao da su akulturacioni procesi postojali u svim periodima kulturne istorije Balkana i često bili deo svesne odluke kulturne javnosti (upravo kroz pomenuto uspostavljanje školskih sistemna po ugledu na zapadnoevropske itd). Međutim, fetišizacija folklorizma i nacionalne autentičnosti, samobitnosti, koja se više podržava u rečima no u praksi, nije uspela da doprinese nacionalizaciji svakodnevnog života koji je u najvećem broju zemalja jugoistočne Evrope izrazito sličan (dakle, hibridan) jer je plod vekovnih međusobnih uticaja (folklor, porodične svečanosti, kuhinja, vrednosti i sl.) Ovi preklapajući balkanski identiteti ipak se mogu koristiti i u praksama nacionalne identifikacije, iako kroz dela savremene umetničke produkcije objektivno doprinose daljem širenju jednoznačne slike Balkana (npr. Kusturica, Bregović, a na BITEF-u 2009. paradigmatična je bila predstava „Bure baruta“ u izvođenju nemačkog pozorišta i režiji Dimitra Gočeva, bugarskog emigranta).

Da li postoji mogućnost da nova kulturna politika, koja više ne bi bila ni samo etnički ni samo teritorijalno zasnovana, koja bi se gradila u prekograničnom dijalogu većinskog stanovništva sa ove i one strane granice, kao i manjinskog stanovništva koje bi takođe razvijalo svoje prekogranične oblike saradnje – uključi i disperziranu dijasporu u globalnom svetu, dijasporu koja s jedne strane čuva sećanje na ponekad zaboravljene kulturne vrednosti (iz vremena kada su njihovi preci napuštali domovinu), a s druge, bivajući uključena svojim životom i radom u različite razvojne procese savremenog sveta, može u velikoj meri da doprinese transferu znanja i oblikovanju novih strategija delovanja u kulturnoj praksi. Još je Jovan Skerlić 1905. godine uočio da postoje tri modela kulturne politike. Prvi model je model indiferentnosti – umetnik je slobodan u slobodnoj zemlji i tradicija se čuva i stvara i u odnosu na to što sami umetnici žele i u odnosu na ono u čemu je građanstvo spremno da učestvuje (tržište). Drugi model podrazumeva jaku državu koja upravlja umetnošću – u pitanju je i tradicionalni, a i socijalistički model. Tek treći model čini se modernim i u današnjem smislu reči jer podrazumeva slobodnog umetnika i slobodnu kulturu u državi koja podržava svojom kulturnom politikom prakse i tendencije koje usvaja i deli kompetentna kulturna javnost. To dakle znači da će podrška biti onoliko diverzifikovana koliko i sama kulturna javnost, te da bi ukjučivanje dijaspore i svih manjinskih grupa u aktivno javno mnjenje stvorilo uslove za ostvarivanje istinske kulturne raznolikosti uz očuvanje i razvoj identiteta.

Oblikovanje javnosti i stvaranje prostora za javne debate zahteva kompleksan i slobodan medijski sistem, autonomne ustanove kulture koje bi svojim programima vodile kulturnu politiku „odozdo“ (Dragičević Šesić, 2006), i takav obrazovni sistem u kome bi podjednako mesto bilo dato i očuvanju sećanja i produkciji novih znanja. Tek kada se unutar jedne države i jedne kulture stvore uslovi za razvoj i produkciju novih znanja, stvaraju se i okolnosti za ravnopravno učešće u kulturi sveta (Lečner i Boli, 2006). Tu ne može pomoći kulturna diplomacija, ma kako obrazovana i profesionalna bila, jer je ona ograničena načinima i mogućnostima međudržavnog komuniciranja. Pojedinci ili grupe u dijaspori imaju svu

slobodu stvaranja mreža ili ulaska u postojeće mreže u kojima će otvarati put akterima koji deluju danas u Srbiji da reprezentuju svoja ostvarenja pre svega kao ostvarenja kulture ili nauke, a tek zatim kao ostvarenja koja su deo nacionalnog kulturnog koda.

Kada se oslobođimo romantičarskog predubedjenja da će nas u svetu najbolje predstavljati „nacionalno specifično“: folklor, Balkan kao žanr (Daković N, 2009), tradicionalna kulturna baština (sakralna srednjovekovna umetnost) itd, već najznačajnija i najbolja ostvarenja koja su relevantna u svetskim okvirima (poezija Vaska Pope uvek je imala bolju recepciju od M. Bećkovića i drugih mnogo popularnijih pesnika u Srbiji koji su negovali tradicionalistički diskurs), tek tada će se stvoriti uslovi za istinsko uključivanje Srbije u međunarodne kulturne tokove, tokove saradnje, razmene ali i tržišne ekonomije kulture.

Istovremeno, mora se voditi računa i da nacionalistički diskurs kulturne politike i prakse dalje ne izoluje zemlju što je očevidno kada je u pitanju Jermenija u kojoj i unutar zemlje i u dijaspori još uvek preovlađuje diskurs žrtve, a kulturna politika sve snage, i finansijske i druge, usmerava ka očuvanju jermenske baštine dok se spomenici i nasleđe drugih ignorisu i zaboravljuju. Slična je situacija u sve tri kavkaske zemlje u kojima etnicitet preovlađuje u karakterisanju ličnosti umetnika, te je tako nasleđe Sergeja Paradžanova slavljeno u Jermeniji u kojoj je proveo samo dve poslednje godine života, a zapostavlja se u Gruziji odakle je porekлом, i u Azerbejdžanu, čiju je kulturu iskreno poštovao i promovisao.

¹¹ Prognan sa ostalim banatskim Nemcima kao dete. Postao je počasni član Vojvođanske akademije 2006. godine, ali njegovo delo još uvek nije poznato i integrисано у kulturnе процесе у Србији. <http://vanu.org.rs/page.php?84>

Ovakvih primera ima mnogo i na Balkanu s tim što je tu češće reč o preuzimanju i svojatanju (kada su u pitanju umetnici koji pripadaju većinskim narodima sa ovih prostora poput Meše Selimovića, Danila Kiša, Vladana Desnice, Marina Držića itd), a zaboravljuju i potpuno ignorisu umetnici sa ovog područaja koji pripadaju manjinskim nacijama (Robert Hamerstiel, austrijski slikar, porekлом iz Vršca¹¹, tur-

ski pesnici iz Užica, poput sufijskog pesnika Sabita Alaudina Užičanina¹² ili narodnog tribuna, hroničara Šejha Mehmeda Užičanina¹³ – itd).

Nacionalizam u kulturnoj politici ignorisao je i nasleđe i doprinos drugih kultura. Naša brojna dijaspora u Izraelu više kontaktira s jevrejskom zajednicom u Srbiji no s kulturnom javnošću kao takvom. Tek ulaskom medunarodnih fondacija muzeji u Srbiji su počeli, na njihov podsticaj, da oblikuju multikulturalnu sliku naših gradova, no ona je i danas više data u specifičnim izložbama¹⁴ no što za nju ima mesta u stalnoj postavci¹⁵. U gradskim muzejima u Srbiji, u Boru, Negotinu... tek segmentom folklora (nošnja) ukazuje se na postojanje vlaškog stanovništva, dok muzeji u drugim gradovima namerno potiskuju sećanje na manjne koje su nekada živele ili još žive na tim prostorima. Samo najobrazovaniji deo kulturne javnosti zna koji je doprinos Cincara ili Jevreja pozorišnom i kulturnom životu Srbije. Drugačije etničko poreklo je često prikriveno u istorijama umetnosti, retko stoga što to sam umetnik nije smatrao bitnim, a češće jer to kulturni radnici nisu želeli da otkriju, i što je poželjna kulturna istorija bila istorija jednog, sabornog naroda.

Zaključak

“Kultura nas ukorenjuje u našu prošlost i omogućuje nam da zamislimo i kreiramo sopstvenu budućnost.” (S. Džons, 2009)

Strah nacionalista od evropskih integracija nerealan je i iracionalan jer je zasnovan na mitskom mišljenju, na strahovima ali i osećanju megalomanije – jedinstvenosti sopstvenog naroda. A jedan od najvećih zavodljivih narati-

¹² http://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabit_Alaudin_U%C5%BEi%C4%8Danic

¹³ http://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%A0ejh_Mehmed_U%C5%BEi%C4%8Danic

¹⁴ Jedna novosadska priča – Nemci našeg grada, Muzej Grada Novog Sada, septembar 2008.

¹⁵ I muzej u Temišvaru ponosno pokazuje svoju novu postavku koja prikazuje Temišvar kao rumunski, nemački i mađarski grad. Na pitanje kako muzej odsljikava prisustvo Srba i Roma u istoriji Temišvara, direktor odgovara da su Srbi uglavnom seosko stanovništvo te da bi to moglo imati mesta u Etnografskom muzeju, kao i kad su u pitanju Romi. (intervju voden marta 2007)

¹⁶ „To Evropa ne zna (...) Ona ništa ne zna osim onog što joj Židovi pruže kao znanje. Ona ništa ne veruje osim onog što joj Židovi zapovede da veruje. Ona ne ume ništa da ceni kao vrednost dok joj Židovi ne postave svoj kantar za meru vrednosti. Njeni najučeniji sinovi su bezbožnici (ateisti), po receptu Židova. Njeni najveći naučnici uče da je priroda glavni bog, i da drugog Boga izvan prirode nema, i Evropa to prima. Njeni političari kao mesečari u zanosu govore o jednakosti svih verovanja i neverovanja. Sva moderna gesla evropska sastavili su Židi, koji su Hrista raspeli: i demokratiju, i štrajkove, i socijalizam, i ateizam, i toleranciju svih vera, i pacifizam, i sveopštú revoluciju, i kapitalizam, i komunizam. (...) Za čuđenje je da su se Europeji, potpuno predali Židovima, tako da židovskom glavom misle, židovske programe primaju, židovsko hristoborstvo usvajaju, židovske laži kao istine primaju, židovska gesla kao svoja primaju, po židovskom putu hode i židovskim ciljevima služe.“ (Velimirović N., 2000, str. 193–194)

va nacionalizma, upotrebljavan i zloupotrebljavan u populističkom političkom diskursu brojnih zemalja istočne Evrope, jeste mit o poslednjem evropskom bastionu pred naletima iz Azije, te mit o žrtvovanju i nezahvalnosti Evrope. U jednom delu srpskog medijskog i kulturnog prostora pothranjuju se slike o izuzetnosti sopstvene kulture i neguje strah od globalizacije. To je isti onaj deo koji glorificuje delo Nikolaja Velimirovića – delo koje je protkano prezriom prema evropskoj kritičkoj tradiciji i antisemitskim izjavama¹⁶.

Nacionalizam i nacionalistička kulturna politika ne barataju činjenicama, niti ih zanimaju „objektivni“ kriterijumi, niti argumentacija prilikom izvođenja dokaza. Nacionalizam u kulturnoj politici ima samo jedan smisao, da jača osećanje nacionalne pripadnosti, a to se može postići pre svega u odmaku, distanci prema drugom i zloupotrebi i preradi pojedinih dogadaja prema poželjnim narativima kulturne politike. Stoga nacionalizam ima „svoje sopstvene amnezije i selektivna pamćenja koja, čak i kada su krajnje sekularna, mogu biti duboko iskrivljajuća i varljiva“. (Gelner, 1997)

Nacionalizam danas, svuda u svetu, zahteva apsolutno poštovanje vere, i odbacuje bilo kakvu mogućnost kritike religije, što je zahtev Ujedinjenim nacijama koji je prvo postavljen od strane islamskih država, a marta 2009. Savet za ljudska prava Ujedinjenih nacija usvaja rezoluciju koja „klevetu religija“ naziva kršenjem ljudskih prava. Ovo je jedno od pitanja koje odgovara

fundamentalistima i nacionalistima svuda, pa i u Evropi, iako je pitanje kritike, pa i pitanje kritike religije, izuzetno važno evropsko nasleđe, i upravo

je ono deo evropskog identiteta. „Tolerancija kritike religije čovečanstvu je podarila dela Dekarta, Hobsa, Loka, Spinoze...“ (Kišjuhas, A. 2009).

Otuda srpski nacionalizam nekritički usvaja dela Nikolaja Velimirovića, organizuje prenos moštiju 1991, a kanonizuje ga kao sveca 2003. godine. Ova veza države, religije i nacionalizma, zahteva posebno preispitivanje danas, jer su korenji međuodnosa izuzetno dobro definisani radom Miodraga Pavlovića – *Vidovdan i časni krst*¹⁷.

Nacionalizam u kulturnoj politici ne može da dozvoli da se iscrpljuje sam u sebi. Da bi osećao da postoji, on zahteva da bude opažen, prepoznat kao takav, poseban. „Biti, znači biti opažen“ (Vuksanović D, 2007, str. 49). Otuda veliki broj „nacionalnih institucija“, nacionalnih festivala i manifestacija, medija sa „nacionalnom“ frekvencijom. Epitet „narodni“ sasvim je izgubio na značaju, kao deo diskursa suviše blizak socijalističkom – dakle u vreme vladavine neoliberalizma – sasvim nepoželjnog diskursu.

Ipak, zahtevi koji se i dalje čuju u Srbiji, poput zahteva *Naprednog kluba* da se definiše stalna politika prema Srbima koji žive u drugim državama regionali i u dijaspori ne ukazuju na to da smo došli do trenutka kada će kulturna politika istinski brinuti o građanima Srbije¹⁸, već se i dalje u političkom polju stranke nadmeću oko toga koja više „patriotski brine“ o Srbima van Srbije. Dijspora iz Srbije, koja nije etničkog srpskog porekla (veliki broj Vlaha i Roma je na radu u Nemačkoj, Švajcarskoj, Austriji...), ne može ništa da očekuje od države Srbije, sem ako ne postane umetnik svetskog značaja, poput Jozefa Nađa.

¹⁷ „Kao crkveni i nacionalni praznik, Vidovdan je tekovina novijeg vremena. Put do njegovog unošenja crvenim slovima u kalendar Srpske pravoslavne crkve dosta je dug i zanimljiv. Karakteristično je da on ide uporedo sa stvaranjem novog vidovdanskog kulta, u kome kosovski predanje dobija pseudomitsku varijantu (...) U XX veku, očigledno, stvara se novi vidovdanski kult, koji dolazi kao neočekivani završetak nacionalno-političkog procesa započetog još u doba romantizma. U XIX veku romantičarski pesnici i ideolozi srpske nacije prihvatali su kosovski mit i dalji mu izuzetno mesto u duhovnom životu srpskog naroda. U njihovo vreme on je postao sržni nacionalni mit, uz koji će ići i nova ubojita krilatica, 'Za krst časni i slobodu zlatnu'.“

¹⁸ „Pre svega potrebljano je doneti zakon o državljanstvu i zakon o srpskom narodu koju živi izvan Srbije“, http://www.napredn klub.org/dokumenti/o_NK.php

Ti izuzeci se obično uzimaju kao dokaz stepena usvojene interkulturalne odgovornosti države, iako pravih programa interkulturnog dijaloga ima izuzetno malo (Compendium, 2008). Dakle očito je da smo još uvek u polju etnički definisane kulturne politike, kulturne politike koja se pre svega bavi pitanjima tradicionalno shvaćenog koncepta nacionalnog identiteta, u uskoj vezi sa održavanjem i konstituisanjem narativa naslonjenih na pravoslavlje i savremenu crkvu, i u kojima je kritičko preispitivanje prošlosti nepoželjno. Idealizacija istorijskih pojava i likova, izgradnja herojskih mitova i mitova o žrtvama (pre svega žrtvama socijalizma), čak i kad nije definisana kao kulturna politika, tolerancijom države (tj. pre svega njenom politikom pamćenja i zaborava) – postaje zvanična kulturna politika.

Stoga se i dalje, uprkos procesu evropskih integracija, u kulturnom polju vode stari ratovi – ideološki ratovi – ali ne više između levice i desnice, već između onih koji tradiciju, veru i naciju idealizuju u formi u kojoj ju je definisao XIX vek i koji ne dozvoljavaju kritiku i kritičko mišljenje o „vrednostima“ srpske kulture, i onih koji smatraju da je u temelj kulture jednog naroda potrebno ugraditi kritičko, slobodno mišljenje, pa makar ono dovelo do toga da „padnu“ neke nacionalne veličine, a da se etika crkvenih voda ispituje pojedinačno, a ne da bude podrazumevajuće pozitivna. Stoga podele na „patriotsku“ i „izdajničku“ inteligenciju i dalje dominiraju u javnosti, jer kulturna politika nema snage da jasno definiše svoj stav i izbori se za autonomost kulturnog polja – tj. da garantuje slobodu izražavanja i u odnosu na sebe samu (vlast), ali i u odnosu na veru i crkvu (čije interesе, mnogo direktnije i nasilnije, brane brojne nevladine organizacije). Tako su se sukobi u polju kulture – umesto da se vode u stručnim krugovima podržanim od strane kulturne politike, vode unutar raslojenog civilnog društva – u kome je borba protiv fašističkih i nacionalističkih politika *Obraza* i *Dveri*, prepuštena nevladinim organizacijama gradanske i proevropske orijentacije (a sama vlast izdaje saopštenja, ili, još češće, prečutkuje i izbegava da reaguje, posebno na nacionalističke poteze crkve).

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SLIKE U GLAVAMA

Kao polaznu osnovu za ovaj tekst uzećemo da je kolektivni identitet promenljiva kategorija, koja nastaje mnoštvom diskurzivnih poticaja nastalih u raznolikim kontekstima stvarnosti. Tako će se identitet-(i) razvijati u skladu sa kontekstom koji preovlađuje u određenom društvu/vremenu, tj. u skladu sa sistemom vrednosti koji gotovo uvek određuje intelektualna i politička elita. Ovde se dakle radi o simbolima kolektivnog znanja i njihovog tumačenja unutar odredene zajednice, kojima se ona samopotvrđuje, daje sebi smisao, i gde se „stvarnost“ tumači u okvirima dominantne vrednosne matrice. Način na koji se vidi i objašnjava „stvarnost“, neodvojiv je od pojma identiteta, jer se na ovaj način definisana stvarnost ne spoznaje iskustvom, već ponuđenim setom stereotipa. U ovom kontekstu misao nije autonomna, tj. ona ne nastaje i ne razvija se po nekim svojim immanentnim zakonima, koji bi se ostvarivali nezavisno od društvenih i istorijskih uslova, već je povezana sa simboličkim univerzumom datog društva i nalazi se u korelacijskom odnosu sa mnoštvom spoljašnjih uticaja. Pitanje identiteta je, dakle, pitanje kulture u širem smislu.

U Srbiji je krajem osamdesetih godina prošlog veka upravo na ovaj način definisana nova identitetska paradigma, koja se zasnivala na nacionalističkim predstavama i gde je u prvi plan bio stavljena set stereotipa o nacionalnom identitetu. Medijskim intenziviranjem ove teme stvoren je potpuno nov vrednosni okvir, čime je uspostavljen jedan zatvoren simbolički poredak u kom je svaka alternativna artikulacija postala nemoguća i nepoželjna. Shodno tome emitovane su vrednosno-ideološke poruke, kojima se sa jedne strane hiperbolisala vrednost i osobnosti srpske nacije, a sa druge, proizvođenjem neprijatelja, kao i propagiranjem mržnje u kontekstu poželjnosti, širio osećaj netolerantnosti i odbojnosti prema svemu što je odstupalo od ponuđenih klišea. Opšta radikalizacija političke i društvene scene postala je osobenost i sastavni deo dominantnog diskursa kao i ideologija isključivosti, kojom se negirala i diskriminisala svaka razlika, bila ona definisana na nacionalnoj, etničkoj, verskoj, ili bilo kojoj drugoj osnovi.

Destruktivne političke odluke, masovno osiromašenje, specifičnosti socijalne strukture, mitologizacija istorijskog i kulturnog nasledja, autoritarnih vrednosti i sl. vodili su ka sveopštoj degradaciji i anomiji tj. doveli su do promene u vrednosno simboličkoj orijentaciji na nivou individue. Može se slobodno reći da se ovde radi o simptomima gubitka društvene orijentacije i kidanja niti koje su nekada vezivale ljude u jednu društvenu mrežu.

Praćenjem rezultata mnogobrojnih ispitivanja javnog mnjenja, od kraja osamdesetih pa sve do danas, evidentan je pad tolerancije naspram drugih etničkih, religioznih, političkih i ostalih, sa nacionalističke tačke neprihvativljivih grupa, raširenost predrasuda i stereotipa, pad prosocijalne orijentacije kao i okretanje ka utilitarističkim vrednostima. Posledice ove anomalije osećaju se pre svega u političkoj, kulturnoj i životnoj svakodnevici, koja zahvaljujući dominantnom diskursu, baziranom na aluzijama srpskog nacionalizma, i dalje tavori u svojoj iracionalnosti, samodestrukciji i samoizolaciji. Shodno tome svakodnevni život u Srbiji odlikuje se mnogim paradoksima, jer građani, tapkajući po smesi paradoksalnih postavki dominantnog diskursa, svaku situaciju mogu da protumače preko kolaža sačinjenog od potpuno nespojivih objašnjenja.

U ovakvoj konstelaciji stvari nameće se i pitanje kakvu sliku Srbija proizvodi o sebi, i kako se ta slika percipira „napolju“. Odgovor na ovo pitanje je negativan, jer slika o nekom društvu stvara se na osnovu poruka koje to društvo proizvodi o sebi i svetu oko sebe. Zapadni mediji mogu na primer da obrađuju samo pojedine isečke stvarnih događaja iz Srbije, i da ih tumače u određenom kontekstu, međutim taj kontekst nije nikada u suprotnosti sa opštim civilizacijskim standardima. Kontekst u Srbiji nažalost jeste, te će se slika „napolju“ menjati jedino i isključivo ukoliko se promeni „iznutra“. A da bi se slika menjala iznutra neophodno je redefinisanje nacionalnih i vrednosnih standarda koji mogu da se ostvare jedino ukoliko država svim svojim raspoloživim sredstvima stvori takvu klimu, koja će dovesti do šireg društvenog konsenzusa o tome šta je dozvoljeno, a šta ne. Ovaj konsenzus ne odnosi se samo na

zakonsko propisivanje normi već i na definisanje moralno vrednosnih standarda koji su u prethodnih dvadeset godina konstantno razarani. Poredenja radi, ovaj proces je u Nemačkoj trajao 25 godina. U Srbiji bi mogao da potraje i duže jer su generatori antiintegracijskih ideja još uvek prisutni u javnom govoru, a samim tim i kod običnih ljudi kojima su te ideje i namenjene. Dodatni problem je i taj što su šovinističke ideje uspešno inkorporirane u set stereotipa o nacionalnom identitetu, što dodatno otežava proces nacionalne rehabilitacije – u svest o samima sebi tj. o pripadnosti naciji pridodati su elementi koji su je definisali nasuprot drugih – „zbog toga što svi znamo kakvi su oni“, a mi nasuprot njih, „dobri i naivni oprštamo lako“ i sl. U jednom tako haotično-diskurzivno-simboličkom univerzumu prepliću se značenja koja uvek iznova percipiraju simboliku nepoštovanja drugosti i održavaju je kao večitu vrednost.

Slika Srbije zavisi dakle prvenstveno od procesa koji se dešavaju unutar nje same, a kakva će ta slika biti u budućnosti zavisiće prvenstveno od toga šta će u Srbiji biti određeno kao vrednost, odnosno ne-vrednost.

Posvećeno Brisu Tattonu, tragičnoj žrtvi nasilja.

Boris Žuk je u periodu od 1997. do 2003. godine radio kao novinar u nezavisnim medijima u Srbiji, u dnevnom listu "Demokratija" i na RTV Pančevo. Od 2005. godine živi u Berlinu gde trenutno završava doktorske studije na Katedri za Komparativnu Sociologiju Humboldt Univerziteta. Povremeno objavljuje tekstove u različitim nemačkim medijima.

Boris Žuk je učestvovao u radu Međunarodne letnje akademije (*Bezgranični identiteti*.

SRPSKI? HMMM, ZVUČI POZNATO...

i/ili konceptualizacije ovog termina. Mislio sam da treba da preskočim sve prethodno navedeno i da pokušam da o srpskom identitetu govorim jednim „slobodnim stilom“.

Naravno, sve te definicije i različite interpretacije pitanja identiteta (*in extenso*) su sada već deo MENE. Specifičnog MENE koji se bavi pitanjem srpskog/ih identiteta, a koji je umnogome drugačiji od onog MENE koji se bavi pečanjem, zimskim sportovima, ili bilo čime drugim. Potom bismo mogli istaći otkriće po kome ljudi mogu biti definisani kroz „pripadnost“... U redu, evo ga svojevrsni prvi trag onoga o čemu je ovde reč: Identitet kao uključenost u i isključenost iz fiktivne grupe. Zašto fiktivne? Jednostavno, zbog toga što način na koji su *uključenost* ili *isključenost* mogući predstavlja rezultat pukog izbora. Uzmimo u obzir grupu okupljenu oko Akademije (radi boljeg razumevanja). Kako je ova proizvoljna selekcija (kao deo izbora) delovala na grupu? Kao prvo, u pitanju je bila selekcija kandidata. To znači da su primenjivani odgovarajući kriterijumi za konačan sastav grupe. Ne želim da kvalifikujem u smislu dobro/loše, samo diskutujem o mehanizmu bilo kog selektivnog procesa koji je baziran na pitanjima identiteta. Izbor je sproveden na sledeći način: X i Y su izabrani da provedu neverovatnu nedelju u Beogradu, dok A i B i C nisu. Tako je ustanovljen identitet grupe učesnika/ca Akademije – baziran na uključenosti i isključenosti.

U redu, možda ovaj primer ne zvuči dovoljno ubedljivo, ali ne treba zaboraviti da u osnovi grupa (zajednice, društva, nacije, itd.) leži spektor zajedničkih interesa. Uprkos razlikama među njima, mađarski plemeć iz XIX veka i seljak na njegovom imanju su delili identitet kao osnovu zajedničkog interesa. Da bi se proizveo zajednički identitet različitih entiteta (bilo da su u pitanju ljudi ili samo apstraktni društveni koncepti), korišćen je set

veštačkih instrumenata – baziranih na istorijskim argumentima, filološkim predlošcima, mitovima, vrednostima, spomenicima, geografskim karakteristikama, mentalitetima ili čak specifičnim jelima (ovde mislim na stvaranje država-nacija). Tako je platforma zajedničkog identiteta postala doступna. Grupa učesnika/ca Akademije formirana je na povezanosti očigledne različitosti njenih članova/ca i njihovog zajedničkog interesa (to je bilo upoznavanje različitih aspekata savremenog identiteta Srbije). Na isti način/uz pomoć istog mehanizma kao što je gore opisano, set veštačkih instrumenata određenih da proizvedu „zajednički ineters“ bio je u manjoj ili većoj meri jednak kriterijumima selekcije – motivacija (motivaciono pismo), profesionalni profil, relevantno iskustvo vezano za Srbiju ili povezanost sa srpskom dijasporom. Članovi/ice grupe su tako već u samom startu morali/e da se uklape u ovu selekcionu matricu. Međutim, matrica nije bila tako striktna, te je dopuštala da svi u nju uključeni budu drugaćiji od ostalih. Ipak, postavlja se pitanje kako to da su tako različite osobe, koje imaju potpuno drugačije pristupe i iskustva vezana za temu Akademije, završile u istoj grupi? Zbog toga što su svi imali zajednički interes. Takođe, i članovi države-nacije su inicijalno bili uslovљeni nužnošću da se uklape u selekcionu matricu, što je podrazumevalo dogovor oko izvesnih simboličkih elemenata koje svaka nacija treba da poseduje (jezik, istorija, nošnja, običaji, hrana, itd.). Zašto? Zbog toga što su svi imali zajednički interes. Termin „identitet“ sam o sebi govorи sve: čvrsto spojeni identični entiteti! Ali to nije uvek slučaj sa identičnim entitetima... oni mogu postati identični voljnošću i konstantnim naporom da to budu, usled, već nekoliko puta spomenutog, „zajedničkog interesa“. U tom slučaju, ispada da je sličnost više efekat nego razlog celog scenarija.

Izabrao sam da predstavim ova dva paralelna i naizgled različita primera samo zbog mehanizma stvaranja identiteta o kome je reč. Nalazim da je mnogo zanimljivije i smislenije kada se radi o identitetu zasnovanom na suštinskim razlikama nego na očiglednim sličnostima, jer takav identitet može jasnije da prikaže šta treba da se uradi kada izgleda da se ništa ne uklapa u zajedničku karakteristiku. To bi mogao biti i srpski slučaj (?), videćemo...

Zatim, čitav program Akademije bio je u dovoljnoj meri heterogen da precizno istakne ono o čemu sam prethodno govorio. Kako su toliko različiti pristupi i perspektive mogli da se usklade radi smislene i sveobuhvatne debate o srpskom identitetu? Imali smo marketinške, filozofske, istorijske, filološke, čak i antropološke pristupe... jednom rečju, imali smo sve! Cilj je bio obuhvatiti mnoštvo različitih perspektiva koje su se ticali bilo koje debate o širokom konceptu „identiteta“. Naravno, poput svakog prihvatljivog i plodnog ishoda, nismo mnogo postigli po pitanju opipljivih rezultata. Ova činjenica potvrđuje ideju „identiteta“ kao otvorenog koncepta. Ponekad je korisnije postaviti što je moguće više pitanja, no proizvesti definitivne i destruktivne odgovore...

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Kvalitetan pristup pitanju IDENTITETA ne može početi bez definicije, ili bar pokušaja da se definiše. Stoga, koncept IDENTITETA zahteva posmatranje. Semantika vezana za ovaj pojam nije samo ono što neko misli, oseća ili veruje da bi trebalo da bude. Ključni element definisanja pojma identitet jeste percepcija drugog (drugih). U kombinaciji sa svojim pluralom – IDENTITETI, mislim da bi bolje funkcionalisao kao operativni koncept na ovaj specifičan način: SRPSKI IDENTITETI – ZBIR SVIH MOGUĆIH OSOBENOSTI OPAŽENIH OD STRANE DRUGIH! Međutim, šta se podrazumeva pod „drugi“? „Drugi“ su ljudi koji ne dele iste karakteristike kao Srbi. Takođe, više sam za upotrebu množine pojma „identitet“ jer bolje prikazuje mnoge dimenzije koje ga čine: bilo da su to osobnosti koje se odnose na ljude, državu, prestonicu (Beograd), pejzaž itd. Posmatrano u okvirima marketinga, identitet je pojednostavljen do svoje same sústine. Uzmimo najjednostavniji primer. Drugi o Francuskoj: šampanjac, vino, sir i sl. Drugi o Parizu: Ajfelov toranj, moda, grad ljubavi i sl. Da se vratimo temi o kojoj je reč! Drugi o Srbiji: rat, Milošević, čak i Hag (ovo je u najmanju ruku „komično“, jer je holandski grad asocijacija na Srbiju). Drugi o Beogradu: bombe...

hmmm, to je sve! Dakle, očigledno je kako percepcija drugih oblikuje određeni identitet. S druge strane, formiranje specifične percepcije je dvosmerno nastojanje: nastojanje drugih koji će hteti ili ne da prošire svoje znanje o identitetu, i nastojanje samih građana Srbije koji će hteti ili ne da promovišu sopstveni identitet (način na koji bi voleli da ih drugi vide) u inostranstvu (ili među drugima). Bez tog dvosmernog nastojanja mnogi aspekti srpskog/srpskih identiteta mogu ostati nepoznati: hrana, muzika, sport, kultura, kinematografija, mogućnosti ulaganja itd. Ipak, glavni doprinos boljoj percepciji Srbije predstavlja napor njenih građana da se ona promeni. Zbog toga spoljna percepcija može i treba da bude pod uticajem onih koji su predmet tog posmatranja.

Zaključak je očigledan: mišljenja sam da u cilju ostvarivanja kohezije ličnog i kolektivnog identiteta svaka naučna disciplina zahteva „epistemološko drugo“ (bilo da su u pitanju različite društvene nauke ili discipline koje se odnose na oblast marketinga). Ovo su sredstva kojima se identitet može predvideti i tretirati na teorijskim osnovama. Najvažniji zadatak je stvoriti adekvatan narativ o srpskom identitetu/identitetima. O čemu je ovde reč? Recimo ovako: ukoliko se u obzir uzme festival *Exit* i pokuša da mu se pronade značenje određujući taj događaj kroz specifičnu kategoriju, to, dugoročno posmatrano, nema smisla. Zbog toga je neophodan poseban narativ koji unapred isključuje pronalaženje osobnosti u pojedinačnom izolovanom fenomenu (ili događaju). Ovaj poseban narativ zahteva da se utvrdi smisao takvog pojedinačnog događaja u vremenskom i prostornom odnosu sa drugim različitim događajima. Na taj način, bolje razumevanje je moguće samo međusobnim povezivanjem delova u konstruisanu mrežu (nazovimo je konfiguracijom, identitetskom konstelacijom ili kako god). „Narativnost“ transformiše izolovane *dogadaje* u *epizode*. Samo pretvaranjem *Exit-a* u epizodu (umesto u pojedinačan i izolovani događaj), može se spoznati njegov značaj. Da, mislim da već počinjem da shvatam: koherentan narativ identiteta jednak je nacionalnoj strategiji (ovo nikako ne smatram eufemizmom za brendiranje).

Sada, hajde da damo najmanje četiri dimenzije ove „narativnosti“:

Ontološki narativi – priče koje Srbi mogu da koriste kako bi dali smisao svojim životima (u određenoj meri služe da bi opisali ko su). Naravno, ovo je prvi korak ka drugom važnom pitanju, a to je: šta raditi (?). Ta-kva vrsta „narativnosti“ obezbeđuje pojedincima identitet bez obzira koliko se različitim činili. Ontološki narativ utiče na savest, verovanja (itd.), kao što je i sam pod njihovim uticajem.

Javni narativi – ovo je manje-više institucionalni narativ, makro priča (da tako kažem) o Srbima (mediji takođe igraju važnu ulogu u njoj). U okviru ove perspektive javne institucije teže da stvore zvanično i stručno objašnjenje i da ga plasiraju kao „državni narativ“.

Metanarativnost – je inkorporiranje u široko postavljene koncepte kao što su totalitarizam naspram demokratije, balkanizacija naspram ev-ropeizacije itd.

Naučno zasnovana narativnost – svrha ovog tipa narativnosti je da osmisli adekvatan vokabular u cilju konstruisanja i rekonstruisanja, kroz vreme, svih vrsta narativa (gore navedenih). Ovo je najapstraktnija predstava društvene narativnosti. Koristeći je, možemo pripisati veliku važnost kategorijama kao što su „srpski glumac“, „srpska kultura“, „srpsko društvo“. Ta konceptualna (ili naučno zasnovana) narativnost je naj-relevantnija i najvažnija jer omogućava Srbima da kreiraju pravi tip di-skursa kroz koji se stvaraju identiteti i ostvaruje društvena medijacija.

Ovaj pristup koji se bazira na „narativnosti“ izabrao sam jer može da stvo-ri sliku koja prevazilazi fiksiranost koncepta kao što je IDENTITET. Sva-ki kategoričan pristup pojmu IDENTITETA isključuje vreme, prostor i analitičku povezanost. Verujem da se samo uvođenjem „narativnosti“, projekti poput konstruisanja i rekonstruisanja srpskog identiteta (ili srpskih

identiteta) mogu privesti kraju. Uzmimo još jedan primer koji uvek pomaže: recimo, argumenta radi, da su posle 2000. građani Srbije i dalje „nenaklonjeni Evropi i nacionalisti“. Ovo je dominantan zapadnjački narativ i nije ništa manje od rigidnog. Zato ne čudi što većina stranaca prihvata taj narativ zdravo za gotovo, bez promišljanja. Ovo je tačka u kojoj na principu narrativnosti zasnovan identitet treba da se umeša i promeni prethodno formirane predrasude/percepcije u prostorno i istorijski šire koncipirano razumevanje realnosti: Miloševićev režim, ratovi, NATO bombardovanje itd. Sva četiri tipa narrativnosti koja su prethodno opisana, treba da se primenjuju u zajedničkom okviru, kao državni ili nacionalni projekat, kako bi se iznova izgradio adekvatniji srpski identitet. Identitet koji je uvek otvoren, koji zapravo nikada nije postojao i kome je nužna rekontekstualizacija i reaffirmacija.

Na kraju, kada se sve ovo privede „kraju“ (u smislu tranzicionih studija), svako na planeti bi bar trebalo da može da kaže: Srpski? Hmm, zvuči poznato... (u smislu poznavanja).

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Marius je bio jedan od polaznika Medunarodne letnje akademije (*Bez*)granični identiteti.

NERAZREŠENO PITANJE SRPSKOG IDENTITETA

Tokom 1990-tih godina nijedna zemlja u Evropi nije imala problematičniji imidž od Srbije, a posledice tog perioda se još uvek osećaju u savremenoj politici i društву. Da bismo danas razumeli identitet Srbije potrebno je da istražimo proces njegovog formiranja tokom prošlih vekova i nekoliko poslednjih decenija. Prošlost i sadašnjost Srbije ukazuju da je trauma oblikovala društvene odnose s Evropom, njenu poziciju u Evropi, i način na koji pojedinci/ke vide sebe. Srbija svetu prezentuje kontradiktorne slike, koje se zatim reflektuju na nju spolja. Na primer, može se uočiti poštovanja vredan srpski kosmopolitizam i znanje o svetu. Mnogi građani Srbije su puno putovali po Evropi i dalje po svetu, i oni ističu svoj afinitet za evropsku kulturu i želju za integracijom u Evropu. Međunarodno priznati muzički festivali i živa umetnička scena s pravom privlače evropsku pažnju. Ovo je imidž moderne i progresivne zemlje, čvrsto locirane u Evropi. S druge strane, mali ali nezanemarljiv deo populacije veruje da Srbija treba da okrene leđa Evropi. Takva Srbija je nazadna, nacionalistička, šovinistička, karakterišu je korupcija, kriminal i ekonomski haos. Otpor ka saradnji s HAGOM, odugovlačenje u priključivanju Evropskoj Uniji i široko rasprostranjena politička apatija se interpretiraju kao znaci udaljenosti od „evropskih“ gradanskih vrednosti. Međutim, bilo bi pogrešno sugerisati da su često zategnuti odnosi Srbije s Evropom ukorenjeni samo u događajima tokom prethodnih decenija. Zapravo, najskorije epizode pružanja otpora mešanju spoljnih faktora u unutrašnji razvoj Srbije mogu se pratiti kroz dugu istoriju suprotstavljanja i neodređenog stava u odnosu na poziciju zemlje u Evropi i svetu. Srbija često projektuje dve različite slike, koje se mogu ilustrovati, na primer, kontrastom između ekstremne gostoprimaljivosti i tvrdoglavosti – obe karakteristike su postale klišei zapadnjačkog tumačenja srpskog naroda.

Za zapadne posmatrače, sirovost istorije Srbije je u isto vreme i izvor fascinacije i problema. Pisci koji teže da „pronadu“ pravi srpski identitet su

konstantno zbumjeni kontradiktornošću nalaza. U knjizi *Bure puno kamenja: U potrazi za Srbijom* Peter Morgan beleži da je svoje vreme za vreme boravka u velikim srpskim urbanim centrima (tokom devedesetih godina XX veka) uvek provodio s obrazovanim članovima srpske „opozicije“ – muzičarima, novinarima i umetnicima. Ti ljudi su ismevali Miloševićev režim i druge aspekte modernog života, kao što je npr. turbo-folk muzika. U isto vreme

Morgan opisuje svoju nelagodu izazvanu činjenicom da su mu razgovori koje je vodio s ovom „opozicijom“ učinili manje poznatim druge segmente nacije i sprečili ga da se bavi aspektima „svakodnevnog“ života u Srbiji.¹ Često istican argument u spoljnim opservacijama Srbije glasi: urbani obrazovani ljudi

su izuzeci u odnosu na pravu prirodu Srbije. Ovaj argument doprinosi učvršćivanju „balkanskih“ diskursa i potrebno ga je istražiti. Ipak, treba uzeti u obzir da se urbane elite u mnogim zemljama ponašaju na isti način prema ljudima koje smatraju manje sofisticiranim. To je deo formiranja sopstvenog imidža, deo procesa definisanja sopstvenog identiteta kroz artikulisanje „drugog“.

Srbija danas bi mogla biti opisana kao „posttraumatsko“ društvo koje se još uvek nosi s pitanjem identiteta i imidža. Zemlja se razlikuje od mnogih drugih u regionu, po tome što je ta skorašnja trauma doprinela oblikovanju društvenog stava u odnosu na svet. Nemoguće je razmatrati savremeni srpski identitet bez analiziranja uloge formiranja negativnog imidža – ili „demonizacije“ – na putu tranzicije političke kulture Srbije i njenog društva ka onom koje se zasniva na „zapadnjačkim“ gradanskim vrednostima. Uloga Zapada u stvaranju imidža ne sme biti potcenjena. Način na koji je Srbija predstavljena na Zapadu često podleže ustanovljenim stereotipima: otpor, buntovništvo i ogorčenost. Postoje materijalni uticaji ovakve stereotipizacije. Moguće je razumeti kako formiranje imidža uzajamno deluje s tradicionalnim srpskim narativima (koji ističu ulogu žrtve) ukoliko se analizira način na koji su se Srbi nosili s negativnim spoljnim percepcijama. Mnogi-

¹ Peter Morgan, *A barrel of stones, Aberystwyth, 1997*, str.103

ma je negativan međunarodni imidž zemlje tokom devedesetih godina XX veka poslužio za identifikovanje i, na taj način, iskazivanje otpora prema Zapadu. Tokom raspada Jugoslavije, urbana populacija, posebno mladi, apelovali su na Evropu da prizna njihovu brobu protiv Miloševićevog režima, najvidljiviju tokom demonstracija 1996. i 1997. Demonstranti su aludirali na zapadnu kulturu ne bi li istakli svoje mesto u okviru nje. To je na neki način doprinelo da se povrati, tada narušen, imidž Srba, da bi NATO bombardovanje 1999. poništilo tu rehabilitaciju. Tada, umesto da se suprotstave kao gradani koji zahtevaju demokratiju, demonstrantni su svesno izašli na ulice kao Srbi, ujedinjeni NATO bombama. Demonstracije koje su usledile, vrlo energične kao i prethodne, zbulile su strane posmatrače koji su ih gledali ili s divljenjem ili s prezirom.

Izražena samosvest u srpskom društvu o konceptualnim i emocionalnim matricama na kojima je ono zasnovano stimulisala je razvijanje uverenja da su pokušaji stranaca da „razumeju“ srpski narod uzaludni i da je potrebno da neko bude Srbin da bi razumeo Srbina. Karakteristike kao što su „inat“ i „prkos“ su najčešće navođeni srpski atributi, koji se manifestuju posebno u periodima kada je zemlja predstavljena u negativnom svetlu. To je način pokazivanja prkosa spoljnem svetu. Dalje, to isticanje nerazumljivosti i iracionalnosti kao osnovnih karakteristika srpskog društva, takođe se može posmatrati i kao metoda suočavanja sa traumatisujućom prošlošću. Izražavanje nedostatka razumevanja za svoju zajednicu može pomoći da se umanji osećanje krivice ili spreči kriticizam. Spoljne predstave o Balkanu često jačaju stereotipe, uprkos pokušajima pojedinih Srba da ih oslabe. Takođe, ne bi trebalo da zanemarimo ulogu Srba u uticanju na percepciju stranaca o Srbima i jugoslovenskim konfliktima.

Želja Srbije za priznavanjem njene istorijske uloge u Jugoistočnoj Evropi kao bastiona protiv otomanske ekspanzije, habsburške provokacije i nacističke agresije, podjednako čini deo i izvan je savremenih trendova u etnografiji i istoriji. Danas je mnogo uobičajenije videti da zemlje tumače

svoju istoriju u širem evropskom kontekstu. Portugalija i Francuska su dve države koje interpretiraju svoju istoriju i etnografiju na taj način. Srbija takođe želi šire priznavanje njene uloge u evropskoj civilizaciji, ali uz mnoge kompetitivne interpretacije postoji stalna bojazan da će pojedini opisi prošlosti antagonizovati i otudivati iste kompetitivne interpretacije koje dolaze iz drugih zemalja. Ovo ne utiče samo na Srbiju. Mediji danas su takođe cinični na temu hrvatskih i slovenačkih npora da se distanciraju od Balkana i da se predstave kao progresivne, moderne evropske zemlje koje nemaju puno zajedničkog sa svojim slovenskim susedima. Takva je bila poruka jednog članka objavljenog u magazinu *Economist* u kome je opisivano hrvatsko „mračno i nasilno podzemlje”.

Članak je citirao hrvatskog novinara koji je tvrdio da su predstave Zapada o Hrvatskoj površne (npr. venecijanska arhitektura na hrvatskoj obali i veće bogatstvo po glavi stanovnika).²

² The Economist. "Still a Balkan country," 31 October 2008

Identiteti su sačinjeni od onoga što mislimo o sebi, onoga što drugi misle o nama i načina na koji vidimo istoriju i naš položaj u svetu. Portugalija je primer kako zemlja sa imidžom periferne države može uspešno da bude povezana sa Evropom. Tokom osamdesetih godina XX veka tamo je stvoren slogan „Budimo najbolji učenici u Evropi”. Portugalcu su hteli da budu „dobri” Evropljani i pokušali su da uklope svoja očekivanja sa onim što su podrazumevali pod evropskim. Drugačije odluke bi mogle imati nepredvidive efekte. Zemlje poput Irske i Portugalije smatrале су da su „uspele” kada su počele da privlače imigrante, posebno iz drugih delova Evrope. Pokazalo se da je to dobro za predstavu ovih zemalja o sebi. Portugalija je počela da posmatra svoje emigrante kao simbol siromašnog i ruralnog društva. Oni su predstavljali prošlost koju su mnogi hteli da zaborave. Srbija je započela proces menjanja svog imidža, delom zahvaljujući živoj kulturi mladih. Imajući u vidu mogućnost efikasnijih evropskih integracija, olakšavanje viznog režima, kao i protok kvalifikovanih migranata u suprotnom smeru, vrlo je verovatno da će se taj proces ubrzati. Da-

nas, slična poseta onoj preduzetoj od strane Pitera Morgana bi potvrdila postojanje slične urbane „opozicije”, možda apatične zbog kontinuirane ekonomske i političke nestabilnosti, koja možda traži novi život u inostranstvu, ali je svesna da zemlja mora pomoći sama sebi, kao i da postoji mnogo mogućnosti da i ona učestvuje u ovoj tranziciji.

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SRPSKI IDENTITET: CRNA KUTIJA?

Pitanje identiteta je mnogo složenije nego što bismo mi to voleli. Identitet je fluidan i permanentno se menja, kao „projekciono platno“ na kome se prikazuju simboličke predstave. Svaki grupni identitet je poput crne kutije. Niko zapravo ne zna šta je u njoj, svako ima svoju interpretaciju i percepciju iste. Svaki identitet predstavlja društveni konstrukt koji se konstantno iznova stvara, zavisan je od vremena, prostora, različitih okolnosti, kao i od individualne percepcije svakog pripadnika grupe i karakteristika koje mu dodeljuju drugi.

Srpski identitet je takođe poput crne kutije. Svi pojedinci i društvene grupe u Srbiji stvaraju različite vizije i ideje o tome šta je u kutiji, šta je važno, a šta nije. Takođe, različiti akteri izvan zemlje konstruišu svoju sliku o Srbiji i na taj način utiču na formiranje njenog identiteta.

Trenutno, kao i proteklih godina, bilo je teško postići dogovor o onome šta bi trebalo da bude u toj crnoj kutiji, a šta ne. U skorijoj prošlosti postajalo je sve nejasnije šta sve termin „nacionalni identitet“ treba da obuhvata. Ključna pitanja na koja treba odgovoriti su: Na koju naciju će se identitet odnositi? Kom tumačenju istorije ili nacionalne prošlosti ćemo se obratiti? Koje vizije o naciji su nam zajedničke, šta je ono što delimo? Koje naslede, kultura, norme i vrednosti? Da li je to istorijsko naslede iz perioda Rimskog carstva preko perioda vladavine cara Dušana do danas; naslede iz perioda socijalizma ili čak Miloševićeve ere; ili je to ideja evropske Srbije? Ko bi trebalo da bude uključen, ko i šta isključen(o)? Koji pozitivan utisak je ostao nakon perioda krize tokom devedesetih, nakon nazadovanja u periodu koji je sledio posle takozvane „revolucije“ 2000. godine i ubistva Đindića? Koja definicija identiteta će biti najubedljivija? Da li sebe definišemo pripadnošću određenoj etničkoj, kulturnoj, geografskoj ili normativnoj kategoriji? Da li je čist „kulturni“ identitet, koji nije usvojio političke stavove, dovoljan da premosti podele? Ili bi trebalo da zagovaramo viziju političkog identiteta?

Čini se da je baviti se srpskim identitetom podjednako teško kao i baviti se srpskim društvom u celini – društvom koje je izrazito podeljeno u kulturnom, ekonomskom, religioznom i etničkom smislu, koje je podeljeno na urbano i ruralno, u kome postoji najrazličitiji politički ekstermi. Ljudi su u sličnoj konfuziji. Ono što možemo konstatovati u ovom trenutku je da je teško postići konsenzus o tome šta „srpski identitet“ zapravo znači.

Identitet je često definisan drugošću. Najčešće „aktiviramo“ svoju pripadnost društvenoj grupi onda kada je naša društvena grupa, njena percepcija ili pozicija (u poređenju sa drugima) ugrožena. Uobičajeno je da uvek želimo da pripadamo grupi koja je veća, bolja, uspešnija. Imamo potrebu za pozitivnim ličnim imidžom, a u idealnim uslovima to znači da budemo u najuspešnijoj grupi u odnosu na druge. Za budućnost Srbije i celog regiona bi bilo važno da se u crnoj kutiji srpskog identiteta vidi više onih karakteristika koje podstiču uključivanje, a ne one koje ga remete.

Možemo konstatovati da je u ovom turbulentnom vremenu tranzicije i nestabilnog toka političkih događaja, srpsko društvo prošlo kroz fazu paralisanosti. Ali, pobediti paralizu je jedino moguće kroz aktivnost, kroz pokretanje stvari i njihovo eventualno ostvarenje. Neosporno je da je potrebno preduzeti važne korake u cilju ostvarivanja pozitivne vizije srpskog identiteta – kreiranje diskursa na temu prošlosti (kao i budućnosti) i podsticanja građanskog delovanja. Diskursi na obe teme bi mogli omogućiti razmatranje normi i vrednosti koje bi mogle postati stabilni temelji srpskog društva i srpskog identiteta. Diskusije vezane za „potragu“ za srpskim identitetom trebalo bi da su otvorene za svakog; trebalo bi da obuhvate najrazličitije vizije. Potrebno je započeti društveni dijalog o tome šta treba upakovati u kutiju, a šta ne.

Oспорavana prošlost, osporavani identiteti?

Suočavanje sa prošlošću kroz unutar-društveni i javni diskurs je vrlo važno u cilju prevazilaženja nasleda Miloševićeve ere. Do danas mnogo ljudi još uvek ne zna šta se zapravo dogodilo tokom tog vremena. Uprkos tome, mitovi i pro-

paganda ugrožavaju razumno suočavanje sa prošlošću. Naslede prošlosti utiče na politički, društveni i ekonomski razvoj, na odnose sa susednim zemljama i „ostatkom sveta“. Istovremeno, političko, društveno i institucionalno naslede utiče na život pojedinaca u formi sećanja, a ponekad čak i trauma. Nemoguće je pobeći od prošlosti, a poricanje će izazvati dugoročne mentalne poremećaje.

Proces suočavanja sa prošlošću je tesno povezan sa stalnom transformacijom i modifikovanjem nacionalne samospoznaje – drugim rečima, to je proces samouveravanja u kontekstu promenljive političke strukture. Ova kontekstualizacija je izuzetno teška budući da su i socijalistička ideologija i ona ekstremno nacionalistička za vreme Miloševića ostale bez legitimite. Sada deluje nejasno kako taj „vakuum identiteta“ treba da bude popunjena. Nepodudaranje različitih „identitetskih opcija“ stvorenih od strane političkih partija ili organizacija civilnog društva, institucija poput Srpske pravoslavne crkve i njenih tela, organizacija „Novog hrišćanskog prava“ (v. Sundhaussen 2008) i, s druge strane, proevropski orijentisane NVO scene, ne može biti veće. Tu se može pronaći sve, od koncepta organske filozofije sa svojim patrijarhatom i verovanjem u sveto jedinstvo „domaćina“, kralja i Boga, do anti-nacionalne kosmopolitske vizije života u svetu bez razlika i globalnih vrednosti.

Jedna od najvećih prepreka za kreiranje diskursa o srpskom identitetu je činjenica da je istorija i dalje jedan od konstitutivnih faktora identiteta. Takođe, pitanje suočavanja s jugoslovenskim ratovima tokom 1990-tih još uvek nije rešeno. Ni jedna Vlada Srbije od 2000. nije iznela jasan stav po pitanju kako bi trebalo da izgleda sveobuhvatni pristup toj temi. Uglavnom je saradnja sa Međunarodnim sudom za zločine u bivšoj Jugoslaviji bila zasnovana na usmenim obećanjima bez propratne akcije, ili je pak bila deo strategije cenkanja spoljne politike u „intersu Srbije“. Čak je i Koštuničina opšte prihvaćena inicijativa za implementaciju prve Komisije za istinu i pomirenje na Zapadnom Balkanu 2001. po svemu sudeći stvorena da ne bi uspela – kao i da bi umirila međunarodnu zajednicu. Predlozi i mišljenja o tome kako se suočiti s prošlošću su ekstremno različiti i kreću se od onih koji glase: „Ne dirajte naše nacionalne heroje!“ preko jednostavnih

objašnjenja poput: „Bio je rat.” (bio je rat i svi su bili žrtve i počinoci, ali sad je sve gotovo i ne želimo da pričamo o tome), do izražene potrebe za radikalnom politikom utvrđivanja činjenica i gonjenja počinilaca.

Šta nije u redu sa Srbijom i problemom suočavanja sa prošlošću? Različiti učesnici u akademskoj debati na ovu temu različitih su mišljenja, „dijagnoze“ se razlikuju, ali su u isto vreme vrlo slične. Todor Kuljić koristi naziv „revizionistički proces suočavanja sa prošlošću koji ima restaurativni karakter“ (v. Kuljić 2002:I). Sabrina P. Ramet imenuje ambivalentni tretman jugoslovenskih ratova „sindromom poricanja“, i definise ga kao tipičan psihološki proces koji teži prebacivanju krivice na spoljne faktore (v. Ramet 2007). Latinka Perović govori o široko raširenoj „kolektivnoj amneziji“ (Perović 2008), dok je Wolfgang Hepken primetio postojanje „poricajućeg diskursa krivice“ (v. Hepken 2005). Gordi je radio na pokušajima i odbijanjima srpskih institucija i srpskog društva da se suoči sa prošlošću (v. Gordi 2005), dok Nenad Dimitrijević ističe moralnu odgovornost za suočavanje. Sve te dijagnoze ne predstavljaju dobar znak. Postoji jaka veza između doživljaja samog sebe i istorijske interpretacije karakteristične za nacionalnu grupu kao što je srpska, a koja je izgrađena na istorijskim temeljima. Takođe, proces suočavanja sa prošlošću uticaće i na naš doživljaj samih sebe: suočavanje s prošlošću donosi preispitivanje identiteta, transformaciju istorijskih percepcija i kreira javni diskurs o društvenim normama i vrednostima. Kao što je Gordi 2005. rekao: „najveće implikacije procesa su na nivou samopercepcije i identiteta, i utiču na pitanje da li će politička transformacija u Srbiji dovesti i do socijalne transformacije“ (v. Gordi 2005: 166). Proces suočavanja s prošlošću nije samo pitanje krivice, već je više pitanje odgovornosti, odgovornosti za ono što se desilo i za sve involvirane strane i pojedince, ali i odgovornosti prema sadašnjem društvenom i političkom okruženju, i prema budućnosti. *Izboriti se s prošlošću da bi se posvetilo budućnosti*. Pojedinac, kao i društvo, treba da se suoči sa senkama prošlosti ne bi li stvorili što mirniju, vedriju i čak svetliju budućnost. Ovaj proces omogućava da se uči iz prošlosti... Nepravda iz prošlosti nas uči moralnoj istini sutrašnjice, kao što prošlost pruža vrednosti ili institucije na koje je moguće osloniti se i koje nas vode u budućnost.

Kao i u vreme socijalizma i posebno u bliskoj prošlosti, građansko delovanje u Srbiji je još uvek nedovoljno razvijeno. Pored nevelike NVO scene, koja je vrlo ograničenog opsega delovanja i kapaciteta i koja pati od lošeg imidža, nedostaju građansko delovanje i aktivizam društva u celini. Ljudi i dalje čekaju da se promene iniciraju sa državnog vrha, tj. da ih neko od političkih lidera rasteretiti od teškoća i izazova. Naklonjenost autoritetima je široko rasprostranjena, kao i stanovište da promene treba da budu inicirane spolja (v. studije Pontis Fondacije i indekse transformacije Freedom House-a). Slika o bivšem tetošnjem društvu, paralisanom i iscrpljenom tokom skoro dvadeset poslednjih godina, pokazuje jasnu potrebu za civilnim inicijativama i za jačanjem samoodgovornosti. Nedostaje ideja da je svaki pojedinac rođen da stvara svet u međuodnosu sa drugima, nedostaje izvesna doza odgovornosti u odnosu na činjenicu da svet treba da bude oblikovan po meri svake individue. O ovome mora da se govori u (građanskom) društvu kako bi se državne ustanove primorale da učestvuju u javnoj diskusiji i da podrže građansko delovanje. *Gradanski i kritički angažman može omogućiti izvor identiteta.*

Politika je prisutna svuda, kako među pojedincima, tako i u međuprostoru. Zašto onda samo šaka moćnika i organizacija sa najradikalnijim stavovima određuje budućnost Srbije i njenog identiteta? Zašto gradani jedino reaguju na ono što se lično njima događa? Politika i identitet se stvaraju kroz društvene procese i dijalog. Budi deo tog dijaloga. Počni da govoriš o pitanjima identiteta, budućnosti, kulture. Oblikuj svoj svet sutrašnjice, živi naglas. Sa tvojom porodicom, sa tvojim prijateljima, u tom gradu, u tvojoj svakodnevici. Za pozitivnu budućnost i pozitivnu viziju identiteta.

Ovo je zahtev za *postnacionalni režim sećanja*, sećanja koje nije podredeno dobrobiti nacije i nije učvršćeno istorijskim interpretacijama, već nam omogućava da razmišljamo kritički (i glasno, a ne tiho u čošku!) o našem društvu i okruženju, o prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti.

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GRAĐENJE PUTA NAPRETKA ZA PROŠLOST SRBIJE

Prezentacija nasledja Srbije na „evropski način”

nasleđa čuvali i razvijali (tvrdave), deo su uništavali (paganski hramovi, crkve i manastiri), a veliki deo je ostao da leži zaboravljen i odbačen (carske palate).

Svoj doprinos razvoju kulture davali su svi narodi koji su se doseljavali, ili osvajali ovo područje, kao i svaka nova generacija koja je stasavala.

Tako se danas na srpskim putevima kulture sreću sećanja Evrope iz različitih vremenskih perioda, ukrštaju se na rečnim ušćima i dolinama, a razilaze po obodima planinskih venaca, gde su civilizacije tragale za skrovitim mestima u kojima će omogućiti slobodu okupljanja i razvijanja misli i dela (...).”
(Milena Dragičević Šešić, 2009)

U ovom citatu koji se nalazi na prvoj strani brošure Turističke organizacije Srbije turistima se nudi prilika da se „vrate sećanjima na evropsku prošlost Srbije”. Posetioci mogu upoznati deo perioda istorije Srbije tokom kojih je zemlja bila deo slavnih evropskih imperija i drevnih civilizacija. Poseta spomenicima predstavljenim u brošuri pruža turistima

mogućnost „jedinstvene spoznaje duha moderne Srbije” i ukazuje na njenu „kompleksnu povezanost sa savremenom Evropom”¹. Ovaj uvod je jasan pokušaj da se stvori slika o kulturnom identitetu Srbije koja se može uključiti u širi koncept evropskog kulturnog identiteta. On je takođe povezan s aktuelnim težnjama

da se kreira slika o autentičnom kulturnom identitetu Srbije u okviru sve više ujedinjene Evrope. Ministarstvo kulture Republike Srbije je preuzeo

¹ Dragičević Šešić, M. (2009). *Serbia Culture Trails*. National Tourist Organisation Serbia: Belgrade.

taj zadatak i od 2003. se uključilo u zajednički projekt Saveta Evrope (SE) i Evropske komisije (EK). Ove dve institucije Evropske Unije su razvile poseban regionalni program za nasleđe Jugoistočne Evrope čiji je cilj da stimuliše kulturnu, ekonomsku i političku inkluziju zemalja ovog regiona u evropsku zajednicu.²

² Uključene su sledeće države: Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Crna Gora i Kosovo.

Predstavljanje nasleđa Srbije na „evropski način”

Regionalni program za kulturno i prirodno nasleđe Jugoistočne Evrope su pokrenuli SE i EK 2003. godine. U početku je primarni cilj programa bio da stimuliše pojačanu saradnju između zemalja u regionu, posebno između zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. Zamisao je bila da bi obnovljena svest o regionalnoj pripadnosti mogla ponovo povezati region sa ostatkom Evrope i kreirati novi okvir za povezivanje u samom regionu. Nasleđe bi trebalo da obezbedi regionu „kulturni prostor za komunikaciju”, u kome bi bio prikazan i doprinos regiona tzv. „evropskom nasleđu”. Na ovaj način bi ljudima u regionu bila pružena mogućnost da „iskuse” što znači biti deo evropske kulture, a ljudima van regiona da otkriju ovaj relativno nepoznat deo Evrope, lociran na marginama EU. Tokom godina interpretacija programa se postepeno promenila, kao posledica promjenjenih interesa Evropske Unije i Saveta Evrope. Od 2008. program je prezentovan na sledeći način:

„Ova akcija je pokazatelj kontinuiranog napora da se izgrade mostovi među narodima, tako što podstiče pomirenje, kulturnu različitost i interkulturalni dijalog. Zaštita i ponovna upotreba graditeljskog nasleđa su veoma važni za održivi razvoj i ističu suštinsku ulogu nasleđa kao generatora društvenog i ekonomskog kapitala, do-nose materijalnu korist lokalnim zajednicama, između ostalog podsticanjem turizma. [...] Veliki potencijal je u fokusiranju pažnje i podsticanju investicija u rehabilitaciju istorijskih lokaliteta u oblastima koje su u političkoj, ekonomskoj i društvenoj tranziciji.”³

³ CoE/EC (2008) IRPP/SAAH. *The Ljubljana Process – Funding Heritage Rehabilitation in South-East Europe. A Joint Action of the European Commission and the Council of Europe*, [online] Dostupno na: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/Regional/SEE/IRPPSAAH/ljubljana_precatalogue_E.pdf.

Ovaj citat može navesti na zaključak da je nasleđe smatrano tajnim oružjem protiv postojećih regionalnih antagonizama koji su nastali kao posledica skorašnjeg rata. Takođe, nasleđe se posmatralo kao jedno od mogućih rešenja za povećano osiromašenje pojedinih delova Jugosločne Evrope. I, konačno, kako bi se očuvalo postojanje i prezentacija nasleđa na najbolji mogući način, kao ključna je prepoznata rehabilitacija graditeljskog nasleđa u Jugoistočnoj Evropi na način koji bi omogućio harmonizaciju standarda zaštite s onima koji se primenjuju u zemljama EU.

Ono što je začuđujuće u ovom opisu je činjenica da kulturno-istorijska evropska dimenzija, kako ju je opisala Milena Dragičević Šešić u citatu na početku ovog eseja, nije pomenuta i izgleda da je glavni fokus usmeren na vrednosti, održivi razvoj i tehnike konzervacije. Iako je jedan od ključnih faktora da bi se nešto smatralo nasleđem postojanje određenog stepena vezanosti za njega, on nije uzet kao polazna tačka. Relevantnijim se smatra to što naslede nudi mogućnost da se stimuliše regionalna saradnja, podstakne ekonomski razvoj i implementiraju nove metode konzervacije. Ovi kriterijumi čine odredene lokalitete „evropskijim” u odnosu na druge. Ovakav pristup EK i SE je primetan i u načinu na koji je program razvijan u Srbiji.

„Evropska baština” u Srbiji: Senjski rudnik, Difuzni muzej u Baču, Feliks Romulijana

SE i EU su rešili da podele program u nekoliko faza kako bi zemlje koje su u njega uključene mogle polako ali temeljno da rade na promeni politika u oblasti nasleđa ka „evropskijem” pristupu. Koordinatori programa u Srbiji su prvo morali da odrede spomenike koji će biti uključeni u program. Zatim su morali da utvrde moguće rizike i troškove vezane za rekonstrukciju i konzervaciju tih lokaliteta, i, na kraju, su morali da naprave jasan plan za potencijalnu buduću upotrebu spomenika i plan mogućeg finansiranja. Određeno je nekoliko rokova za predaju potrebnih dokumenata i koordinatori su morali redovno da obaveštavaju SE i EK o

postignutom učinku. Ubrzo se ispostavilo da je teško ostvariti predvidene rokove i postavljene uslove. Postojalo je neslaganje između različitih aktera u oblasti o tome koji bi lokaliteti trebalo da imaju prioritet, a koji ne. Različite strane (poput Srpske pravoslavne crkve, arhitekata i predstavnika institucija) su imale različito poimanje o svrsi nasledja i njegovom značaju. U pojedinim slučajevima je bilo rasprava na lokalnom nivou o vlasničkim pravima, kao i o generalnom nedostatku vrednovanja nasledja. Usled nedostatka iksusnih profesionalaca u oblasti upravljanja kulturnim nasleđem proces iniciran od strane SE i EK je bio zahtevan i spor se odvijao. Ispostavilo se da je prva lista spomenika koja je sastavljena 2003. bila suviše ambiciozna u odnosu na određene uslove koje su postavili SE i EK, te je potom modifikovana i skraćena 2008.⁴ Na kraju je doneta odluka da se treba fokusirati samo na nekoliko tzv. „konsolidovanih projekata”.⁵ Tri izabrana projekata u Srbiji su: *Senjski rudnik*, *Vekovi Bača-Difuzni muzej*, koji uključuje franjevački manastir i srpski pravoslavni manastir Bodani, i *Feliks Romulijana*, arheološki lokalitet blizu Zaječara koji sadrži ostatke palate rimskog cara Galerija.

Zbog čega su ova tri projekta odabrana kao najbolji primeri dobre prakse u okviru evropskog programa za naslede? U kom pogledu su se najbolje uklopili sa ciljevima i motivima EU i SE u odnosu na ostale spomenike koji su isključeni iz programa? Ova tri lokaliteta su izabrana iz nekoliko razloga. Prvo zbog toga što su lokalne vlasti, vode projekta i nekoliko institucija koje su bile nadležne za ove lokalitete, saradivali na najbolji mogući način. Budući da

⁴ Lokaliteti kao što su Lepenski Vir, manastir Mileševa, Viminacijum, manastiri Fruske Gore, i staro jezgro Novog Pazara (bez hamama) su isključeni, a pojedini, poput opservatorije i staklenika u Botaničkoj bašti u Beogradu i drvena crkva u Seča Reci su dodati. Važno je napomenuti da su, pored problema pomenuih u tekstu, neki projekti isključeni jer su već bili finansirani iz drugih izvora, te nisu više bili odgovarajući za program SE/EK.

⁵ „Konsolidovani projekti“ bi trebalo da postanu primjeri efektivnosti novog pristupa koji je usvojen od početka „Ljubljana procesa“ u 2008. S ovim „procesom“ fokus je preusmeren na formiranje strategija razvoja, podrške unapređenju javne svesti o nasleđu i na obezbeđivanje sredstava za finansiranje pojedinačnih projekata koji bi stimulisali održivi razvoj. Konsolidovani projekti su izabrani u svim uključenim zemljama. Srbija nije izuzetak.

je jedan od ciljeva programa za naslede SE i EK da stimuliše regionalni razvoj, da uključi lokalno stanovništvo u upravljanje kulturnim nasledjem i da razvije demokratski pristup u razvoju nasledja, izgledalo je da su, u ovom pogledu, pomenuti lokaliteti najpodobniji. Na ovim lokalitetima su bili angažovani entuzijastični i marljivi pojedinci, otvoreni ka usvajanju i primeni novih metoda i pristupa i koji su bili spremni da razvijaju program prema sugestijama SE i EK. Dalje, kada su u pitanju navedena tri lokaliteta, bilo je najmanje problema oko vlasničkih odnosa, ilegalne gradnje i razilaženja po pitanju prioriteta za zaštitu. Većina institucija nadležnih za naslede razumela je ideju SE i EK da se naslede može sreditati i kao ekonomski resurs i da to nema negativan uticaj na spomenike i ne ugrožava njihov integritet. Novi načini prezentacije nasleđa kako bi se obezbedilo finansiranje, kao i fokusiranje na buduće namene spomenika nisu prepoznati kao adekvatni od strane svih uključenih aktera. Ispostavilo se da je puna saradnja s nadležnim institucijama i pojedincima bila retka, tako da su odabrani lokaliteti u čijem slučaju su okolnosti bile najpovoljnije. Drugi faktor koji je uticao na izbor je bio taj što su navedeni lokaliteti bili relativno nepoznati u Srbiji (npr. Senj i Bač). Oni su se mogli prilagoditi i lako uklopiti u propozicije SE i EK bez uključivanja drugih institucija. Na ostalim lokalitetima vladala je borba između aktera koji su imali različite interese i ideje vezano za njihovu prezentaciju. Odabrani lokaliteti su bili otvoreniji za interpretacije i zbog toga podobniji za moguću demonstraciju evropskih vrednosti i prilagodavanje evropskim standardima.

Izbor lokaliteta uključenih u program je reflektovao napor koordinatora programa u Srbiji da se izbore s pristiskom kreatora politika u dатој oblasti na nivou EU i SE u kombinaciji s određenim lokalnim pritiscima karakterističnim za savremenu Srbiju, a u vezi s njenom kulturnom i politikama vrednovanja nasleđa. Sektor nasleđa u Srbiji pati od centralizovane kulturne politike koja kao posledicu ima neusklađen odnos između Ministarstva kulture i određenih aktera koji su aktivni u oblasti

nasleđa. Takođe, nema mnogo poverenja u način na koji funkcioniše resorno ministarstvo. Različiti potencijalni partneri (poput akademika, predstavnika lokalnih zajednica i nevladinih organizacija) nisu motivisani da sarađuju. Pomenuti lokaliteti su izabrani jer mogu dovesti do najboljih rezultata u kratkom vremenskom periodu, jer su u njihov razvoj uključeni ambiciozni pojedinci, i jer je u njihovom slučaju saradnja s lokalnim stanovništvom mogla da bude bar delimično osigurana. Dodatno, program pati od nedostatka komunikacije između ljudi angažovanih u oblasti nasleda, jer izgleda da se svako od njih drži svojih ciljeva. Treba reći da regionalni program za nasleđe nije prepoznat kao važan u Srbiji, što je dovelo do toga da pojedine odluke poput fokusiranja na relativno nepoznate spomenike kao što je Senjski rudnik – što je bilo rezultat ličnog interesa koordinatora programa u Srbiji – budu relativno lako donete. Još jedno objašnjenje za izbor datih spomenika potiče iz činjenice da u Srbiji, generalno posmatrano, ne postoji jasna vizija o tome kako naslede treba da bude prezentovano. Srbija je još uvek u potrazi za adekvatnom interpretacijom svog kulturnog identiteta u okviru Evrope i nema mnogo iskustva na tom polju. Stoga od samog početka nije postojala jasna vizija o tome koji će se lokaliteti/spomenici najbolje uklopliti u evropski program za nasleđe i na koji način ih predstaviti.

Povratak sećanjima na evropsku prošlost Srbije

Na osnovu svega rečenog možemo zaključiti da su izbori napravljeni u programu bazirani na pragmatičnim osnovama. To se može posmatrati kao rezultat tenzije do koje dolazi kada lokalni uslovi u vezi s politikama u oblasti nasleđa i njegovog vrednovanja treba da budu usklađeni s trostrukim i prilično kompleksnim pristupom SE/EK. Ono što je evropsko u ovom evropskom programu za nasleđe odgovara tehničkim kapacitetima i novim pristupima primenjenim na mestima gde su uslovi najpodobniji. Program ne ukazuje na jasnu viziju o tome kako bi Srbija želela sebe da predstavi u širem evropskom kontekstu, već otvara prostor za primenu novih metoda i pristupa. Dakle nasuprot onome što se obećava u brošuri iz koje je uzet

citati sa početka ovog kratkog eseja, turistima se ne pruža nikakva mogućnost da steknu predstavu o kulturnoj i istorijskoj jedinstvenosti Srbije u širem kontekstu Evrope. Ovo ne podrazumeva da je razvoj „evropskih kulturnih prostora” izgubljen, već da ostaje u pozadini – bar za sada.

Klaske Vos je doktorantkinja na Univerzitetu Aarhus u Danskoj.

Tokom godina specijalizovala se za region Jugoistočne Evrope i posebno Srbiju. 2004. je odbranila magistarsku tezu na temu “Preko Save i Dunava. Studenti iz Beograda o Srbiji u Evropi”. U okviru multidisciplinarnog master programa Centralno i Jugoistočnoevropske studije na *School for Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES/UCL)* u Londonu je 2006. odbranila magistarsku tezu na temu “Evropa u Srbiji: Promocija srpskog evropejstva”.

U okviru svog doktorata se bavi rezultatima zajedničkog projekta Saveta Evrope i Evropske Komisije u Srbiji.

Klaske je bila jedna od polaznica Medunarodne letnje akademije (*Bez*)granični identiteti.

MISIJA SKORO PA (NE)MOGUĆA

Naslov sve govori! Da li će pogled na do pola punu čašu biti kao u optimiste ili pesimiste, zavisi od vašeg karaktera. I jedan i drugi pogled legitimni su i istiniti po pitanju identiteta Srbije i promene njenog imidža u svetu. Podaci i činjenice opravdavaju nemoguću misiju, a izraženi potencijal onu moguću.

U ovom tekstu biće dat jedan kraći pregled o tome koliko se do danas uradilo po pitanju određivanja identiteta Srbije i promene njenog imidža u svetu. Kao izvor informacija korišćen je isključivo internet, koji svakako nije pouzdan za detaljnu i sveobuhvatnu analizu, i medijska dokumentacija *EBART Consulting*. Uprkos nedovoljnosti izvora dobijeno je dovoljno podataka kako bi se stekla jedna temeljnija slika o tome koliko smo do sada bili vredni u određivanju toga ko smo, šta smo, kakvi smo, kako nas drugi vide, a kakvi želimo da budemo.

Pregledani su novinski članci objavljeni između 2003. i 2008. godine u dnevnim novinama i časopisima u Srbiji. U pretraživač dokumentacije unete su dve grupe ključnih reči: „identitet Srbije“ i „promena imidža Srbije“.

Državni sektor

Na osnovu prikupljenih podataka čini se da je vladin sektor u izvesnoj meri prepoznao važnost promene imidža Srbije u svetu što potvrđuje osnivanje Ministarstva za dijasporu, angažovanje lobističkih agencija ili osnivanje Saveta za brendiranje. Na žalost, može se zaključiti da nije postojao sistematičan pristup rešavanju ovog problema.

U pomenutoj analizi evidentno je da nedostaju podaci o tome šta se danas dešava sa Savetom za brendiranje, da li i dalje neka agencija radi na brendiranju Srbije u svetu, ko danas lobira za nas, dokle je u svojim projektima stiglo Ministarstvo za dijasporu i da li u ovom trenutku u Vladi postoje osobe koje planiraju da urade nešto po pitanju rešavanja ovog veoma značajnog prob-

lema, kao i da li postoje dugoročni i kratkoročni planovi vladinog sektora. Do tih odgovora nije lako doći jer se mnoge akcije započnu i ne dovrše. Tako npr. znamo za osnivanje Saveta za brendiranje, što je u jednom trenutku bila udarna vest na svim medijima, ali ne znamo da li on još uvek postoji, ko su sada njegovi članovi, šta taj savet zapravo radi ili kada je ukinut? To nisu vesti za naslovne strane.

Nevladin sektor

Istraživanje navodi na neočekivani zaključak da ni nevladin sektor nije bio previše vredan u osmišljavanju projekata koji bi na bilo koji način pomogli u rešavanju gorućeg problema Srbije. Pominju se organizacije poput Centra za ekologiju i turizam, Srpskog instituta za javnu diplomaciju, Attache Conferences i Kulturklammer – centar za kulturne interakcije. Ipak, čini se da je svaka od pomenutih nevladinskih organizacija osmisnila projekt na visokom nivou i sa odgovarajućim ciljevima u ovom trenutku – ukazivanje na problem, motivacija, budenje i okupljanje stručne javnosti, kao i edukacija mlađih o važnosti rešavanja ovog problema i mogućnostima da oni tome doprinesu.

Da li zbog nemoguće misije, nedovoljno stručnog kadra ili nečeg trećeg, sigurno je da nedostaje ozbiljniji, energičniji i sveobuhvatniji pritisak nevladinskog sektora na vladajuću političku elitu da sistematično i dugoročno pristupi rešavanju problema.

Međunarodna letnja akademija (*Bez)granični identiteti*

Prošle su godine i godine našeg činjenja i nečinjenja koje su uticale na stvaranje negativnog imidža u svetu. A kada nas neko pita „A ko ste vi, ako ne narod o kome mi imamo negativnu sliku?“, mi kažemo „Bolji smo!“. Ali se čini da ne znamo i zašto.

Pitanje identiteta Srbije koje je pokrenuto na održanoj letnjoj akademiji (*Bez)granični identiteti* predstavlja krucijalnu i polaznu tačku u rešavanju prob-

lema lošeg imidža Srbije. Mladi stručnjaci iz Srbije, dijaspore i inostranstva pokušali su da odgovore na ovo pitanje i da svojim znanjem i iskustvima pomognu Srbiji da se pomeri ka ispunjenju (ne)moguće misije. Opravdano se čini da je ova letnja akademija odlična osnova za dalji rad, što potvrđuje i objavlјivanje ove publikacije.

I za kraj...

Ovi zaključni redovi definitivno ukazuju da je čaša s početka ovog teksta poluprazna. Vladin i nevladin sektor Republike Srbije radili su nedovoljno na menjanju imidža države u svetu. Neosporna je činjenica da javno mnjenje Srbije želi i zaslužuje bolju sliku svoje zemlje u svetu.

Za sve važne promene u jednoj zemlji neophodna je spremnost i odlučnost Vlade da ih i sprovede. Deklarativna želja možda i postoji, ali odlučnosti da se ozbiljno pristupi problemu o kojem govorimo – nema.

S druge strane, ni nevladin sektor do sada nije imao dovoljno vere, snage i odlučnosti da izvrši ozbiljniji pritisak na vladajuće strukture i ukaže na potrebu za jednim sistematskim pristupom.

Nakon letnje akademije (*Bez*)granični identiteti i tokom nastajanja ove publikacije, iskristalisala se neophodnost usvajanja temeljne, sistematične i dugoročne nacionalne strategije, koja bi Srbiju u periodu od pet do dvadeset godina predstavila u mnogo boljem svetlu. Neophodan je nacionalni plan po ovom pitanju, što jeste odgovornost pre svega državnih organa. Oni su ti koji moraju da okupe sve one institucije i pojedince u zemlji koji na bilo koji način mogu da budu ambasadori Srbije u svetu. Neophodna je jasna vizija budućnosti, kao i pridobijanje podrške javnosti, što čini se već postoji.

Naravno da je istinita činjenica da građanin Srbije koji otputuje u inostranstvo i predstavi sebe i svoju državu u najboljem svetlu, na značajan način doprinosi sprovođenju javne diplomatiјe. Uostalom, svaki boljši tak u bilo kom

segmentu društva, utiče na stvaranje bolje slike o nama u svetu. Ipak, možda je potrebno da država razmisli o formiranju posebne državne institucije koja bi se bavila isključivo ovim problemom i bila koordinator svih aktivnosti koje bi kroz svoj aparat sprovodila. O ovoj ideji govorio je gospodin Božo Skoko tokom svog predavanja u okviru letnje akademije *(Bez)granični identiteti*. Ili bi nevladin sektor mogao ozbiljno da pristupi formiranju fondacije koja bi radila na stvaranju jedne ovakve strategije, o čemu su govorile gospođa Andrea Brbaklić i gospođa Aleksandra Vesić tokom svoje radionice.

Međunarodna letnja akademija *(Bez)granični identiteti* predstavlja događaj na kojem su se okupila i razmenila različita mišljenja, iskustva i impresije, ali nakon koga su naši pogledi usmereni ka do pola punoj čaši.

Jelena Krstić je diplomirala na Grupi za španski jezik i hispanske književnosti na Filološkom fakultetu Univerziteta u Beogradu. Trenuto radi kao prevoditeljica u jednoj prevodilačkoj agenciji. Aktivistkinja je u Društvu hispanista i od marta 2009. godine stažistkinja je Srpskog instituta za javnu diplomaciju, kao nastavak aktivnosti i interesovanja pokazanih na Međunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji *(Bez)granični identiteti*.
Jelena je bila jedna od polaznica Međunarodne letnje akademije *(Bez)granični identiteti*.

IDENTITET IZ-MEĐU

Pitanje identiteta obično dospeva u prvi plan kada se identitet gubi ili kada njegovo postojanje i značenje postane nejasno. Veliki potresi u društvu, pogotovu traumatična iskustva, dovode do neophodnosti redefinisanja identiteta odredene zajednice i njenih institucija. Međutim, iako neophodna i (u istorijskom i društveno-političkom kontekstu) krajnje utilitarna, sama zamisao o postojanju jednog određenog originalnog i jedinstvenog identiteta države, nacije ili društva je u velikoj meri sporna, ako ne i absurdna. Ukoliko se želi dosledno sprovesti u delo, ona je unapred osuđena na zapadanje u stereotipe ili totalitarizam.

Pošto ovo važi za svako društvo, važi i za Srbiju koja se, istina, u 20. veku susretala sa iskušenjima koja prevazilaze iskušenja mnogih drugih zemalja. U Srbiji je moderna agit-prop „odbrana“ (specifično srpskog, nacionalnog, metafizičkog) identiteta uglavnom završavala u posve nekritičnoj mitologizaciji pojedinih istorijskih perioda, odnosno u potpunoj negaciji nekih drugih (nepoželjnih) sekvenci istorije naroda i države. To vodi u, do krajnosti banalno, „čišćenje“ istorije prema kriterijumu „poželjnih“ („pravih srpskih“) i „nepoželjnih“ („nesrpskih“, „izdajničkih“) narativa. Iako su razlozi za ovakav odnos prema istoriji dobrim delom ukorenjeni u neznanju i/ili zloupotrebi određenih narativa, oni imaju i drugu dimenziju – pitanje identiteta, koje se manifestuje u potrebi da postoji jasna, racionalizovana granica između „nas“ i „njih“, pošto ta granica sama po sebi nije jasna ili pak uopšte i ne postoji. Identitet postaje stvar „invencije“, konstruisanja narativa prema određenom ideološkom, utilitarno-političkom kriterijumu.

Pitanje šta jeste *moj* ili *naš* identitet jeste i posledica napuštanja (iz bilo kog razloga) prethodnog identiteta kako bi se on zamenio novim. Ovaj proces *tranzicije* identiteta nazivam „identitetom iz-među“. Jedan identitet je izgubljen, drugi još nije zadobijen. I dok je ova situacija ponekad plodonosna na ličnom planu, ona izaziva strašnu frustraciju na kolektivnom planu.

Ona je u vezi i sa pitanjem vrednosti koje oblikuju određenu društvenu realnost kao i sa najopštijim društvenim okvirom koji daje (prividni) *smisao* delovanju i postojanju unutar jednog kolektiva. Zbog toga taj identitet nazivam identitetom „iz-među“ (in-between) čime potenciram poreklo tog identiteta. On se, naime, uglavnom razvija iz „međe“ tj. granice prema drugome. A granice koje mogu poslužiti kao tlo za razvoj ovog identiteta su mnogobrojne. One variraju od geografskih, političkih, do jezičkih, kulturnih, verskih, nacionalnih, psiholoških ili ideooloških. Međa, graniča, postaje okvir nastanka i razvoja identiteta, i time nužno nosi sa sobom određeni ksenofobni karakter, ali i mogućnost prevazilaženja granice kao mesta razdvajanja zarad shvatanja granice kao mesta kontakta, povezanosti entiteta između kojih se granica nalazi.

Sa druge strane, prethodni osvrt na problem identiteta ne znači da je pojam identiteta u potpunosti nemoguće aplicirati na bilo koji kolektiv. Ko se još nije uverio u nemačku sistematičnost, američku površnost ili kvalitet balkanske kuhinje? Problem se sastoji u *ekskluzivističkom* (koje bih nazvao i *iluzionističkom* a najčešće i totalitarnom) shvatanju identiteta kome je, kao alternativu, moguće suprotstaviti i *inkluzionistički* model. Srbija je dobar primer na kome se ovo pitanje može analizirati.

Bilo kakav pokušaj da se sintetiše jedan „organski“ ekskluzivni i ontološki (u ovom slučaju srpski) identitet i kultura, koji su tako specifični da se ne mogu dovesti u vezu sa bilo čim drugim, završava u stereotipu, mitomaniji, laži i despotizmu koji ovakav narativ koristi kao izvor ili legitimaciju svoje moći.

Inkluzionističkim pristupom identitetu, naprotiv, moguće je sagledati sve različite, nekad i kontradiktorne, slojeve nasleđa koji čine sastavni deo identiteta i kulture određenog prostora. Ukoliko se pitanje današnjeg identiteta Srbije postavi u ovaj kontekst, razlika u odnosu na ekskluzivistički pristup postaje veoma uočljiva. Identitet Srbije transformiše se sam po себи

u jedan „evropski“ identitet u smislu da odražava „jedinstvo različitosti“ kroz praktično čitavu istoriju. Da se ova teza dokaže dovoljno je pogledati srednjovekovnu Srbiju koja je „specifično svoju“ kulturnu produkciju i identitet ostvarila spajajući elemente istoka i zapada (npr. jedinstvenim „Raškim stilom“ koji izranja iz kombinacije vizantijske i romaničke arhitekture). Prvi srpski kralj biva krunisan papskom krunom, ali vera ostaje većinski pravoslavna. Moderni državni simboli Srbije (poput zastave i grba) takođe ne poseduju niti jedan „originalni“ i „specifično srpski“ element (orao je modifikovani vizantijski orao, „četiri (ćirilična) slova s“ su zapravo stilizovana početna slova mota dinastije Paleologa „Βασιλευς Βασιλεων Βασιλευων Βασιλευσιν“ tj. „Car careva vlada nad carevima“, boje zastave su panslovenske, itd), ali se njihova specifičnost sastoji upravo u jedinstvenom spoju različitih uticaja, kultura i tradicija koji se prepliću na prostorima na kojima Srbi žive već oko 1500 godina. Svi ti slojevi i kulturna nasleđa, počev od praistorijskih i antičkih civilizacija (kada je ovaj prostor, po rečima prof. Srejovića bio „kulturna prestonica sveta“), preko srednjovekovnih (slovenskih), turskih, austrijskih i nemačkih uticaja, do modernih monarhističkih i komunističkih, i evropsko-globalističkih ideologija, jesu naša kultura i identitet.

Ako se na savremeni srpski identitet gleda iz ove perspektive, onda se on od „ugroženog“, zatvorenog i ksenofobnog transformiše u bogatu riznicu koja ljude na ovom prostoru, njihov identitet i kulturu svrstava u red značajnih svetskih kulturnih činilaca. Taj identitet onda nije u opasnosti da se izgubi, niti je za njegovo potvrđivanje ili „odbranu“ potrebna mitologizacija i artifijelno konstruisanje parcijalnih i virtuelnih identiteta. Njegovo bogatstvo i trajnost su očigledni. I ne samo to, njegovo postojanje postaje mogući doprinos i putokaz evropskom identitetu koji je, budući takođe nejasan, još uvek u fazi artikulacije i racionalizacije.

U zaključku ovog kratkog teksta iskoristio bih priliku da se zahvalim organizatorima i realizatorima letnje akademije (*Bezgranični identiteti* (2008) što

su aktuelizovali temu identiteta Srbije danas i njegove percepcije „iznutra“ i „spolja“. Zainteresovanost koju su učesnici projekta iskazali, kao i samo njihovo odazivanje pozivu da učestvuju u Akademiji svedoči o uspehu inicijative. Po mom mišljenju, Akademiju 2008. i ovu publikaciju ne bi trebalo shvatiti kao zaključak jednog projekta već pre kao otvaranje pitanja čije će dalje diskutovanje uslediti.

Davor Džalto je docent istorije i teorije umetnosti na Univerzitetu u Nišu. Doktorirao je na Albert-Ludwig Univerzitetu (Albert-Ludwigs Universität) u Frajburgu, Nemačka. Među glavne oblasti njegovog istraživanja spadaju: ljudska kreativnost u teologiji i umetnosti, koncept „umetnosti“ kao modernog konstrukt-a, umetnost u eri globalizacije. Kao umetnik radi u različitim medijima, uključujući video umetnost, performans, slikarstvo i skulpturu.

Davor Džalto je bio jedan od predavača na Medunarodnoj letnjoj akademiji (*Bez)granični identiteti*.

TO BE FROM OUT

Towards the Redefinition
of the Cultural Identity
of Serbia

INTRODUCTION

Accelerated globalisation together with intensified migrations and processes of European political and cultural integrations have raised the question of cultural identity and brought it into the focus of international relations and social dialogue in every particular country, as well as in the Europe as a whole.

Therefore, finding ways to preserve authentic cultural identity and to enable its harmonisation with the dominant one – the emerging *European identity* – has become the subject of various scientific disciplines and fields of research, and also one of the most important tasks of the public policies in many European countries.

Observing Serbia in a given context, but also as a country which has already begun the processes of European integration and accepted position in which, among many other smaller or bigger countries, it strives to gain unique status within the community of European states, it became obvious that besides the need to undergo different changes and transformations of its economy and socio-political system, Serbia is faced with the challenge of improving its image and repositioning on the international scene. In relation to this, it is of essential importance for Serbia to redefine its collective identity, which was compromised by the state and socio-political discontinuity and loss of the previous system of values, due to the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and definitely lost during the socio-political and economic crisis during the 1990s.

Simultaneously with the crisis of identity, which is present in Serbian society for almost two decades, Serbia lost its reputation and negative image of the country was created in its closer and wider surroundings. Years of isolation and inaccessibility of the country, media manipulation and non-critical attitude of citizens of Serbia towards its role in the wars in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, unwillingness of the ruling regime, the social elites, but also of the majority of citizens to take the responsibility for politics of conflicts and wars,

are just some of the factors that contributed to the damage of the reputation of the country and the emergence of its negative image. On the other hand, after 2000, the unwillingness for reflective and critical examining of the recent past, historical narratives and collective memory on which collective identity was constructed during the 1990s, significantly slowed down the positive change of the way in which Serbia is perceived, both from inside and outside.

Cultural identity can be seen as a social construct, and as such dependent on various factors and circumstances, which is constantly changing and regenerating and which besides many features that originate from different elements within a particular culture, also includes the relation to other cultures. It is therefore understandable why the public dialogue and critical examining of the key factors in the formation of the collective (cultural) identity, among other things, must include the relationship to other cultures, and therefore perception of others.¹

¹ R.R. Božović, *Kulturni identitet u globalnoj integraciji*, Sociološka Luča I/1, 2007.

One-dimensional presentation of Serbia's culture and one-dimensional way of communicating its cultural identity caused that diversity of cultures in Serbia and their corresponding identities have become completely invisible and irrelevant in the domain of external relations. When it comes to internal development of Serbian society, such approach endangered safeguarding and fostering the multiculturalism as one of the basic values of modern civil society, and eliminated its significance as potentially very powerful generator in collective identity formation.

Therefore, in order to change the negative reputation of Serbia and improve communication of its specific identity with emerging European identity, it is necessary to involve all interested parties and engage different aspects of social life in these processes, as well as to devise policies and strategies, at the state level, for repositioning of the country. Moreover, in addition to creating

the appropriate context for the redefinition of cultural identity and international status of the country, it is of equal importance to enable participation of citizens in a given processes. It means opening the country, enabling greater mobility of its citizens and intensive cultural cooperation and exchange, but also inclusion of the diaspora representatives and providing opportunities for all interested parties to be better acquainted with the sources of contemporary identity of Serbia and to contribute to redefinition of its current determinants.

The Project SERBIA MOBILE_Between Two Stands

The Project *SERBIA MOBILE_Between Two Stands* deals with the questions related to the contemporary identity of Serbia – its formation, communicating and presentation – both in the country and across its borders, and the role and contribution of different socio-cultural groups, categories and generators in its formation.

The project realization began in 2008 and so far its two phases have been successfully completed, both focused on examining the collective identity of Serbia in the context of current European integration: International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities* (2008) and the publication *TO BE FROM/OUT – Towards the Redefinition of the Cultural Identity of Serbia* (2009).

The International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities* (Belgrade, 25th – 31st August 2008) was organised with support of the Ministry for Diaspora of the Republic of Serbia, ERSTE Bank a.d. Novi Sad, Austrian Cultural Forum Belgrade and French Cultural Center Belgrade. The Academy is based on the assumption that inclusion and participation of migrants and representatives of diaspora in the processes of redefining the contemporary social and cultural identity of Serbia and its promotion at the international level, could become potential instrument in changing the negative image of the country and its quality presentation and affirmation of its cultures and identities beyond its borders – its connection to close and wide surroundings.

As a result, the Academy proved existence of a large number of representatives of Serbia's diaspora who continuously make great efforts to change the image of the country in their micro environment. Those individuals are mainly young people who can, through their rich, dynamic and multidimensional interaction with other cultures (through networking, different cultural activities, professional work, etc.), contribute to already initiated processes of modernisation of the country, while their engagement could become enriching constituent of Serbia's redefined cultural identity. However, their efforts are ignored or even more often not recognised as important in the country of their origin.

Finally, discussions and dialogues conducted during the Academy led to the conclusion that it is necessary to introduce systematic, professional and multidisciplinary approach in the presentation of cultural heritage and contemporary artistic production and communication of cultural identity of Serbia beyond its borders, as well as to provide better visibility of engagement of the diaspora representatives. This would be the opportunity for emigrants to better understand and in their personal identity incorporate some of the generators of cultural identity of the country of their origin and thus become its active transmitters. Furthermore, inclusion of diaspora representatives would enable their recognition as an important factor in the improvement of state reputation at international level, but also it would enrich the cultural identity of Serbia with one of the most important constituents in its formation – the perception of "others".

The publication *TO BE FROM/OUT – Towards the Redefinition of the Cultural Identity of Serbia* is an attempt to contribute to opening of the public space for reflection and dialogue on the topic of cultural identity as important determinant in the processes of building the reputation of the country and the crucial element of collective identity. The aim of the publication is to contribute to identification of the tasks of public policies and stakeholders within the process of Serbia's cultural identity redefinition, as well as the main values and

generators in its formation. In addition, the basic concept of the publication is based on the inclusion of visions and perspectives of those who are “outside” in order to enable recognition of adequate methods and approaches in communicating identity of Serbia.

The publication includes selected essays of participants of the International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities*, and texts of relevant experts affiliated to different scientific and research fields, as well as the works of certain artists whose work corresponds to the theme of the publication.

By analysing and examining the concept and sustainability of shared *European identity*, cultural and artistic practices and approaches aimed at the integration and harmonisation of specific cultural identities with emerging *European identity*, challenges and tasks of public policies and stakeholders, different factors and generators in the formation and communication of the contemporary identity of Serbia, the publication aims to contribute to better informing on the issue of multidimensionality of the process of building the state reputation and incite proactive attitude of the state towards the redefinition of its own identity and status at the international level, primarily through the active involvement of all of us in the given processes.

KULTURKLAMMER – centre for cultural interactions is a civil society organisation founded in 2007 with the aim to incite integration and activation of cultural resources in the sustainable development of the society through diverse forms of cultural and artistic actions. Following the principles of professionalism, innovativeness and international cooperation, the organisation strives to stimulate positive changes within society, by provoking proactive and critical thinking and responsible involvement of all societal actors.

www.kulturklammer.org



(UN)Limited Identities - Multiple Meaning of the Term

My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity — for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction — involves establishing opposites and “others” whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from “us”. Each age and society re-creates its “Others”. Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of “other” is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies. **Edward Said***

* Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 1977

Do IDENTITIES KILL?

„Nobody is willing to die for Europe!“
This seems a plausible statement and,
furthermore, a thoroughly positive

one. Nevertheless, when I heard it some years ago it was uttered as a complaint. And this complaint was not brought forward by a soldier trying to defend his job or professional pride but by a colleague of mine, a political scientist, studying European identity.

While I thought his statement is inappropriate if not shocking I still had to admit that he had raised an important point. It is certainly a sign for a collective identity when people are willing to bring sacrifices for their political community. And, unfortunately, such sacrifices are necessary in order to uphold a political system. People have to renounce some of their personal interests for the sake of the whole society. If they do not do so voluntarily, they have to be forced to. But no stable political system can be upheld by force only. This holds especially true for democratic systems ideally defined by self-rule of the people. Obviously, “the people” do not always or even frequently share the same interests. Thus, ever and again, minorities have to accept the decisions of majorities. But why should they do so, why shouldn’t they riot or leave the country if not due to the fact that they define themselves as part of the people, that they share a collective identity.

Collective identities are necessary for political systems and new political entities have to strive for a collective identity of their citizens – be they greater unions of formerly independent states such as the European Union, or smaller units coming out of larger former political entities, such as the successor states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

However, the fact that identities are necessary does not mean that they can be seen as a “good thing” as such. Quite on the contrary, they are dangerous and lead potentially to aggression. By defining who we are and who belongs to us,

we automatically also define those who do not belong, who are excluded – or, in the most extreme case, those whom we are allowed or even required to kill, as, obviously, the main aim of wars is not to die for one's country but to kill for one's country.

So, what can be done about this ambiguous concept of collective identity which cannot be abandoned due to its necessity and is not desirable due to its dangers? A possible and currently widely discussed answer is the solution of *constitutional patriotism* developed by Juergen Habermas. According to this concept, collective identities should not be based on an assumed common culture or fate, but on a common political will, more precisely, a common democratic understanding of society.

This solution is in many respects an attractive one. It is based on the most important function of collective identities in democracies, namely to develop political will and political agency. It is a relatively open concept – you do not have to be born in a community in order to become part of it. And it is a rational concept, rather based on common ideas than on common emotions.

The most frequent critique of this concept maintains that it is extremely unrealistic, ignoring the day-to-day reality of strong emotions against those who do not belong – due to ethnicity, religion or culture, not due to political differences. However, a normative concept does not have to describe empirical reality, it has a value of its own, precisely because it shows aims towards which democratic politics should strive.

But is constitutional patriotism really a desirable political aim? While certainly more open than culturalist definitions, constitutional patriotism is still an exclusionary concept, excluding those who do not base their political agency on democratic ideas. This form of exclusion is especially problematic with regard to contemporary migration societies within which lack of democratic values and traditions has become a more and more popular reason

for exclusion and discrimination. Thereby, democracy is seen as a clear cut concept to which one can subscribe or which one can renounce. Obviously, this is not the case. Most contemporary political systems call themselves democracies. For some of them, one can argue that this political “branding” is little more than a smoke screen, e.g. when no fair elections are carried out forming a minimum requirement for democratic systems. But there are many examples for conflicts about the meaning of democracy within which every party can bring good reasons for the respective legitimacy of its position: Are direct democratic processes “more democratic” than representative ones? Can democracy include group rights or does it have to be based on individual rights only? Which rights of minorities have to be protected from majority decisions? etc.

Democracy is in many respects an empty signifier which can be filled with different contents. These contents are open to contestation – and this is probably the main virtue of democratic systems. Thus, also every definition of democratic identities, such as e.g. constitutional patriotism, has to remain open for contestation. And – contrarily to Habermas – I would argue that this contestation does not have to be as rational and unemotional as possible. We certainly have experienced many tragic results of emotions in politics – national and nationalistic conflicts, genocides, and the successes of the populist right in Europe, just to name a few examples. But do those experiences really teach us to ban emotions from politics? Is this even possible? Why should anybody engage in politics if not because she is feeling strongly about some political matters?

So, again, we have to ask how we should deal with the uneasy concept of collective identity. And, maybe, the first and most important step is to recognize and accept this uneasiness as inevitable. Not only do we have to accept on a theoretical level the necessity and dangers of collective identities, we also have to deal with identities as we find them “out there in the streets.” In many cases, these identities are not especially desirable, they are often nationally

or even nationalistically defined, they tend to rigid exclusions and are frequently not open to rational discourse.

However, and this is the good news, they are not naturally given, they are not based on essential roots – they are constructed, above all by nation states and their different components, such as national cultures and educational systems. These constructions have proven extraordinarily stable over a long time and they have even spilled out to states lacking a strong own national tradition. But they can be changed – and, in fact, they are continuously changing.

European identities are still relatively weak but they develop thereby not replacing national identities but overlapping with them. And also citizens of countries aiming at accession reshape their identifications according to this aim, frequently juggling several identifications they were required to develop during their life time – as Soviet or Yugoslavian citizens (with all included characteristics of communism or socialism, opposition to capitalism and imperialism etc.), as citizens of young nation states and as European citizens-to-be. Furthermore, migrants and their children have to find a way to combine identities of origin and identities of their daily lives.

These are stressful and difficult processes but by them the fluidity and ambiguousness of identities become part of everyday lives of normal citizens. These leads to quite different developments of the self-understanding of people, towards more openness or towards an ever more rigid re-affirmation of one's own identity, towards individual and collective self-reflection or simply towards confusion.

But, in any case, these processes open up new spaces for debates and negotiations. And those who oppose exclusion and discrimination can find possibilities to raise doubt about existing identifications, to question seemingly self-evident concepts – and, in the best case, to trigger debates about democratic ways to deal with identities.

There is no reason to wish for those debates to be purely rational. Opposition against exclusion and discrimination can be as emotional as discrimination frequently is. There are, however, lots of reasons to wish for these debates not to end with the question who is prepared to die or kill for whichever reason or affiliation. Instead, it would be an utterly desirable outcome if citizens became more willing to spend a part of their life time with political thought and agency aiming at open and dynamic conceptualizations of collective identities.

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EUROPEAN AND/OR NATIONAL IDENTITY – SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS*

The history of the European idea

One of the fundamental fallacies concerning Europe is that the concept of Europe as a generally accepted notion has always existed, and that the construction of the European Union after World War II only validated the efforts

of many centuries on the part of European peoples aimed at building a political community from a geographical term. The situation, however, is rather more complicated than that. The first mention of the term Europe occurred only at the beginning of the 15th century, when it was endangered by a severe incursion of the Asian Osmanic Empire from the East, and what was probably the first clear mention of "Europe" as a distinct, homogeneous area occurred only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 (Šmale, 2003). Even then, "Europe" was a term characteristically used by the elite and men of letters, especially in the era of romanticism and the beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, when the Europeanism of the oppressed and occupied peoples from south-eastern Europe, especially Greece as a representative of Hellenic culture, which laid down the foundations of European culture, was increasingly emphasised. The struggle for the liberation of Greece, accompanied by the romantic enthusiasm of Byron and the political influence of the British Prime Minister William Gladstone, introduced for the first time into our vocabulary the clash of civilisations and cultures, based on the shifting of the eastern border of Europe towards the Bosphorus (Todorova, 1999). Still, the real history of the European idea actually began with the feeling that Europe, however it was understood, was endangered by non-European Turkey, which, with the fall of Constantinople, officially became a part of Europe in geographic terms. The first ideas about a united Europe directly followed and were the consequence of the fall of Constantinople. In the mid-15th century, the Bohemian King

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Jiří z Poděbrad made a plan about the alliance of Bohemia, France, Burgundy and Venice, leaving open the possibility of adding new members to the alliance (and all this was half a millennium before the establishment of the European Union). Furthermore, this “Europe of nations” would have its federal assembly, whose members would have *equal* voting rights. Naturally, this idea of Europe, along with all the others until the end of the 19th century, contained an element of benefiting one’s own cause: in this case, Bohemia would preserve its independence and its position in the European space. For a long time afterwards, the idea of Europe was actually connected, in the works of well-known philosophers such as Erasmus of Rotterdam and of politicians such as Pierre Dubois alike, with establishing peace on the European soil. This view of the European idea certainly cannot be called a history of the political union of Europe, which only came into being around the middle of the previous century, but it represents a basis for thinking about a common European space that would have its own power and that, due to its size, would be ready to deter all potential invaders intent on snatching off even a small part of this continent. Naturally, the basic idea of such an “integration” was peace among European peoples, whose relations, until the fall of Napoleon, were rather more often conflictual than good (Šmale, 2003). This idea of “European peace” is also confirmed by the view that this new system of states, according to Maximillian de Bettina, Duke of Cilli, should be based on common laws and statutes, oaths and obligations, and especially freedom of commerce and the resolution of all conflicts in the course of a general assembly of all the states. It sounds almost incredible that these ideas of the Duke of Cilli originated almost five hundred years before the passing of the first European Constitution (or to put it more precisely, the constitution of the European Union).

In the period between the great wars there occurred the first attempts at networking among European businesses, and this idea about networking in the sphere of the economy remains as the basis of today’s European Union (the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community is referred to as the foundation of the European Union as it is today). It is interesting to

note that steel was the basis of cooperation among European states (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg) between the great wars as well, which testifies to the fact that today's European Union was established on pragmatic foundations and that it has started to change its role only recently – from an industrial and economic community, it has turned into a community of nations and cultures (Carls, 2004).

Why is this brief historical overview of the idea of European union before World War II so essential for today's issue of Europe and the European identity? If we bear in mind the opinion of some sociologists (Smith, 1992; Molnar, 1997) that any identity arises out of conflicts and comparisons between two peoples, then it is clear that the European identity arose and developed out of the conflict between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, especially when the ideas that the latter was an intruder in Europe and that, owing to its culture and religion, it belonged to Asia, began to take root among the inhabitants of the continent of Europe. Hence the support to the "occupied" parts of Europe to take their rightful place within the family of European peoples and free themselves from the Asian invaders. This is somewhat absurd in view of the fact that today South Eastern Europe (with the minor exception of Greece) is still further away from Europe and the European community of nations than any other part of the European continent. Furthermore, even after World War II, the idea of a unified European space was significantly influenced by the perceived need to defend the European way of life and European influence in the world from the increasingly aggressive and reckless policy of the United States of America, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the downfall of the only real counterbalance to American imperialism. In all of this, the development of the European identity, as well as that of new national identities, never presupposed a feeling of superiority, even though the cultural elite, for the most part, was greatly opposed to the American cultural industry and American industrialism as a whole, but rather a wish for multiculturalism (Berendse, 2003).

However, it would appear, in the final analysis, that the answer to the question of who Europeans are is not – where its borderlines are, but where people who feel themselves to be Europeans are to be found. Therefore, where do the people who call themselves Europeans, who dream of Europe or “paint it and chisel it in stone” (Šmale, 2003) live? In a word, from the era of enlightenment until World War II, there existed the notion of Europe as a culture, a specific European culture, and since World War II attention has increasingly been focused on Europe as an identity (Šmale, 2003), that is, the European identity.

The European idea after World War II

The idea of a common European space after World War II boils down to, although not entirely, the history of the European Union. Namely, after World War II, the powers that emerged victorious out of the war saw the advantages of establishing a unified European economic space and a single European market. Also, losing its African colonies and on account of the increasing development of the United States of America, Canada, and a few decades later Asian countries as well, primarily China and Japan, Europe stopped being the centre of the world, and its magnitude, unquestioned before the 20th century, was all of a sudden reduced to a territory a little bigger than that of Canada or China. This is precisely one of the reasons why a new idea started developing in these parts, the idea of a common identification for a new Europe, embodied in a community, as an attempt to unify a multitude of small states into a big one, or at least to unify their economies, wishing to parry the economies of those countries that were developing with increasing speed.

Initially, the idea of the European Union was much more an economic and political idea, and Adenauer's appeal for a common culture started being considered seriously only at a later stage of the development of this community.

To what extent is the European Union European?

What is “Europe”, in fact? What are the borders of Europe? Today, can we refer to the European Union (along with two or three states awaiting their turn to join

the EU) as Europe, or is the notion of Europe much broader than that of the European Union? Therefore, what are the characteristics of Europe that not only determine it but also differentiate it from other regions in the world?

But even if we do agree that it is not entirely clear whether today the notion of Europe presupposes the political community of states that belong to the European Union, or whether it presupposes the geographical and cultural community developed out of the common history and cultural heritage, the fact remains that the European integration after World War II embodied in the establishment of the European Union provided the impetus for the integration of the European continent and raised the fundamental question concerning the European identity – is there a sociopsychological counterpart to the national identity that would be connected with Europe no matter how it is understood? Since its inception, the idea of a mutual rapprochement of the nations of Europe that is imposed within the European Union has primarily been based on laws, rules and institutional issues, and in a very small degree on issues pertaining to the cultural rapprochement of nations. Even today, most ordinary citizens equate *European culture* with *Western culture*, as opposed to African barbarism or Oriental despotism. This European culture is delineated by Plato, NATO, science and the rule of law (“Plato, NATO, science and the rule of law”; Pieterse, 1991). Even Anthony Smith sees several areas as being specific of Europe: the linguistic area, cultural geography and territorial symbolism (along with all the problems pertaining to the geographic determination of Europe), the area of “the other”, that is, non-Europeans (as previously mentioned in this paper) and, of course, religion (as non-Islamic and non-Jewish) as the fourth area (Smith, 1992). If we focus on the latter, then the issue of the differences between Christian religions on the territory of Europe, that are often greater than those between some Christian religions and Islam or Judaism (one should not forget that until the end of the 15th century a large part of Spain was under the rule of Muslims and Jews, and that those parts of Spain had a reputation for being the most tolerant part of Europe at the time).

Two notions of the European identity – Europe as a state and Europe as a culture

The issue of developing the European identity has preoccupied researchers for only a little over three decades. One of the fundamental considerations is whether the European Union, as a primarily political creation, can develop a new identity, regardless of whether the development of this new identity would resemble a period of creating a national identity, or whether the process would unfold in a different manner. There is less and less debate over the question of whether the European identity, just like a national one, could take the form of a political, civic and/or cultural identity (Risse, 2003; Bruter, 2003). In this respect, two versions of creating identity are usually taken into consideration (Fossum, 2002).

Constitutional patriotism – this notion was introduced in the sphere of social sciences by Habermas in the early 1990s, his idea being that the basis of respecting laws and democratic values is built into the Constitution and the system of authority given on the political level. Citizens are mutually connected not through common intertwined prepolitical ties, as is the case with nations, but through accepting democratic values and human rights. This kind of identity is postnational and weaker, after all, than a national identity. The basis of this kind of loyalty are *rights*, and persons with whom one interacts are seen as the bearers of those rights. Similarly to the debate on minority rights, what is insisted upon here are individual rights that form the basis of personal autonomy. Still, for constitutional patriotism to develop, rights are a necessary but not a sufficient precondition. Representative institutions, various legislative bodies and a living civil society are the necessary preconditions for establishing a democratic will and rights.

Manifest difference – a notion introduced into science by Charles Taylor, which has served to explain identity in complex, multinational and multiethnic societies. This view testifies to the acceptance of different ways of understanding identity on the part of a common state. This acceptance unfolds in three phases:

- in phase one, in a multiethnic state, there is no agreement on what the state is and what it serves for. The differences in the sphere of language, ethnicity and culture create different collective goals to be striven after by society;
- phase two presupposes the acceptance of these different collective goals by the state and attempts at realising each one of them by allowing each group to maintain its feeling of difference;
- the third and final phase enables groups who feel themselves to be different to actively try to maintain their feeling of difference over time (Fossum, 2002).

Thus, through these phases of establishing differences, groups or collectives who feel their own difference begin to transfer part of their feeling of belonging from their own group to a superordinate group that enables such a development of differences. This theory of developing identity negates the possibility that rights may be sufficient for the development of society. It emphasises that the sense of belonging to a nation or any supranational creation also creates a sense of duty and obligation towards that group.

The issue of the European identity became especially important at the time of the unification of Europe, especially in view of the fact that attempts at unification had occurred before and that the possibility of a unified Europe is more real today than ever before in history. The development of modern means of communication, the process of the globalisation of culture, and even language, up to a point, causes rather a lot of ambivalence in most people living on the territory of Europe – on the one hand, they would like to accept new tendencies and new types of communities, but are afraid whether they would correspond to their needs and interests as well as other types of communities, primarily the nation. The basic problem pertaining to this conflict between the national and the European that exists in practice is the fact that the development of a common cultural space on the territory of Europe is not accompanied by the comparably fast development of a political space (Smith, 1992).

Even though the question of the European Union in political terms has very often been raised in Europe, as well as outside Europe, approximately since the end of the Cold War, very little attention has been dedicated to psychological and culturological issues. Almost all the overviews of the unification of European space have boiled down to considering its political and economic consequences. What little research has been done, for the most part, has not been sufficiently well operationalised or methodologically well postulated. The question that arises here is whether it is at all possible to establish a cosmopolitan culture that would basically be post-national. Furthermore, if a cosmopolitan culture does get established in Europe, will it be more similar to the development of the culture of the United States of America, or will it be something entirely new in historical terms? Most likely, it will be a mixture of the above two approaches, and at the same time, it will not replicate the US model, but it will not be completely new either. The idea of the European project must be somewhere in-between national awakenings and global cultural aspirations. In other words, it must be somewhat global, but at the same time it must observe specific national characteristics (Smith, 1992). A further question arising from this is whether a feeling of Europeanism is a mere sum total of different national identities, or whether that feeling is something more than a mere mixture of its constituent parts.

Building upon the ideas of distinguishing between the civic and the cultural part of identity, we can also point to a division on the basis of which the European *civic* identity depends on the degree to which people see themselves as citizens of the European political system, whose rules, laws and rights influence their everyday lives. This designation is actually very similar to Habermas's definition of constitutional patriotism.

The *cultural* designation of the European identity is based on the feeling that other Europeans are closer to us than non-Europeans, so that it is not based on political systems but on human community. This feeling of

being connected to other inhabitants of Europe can also take the form of imagined common history, culture, tradition, political and moral norms (Bruter, 2003).

Another crucial question, which we have already touched upon when emphasising the differences between Europe and the European Union is whether the European identity is more strongly manifested in the countries that formally belong to “Europe” (that is, the European Union), or whether the actual, generally accepted state of belonging to Europe is not the decisive factor when it comes to whether a person feels him/herself to be a European or not. We can only get an answer to this question if we compare how pronounced the European identity is in various countries, but at the same time, it is necessary to use the same instrument. Several surveys were conducted based on precisely these principles in the course of 2003 and 2004 on the territories of Norway, Serbia and Croatia (Mihić and Mihić, 2005; Kamenov, Jelić, Huić, Franeško, Mihić, 2005). The idea was, among other things, to compare the results obtained in these surveys with those obtained from surveys conducted in Great Britain and Italy (Cinnirela, 1997). The results indicate that membership in the European Union is not an essential factor when it comes to manifesting the European identity. Therefore, the feeling of belonging to Europe is more subjective and based on some other aspects, and mere EU membership is not a strong enough factor to increase the degree of manifesting the European identity in people.

The connection between the national and the European identity

To end with, we consider it important to provide at least a partial answer to the question of whether the European and the national identity are mutually exclusive categories of identity. The conflict between the national and the European is much deeper and goes much further back than the establishment of the European Union, where this relationship has only intensified and finally become the focus of attention. The conflicts between European nations in the 19th and especially in the 20th century were an expression of nationalism,

but on the other hand, after almost every one of those conflicts the notion of Europe and the European identity grew stronger. Sometimes this feeling of Europeanism became extreme, as in the case of National-socialism, in which the European man (again, without his evil *alter ego*, the Balkan man and the Orthodox man, exemplified by Russia) was considered the only real inheritor of the world, who carried on the brilliant Greek, Roman and Italian Renaissance culture, destined to lead the world into a new golden age. But out of this absurdity, after the bloodiest war waged on European soil there emerged a new idea, one which is still fresh after sixty years and has very good chances of surviving, the idea of uniting Europe into a single community, with a single common culture and common history. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union says that “The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels” (Fosum, 2002).

Also, nationalists today mainly speak of the incompatibility and exclusivity of the national identity, as opposed to the European identity. These two cannot exist together, they believe. If we accept that there is a conflict, an apparent one if not a real one, between the national and the European identity, then it at least partly stems from the fact that a nation is seen as a boundless, organic, cultural community, and that it is difficult for Europe, as a primarily political construct, to struggle with this irrationality. On the other hand, the conflict decreases if a nation is seen as a rational community of law and culture within certain boundaries. The latter option, which is more broadly accepted, at least in the culture of the West, enables a person to choose his/her identity and to change it depending on the situation (Smith, 1992).

Finally, if we summarise everything that has been said about the relationship between the national and the European identity, we can conclude that, like all the other multiple identities, they can establish several possible relations:

Firstly, identities can be embedded, so that one of them forms the core, whereas all the others are arranged in concentric circles around it. In such a constellation, the core consists of the national or regional identity, and the others are around it, so that the European identity would probably be the largest, outer circle of identity postulated in this way.

Another option is for identities to overlap, and that the majority of people, but not all, who are members of one group are members of the other group as well. Such a division of identity presupposes that in some members of a national group there is at the same time a feeling of being connected with Europe, but this may often result in a conflict within the role of a person, which is manifested in a strong acceptance of one and rejection of the other identity.

The third way of thinking about the European and the national identity is the one that resembles a “marble cake”. Namely, both the national and the European identity are parts of one cake, and are therefore very mixed and inseparable. It is impossible to separate them as clearly as the first two theories propose, and to see where the national identity ends and the European one begins. One influences the other, and they become intertwined (Risse, 2003), and if we remember Fredrik Barth’s words that ethnic identity can change in time, then it is clear that in many European states today the European identity becomes a part of the national identity, which is often unthinkable without a feeling of being connected with Europe (Jenkins, 2004).

Whether any on those models will prove applicable is up to historians, and why not – also up to sociologists and psychologists to assess in the future.

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POST-SOCIALIST IDENTITIES, TRANSFORMATIONS, AND REPRESENTATIONS

The topic of the post-socialist identities, their transformation and representation has been a regular interest for me over the years. In all the European

post-socialist countries, it was an important point in discussing the processes of European integration and the harmonization of national traditions with the emerging new European identities. This was the particular reason that guided me in choosing the issue of “post-socialist identities” as a topic of my workshop during the International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities*, Belgrade, 25–31 August 2008. The purpose was to offer for discussion different modes of managing with the socialist past in the countries of Eastern Europe; and to illustrate the major challenges to the coining of post-socialist and “European” identities in Eastern Europe. Although the workshop focused more closely on Bulgaria identity processes over the last two decades, it drew examples from different countries of Eastern Europe, where similar processes of identity transformations have been also under way.

The workshop consisted of four sessions with lectures and discussions dedicated to different aspects of memory, representations, and heritage of the communist period in Eastern Europe. The first session *Withering Memories/ Persisting Memories: Memory about Socialism and Its Resource for Post-Socialist Identity Formation* focused on diverse problems related to the definition and conceptualization of the communist period and on the varying meanings of the socialist past in the countries of the region. A point of special reflection was the withering memory about socialism in Eastern Europe (conditioned by time distance, generational change, decrease of political pertinence, etc.), and the persistence of this memory – as expressed in everyday communication, personal recollections, political evocations, etc. The major emphases in the session fell upon the potential that the memories about the communist period supplied on the recovering and representing national histories after the fall of the communist regimes, on the achievement of ethical

and political distance towards the recent past, and on their overlapping with the memories accumulated during the period of the post-socialist transition.

The focus of the second session *Representations of the Past “In Transition”: Monuments, Museums and Historical Representations in a Post-socialist Mode* was on the visual transformations after the end of socialism in Eastern Europe and the difficult terms of representing the socialist past after 1989. The session involved an overview of the main processes related to memorial signs and museum exhibitions of the communist period in Eastern Europe, to their new meanings after the fall of the communist regimes, and to the new forms, which were created to narrate the past in a “post-socialist” mode. Having had enormous role in the establishment of the socialist power and in the legitimization of the ideology through propaganda tools, monuments and museums undertook a key role in signifying the symbolic overturning of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and their destruction, dismantlement, or reshaping turned emblematic for the memory processes and restructuring of collective identities after 1989. Providing examples of different monuments and museum types of the region (e.g. to Soviet army soldiers, ideological figures, partisans and anti-fascists, national history heroes, exhibitions to the socialist and revolutionary movements, etc.), the session outlined the difficulties to “accommodate” the former ideological emblems into a new political context and the new emphases in national holidays and celebrative occasions that developed around these forms. Special attention was paid to monuments and museums dedicated to the victims of the totalitarian regimes, and to the ambiguity of mourning and commemoration that they often presupposed. The main emphasis in the session was on the capacity of monuments and museums to reflect the changes of historical, political, and cultural identities, and thus – on their identity shaping mechanisms, which can be a good point of departure in exploring the redefinition of the cultural identity of Serbia nowadays.

The third session *Living with the “Socialist Heritage” in a “Post-socialist World”* was dedicated to the functionalization and making sense of socialist heritage in policies related to collective identities today. The session addressed a range of topics and issues

for discussion: about the scope and definition of the term “socialist heritage”; about the inextinguishable presence of the socialist period in urban environment, visual forms, and everyday experience; about the paradoxes of what “socialist heritage” is and the lack of consensus around its meaning. By means of diverse illustrations from different countries of the region, the presentation laid an emphasis on the changing attitudes to the presence of socialist material traces and of the attempts to construe them as “heritage”; on the tourism industry developing around the communist past and the “commodification” of its objects; on the intertwining between nostalgia, irony, and grotesque in the construction of such heritage products, etc. Highlighting the different levels (local, regional, national, etc.) of public policies towards the “socialist heritage” across Eastern Europe, the session revealed the dimensions of continuity and discontinuity with the communist period, and the pertinence of this issue in the processes related to the building of new European identity.

It was namely this issue, which turned into the core of the last session in the workshop: *From “Post-socialist identities” to “European identities.”* Among the major themes, which were addressed in the session, were: the changing perspective on the socialist past and its gradual re-utilization as heritage resource; the rebuilding of “national identities” in post-socialist terms, and the challenges of construing “European” identities at the socialist background. The session carried out an overview of the post-socialist realities faced by the different countries of Eastern Europe over the last two decades (political and economic crises, social problems, migration, corruption, etc.), laying an emphasis on the confusions around the consolidation of collective identities along shared lines. The period after 1989 posed a series of questions around the rebuilding of identities in “post-socialist” terms: how to establish a distance to the post-socialist period without losing the memory of the difficult “transition”; how to turn the experience of socialism and post-socialism into a resource for present-day cultural policies; how to preserve authentic cultural identity and the one formed by the recent historical experience in the context of multiculturalism and globalized cultures that we face nowadays.

Far from having the intention to provide an answer to the evolving questions, the workshop stirred vivid discussions on the place of the memories and material reminders of the communist period in nowadays' cultural policies and practices. A shared view among the participants of the workshop was that the recent past is certainly a niche, which provides possibilities not only for researching and representing, but also for understanding better one's identity and for its turning into an ingredient for present day cultural interactions. The comparative trajectories that were traced to different East European countries showed the enormous diversity in managing with recent past experience, as well as the importance of sustaining collective references which would not be confined only to the "national" one, but would rather be open to the European cultural space in general. Although the traumatic experiences, which all East European countries had in their socialist and the post-socialist periods will keep on resonating over the following decades, in the increasingly dynamic and globalized world they will gain meanings that we can hardly imagine or predict nowadays. It is namely this enormous diversity that contemporary societies are facing today, which may give smaller and larger nations in Eastern Europe the chance to find appeasement after decades of turbulence in recent times, and to add their contribution to the motley array of cultures and identities. I am deeply convinced that the fostering and sustaining of this "(un)limited" diversity is possible in all East European countries, despite the challenges imposed by their socialist and post-socialist realities.

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THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY AS REFLECTED THROUGH VIDEO ART IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA

1989. The shift in ideology and the dominant social paradigm were very strong factors that began to reshape the social space of these countries, resulting in socio-political, economic and other crises, which induced serious internal confrontations among their citizens. The crucial problem was the loss of the old collective identity, which left the citizens on their own to cope with new driving forces that began to “produce” the social space offering vague choices of models of identification. This has resulted in a retreat to historically older collective identities, above all, ethno-national and religious. The period that citizens needed to accept the process of social transformation was very long and had its ups and downs in most of the post-Socialist countries that respectively became members or are still on the waiting list to join the European Union.

The case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was the most specific because the transformation did not occur peacefully. Already after the death of President Tito in 1980, the social system of workers’ self-management began to collapse. The old Socialist systems of values and the ideology of “brotherhood and unity” were fading away, and the changes in collective identity were inevitable. The newly formed oligarchies that came to power in all republics of Socialist Yugoslavia abused the fact that citizens needed to acquire a new identity, and to identify either with political, national or other programmes and goals. In this situation, when the question of collective identity became blurred and confusing for most citizens, it was very easy to “seduce” them to turn to an exaggerated national identity, “rediscovering” one ethnic identity as being “older” than those of other neighbouring nations. The proof for

The loss of collective identity in the former Yugoslavia

The question of identity in all its ramifications has been one of the most frequently raised questions in European post-Socialist countries since the fall of the Berlin Wall in

this claim was found in a rich national history, with the process of the re-circulation of national myths, mainly from the period of the Medieval Empire, in most of the former Yugoslav republics beginning to shape public opinion strongly through all media.¹ History was therefore “understood as the active force that determines the roots of nations, nurtures the constitutive myths of ethnic communities and strengthens national identities”.²

Due to the prevailing “national awareness” which led to the ethnification of the republics in SFRY, the chance to choose a civil society instead of a purely ethnic one was lost. It was obvious that the state apparatus could not mediate between common state identity and the narrow national identities that were competitive and in collision.³ The consequence was inevitably ethnic clashes and the disintegration of the country because the new republics could not find common interests in a diplomatic manner.

Confusion over new identities

After the dissolution of SFRY, the newly formed nation(al)-states took their own courses in social transformation that comprised a full shift toward the free market economy and the privatisation of former “social property”. From the perspective of their new social system(s), there was a common tendency toward a resurgence of religious identities on the one hand, and the rise of neo-liberal or predatory capitalism on the other. Although in these years a paradigm of mythological fabula has been mostly replaced with much more

¹ Among all Serbian constitutional myths, the myth of Kosovo was the most present in revived ethno-national stories and phantasmagoria. It marks the symbolic loss of independence of the Serbian Empire from the Ottoman Turks, and points to the “Emperor” Lazar’s choice of a Divine Realm as the correct path and decision for the Serbian national character. The nationality of Miloš Obilić, one of the mythical characters who killed the Ottoman Emperor Murat in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, is now disputed in literature, and the most recent claim comes from the Albanian side that he was actually Albanian Knight Millosh Kopiliq. A similar, even more paradoxical situation could be seen in the Macedonian “appropriation” of Alexander the Great, whose large equestrian statue will soon be placed in the capital city of Skopje, whose airport already carries his name.

² Božidar Slapšak, “Promene prošlosti u društvu koje se menja”, in: Republika, No. 64, March 1993, pp.15-31 (p. 16).

³ Vesna Pešić, “Rat za nacionalne države”, in: Srpska srana rata, Part 1, Nebojša Popov (ed.), Belgrade, Samizdat B92 2002.

pragmatic models offered to the citizens for their identification, a constant state of uncertainty and the expectation of the realisation of foggy social aims in these countries made an individual passive, kept him/her in lethargy and prevented him/her from joining the public arena more actively.

If we shift now the perspective to the global context, into which the new countries have stepped, we may argue that the new paradigm of social relationships is reflected in the appearance of a supra-national hegemony, where

the movement of global capital, commodities and services worldwide overcomes the strength and borders of national states. This type of sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri⁴ described as the emergence of a new Empire, is actually the European concept on which Euro-centrism is based, developed at the same time as Modernism. The last expansions of the European

Union in 2004 and 2007, and the tendency to eventually include the remaining states of the “Western Balkans” gives us the right to think about Europe as a geopolitical reflection of that new type of sovereignty, but also of a new possible collective identity to be produced in future.

While the global integration process has accelerated, some of the countries formed out of the Yugoslav republics have not yet built a coherent model of identification and homogenisation for their citizens. In those states that emerged from inter-ethnic conflicts, different social processes are actually occurring, different social realities are being produced, which could be characterised as proto-democratic, with a presence of the phenomenon of primary accumulations of capital and “privatisation” as the only process that includes them in the web of globally flowing capital. In the discrepancy between the struggle for purifying and shedding their heritage and ballast of previous ideological constructions, and defying models for equal entry and adjustment to the global process and the new order of sovereignty, there are numerous roads and many possible models for identification.

⁴ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press 2001.

While on one hand, we are witnessing the overwhelming expansion of neo-liberal capitalism, on the other, we have loud critical voices that come from the position of ethno-national, clerical and above all, anti-modern disposed ideology. This schizophrenic position of the simultaneous existence of pre-modern, “anti-civilisation” movements and the latest stage of “predatory capitalism” in countries that strive to attain the achievements of European democracy, even at the cost of the acceptance of neo-liberal politics, renders even more difficult the production of a collective identity and the homogenisation of the citizens across a small number of models of identification.

Brief (hi)story of video art in Yugoslavia

At the very beginnings of video production in former Yugoslavia in the 1970s, the circle of conceptual artists was the first to start to experiment with this medium.⁵ Throughout the decade, video production was in a constant interrelation with the actual “new art practice” (action, performance and conceptual work), and was strongly influenced by it. According to Jerko Denegri, there were two primary strategies and approaches to the medium: one that was influenced by analytic art and reflected the medium itself and its capacities for art, and the other that turned toward the social issues that were interpreted in a narrative or metaphoric manner.⁶ The first line discerned by Denegri was related to the analytical approach of the artist in the 1970s, touching mostly upon the problems of the language of art itself, while the other line reflected the second important aspect, i.e., “first person speech” and emphasis on the subjectivity of the artist and his/her self-reflection.⁷ Herewith, one of the dominant means of expression in this new medium was video performance, where the artist’s persona and body were in focus.⁸ That particular interest

⁵ Among the most prominent artists were: Marina Abramović, Braco Dimitrijević, Radomir Damjanović, Damjan, Sanja Ilevković, Dalibor Martinis, Raša Todosijević, Neša Paripović, Goran Trbuljak, etc.

⁶ Ješa Denegri, “Video-umetnost u Jugoslaviji 1969-1984”, in *Videosfera video/društvo/ umetnost*, Mihailo Ristić ed., Radionica SIC, Belgrade 1986, pp.126-27.

⁷ Ibid, p. 127.

⁸ At first, video was merely a tool for the documentation of the artist’s performative acts, but later on, the performances were conceptualised specifically for the medium of video.

⁹ Helmut Friedel, "Video-Narciz- Das Neue Selbstbildnis", in Videokunst in Deutschland 1963 – 1982, Wulf Herzogenrath ed., Verlag Gerd Hatje, Stuttgart, quoted from the Serbian translation: Helmut Friedel – "Video-narcis – novi autoportret", in Videosfera video/društvo/umetnost, Mihailo Ristić ed., Radionica SIC, Belgrade 1986, p. 105.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 107.

¹¹ Raša Todosijević, "Video", in Videosfera video/društvo/umetnost, Mihailo Ristić ed., Radionica SIC, Belgrade 1986, p. 179.

¹² Denegri mentions that the turning point could be seen in the broadcasting of the video work of Slovenian artist Miha Vipotnik on TV Ljubljana. We could even argue that this phenomenon was most present in Slovenia and Croatia throughout the 1980s. Video art was also the focus of various TV programmes, among which "TV Gallery", initiated by Nebojša Đukelić and edited by Dunja Blažević on TV Belgrade was the most important and long-lasting.

Ješa Denegri, "Video-umetnost u Jugoslaviji 1969-1984", Op.cit., pp.126-27.

¹³ Nuša and Srečo Dragan, "Traženi pogled Nuše i Sreče Dragan ili radost dvostrukog ulaska našeg videa u umetnost osamdesetih godina – postmoderna, new wave, nove slike, subkulture – je velika", in Videosfera video/društvo/umetnost, Op.cit., pp.177-78. The artists were the pioneers of video, and produced the very first video in Yugoslavia in 1969.

in artist subjectivity and their own bodies, according to Helmut Friedel, was globally one of the basic aspects from the outset of the use of video in art, and how a new form of self-portrait was invented.⁹ The phenomenon of "video-self-portraits" thus strongly emphasised personality, individuality, contemplation and imagination.¹⁰

The first "pioneering" period of video in SFRY in the 1970s was marked by the artists' interest in conceptual, not technical, aspects of video and the filming process. As Raša Todosijević put it: "I made my video works without any particular interest in the technical aspect of the medium, in the process of production itself and those spectacular possibilities of manipulation with electronic technology. Video has interested me more as a transmitter of psychological and mental activities that are fundamentally at odds with any technical exhibitionism".¹¹

In the 1980s we witnessed the emergence of artists specialised in video art production, who dealt on a higher level with the features and specificities of the media itself and the technical aspects of production. Their stronger connections with the TV networks and orientation toward mass media culture, but also a new kind of video narration, marked a new phase of development of video in SFRY.¹² This new type of video, as Slovenian artists Nuša and Srečo Dragan claimed, had abandoned the experiments with the medium, video performance, and above all, the urge to change the world, inherent to the avant-garde.¹³

Another shift in the 1980s was driven due to the resurgence of manual artistic disciplines like painting and drawing, and the heightened interest of many artists in issues such as mythology, historicity, originality of the artwork, etc., which were also reflected in the video works. The image and the body of the artist was in focus, but the difference in relation to the previous period of the 1970s was that artists had assumed the role of an actor on a stage, sometimes orchestrated as a video installation, where all the theatrical elements of scenography, choreography and make-up contribute to the narrative constructions.¹⁴

Toward the end of the 1980s, video production in Yugoslavia visibly decreased, and the early 1990s were marked by ethnic clashes and the “disappearance” of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From this point onwards, we can follow the development of video art along the separate avenues of the newly formed countries.¹⁵

Despite the growth of video production and the proliferation of topics that artists from the region of former Yugoslavia have dealt with from the 1990s onwards, in this text, I have chosen to focus on the problem of identity, which could be discerned as one of the key issues in the work of many artists.¹⁶ This topic was brought to the fore by the new generation of artists who have a constant conceptual agenda in their work and choose any media to suit their ideas. To paraphrase John Baldessari, for them, video as a medium could be seen as any other: neutral, like a pencil, and just one among many instruments to express their ideas, visions and wishes, but also serving well as a tool for the social criticism that is so often present in their

¹⁴ Branislav Dimitrijević, “An Intermittent History – A Brief Survey of Video Art in Serbia”, in *Video art in Serbia, Center for Contemporary Art – Belgrade*, Belgrade 1999, p. 34. This argument was related to the videos of artists such as Milovan De Stil Marković and Viktorija Vesna Bulajić.

¹⁵ The complexity of developments in the new (video) art scenes and the rise of video production in the 1990s in all the republics of former Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of such a brief survey in this text.

¹⁶ Here, I would also have to make a distinction between the specific position of the Slovenian video scene and the situation of the other republics of Yugoslavia, where the turbulent period of wars, migrations and economic crises and after all, the “identity crisis”, have had a stronger impact on all spheres of society, including the art scene.

work. Baldessari argued that it was important to say, not: “I am just filming a video”, but “This idea would be best expressed in the form of a video work”, and that this distinction in approach and attitude fits perfectly the generation of artists in question, formed in the late 1990s. As compared to the features of the “video-self-portraits” of the 1970s, the situation in the 1990s has changed, with videos acquiring a more narrative, story-telling mode and structure. This kind of self-portrait has a social, rather than physical background, and I would therefore put an emphasis on the capitalized “I” in the key conceptual issue of Identity, that stands more for the artist’s social, than merely existential, or mental being.

I will further analyse the video works in which different aspects of identity and facets of identification processes, such as: (ethno)national identity or identity constructed through ethnic conflicts, religious identity, or artistic identity, are most explicitly expressed. The important point here is the common feature of the artists appearing “in person” in their videos, and addressing the audience with their personal Identity problems.

The topic of identity in video art

Identity constructed through ethnic conflicts – trauma, displacement

One of the first paradigmatic artworks touching upon the issue of the consequences of ethnification and the resurgence of a strong national identity in Serbia was the video installation by Milica Tomić, *XY Ungeloest* from 1997. The work was highly politically motivated, with the artist reconstructing the crime that occurred on 28 April 1989, the very day of the declaration of the new Serbian Constitution, when 33 ethnic Albanians, citizens of Kosovo, were murdered. This work was a turning point in Milica Tomić’s career, when she finally managed to address the social sphere and cope with the traumatic reality in her work, initially in a subdued and metaphoric way. The method of crime reconstruction in the German TV series *XY Ungeloest* from the 1970s was the inspiration for the artist to conduct her investigation, and gather all

possible information, particularly on the clothes the victims were wearing when they were killed, which was used in the reconstruction and symbolic re-enactment of the crime in the video in which 33 friends of the artist, representatives of the Serbian art scene, wearing the same garments as the victims, fall down in the snow, leaving the mark of their bodies.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ethnic clashes have resulted in big waves of migration, with many people of all nationalities forced to move and live in exile. The work of Bosnian artist Maja Bajević has reflected exactly these kinds of intertwined circuits of personal life and political reality, touching upon such issues as the identity constructed through loss and displacement. The outburst of war in her hometown of Sarajevo in 1992 caught her in Paris attending the Art Academy, where she stayed in exile, which strongly affected her private life and determined the focus of her work. Bajević's video work *Green, Green Grass of Home* (1997) shows the artist walking on a lawn, and telling the story of her grandmother's apartment in Sarajevo, while trying to mark its shape in space based on her recollection of the rooms and furnishings. The tone of her narration is precise and austere, as if the artist is deliberately suppressing all the emotion and melancholy this topic could evoke, but her ritual of reconstruction appears as if she is trying to "materialise" the memory of a lost home.

The same problem of displacement, but this time as the ultimate question of decision of an individual facing ethnic conflicts in his/her country, is the topic of the video *On the way to/from Macedonia* (2002), by Macedonian born, Cologne based artist Irena Paskali. The artist came back home in 2001, at the moment when the spark of ethnic clashes threatened to burst into the flame of war. She came back, only to see her friends getting ready to leave the country. The dilemma she faced was transposed into a video, in which Paskali, wearing a red dress and carrying a red suitcase, stands in front, back to back, in a line, marching with a squad of the Macedonian army. "The soldier is going to stay in Macedonia", says the artist, but what about her? How she

can make such a decision? The choice of exile and life in the diaspora will determine both her personal and artistic identity.

In October 2006, young Bosnian artist Mladen Miljanović entered the site of the former military barracks in Banja Luka to “serve art” for nine months, as he “served the people” in the school for officers from October 2000 to July 2001. The video *I Serve Art* (2007) documents the entire process of “self-isolation” and the artist’s decision to anthropologically operate through art. The choice of such a method shows the artist’s awareness that his art production should inherently reflect (the failures in) his personal identity building process, and the consequences on his position within the art system and society. Miljanović questions the “technologies” of the functioning of a subject in society, the process of subjectification whereby an individual determines his/her own identity, modelling it through external power centres, and the subtext for political and social strategies of influence on the individual and his/her life. Thus, the artist analyses his own identity, the ways he changes and constructs, and he turns to the question of his own position in society where he acts, and to the models of positioning in the public sphere. The artist thereby repeats his personal experience of serving the army as an artistic performance, present in the media and in public, contextualising his intimate narration in the wider social sphere and creating for himself a new kind of public identity.

Overlapping identities

With the formation of new states from the republics of Former Yugoslavia, the issue of (ethno)national identity had to be confirmed through its distinctiveness and even uniqueness as opposed to their neighbours’. The most important proof for such “constitutive” distinctiveness of a certain nation was found in language, and its modifications if necessary, and in new state symbols like the anthem or the flag. Macedonian artist Oliver Musovik has addressed this issue in his video *Č&K* (2002), on the case

of his own family name as seen through differences in orthography and phonetics in the Macedonian and Serbian languages. In the video, Musovik gives a short “lecture in linguistics”, explaining how the confusion over different pronunciations of his family name in Serbian and Macedonian actually derived from the wrong pronunciation of his originally Montenegrin surname, when it was transcribed in Macedonian language and read by Serbs. If this whole construction has produced an even bigger confusion over the language and national identities in the countries in question, the term of “overlapping identities” introduced by Bulgarian artist Luchezar Boyadjiev could be a clue for its clarifications. Boyadjiev sees this overlapping happening when two or more nations “lay claim on the same ‘territory’ of historical, cultural, social, political, religious, linguistic, etc. experiences and/or practices that each of them considers to be only their own”.¹⁷ The point he makes is that these kinds of claims are based on emotional impetus and local storytelling, and not on the pragmatic research of historical facts. Problems occur when these claims are incorporated in the processes of the constitution and building of new nation-states, where they could be both the potential cause of hatred and even conflict, but can also lead to the understanding and appreciation of the other nation. A paradigmatic story touching upon the issue of “overlapping identities” throughout the whole Balkan region – in this case, the origin of one melody – provides the focus of the film *Whose Is This Song?* (2003) by Bulgarian filmmaker Adela Peeva. While travelling around the region in search of stories about the melody she thought was of Bulgarian origin, Peeva realises that in all countries of the Balkans – Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Serbia – she could find “evidence” that this was an “old local tune”. It only varied in form, as a love song, a religious hymn, a revolutionary anthem, or a military march, but in each country triggered deep emotions and strong nationalism.

¹⁷ Luchezar Boyadjiev,
Overlapping Identities,
1998
[http://www.cfront.org/
cf00book/en/luchezar-
overlapping-en.html](http://www.cfront.org/cf00book/en/luchezar-overlapping-en.html)

Religious identity

In the former Yugoslavia, the constitutive concept of brotherhood and unity was envisioned to suppress all ethnic and religious differences among its nations. Religion was withdrawn as a topic from the public sphere, and it became almost a taboo, unwelcome to be addressed in a Communist country. In the course of the demise and devolvement of the country, religion played an important role, carried along and intertwined with the waves of ethnonationalism and populism in all the republics of former Yugoslavia. In the newly formed countries, religion has resurged as one of the main driving forces of society, whether Islam, Orthodox or Catholic Christianity. Churches and mosques began to flourish in many cities, with the presence and influence of religion in the public sphere constantly growing, along with the number of citizens who assumed a religious identity, and it all created even stronger polarizations in society. This rapid transformation of the former Communist (atheist and secular) country has become an issue for many artists to address.

In her video *Double Bubble* (2001), Maja Bajević makes a strong statement about the resurgence of religious dogmatism and how it shapes and infiltrates into all social strata in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The distinction between techno and turbo religion, as she calls it, is based on individual choices and needs, and is exemplified in statements such as: “I don’t eat pork”, or “I do not drink during Ramadan, but I take ecstasy”, in the case of the former, or: “I did all that in the name of God” in the latter religious identity. With very explicit statements expressed in binary forms, Maja Bajević reveals the hypocrisy hidden under the cover of identification with religion, that could be just an excuse for different acts of violence, aggression and brutality.

Irena Paskali’s video, *At this Bottom* (2003), opens with juxtapositions of the Qur'an and the Bible, the holy books of Islam and Orthodox Christianity, two dominant religions in a split Macedonian society. The video leads

us through documentary materials about the destruction of mosques and churches, footage of religious rituals in these sanctuaries, split and highlighted with sequences showing the artist repeating rituals. Paskali makes the point of similarities across the religions that have been embedded in the same soil for centuries, and pleads for the need to find ways of coexistence and tolerance among different religious communities.

Serbian artist Vesna Vesić's *Wash Me and I Will Be Whiter than Snow* (1998) offers a completely different perspective on the issue of religious identity. This work could be seen as a video performance, where the camera focuses on the crying face of the artist, who is reading psalms. Vesić deals in her video with the categories of the "inner" and the "pure", and the "simplicity of expression... is firmly grounded in the ascetics and the aesthetics of Eastern Christian theology and art".¹⁸ This leads us to conclusion that the state of the artist expressed in the video is the result of a religious experience. The devotional act induced the emotional reaction that could be understood as a need for purification. The tears on the face of the artist could be misinterpreted as sorrow for the helpless social situation in the country, wars, sanctions, poverty and misery. It is inevitable that the given situation influenced the attitude of the artist, but I tend to see this work as a highly intimate emotional expression, induced by the religious sentiments and identification of the artist.

¹⁸ Jelena Vesić, cat. preface, Inside/Outside, Zacheta Gallery, Warsaw, Poland, 6 November – 3 December 2000.

Bosnian artist Damir Nikšić raises an important issue of confusion over religious and national identity in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where already in 1970s Socialist Yugoslavia, the Bosnians were granted nationhood as "Muslims". When in the 1990s, religious identities were resurging, the intellectuals in Bosnia realised that this national definition placed them into the narrow cluster of an "ethno-religious" group and not a broader or even secular national identity that the term Bosnians could

¹⁹ See the artists' arguments in the essay "Danisam Musliman po nacionalnosti" (If I Wasn't Muslim by Nationality) in: Dani, No. 526, 13 July 2007, pp. 70–72.
²⁰ Ibid.

offer.¹⁹ In the video, *If I Wasn't Muslim* (2004), Nikšić approaches the issue of his religious-national identity in a sarcastic way. The artist performs the melody *If I Were a Rich Man* from *Fiddler on the Roof* in its "authentic" setting – a farmhouse attic full of hay – but with the following lyrics:

[...]

If I wasn't Muslim
Ya ha deedle deedle, bubba bubba deedle deedle dum.
My neighbours wouldn't set my home on fire
And surround me with barbed wire
[...]

What initially appears to be the artist's humorous way to deal with the topic, covers the real existential issue underneath that has affected the life of his family in Bosnia, where the war forced them to "take sides" and declare themselves as Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats or Bosnian Muslims. The artist himself claims that despite his name, which could belong to any of the nations, his "choice" was made by others, those who put him behind barbed wire. Becoming a victim and identifying with the "oppressed and weaker side" has determined his identity on all levels; otherwise, as he says: "I could have been doing design in Slovenia".²⁰

Artistic identity and the question of the art system

The problem of artistic identity, and of "Warholian" success, has become a fascination for the generation of artists formed by the end of the 1990s. This issue could be analysed as a social phenomena in the art world, and is often made ironic or addressed in a critical way by young artists. In this respect, especially (self-)ironic is the position of the Serbian artists Vera Večanski & Vladimir Nikolić in their work, *How to Become a Great Artist* (2001), in which

the young and un-self-confident artist (Večanski) seeks the “recipe” for becoming a star, taking lessons from her role model artist, guru and martial arts expert (Nikolić). Building self-confidence becomes a training process, almost like a mantra, through which young artists have to improve every day.

The work by another Serbian artist pair, Nikoleta Marković & Žolt Kovač, *Choose Life* (2001), combines strategies of an almost confessional approach in the narrative structure and the use of the fictionalized script or scenario in which the artists approach the problem of artistic identity in an ironic way. The person “addicted to art” “confesses” in the manner of documentary crime stories, or other delinquents talking about their crimes in front of the camera. This kind of TV show was very popular in wartime around the country, and in an extremely criminalised society, where spectacular murders of gangsters happened almost every day. The audience was hungry for stories about the “street and war heroes”, ready to listen to their “confessions” filled with the most explicit and horrific details.


Kosovo artist Jakup Ferri touches upon the same issue in several videos, including *An Artist Who Cannot Speak English Is No Artist* (2003) and *Save Me, Help Me* (2003), in which he tells his stories “to the camera” from his home/studio environment in a very laid back way. The first video takes as its starting point the emblematic statement from Croatian artist Mladen Stilinović, that the artist who doesn’t speak English is not an artist. Jakub Ferri’s confusing narration is in what appears to be English language, but without any coherence or meaning. Ferri makes ironic and even ridicules the position of an artist coming from a marginal scene and context, without the ability for self-expression and self-promotion on the global art scene. In the second video, the artist addresses curators and collectors to raise their interest in his work, offering his paintings, drawings, etc. for sale at very low prices. The artist’s “honest” desire to “sell himself” to anyone who can provide him with a successful international career renders the power games in the market driven art world ironic, as he comments on the strongly fixed hierarchies in

the relations between artist and curator/collector, and the sometimes self-marginalising position that artists from the region humbly assume.

Afterthought

The discourse of identity politics as globally reflected in the artistic practice had its peek in the 1990s. Nevertheless, due to the particular contextual framework and individual biographies of the artists from former Yugoslavia, the topic has endured into the beginning of the 21st century. The artists whose work I have analysed began their careers with self-reflexive works, the topics of their videos driven by their inner struggles over an identity that is never predetermined, but constructed through structural processes, and in this case strongly influenced by the drastic changes in the socio-political context, and the loss of collective identity, and traumas experienced due to displacement, wars, economic crisis, etc. While the first decade of 21st century draws to a close, most of the artists in question have opened up other topics in their work, moving from “introspective” positions and “auto-topographic” video works, toward the analyses of broader social phenomena, albeit with the same sharp critical edge.

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CROSSING BORDERS: DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT ARTISTIC STRATEGIES*

is one of the crucial tactics that allows the artist to be more precise, more specific and to really grasp the topic in the way it deserves to be approached regarding its specific context and target audience. Merging different disciplines and different layers of reality in the arts helps to cross the boundaries of strict professionalism, which could of course risk being counterproductive, and enables further development of new models.

For my art practice, I have consciously decided to abandon the production of “one-off” artworks in favour of developing a series of strategic projects that span a period of several years. This position gives me the opportunity to engage in a much more consistent and deeper analysis and development of the issues of concern in my work.

Regarding this stance, I came to realise that, in order to attain relevant content, one has to keep actively trying to overcome the given limits imposed by the rules of production and exhibition format within the art system. The exhibition space, transformed naturally and with a particular intention, is just one space where just one part of the target audience is to be found. Furthermore, because the art field is fertile ground for the exploration of different methodologies, in recent years one has been able to observe visual and performance arts, philosophy and political activism informing each other and adapting concepts – especially with regard to the use of public media

* This essay is excerpt from the one with the same title published in the book *New Feminism: Worlds of Feminism, Queer and Networking Conditions*. Marina Gržinić and Rosa Reitsamer, eds., Löcker Verlag, Vienna 2008.

and/or guerrilla strategies. The whole concept of tactical media is rooted in a mutual learning process involving different disciplines.

Still, the sector of the visual arts, even beyond the white cube, is quite limited when it comes to effectiveness through action. If not for a strain of influential theory in the arts and philosophy that enduringly pushes the syntax towards issues of social concern, these strategies might not result in any achievement at all.

Assuming a migrant woman's identity

First, with *Illegal Border Crossing*, I directly familiarised myself with border-crossing strategies that migrants have been using for decades. I trespassed across the Slovenian-Austrian border, which at that time was the border of the European Union, and where eight or nine “illegalised beings” were captured per day. As a consequence, I went on exploring the topic in *Waiting for a Visa* (August 2000). The title refers to a queuing action in front of the Austrian consulate in Belgrade with “no result”: From 6:00 a.m. until noon, I lined up in the regular queue with hundreds of people, with about twenty pages of documents and guarantee letters, in order to apply for a visa. At noon, the embassy closed, so I shared the destiny of failure with more than a hundred others who were “too late”.

“By using her own body within different cultural and social contexts as a retort to various power games, Ostojić inevitably entered the realm of gender troubles. Her reflection on gender issues is focused on the economic and political phenomena that accompany the phantasm of the European Community that is shared by many Eastern European countries. In her project *Looking for a Husband with EU Passport*, she reveals and ironizes the truth about trafficking in women, prostitution, pragmatic marriages and all other “side effects” of transition. In such conditions, the economy of gendering is inevitably the economy of power over the body. The self-irony of this project is contained in the intentional aesthetics of the artist’s usage of her own image for an internet advertisement: her skinny shaved body without any traces of sensuality or seducing gaze or gesture, conveys a completely opposite visual message. From this conflict of textual invitation and visual re-

pulsion was born the gap of ambiguity between attraction and abjection.”¹

In August 2000, I started the project *Looking for a Husband with EU Passport*.² After publishing an ad with this title, I exchanged more than 500 letters with numerous applicants from around the world. After a correspondence of six months with a German man, K. G., I arranged our first meeting as a public performance in a field in front of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Belgrade in 2001. One month later, we were officially married in New Belgrade. With the international marriage certificate and other required documents, I applied for a visa. After two months, I got a family unification visa, limited to a single entry for a three-month stay in Germany, so I moved to Düsseldorf, where, on the basis of my next visa, I lived officially for three and a half years.

¹ Suzana Milevska, “Spectacle of the Invisible”, in: *NU, Nordic Art Review*, vol. III, no. 5/01, 2001.

² Tanja Ostojić, *Looking for a Husband with EU Passport*: www.scca.org.mk/capital/projects/tanja

In spring of 2005, my three-year visa expired, and instead of granting me a permanent residence permit, the authorities only granted me a two-year visa. After that, K. G. and I got divorced, and on the occasion of the opening of my *Integration Project Office* installation at Gallery 35 in Berlin (1 July 2005), I organised *Divorce Party*.

In order to claim my own rights, which I had been deprived of under current EU law, I explicitly applied the strategy of tricking the law (as earlier with *Illegal Border Crossing*) to gain the right to move freely, and live and work in diverse locations.

Migrants are constantly abstracted by the media and discriminatory laws, and often treated as a single alienated group. The aspect of personal and direct speech, as opposed to abstract speech, is an important element throughout my work. I showed myself in that position, with my own story, as well as later collecting the individual stories of others whom I met, so that the audience would get a chance to understand the variety and depth of the matter, and identify with me, with them, with us.

Working on a redefinition of the field of my artistic activity

I was educated for a decade as a visual artist and have been involved in performance art, theatre and politics alike, without ever being overwhelmed by traditional education in these spheres, but rather with the intention of preserving a certain “amateurism”. Simply speaking, I translate and recycle my actions from the domain of reality into Situationist performances, combining them with discussion, joint dinners, video and photo projections, and intimate talks. At times, it develops into a sort of political cabaret in which the visitors are *a priori* invited to enact themselves.

My *Integration Dinner* in Kanonhallen in Copenhagen in December 2004 was conceived around the same topic as the one that the Danish Prime Minister arranged the same day at his residence: Integration. In the wake of the media-sensationalised murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh, the integration of migrants became a big topic in the struggle for public opinion within the entire European Union. The dominant official discourses were nationalistic and counterproductive.

³ In Denmark, migration laws became very restrictive, much more than in any other European country. As an example: if a Dane is to marry a foreigner, s/he has to be minimum 21-years-old.

Only after 7 years of marriage to a Danish citizen does a foreigner get the possibility to obtain a visa to live in Denmark on the basis of marriage. Hence, Danish citizens married to non-Danish citizens are usually forced to live in Sweden or in the country of origin of their partner.

With the aid of a set of costumes that I had created and wore during the dinner, I presented an embodiment of Islam, sex and terrorism – the phenomena the media machine focuses on in order to produce a continuous spectacle of fear. I think I managed to show that there is nothing to be afraid of in the case of such an appearance. With this artistic event, I attracted the press and got a full page in widely distributed free newspapers in Copenhagen. In an interview for *metroXpress*, I stated that the Danish Prime Minister had confused assimilation with the question of integration of foreigners. Integration should not be a one-way process, as Denmark can only enrich itself with new cultures.³

My classmates were very happy with *Sprachschule*

By now I had gone through the experience of a few different German and French language courses while in those countries. The courses were rather expensive, and I found them very frustrating, as after each lesson, I felt like I had been brainwashed. Many examples used by the teachers and in the books were banal, and thus I found some of the texts surreal and quoted them at some public reading events. Inevitably, the German audience was shocked to hear them. Another problematic approach is that besides grammar rules, language courses impose culture, with the undertone that it is a higher culture than the one the pupils are coming from, whatever their heritage might be.

Within the Halle für Kunst exhibition space in Lüneburg, I installed *Sprachschule*, a real classroom that functioned as a space for a free German language course for foreigners living in the area. I joined them for the courses. Our teacher, who was familiar with alternative methods of teaching, was very motivated, and open to different topics and to a rhythm proposed by my classmates and me. During the second week of the project, I initiated discussions and conducted interviews on the topics of integration and migration. I was also received by the Mayor of Lüneburg, to whom I gave recommendations regarding the issue at the base of my research.

Within the entire *Crossing Borders* series and the *Integration Project* (2000–05), the aim was to introduce certain aspects of reality into the arts in order to utilise the channels of the latter for broader transmission. I was continuously learning through the complex process of this project and, on that basis, making further decisions for the next step of the project. Compiling an archive proved a very helpful device for my continuing work. The *Integration Project Archive* (which consists of over 80 hours of unedited video interviews, audio materials, books, an essay, interviews, documents, photos, flyers, brochures, etc.) stands in an important relation to the ongoing research. Whenever the archive is exhibited as a part of the *Integration Project Office*, it is openly accessible to whoever is interested.

Media scandal

After *Courbet* was presented on rotating billboards in the *EuroPart* exhibition in public spaces in Vienna, from December 2005 to January 2006. The work was removed after two days as a result of an enormous media scandal at the point when Austria was about to take over the Presidency of the EU. Over one hundred articles and over a thousand readers' comments witnessed it in a very interesting and complex way. The poster, 3.5 x 4 metres in size, was re-mounted on the façade of Forum Stadt Park in Graz from January – March 2006.

In certain periods in history, nudity revolved in the public mirror, but taken for its symbolic value in society it frequently served as a carrier for other messages. Besides the composition and the reference to the title (*L'origine du monde – The Origin of the World*, oil on canvas, 1866, 46 x 55 cm, by Gustav Courbet), beyond the image, my reference to Courbet directly addressed his position as an artist who was concerned with the class struggle during the time of the Paris Commune and who believed in the emancipatory role of art in society. His artworks were banned from shows, and he was even arrested, primarily due to his political engagement. The painting *L'origine du monde* remained hidden for more than 120 years in private collections, but has been on display at the Musée d'Orsay in Paris since the 1980s.

In retrospect, I believe this recent interpretation of mine would not have provoked the mass media scandal if the blue underwear had not featured the EU flag on it at such a problematic moment of Austrian political reality. In the tradition of my earlier works, like the *Crossing Borders* series and the *Integration Project 2000–05*, I continue my critical view of the politics of exclusion and the issues of bio-politics in the EU. The body of the woman in the picture – my own – is the body of someone who does not belong to the EU territory, someone who speaks from the perspective of a migrant woman and who has been discriminated against because she is not a citizen of this elitist political and economic space.

As the European Union states sharpen control over non-citizens, the immigration police, for instance, continue the long-time practice of “checking-the-warmth-of-bedsheets” in intermarriages between EU- and non-EU partners.


The fact that my artworks were removed from the rotating billboards in Vienna caused much turmoil in art circles, in Austria in particular. Without a doubt, it is a form of censorship that represents a danger for the future of the arts in Austria – especially when it concerns art with political content, critical art, women artists and artists from outside the EU, public funding in the arts, and removing or covering serious political content from the public eye. The work became even more present in digital media and publications, which are *a priori* public spaces, and apparently some much more constructive and intellectual debates took place, beyond the mainstream reaction. Which brings us to the absurdity and hypocrisy of the removal for moralistic reasons, as that act only served as a manifestation of official political executive power, but failed in its purpose since it actually multiplied the content, taking it to the most remote corners of society.

With two other images that were on the same rotating billboards – *Integration Impossible*, in which, in the first case, I wear a camouflage burqa on the street in Manchester, and in the second case, a red, so-called terrorist mask – I wanted to give visibility to minorities in the EU while addressing the picture of abstraction and demonisation of minorities created by the media, as well as stereotypes in the “war on terror”. *Integration Impossible* was a performance work created for the feminist festival “[prologue] new feminism / new Europe” in Manchester 2005,⁴ with the first part performed on the street and the second part inside the Cornerhouse theatre space, just a few days after an innocent Brazilian man was shot to death by the British police in

⁴ [prologue] new feminism / new Europe, Exhibition at Cornerhouse, Manchester: www.cornerhouse.org/art/info.aspx?ID=239&page=0

London as a disturbing reality of the “war on terror”. This performance, where my interpretation of *L'origine du monde* was also shown, provoked an interesting and intense discussion there.

As for the posters, there was no intention whatsoever to work on a topic like “an advertisement for the EU”, but rather to invite artists to work on the topic of changing European biopolitics, which should be open for critical positions, since they reflect individual standpoints.



Tanja Ostojić, born 1972 in Yugoslavia (Serbia), is an independent performance and interdisciplinary artist and cultural activist based in Berlin. She studied art in Belgrade and Nantes. Ostojić includes herself as a character in Situationist performances and uses diverse media in her artistic research, thereby examining social configurations and relations of power. She works predominantly from the migrant woman's perspective and the approach in her works is defined by political positioning, humour and integration of the recipient.

Tanja Ostojić was one of the lecturers at the International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities.*

SERBIAN LABOR MIGRANT IN THE 20TH CENTURY EUROPE – FROM A GUEST WORKER TO A TRANSNATIONAL ENTREPRENEUR

International migration, and therewith also the labor migration is a constantly growing phenomenon. The interdisciplinary nature of the migration phenomena reflects in fact that economics, sociology, political science, and history each address these phenomena in their own way, employing various typologies, data or levels of analysis.

Europe has a long and wide-ranging migration history, consisting of various internal movements, East-West migrations in the nineteenth and twentieth century as well as West-East movements that started about four hundred years ago.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, nation-states became increasingly concerned with controlling their national borders and identifying their citizens. As a result, passport and *visa* systems were introduced as well as *migration* and *naturalization* policies. Although international labor migration, international trade, and capital flows have contributed to overall welfare gains in the nineteenth century, migrations were more and more perceived to be a threat to national identity and security.

Until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, international migrations were first of all related to colonization and to economic factors, as well as to poor living conditions and unemployment in the sending countries.

However, after the end of World War I, new forms of migration emerged reaching its peak after the World War II whereby millions of people were forced to flee from their homes. Forced migrations, displacement and flight play an enormous role in the European migration context.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with the West European rapidly expanding economies, a so-called guest worker /Gastarbeiter program started the labor movement from

¹ *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies* (1979) CUP, England, Cambridge

² In advanced industrial societies labor market segmentation refers to a primary labor market with secure employment conditions, comparatively high wages and social security standards, and to a secondary labor market with low wages, little security and difficult working conditions. Because native workers often are not willing to accept secondary labor market jobs, immigrant labor is recruited. Under these conditions a growing demand for workers in the secondary labor market presumably leads to an increase in immigration.

³ Admission regulations, migration policies and emigration laws have to be taken into account when analyzing the movement of people.

⁴ European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications (1994) Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield

⁵ Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems (1992) Oxford, England, Clarendon Press

Southern European countries to several West European Countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden). American economist Michael Joseph Piore¹ argues that the *demand for labor in segmented labor markets*² is the main reason for international labor movements.

In many cases, demand-driven labor migrations are supported by governmental *recruitment programs* or *bilateral contracts*. Thus, such migration movements are typically influenced by the *political goals and legal regulations*³ of both sending and receiving countries. A typical example is the labor movement from Southern European countries to Germany in the late 1960s. According to Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz⁴, 1,3 million Yugoslav (and thereby also Serbian) workers were recruited by the booming West European countries, primarily to Germany.

Labor migration is also dealt with within the field of *sociology* which focuses on migration being perpetuated over time and space. The role of social networks has been recognized by Gurak Douglas T. and Fe Caces⁵ as an essential basis for the continuous labor migration flow. On the *meso level*, this so-called chain migration partially explains the development of guest workers' enclaves and the formation of migrant communities in the receiving society.

Against this background, one can argue that social, political and economic links between sending and receiving countries are an important factor, sometimes even a precondition, for labor migration movements.

As a consequence of today's process of EU enlargement and globalization (it could be argued that the EU widening is part of the globalization!), a new form of a labor migrant has been developed: a transnational entrepreneur with transnational networks. This new form of labor migrant is often bilingual, holds dual citizenship, frequently maintains homes in two countries, moves easily between different cultures and pursues economic, political, and cultural interests that require a simultaneous presence in both areas. This new category of a "hybrid- or a semi-labor migrant" has not been, up to now, sufficiently dealt with in the academia. Furthermore, many forced migrants from the former Yugoslavia – today called Diaspora (initially considered as refugees) – could be seen as a third group of labor migrants.

Very little is known about all three groups. There is abundant literature about the guest workers from Turkey and that might also be the reason why this particular migrant group (aside representing the largest guest workers population in Germany) has started a process of genuine integration in German society. The subject of guest workers from Serbia (and former Yugoslavia) has been rather accidentally dealt with in the field of social sciences⁶ while Diaspora and transnational migrants are still relatively new phenomena. Who are the new transnational entrepreneurs? Are they guest workers' second generations' inventive answer to the limbo they were left in by both host and home countries? Or are they predominately consisting of new migrants who left during the Yugoslav wars? What could be their role in building Serbia's reputation and establishing relations and links between the countries? These and other questions could be answered if we

⁶ Pascal Goeke ("Transnationale Migration" (2007), Transcript, Bielefeld, Germany) is one of the few social scientist who dealt with guest workers from the former Yugoslavia, while Predrag J. Markovic analyzed "Gastarbeiter as the Factor of Modernization in Serbia" (2/2005; History of the 20th century). Sociologist Maja Korac pointed to the lack of contact between the refugees and guest workers in the host countries in her article "Living Ethnicity in exile" ("Gender, Identität und kriegerischer Konflikt" (2004), LIT Münster, Germany). In the art world the subject of Serbian guest workers has been lately receiving more attention – e.g. Noa Treister "Art Interventions – The Return of the Gastarabajters" (2008) Pozarevac, Serbia

initiate a multidisciplinary academic investigation into the position of Serbian guest workers in the host countries and the relation between the three groups mentioned above.

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(UN)LIMITED IDENTITIES

I am standing in a queue waiting to get in. The man said, “ID, please.” I showed him a small piece of plastic with something inscribed on it. He nodded, I went in.

I have so many ID cards these days:

“I am a musician, I can sing just fine.”

“I write poems, I am a poet.”

“I paint, I am a painter.”

“I cook, I am a chef.”

“I tell stories, I am a storyteller.”

“I have three children, I am a mother.”

“I wash dishes, I am a human dishwasher.”

I have lost track of what or who I am...

I do not recall who started the game, who set the boundaries, when and where... who chose which identity is used in which occasion, and why.

Sometimes I get mixed up with all of my cards and show “dishwasher” instead of “student” to the lady at the student’ service office and she looks at me suspiciously.

I wonder why...

I have never said anything that was not truthful, so why that glance, Mrs.?

It seems as though we are persistent in our effort to depict this thing called “identity” with every brush stroke of words. I wonder if we are bound to failure...


Are we so egocentric not to realize that by giving names to everyday activities, our virtues, abilities etc. that we are slowly peeling off bit by bit what our identity is or may be... They used to teach us to see the big picture first and then concentrate on its parts; and yet we are obliged to cling to parts and then, perhaps, if interested or curious enough we will try to examine other pieces too and to put this puzzle called human being, finally, together.

It is strange when you come to think about it how we have evolved and if we really have, and into what, because at the end of each day we go to bed not thinking nor feeling that we are one and not the other, anything and not something. We close our eyes and leave our thoughts with “Nothing” and go on to dream of a better day.

So have our numerous identities managed to endanger us? Are we gradually becoming extinct by all of these definitions of what we are? Are we settling for that beautiful “nothing” because it so common and does not divide nor tear us into pieces?

You can not have “a part of nothing”; nothing is always “a whole”.

“I am what I am”; and **you**?



Iva Kolundžija is a student at the Faculty of applied arts in Belgrade. Her interests range from art/culture practices, urban culture, art in public space, to environment protection and research of different aspects of modern society. Through her artistic practice, but also through engagement in realisation of numerous civic/youth actions and international projects, Iva shows her devotion to contribute to building civil/democratic society in Serbia and improvement of its reputation at international level. Iva was one of the participants at the International Summer Academy (*UN*)*Limited Identities*.

STUDENTS' IDENTITY

It is not easy to describe briefly one's impressions from last year's Summer Academy (*UN*)*Limited Identities* – it is impossible to summarise seven days of interesting lectures and workshops, as well as seven evenings of interesting conversations, in two pages only. In view of the fact that the main topic of our meeting was the phenomenon of identity, I shall try to summarise my experiences using that very notion.

In the course of the Academy, we talked a lot about nationalism and internationalism in the context of the problem of identity of Europe and Serbia in Europe. When I think about the Academy one year later (and of other similar events that I have had the opportunity to participate in), it seems to me that during the course of the Academy a particular form of European international identity was manifested: I am referring to students' culture, the culture of "Eurostudents".

When talking about students' culture, one usually means film, music and theatrical performances whose authors and/or consumers are students; alternatively, as is the case in some cafés in my city in Poland, for example, the adjective "student" is associated with cheap beer. To me, our Summer Academy is ample proof that the phrase "students' culture" has another meaning as well. Of course, it is not my intention in this brief essay to define precisely what that notion means to me; instead, I would like to sketch a few situations from the Academy that point to who "Eurostudents" really are.

The first picture. We were talking, I do not remember exactly where. The participants in the conversation were a girl from Romania studying in Germany, a girl from Serbia studying in London, a girl from Holland studying in Denmark. The conversation was, of course, conducted in English.

The second picture. A professor from Portugal spoke about the attitude of the Portuguese towards the European Union and the problem of emigration. A conversation ensued. Even though there were no students from Iberian countries present, people asked questions and the discussion was very interesting.

The third picture. On the first day, only a few of us knew one another from before, the majority being unknown to one another. This, however, did not stand in the way of our desire to get closer quickly and to start a discussion.

And the last picture – in the morning, almost everyone yearned for a cup of coffee. Why? Because our “night life” was very intensive. Why? The Academy lasted only a short period of time, the people were very interesting and there was not much time to lose sleeping.

All of the above is indicative of openness, ability to communicate, readiness to associate with others, which also indicates the possibility of serious cooperation in the future. These are signs of mobility, curiosity and readiness for contact with other people, regardless of their origin.

Why do I point out that this is students’ identity? Naturally, not all the participants of the Academy were students – but an overwhelming majority of us have been in contact with various types of cultural-educational institutions (such as universities) and have actively used (or continually use) the experience afforded by studying. It seems to me that the people I am talking about strive for knowledge and company, and in Europe the university is an institution that offers such possibilities to the young.

And what is the most important thing for me concerning this students’ identity? I think it proves the theory that identity is not a monolithic structure but a hybrid that links various elements and ideas. An individual may feel the identity of a “Eurostudent” without stopping be-

ing a Serb, Englishman, Belgrader or Londoner. Like people from the diaspora, for whom the identity of a citizen of the country they live in does not preclude their belonging to the culture of their country of origin. Perhaps that was the most interesting feature of the entire Academy: our stay in Belgrade, in itself, was the best confirmation of what we heard in the course of lectures.

Text is originally written in Serbian language.

Tomasz Ewertowski is student of Serbian and Polish philology at the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań, Poland. He stayed in Serbia several times in the framework of different international programs and exchanges.

Tomasz was one of the participants at the International Summer Academy *(UN)Limited Identities*.

A SPLIT IDENTITY FLANKED BY SLAV AND ALBANIAN CULTURE

This is a story that implicates political systems, ideologies and national agendas in the destruction of cultural identity. Speaking of cultural identity, something quite contradictory can be assured: political

regimes are perhaps the most significant force in creating and proliferating cultural identity, far from destroying it. This story involves one rather different understanding of the idea of “identity” than to some extent reified understanding of an individual or collective possession.

A high number of discourses, definitions and theories related to this term reflects its complexity and ambiguity. Theories focusing on a macro-level understand the identity as a condition for social order and stability in every kind of community, while on a micro-level the identity is supposed to provide an answer to the question who or what we are (Ristić, 2007:186).

Identity then, like a language, is not just a description of cultural belonging; it is a sort of collective treasure/inheritance of local communities. But it is also discovered to be something fragile that needs protection and preservation, something that could be lost.

Far from being the fragile flower that state institutions, political systems, Europeanization and globalization tramples, identity is seen in this text as the upsurging power of local culture that offers resistance to the centrifugal force of different schemes (see Tomlinson, 1999).

The inheritance

The first time I have heard about Yugoslavia I was five years old. Before that day I knew about the state, but for me it meant only a common state’s name on the European geographic map.

It was an usual day; I was walking with my mother through our neighborhood when a lady who was my doctor called my mother Slobodanka. I was astonished by hearing the lady calling my mother with, for me, unfamiliar name. The only mode of naming my mother that I had ever heard was Mili, but the name Slobodanka was really a strange one for me. Hence, I asked my mother why the lady had called her with that name. She answered back by saying that this was her real name. This detail stimulated me on several questions on which I impatiently needed responses. Consequently my mother started to let me in her family's facts. She explained me her father's origin, who was from Cetinje, an important city in Montenegro. She proceeded than by detailing that her family moved to Albania during the 19th century and held Yugoslav nationality until 1970. At that time the Albanian popular monocracy prohibited foreigner residents in Albania by prosecuting or considering them as nation enemies. For this reason my grandfather was constrained to change the Yugoslav nationality to Albanian one and the family name by dropping the letter Ć/Ç¹. Hence, the surname was changed from Stanić or Staniç to Stani maintaining the local meaning of the surname both in Albanian and Serbo-Croatian language. The meaning of word *stani* in Albanian society is associated with pasturage and shieling where the flock pastures during the summer time, as well as for the Yugoslav society word *stani* is associated to cottage or a small house.

¹ Ç is written and sounds in Albanian language, and in Serbo-Croatian language is written Ć.

My mother extended her narration explaining that her name derives from the name *Mili*, which was a pet-name, a consequential epithet of a Yugoslav expression 'mila' that means 'dear'. The nick-name was given by her nanny, who was from Montenegro as well, but in the course of the time the name *Mila* became very functional to cover the foreign identity. Moreover, as a communist youth member she had to prevent any marginalization, thus the pet-name was customized in *Mili*.

At a certain point I figured out a new identity for my mother and myself. She had hidden her origin and her identity to her daughters because it was insecure to declare a hybrid legacy.

Apparently, around the middle of the 1970s one individual in the socialist republics in the Balkans was forced to identify himself with the nation, or at least to build his identity upon the national identity, which was closely related to the nation-state. In regard to this, Nashehi sees both the nation and the national identity as two major inventions of Europe's modernity. European thinking is seen as thinking in terms of national identity and the model of national state only. This has resulted in a Europe consisting of national states, which consequently led to discrimination, expulsions, prosecutions of minorities, and further to border-wars and forced assimilation, which are not yet completely overcome in South East Europe upon today (2003: 7 quoted from Ristić, 2007: 187).

Hence, since those moments Yugoslavia penetrated in my persona, the nation was my predecessors' land. This Yugoslav identity was something my mother's family and I simply "had", in fact as a disturbed existential possession, an inheritance, and a benefit of continuity with the past.

In this regard, during my childhood I began to be attracted by the Yugoslav culture, Slav music (which I listened from the radio), Yugoslav landscapes (which I discovered from magazines or Yugoslav TV).

There were times when in Albania it was incredibly difficult to satisfy erudition needs unless through those contents that were extremely censored by the dictatorial government. Primitivism and provincialism, violation of basic

rights of the individual, such as freedom of speech and freedom of organization, in total, were present in literature, music, film, entertainment, radio, press and television. The crisis of values was followed by deep cultural crisis (see also Memorandum 1995:114. Quoted from Halili 2004:5)².

However, frustrating times grow the interest of the masses in diverse survival strategies, such as the illegal

² At some stages in the text I cite several times the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences (published in 1995) because it could serve as an excellent description of economical and moral situation of Albanian society during 1980s (Halili, 2004:31).

migration, elopement, escape and that were strategies chosen by large number of Albanians through that historical period. Elopements involved people from every circle of the society, and they encompassed different actions beginning from physical to mind border crossings³. Indeed, physical border crossings were at a very limited number because of the high-risks on the boundaries, but escape over the mind and cultural borders was extended in large.

As a result, in the early 1980s Albanians invented numerous solutions to catch a glimpse of the world, by fabricating many clandestine devices that were frequently improvised by courageous electrical engineers. The most popular apparatus was a broadcasting receiver named by the Albanian capital's inhabitants "kanoçja" - the tin, or "grupi" – the group. It was a small aluminum box overflowed with some capacitors/condensers and a variable commanded by a tuner, utilized to synchronize UHF - short-waves⁴. The device "kanoçja" looked simple in technical terms, like an infantile conception, but it was a very good system to catch foreign televisions such as the Yugoslav, Italian and Greek ones.

Certainly, during the communist period the Albanian TV did not offer much entertainment. A large segment of television material and programs were based upon communist propaganda. Moreover, the broadcasting hours were under restriction.

The official ideology, which instead of the real socialist program, offered only empty political proclamations generated by narrow-minded mental-

³ During the communist oppression (1945-1990) in Albania the monarchy attached a socio-eco-nomical segregative strategy. Emigration was illegal, thus, the only option to emigrate was the illegal one, constituted as a condemnable activity. Who was capable to emigrate illegally was specified as a renegade. In addition, the after-effects upon the relatives were cruel; instigated a police terror regime, imprisonments, exiles (Canco, 2005:141). After all, many young people attempted to cross illegally the Yugoslav border via several pathways- water, terra and so forth.

⁴ The device was, in fact, a model of the decoder which is incorporated to the contemporary television set. And the tuner for the short-waves was a parallel invention to that of the remote control.

ity, had largely squandered its ability to win hearts and minds of people. (Memorandum, 1995: 114. Quoted from Halili, 2004:5).

Consequently during the 1980s, like lots of fellow-citizens, I passed my childhood listening Yugoslav music from the radio, watching TV shows and movies signed by Yugoslav authors. As a matter of fact, I was a better telespectator of Yugoslav television than of the Albanian one.

⁵ In order to resist the Turkish authority people in ex-Yugoslavia and Albania have developed a strong ethnical homogeneity with strong solidarity and a high degree of isolation. And, since there was no institutional possibility to act on a national level, the people in ex-Yugoslavia and Albania had to rely on their closest circle (family) which is one of the reasons why a national identity and consciousness could not be held up over for centuries. Hence, they built close ties within their families (distinctive clan structures), while partitioning themselves from all that is foreign. In correlation to this over-proportional significance and approval of primary groups (family), there was a less significance, moreover a resisting attitude towards the state as such (state institutions, political organizations and the differentiation of people according to their profession). (Golubović 1995:58-59. Quoted from Irena Ristić 2007:191)

In this way, the young generations began to familiarize with their neighbor's culture, mainly with Serbo-Croatian language. Little by little this familiarity tended to transform in admiration and affection. The esteem culminated at that point that visiting the country or any province of the SFRY was considered as an event. The ingress to Yugoslavia would offer opportunity to experience everything that was prohibited in the Albanian socialist fatherland and, naturally, in the same time, the information absorbed by the TV screen would become real.

Yugoslavia was considered as a Western European country - a country that belongs to the western culture. This identity was closely linked to liberal values because it was based on a strong urban identification frame and, oppositely to Albania, did not have the nation in its core, but the citizen. On the other hand, the former Yugoslavia was a traditional state that geographically belonged to Europe but not necessarily shared all values considered as European. The identity was also related to an orientation towards Ottoman heritage and common historical circumstances with Albania, that shaped the today's fate of ex-Yugoslav states and their neighbor country⁵ (see also Ristić 2007:190).

Despite my Montenegrin origins and the fact that my mother's relatives lived in Podgorica and Belgrade⁶, I never had the possibility to visit Yugoslavia during the period of communist system. However, in the time of my childhood and the communist regime, I had connected with a small number of children from Yugoslavia, whose parents were working in the nearby embassy of the SFRY. But at that time, in the late 1980s, diplomatic relations amid Albania and Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia were over-aggravated, hence the friendship between my Serbian friends and me was persistently prohibited by the state security agents, who menaced us and our parents by accusations for espionage and acting versus the communist Albanian government. These claims could bring my parents in prison while my friend's parents would be deported from Albania. In fact, it requires another essay to describe the adventures that my Yugoslav friends and I committed to get together, and not to mention the support of our families.

⁶ For a long time Montenegro was accounted to Serbian territory, thus Montenegrins' nature was permanently characterized as a Serbian kind, moreover they have considered themselves as part of Serbian nation. Montenegro has forever defended the ideal of a free Serbian nation (Udovicki, 1998:25-29).

In the meantime the years went by. The beginning of 1991 for Albanian people marked a new phase of political, economical, and social changes. Finally Albanians were celebrating the fall of communism and the prelude of a new epoch. Later than a half of the century of segregation with Western world, the nation could enthusiastically hope to construct "the united European house"⁷ (Glenny; 2000:634). Over a night, liberty and democratic rights replaced dictatorship and censure. Albanians devoted to Yugoslav culture were largely engaged on translating the terms like democracy, latitude and freedom of speech, and on transforming the centralized economy to the capitalist market.

⁷ Stated publicly by Mikhail Gorbachev.

At the other side, political, social and economical changes had previously taken place in Yugoslavia. After 1992 the name of Socialist Federative Re-

public of Yugoslavia was already vanished, the notion of the united state was progressively falling. The deep crisis in Yugoslav economical and political life caused “such a catastrophic outcome as the break-up of the Yugoslav state” (Memorandum, 1995: 95. Quoted from Halili, 2004:5). The provinces/republics were gradually dissociating, obtaining autonomy and seeing the light of the independent state. Hence, the politics and economy of each state were concentrated within the frame of every single nation.

In addition, the image of Yugoslav cultural model at the international level was fragmented, due to tradition that differed relatively from one state to another. Certain ex-Yugoslav nations, because of historical circumstances, leant upon westerners’ cultural domination, while the majority of them shaped their identity primarily on Balkan roots, including the Ottoman culture as well. Thus, for Albanian public, Yugoslav compactness collapsed once and for all, as well as the Yugoslav myth had dwindled. However, for Albanians as for the international public, the fact that Yugoslav state could cultivate inter-ethnical harmony for more than five decades and after that ethnical and religious hate raised followed by war, was a really foggy explanation.

In fact, despite the differences of ethnicity and religion, ex-Yugoslavia was not only a constitutional or legislative discourse, but, above all, it remains a community of values, because of the common historical fate of these nations and similar social, economical and political problems affronted by them (Skendi, 1980: ix). This consequently means that Yugoslav values were not linked to a specific ethnic, linguistic, socio-cultural, institutional, historical or geographical mutuality, but to abstract values, which existed despite all these, previously mentioned, determinations, which are different for every state.

Certain years later (around 1999) I began visiting several independent provinces of ex-SFRY. Certainly, the emotion was high-pitched. In particular, discovering Montenegro and Serbia gave me the feeling of “home”. Perhaps I felt like that as a consequence of the fact that “the blood att-

ract”, as an Albanian proverb says. However, the sensation was exaggerated. There, in the Montenegro and Serbia, I recognized a strong sentiment because the identity that had remained in abeyance was little by little completed with combination of sense of freedom and equality. The sense of freedom and equality are two pilasters of my childhood and upbringing; the identification with concrete geographical space, such as Montenegro, and further with a region of Cetinje, can be seen as crucial values, from which derive principles of my self-determination – birth – which creates ties to my mother’s family; culture – which forms my person spiritually and emotionally; Orthodox religion; Serbo-Croatian language; awareness of a common identity based on shared values and across the same culture (Pollack, 2004:31 quoted from Ristić, 2007:188).

The dictator regime could not eliminate these factors that shaped my identity. On the contrary, they became stronger, hence, progenitor’s territory nostalgia stayed alive remarkably. Visiting frequently Montenegro and experiencing often Serbia, even at academic level, completed and articulated the process of my identity shaping.

However, my trips to Serbia and contributes to different events in its capital, raised comments and polemics among my friends in Albania. Majority of them were based on argument stating that Serbia is a complicated and dangerous country. Actually, based on external observers’ experiences and perceptions, Albania has often been determined as complicated and dangerous country, like Serbia. These facts bring us to Todorova’s following statement: “...a notable stereotyping of the Balkans and its reduction to elements of primordial societies has always been represented (un)intentionally by western decision-makers. The image construction has very little in common with the self-perception of the people living in the Balkans. Nevertheless, this construct of a „Balkan identity” in the media and public space was dominant and had doubtlessly a certain influence on the self-perception of the people living on the Balkans.” (see Todorova 1997).

In regard to this, many historical circumstances have shaped today's relationship between Serbia and Albania. Due to their common historical past frequently marked by conflicts, a sort of *Serbophobia* has developed among Albanians. In the core of their history lays a centenarian war experience against multi-ethnical communities, foreign rulers (Roman pontiffs, Byzantine emperors and Ottoman sultans). Their history under foreign conquerors detached Slavs from Albanians, whilst mutual agreements urged them on eliminating the ruling masters. But, the Albanians' perception of Serbia has changed along the centuries evolving from sympathy (in 1389 when they fought together against the Ottomans in the battle on the Kosovo⁸) to conflicts⁹, fear and hatred (in 1912 and 1913 when Montenegrins invaded Shkodra and Kosovo, which pursued in massacres over Albanians and subsequently, in 1999, in the war and the genocide policy of Serbs towards Kosovo.). For a short time period, the communist regime in Albania suppressed myths based on old-time hatred towards Serbs, proclaiming the rapprochement to the SFRY. However, starting from 1999, the Kosovo war detached Albania from Serbia in favour of strengthening its links with other republics of the ex-Yugoslavia.

⁸ There exist epic songs related to the Kosovo Polje battle, and they are sung by traditional Serb and Albanian bards.

Besides, during the Ottoman domination, Albanian clans have contributed in defenses of Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo region (Udovicki, 1998:28).

⁹ The conflict between Serbs and Albanians begun around XVI and XVIII century; Serbs impute the fault to Albanians for massive emigration of Serbs who headed for north. (Udovicki, 1998:28).

During the time period 1981-1999, within the array of evidences – from the massive demonstrations of Albanians in Kosovo to the NATO air strikes campaign against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – it is hard to find more compelling evidence of the high degree to which intellectuals and scholars were involved in national and nationalistic discourses. Indeed, in the very core of the Albanian-Serbian scientific debate about the history of Kosovo, lays the question: "Who inhabited the region first?". The trace of that discourse can be found in the Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts written in 1986 and The Platform for the Solution of the National

Albanian Question presented by Albanian Academy of Sciences in 1999, as well as in numerous books or articles (Halili, 2004: 1-15).

Even now, after the collapse of the Milosevic's regime in 2000 and the autonomy of Kosovo, a part of Albanians kept the same aversion against Serbians, while the other part of the population aims to discover Serbia. On the other hand, an increasing interest of Serbian population towards Albania is obvious. Many Serbs every year direct their vacations to Albania, breaking their prejudices and trying to discover the country.

By way of conclusion

The very last part of the text is based on the International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities* (Belgrade 25-31, August 2008) that brought into discussion the question of contemporary identity of Serbia in the context of current European integrations. Serbia, Europeaness and the EU have been the main subjects of large number of debates and discussions in the academic environment, generating each time different and interesting discourses. During the workshops the concept of Serbian identity was approached from very diverse points of view, by experts in different disciplines and areas of research. Theoretical and conceptual aspects were combined with interesting case studies focused on different countries as well.

The process of construing a Serbian identity differs considerably in comparison to certain EU countries and those that are undergoing EU integration. The new identity of Serbia is a combination of values and ideology, and many references to history and past. It is linked to an examination and search for the roots of national agendas, in terms such as "the national revival" or "the national awakening".

In her work Irena Ristić concludes that Serbia has a split identity. According to Ristić, a national identity based on values and ideology leads to two relatively opposite understandings of national identity, values and norms,

each of them based on a strong dichotomy of identities. For centuries Serbia oscillated between East and West. Hence, there is not one consistent, but two discontinuous national identities in Serbia. As a consequence, dichotomy is present in the whole society and its institutions (2007:190). In regard to this, Serbia will not be able to find its way towards Europe until it forms a coherent identity and completely commit the European values. It is a very difficult task to build a Serbian identity (the transnational one) within the EU. The reason is that the EU does not possess the instruments used by the nation-states in order to secure the allegiance of their citizens, namely, a common history, language, symbols, etc.

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THOUGHTS ON IDENTITY

„I am not an anthropologist or philosopher, but as a curious human being, medical doctor and social worker, I was thinking a lot about identities and what does it mean - identity.

Through my office many people passed, looking for help or simple advice how to handle the existing health system. Their names, stories and names of their loved ones were classified in my computer as part of a vast space of public administration's archive.

Names. Is it possible to say that computerized identity, in our modern world, is the complete identity of someone?

None of these data will help us to stringently identify persons as Serbians, and the next question will be: What is the Serbian identity? Is it enough to be born in Serbia or to live in Serbia to be considered as Serbian? Is it enough to have a Serbian passport? For administration it is.”

*

“...I am using two words for our nationality; one is Serbs and the other is Serbians. So what is the difference? Well, Serbians can be people that are living in Serbia and Serbs are people of the same origin but they are living outside of administrative borders of Serbia. That is a critical point in our identity. Are we really the same? Do we have a future in being and developing together or separated? That question was, and still is part of any issue of identity.

There was a dirty war in Yugoslavia and the world has chosen us as the bad guys.

I experienced it many times during my numerous travelings. Once I was in a special room of a border police with three Pakistani UNDP workers and one

Iraqi dentist. Our professional identities did not help us—it was our national identity that mattered only.

Shortly, about identities:

- they are suggested, we did not choose them by ourselves;
- they are changeable, depending from culture to culture;
- there are as many identities as the humans on the planet;
- each person has many identities.

How can this help us? In a way that everybody has to work on one's own development as a human being that cares for others, that is accepting differences and is learning by meeting something and somebody new and is willing to participate in much more important events, then just work and sleep. We influence the world by our thoughts, speech and body and we have to be aware that every cause has its effect."

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NEIGHBOURHOOD (HI)STORIES

This paper seeks to explore identity formation as a process of cultural ex-

change between neighbouring communities tackling the issue from the perspective of oral history. It therefore argues that cultural identity of a country or nation is significantly influenced by the perception of the others and discusses how official discourses might distort this perception. By briefly presenting the story of my grandfather I will try to demonstrate that oral narratives transmitted across generations often oppose politically correct versions and foster memories of friendship and compassion where authorities had used the rhetoric of hostility.

In the late November of 1943 Bulgarian troops fighting on the side of the Axis Powers during the Second World War were dispatched in Kosovo near the town of Pristina. Among the conscripts was my grandfather Ganche Ganchev who was born in 1920 in the Central-North Bulgarian town of Lovech. Rather exhausted and unable to advance, Bulgarian units were ordered to withdraw but while leaving the battlefield my grandfather was hit by random shooting and severely wounded by a piece of shell which tore his left thigh. Incapable of walking alone, he was dragged by a comrade to the nearest trench while panic and chaos were blending with the smell of blood and hot iron. Due to the massive blood loss my grandfather fainted and when later on regained consciousness, he was able to recognize the silhouettes of two men and a woman checking the bodies for weapon and valuables. When they approached, it turned out that these were Serbian partisans whom my grandfather asked to take a photo of him with the camera he had in the haversack. They helped him stand up and walk to their camp where his leg was bandaged and after a few days of recovery he was accompanied to the border town of Kystendil, examined by a doctor and demobilized. As an expression of gratitude my grandfather gave his silver watch to one of the partisans while the photo of him lying in the trench is still in our family album. He passed away in late November 2008; exactly sixty-five years after being rescued.

When recollecting this story I always come up to the following questions. How do we remember? Is official history the only version we must resort to while referring to the past? How do collective myths and memories reshape our perception of ‘the other’? What is to be changed? Born in 1978, I went to school in late socialism which had been already eroded by false propaganda and absolute lack of devotion to ideology. However, nationalism emerging from the opposition to the Ottoman rule was still employed to contrast local and non-domestic cultures. History classes praised Bulgaria’s glorious past, darkened by the Ottoman oppression and later on revived by the communist era, but covered neighbouring countries with silence because of unresolved territorial claims and loyalty to Moscow. The politics of estrangement from the Western World including non-aligned Yugoslavia tended to disregard similarities in customs, language and culture while emphasizing Bulgaria’s closeness to Russia. Yugoslav cultural policies also highlighted Yugoslav uniqueness in the Eastern Bloc and turned aside from their USSR-dependent Eastern neighbor.

Socialism collapsed in 1989 leaving many awkward questions in official history and a culture of dissident narratives as a reservoir of alternative answers. Bulgarian post-socialist society faced the challenge of negotiating with its past by revising history and allowing unofficial records of the socialist and pre-socialist periods to emerge. Thus, along with suppressed narratives on forced labour camps, State Security Department and the ‘Revival Process’ against Bulgarian Turks, stories about a common Balkan past began to come out and posed the question about the close but unknown neighbours. Serbian culture, for example, with its Orthodox background and Slavic language appeared to be next of kin despite previously overestimated minor differences. Myths of “chosen people”, Golden Age and victimization have obviously played their role in Balkan national revivals but have also become a source of manipulation and political propaganda in later periods. A close inspection of Balkan states’ educational systems reveals the efforts of each state to foster the self-image of a glorious but victimized nation occupying sacred lands

in contrast to the image of the hostile and backward ‘others’. Balkan countries considered identities of neighbours artificial or deriving from the only original: the national. And since national significance had been elaborated on the basis of degrading the closest (br)other, the power of national myths increased as the cultural distance between societies lessened.

How could we challenge nation state’s monopoly over reshaping ethnic and cultural identities? Perhaps official histories that strengthened the national cohesion of Balkan communities but stigmatized the difference and erased traces of non-domestic cultural influences could be matched against unofficial stories that do not necessarily reinforce the national pride at the expense of the ‘other’ but promote universal values such as tolerance and reciprocity. Oral narratives represent our ancestors’ first-hand experience handed down to the next generation and therefore seem emotionally coloured and intimate rather than excessively pathetic. These accounts would open space for bringing in the issues of mutuality and gratitude, questioning the traditional perspective in international relations.

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TRAVELLING CINEMA

You can't touch what is in my suitcase.
If you reach for pictures,
they disappear and your hand
lands on its sides, images
caressing your skin, fading out and
vanishing like the smoke.

You see life moving
across the white in-lining.
The births and birthdays,
Families and holidays,
Loves and weddings,
Deaths and funerals.

You watch the whole nation
on a long protest march
creating the waves, sea of people
whilst dancing down the streets.

You hear laughter, horns and whistles,
the beating of pots and pans.
Pieces of revolution,
caught in kaleidoscope,
a mosaic of memories
instead of a diary and
nothing else to declare.



Nela Milić is a producer who works across theatre and visual arts. She had a diverse career, from arts and political journalism to feature, art and documentary film production, thriving in the production and programming of culture industry for fifteen years now. Currently she is a PhD student at Goldsmiths University in London where she is researching the city as a site of spectacle and the culture of protest. She is regularly writing for different arts and sociology publications and she is a visiting lecturer at several universities.

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Between Two Stands – Towards the Redefinition of the Cultural Identity of Serbia

National culture, once perceived as a foundation of the national state and its best ornament, has become a troubled notion. Identitary anxieties are fed by globalization and European integration and by migration that has turned solid national states into tense multicultural societies. But if the national cultures are to flow into some amorphous European culture, what is then its nature, profile and perspective, how can it preserve vitality and diversity of its components? A chimerical image of an official Euroculture, over-regulated and uniform, bland and boring, prompts conferences and symposia, held every weekend about these topics across the continent, while most Europeans care more about unemployment, inflation, crime and terrorism than about “the values and norms” of European culture. **Dragan Klaić***

* Dragan Klaić, *Dry the Swamp of Ignorance; European Culture: a Task for the EU*. Dutch weekly magazine *Vrij Nederland*, No 35, 28th August, 2004

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE CULTURAL IDENTITY

A collective (social and cultural) identity is determined as the self-awareness of members of a group that historically comes into being and develops depending on the criteria established by that group in relations with other social groups. Hence a sustainable social and cultural identity is a necessary precondition not only of the development but also of the existence of any contemporary society. What we have in its absence is an aggregate of individuals gathered in the same social space, not a community characterised by solidarity established on the basis of awareness of belonging (V. Y. Mudimbe, 1997). That is why systematic activities of social actors aimed at establishing and sustaining an identity are referred to as **the politics of identity**. We also encounter the syntagm **the political economy of identity**, which aims to stress the function of collective identity as a voluntarily accepted framework of domination/control over the distribution of political and economic power by the members of a given society (Bernstein, 2005). Collective identity thus becomes the basis of the legitimacy of social elites, which legitimate their leading position in society by means of arguments that are connected not so much to the immediate political and economic interests of those on whose behalf they rule, but first of all to the authentic interpretation of that which represents the cultural (symbolic) basis of differentiation, which is the reason for the existence of any social group or social community.

In order to back up the above claim by arguments, it is sufficient to take the several states that have come into being on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from Slovenia and Croatia, through Macedonia and Montenegro, as the framework of analysis. All of the above states tried to prove the reasons for their establishment as societies taking the form of sovereign states precisely by arguments that had a cultural-historical or identity basis. In each individual case, a more or less the same repertoire of identifiers was used: the existence of a sovereign state in the past

(in the Middle Ages or even earlier), a church organisation that existed at some point in the past and has subsequently been renewed, a standard language that differs sufficiently from the one being used by the neighbouring peoples, and, naturally, an entire repertoire of symbols (flag, anthem, coat-of-arms, national holidays) that were supposed to make the process of identification as successful as possible (Rae, H., 2002).

In societies that have lasted, in a more or less unchanged form and state-territorial framework, for centuries or at least decades, the issues of social and cultural identity are raised, first of all, in relation to the challenges posed by the process of globalisation, which brings into question primarily the traditional economic, political and cultural foundations of a stabilised community. However, in those societies whose very premises of existence (boundaries, state framework, form of rule...) have been repeatedly challenged in recent past, as was the case with most countries in south-eastern Europe (including Serbia) and the former Soviet Union, issues pertaining to identity are of much greater, one could even say vital importance, and a precondition of their very constitution. The example of the post-Soviet Russia can be used to demonstrate what T. Lahusen designates as the process of “ethnicization of nations”, that is, the process of establishing communities based on ethnicity, which were deliberately suppressed and relativised in the name of the new “*homo Sovieticus*” (T. Lahusen, 1997). Similar conclusions were reached by J. Milošević-Đorđević on the basis of empirical research into national identity in Serbia conducted in 2003; like some other authors, she refers to the ethnic elements of national identity as *primordialistic*. The reasons she offers for this lie in the discontinuity (historical, territorial and state) of Serbia in the previous century (J. Milošević-Đorđević, 2005).

In the societies where the process of establishment, even the establishment of the very territorial framework of the state, is still ongoing – and Serbia is undoubtedly such a state – social and cultural identity represent an open question to which answers are sought within the framework of strategies

that are as much a matter of choice of those societies as a consequence of the power relations and interests of external factors. The problem is all the more serious because – within the European framework, and also within the global framework over the last two centuries – it is precisely the national identity that represents the basic (although not the only) framework of identity orientation, and is designated as the *leading* identity (E. Smith, 1999).

The successive disintegration of state communities in the area of the former Yugoslavia resulted, without exception, in bringing into question their previous state frameworks (H. Rae, 2002). First of all, the disappearance of the big Yugoslavia, which was the national state of the Serbian people, in view of the fact that, formally or factually, the Serbs were a constitutive nation in at least four republics (with the exception of Slovenia), opened up the question of the Serbs' new minority status and identity. This led to interethnic conflicts that had the characteristics of ethno-civil wars, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then the conflict in Kosovo intensified, as a result of which the NATO intervention ensued and Kosovo was, in point of fact, separated from the Republic of Serbia, its future (and final) status being subject to negotiations. In the meantime, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and after the Montenegrin referendum held in the spring of 2006, Montenegro and Serbia became two independent, internationally recognised states. That marked the end of a process in the course of which Serbia was in the role of the inheritor of the identity symbols of the former state. At first the very name FR Yugoslavia pointed to a continuity with a state that no longer existed. The same held true of the national flag, anthem, coat-of-arms... It was only in 2003, with the coming into being of the now former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, that the actual name of a state that had stopped existing almost a decade and a half before stopped being used. In the meantime, the national flag, coat-of-arms and anthem were all changed. However, the symbolic remnants of

the former identity framework of Yugoslavia are present on two documents – personal documents the function of which basically has to do with identity, for they answer the question of *who I am*, in the identity card and the passport.

Thus, over a very brief period of time in historical terms, the basic constituents of Serbian society were repeatedly brought into question, and it is therefore clear that the collective identity of the citizens of Serbia also suffered deep frustrations. That is why its reconstruction is a task of prime importance; without this, it is unrealistic to think not only about sustainable development and a European future but also about the survival of Serbian society.

So far, the framework of this analysis has been the collective identity of the citizens of Serbia, as defined by the state framework, and it should be distinguished from the ethnic identity of Serbs and other ethnic communities living in Serbia. However, this framework is nowhere near enough if the aim is to be the sustainable development of Serbian society. Hence it is necessary, when further analysing the social and cultural identity, to proceed from the basic fact that Serbia, as is the case with almost all modern societies, is pluralised from within in a number of ways and its citizens belong to various groups that represent a basis for constituting a corresponding group identity (S. Ting-Toomey, 1999). Apart from the gender identity, there is the ethnic identity, which, along with the religious identity and the regional identity, represent the foundation of the pluralisation of identity in all contemporary societies. To the above, we should add the professional identity, in view of the fact that this form of identity – as is the case with all other forms of identity affiliation – represents a basis for linking an individual to a group, which is realised by way of belonging to professional and trade union organisations. They, in their turn, represent one of the most important foundations for the development of civil society. Finally, there is another, broader identity framework, whose development belongs to the future covered by this strategy of sustainable de-

¹ In the paper *The Demography of Growing European Identities* (W. Lutz, S. Kritzinger and V. Skirbekk), published in October 2006, it was shown that the percentage of the EU inhabitants who see themselves as Europeans constantly increases generation after generation. The analysis included only those EU members who had joined before the latest enlargement, that is, only those where the national, that is, collective identity is by and large stabilised. One can assume that, if the new EU members were included in the analysis, the degree of acceptance of a European identity would be lower, precisely on account of the fact that the period of the consolidation of their collective / national identities was in recent past.

² The claim that a state borderline represents the only legitimate moral borderline (and that it is hence logical that everyone outside that moral borderline, irrespective of the manner in which it was determined, has no morally based obligations and can be removed from the state territory) is the only one that makes sense, and therefore the only acceptable option is "the monopoly of the state when it comes to defining identity" (H. Rae, 14: 2002).

velopment. It is the European identity, understood as a social and cultural identity.¹

Excessive reliance on collective identities, first of all the ethnic ones, entails the danger of exclusivism, manifested as ethnocentrism, which, while being dismissive of others, foregrounds members of one's own ethnic group or nation. This brings into question not only the functioning but, sometimes and somewhere, also the very existence of complex communities made up of members of a number of national or ethnic groups. It is a tendency that, when taken to its extreme, takes on the form of "killer identities" (A. Maalouf, 2003). When referring to the process of creating state identities and ethnic homogenisation that contributes to this, H. Rae uses the syntagm "pathological homogenisation", whose manifestations include mass exoduses of the population in sometimes heterogeneous complex states² (H. Rae, 2002).

Within the framework of Europe (the Council of Europe and the European Union) and the world (UNESCO), over the last ten years or so, the position that has begun to predominate is the one that tries to view identities, especially the ethnic ones, in a different key. It is the concept of **cultural diversity**, which, as opposed to the exclusivist view of identity, emphasises its dimension of inclusiveness, that is, openness towards the identities of others (T. Bennett, 2001). The concept of cultural diversity is very convenient for minority cultures, for it affirms the strategies and legal mechanisms that are conducive to their protection and development (for exam-

ple, the Convention for the Protection of Minority Rights and the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of Minority and Regional Languages, passed by the Council of Europe, and UNESCO's Declaration on Cultural Diversity).

The dimension of inclusivity in the case of collective identities, and especially in the case of the identities of minority communities, gains in importance with the process of the enlargement of the European Union. The development of a unique economic, political and cultural space, the necessary precondition of which is an extreme relativisation, even abolition of state borderlines, which enables free circulation of goods, ideas and people, has resulted in: 1. intensive communication and cultural cooperation among the cultures of European peoples; 2. significantly facilitated communication between home cultures and minority cultures residing on the territory of other countries. This only tends to increase the problems of countries like Serbia, which is only involved in the process of qualifying for EU membership.

Owing to the fact that the Law on the Protection of National Minorities from 2002 does not contain a specific list of ethnic minorities but only specifies the characteristics that a group should possess in order to be considered an ethnic minority, it can be assumed that the process of creation and recognition of ethnic groups in Serbia has not been completed. To that extent, the Law on the Protection of National Minorities functions as an *unmelting pot*, for not only does it not prevent the assimilation of existing minorities, it actually allows the establishment of new minorities. The examples of Ruthenians/Ukrainians, Wallachians/Romanians and Bunjevci/Croatians testify to this. If the Law on Minorities had defined the above ethnic groups as minorities whose home countries are the Ukraine, Romania or Croatia, they would have been forced to erase a part of their cultural diversity (language, customs...) and adjust to the culture of the people from the country designated as their home country. The legislator did not do so, with good reason, and left members of minority groups a freedom of choice. They can choose between opting for an autochthonous origin or for recognising the existence of a home country. In all three

of the above cases, it turned out that both options had a sufficient number of proponents, so that within the framework of either one of them there developed forms of cultural and civil organisation. Even more importantly, there is no exclusivism of the and/or type, and associations have been formed that gather the proponents of both the autochthonous and the home country options (B. Stojković et al., 2004).

In addition to minorities that have come into being in one of the traditional, coercive ways, which include mass displacements or changes of borderlines following wars won or lost, and which are more or less concentrated on one part of the territory of the host country, new minorities have also developed. They are made up of those who have opted for emigration mainly for economic reasons. As opposed to traditional minorities, the latter, as a rule, are not concentrated on a part of a territory (as is the case, for example, with Serbs in Hungary or Hungarians in Serbia), but are dispersed over a much broader area. What we are referring to is a diaspora-like minority – Serbs who, for the most part, live in Western European countries, the USA, Canada and Australia. To them, the problem of preserving their original (Serbian) cultural identity is posed in a specific kind of way, because, on the one hand, they are exposed to assimilation on account of the fact that they do not live surrounded by their fellow countrymen, and on the other, their educational level, as a rule, is above average, which means that they have at their disposal a proportionately greater cultural capital carried over from the home country, acting as a barrier to assimilation. This does not hold true of their descendants, who are socialised in their new environment, as a result of which the process of their assimilation is much more intensive (S. Jones, 1999).

In societies like ours, where the former (communist) value system has disintegrated entirely, and a new, civic value system can barely be discerned, religion strives anew to be established simultaneously as the basic constituent of cultural identity and the basis for the legitimacy of society. Hence a return to Orthodoxy. The national religion thus becomes a part of a cultural map that repre-

sents a consensual image of society, that is, one about which there is a general consensus. The media acknowledge it and publish, first and foremost, the news (and comments) that fit such a map, while they remain silent when it comes to information that brings into question the consensual character of the map, marginalise such information or interpret it in such a manner that they can fit it into the semantic matrix given in advance, thus minimising to the utmost or even eliminating entirely any incongruities. It is not very likely, for example, that a humanitarian action undertaken by some religious community (unless it happens to be the Serbian Orthodox Church, which, for the most part, does not deal with such matters) will be adequately presented in the media, for it does not fit the already established negative stereotype about sects.

What this is all about is problematising the collective identity of Serbian society, defined as the sum total of identifications, of which no individual one carries equal weight in answering the question: who are we? This means that cultural identity should be understood as a contingency (a set of relatively stable identifiers) and not as essence (a coherent and stable whole).

Finally, mass media are also very important for shaping, affirming and maintaining social and cultural identity. This was demonstrated during the 1990's, when state electronic media channels were systematically used for the purpose of promoting the nationalist policy. Since the year 2000, their role has been greatly changed. The privatisation of electronic media – which was begun and then stopped – has resulted in their orientation towards profit and the marginalisation of programmes that belong to the sphere of culture, to contemporary culture and cultural heritage alike. This increases all the more the importance of the role of the public broadcasting service, whose source of funding (subscription, not income from advertising) and the programme scope (two national TV and two radio channels, and provincial TV and radio channels in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina) were initially established so that it should have a positive identity function, both in relation to the national identity and to the identities of minority communities.

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CULTURAL POLICY, NATIONALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS*

Keywords: *cultural policy, nationalism, multiculturalism, diaspora, cultural canon*

sometimes sharp, and sometimes they are vague; schemes are sometimes visible and simple, and sometimes they are elusive and complex.” (Gellner, 1997)

“Nationalism is not what it appears to be, least of all what it appears to be to itself. The cultures that it claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions or have been changed to the point of unrecognisability. And yet, the nationalist principle as such, as opposed to each of its specific forms and individually peculiar pieces of nonsense that it may preach, has very deep roots in our common current situation, is not contingent at all and will not be easily denied.” (Gellner, 1997)

The interest of Central European states in art and culture has been historically conditioned. At the time of national awakenings, the importance of culture and art was such that newly established nation states (Poland, Hungary, Serbia...) placed artists, especially writers (Petöfi, Mickiewicz, Vuk Karadžić...) on the pedestal of “fathers to the nation”, and they valued language and culture as a precondition for preserving national autochthony and state independence. The period of socialism further contributed to these connections between the state and art being even more firmly defined, abusing art as an instrument of ideology. However, the Sovietisation of culture contributed to the disintegration of the specific character of national cultural identities (the Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries...), which led to an abrupt opposite reaction in the countries that were freed from the Soviet influence in 1989 – a renewed demand for viewing culture, first of all, in terms of

* This text has been written within the framework of work on the project “Culture and Art in the Processes of European Integrations”, supported by the Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia.

identity. This, in its turn, resulted in writers – former dissidents – becoming involved in political processes, and some of them becoming heads of state in the early post-totalitarian period. (Dragičević Šesić, 1999)

Vaclav Havel did so in Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, Árpád Göncz in Hungary.¹ Some of them occupied various positions within the government (usually the posts of the Ministers of Culture or Information): Milan Lukes in the Czech Republic, Nikolai Gubenko in the USSR, Isabella Czywinska² in Poland, while Albanian writers were active in the parties in power (Kic Blushi, Driter Agoli) or opposition parties (Reshet Tozaj, Arben Imami).³

Similar things happened in the former Yugoslav republics, where the issue of a return to national cultural values and specific local traditions was imposed as the first and foremost task of the cultural policy, also viewed as a possibility of achieving European integrations (trying to prove that their national tradition was, first of all, of Western European provenance, relying on Catholicism and the European spirit, developed from the Renaissance, through baroque and enlightenment, to modernism). Still, even though artists were actively involved in the shaping of nationalist public opinion, a relatively small number of them attained high political positions (Antun Vrdoljak and Hrvoje Hitrec in Croatia).

In Serbia, these processes were somewhat different, primarily due to the fact that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was seen as a tearing apart of the national corpus (“extremely detrimental to Serbianhood”), not as an opportunity for “gaining independence”. Essentially,

¹ The significance of Árpád Göncz as an artist, as well as a political figure, is evidenced by the fact that no less than five performances of his play *Medea* were selected for the programme of the *Mittelfest* festival, held in the city of Cividale del Friuli, Italy, in 1996. All five performances were from Central Europe.

² “I am an artist on leave of absence and I'll go back to my profession when the time comes. Even now I feel like a theater director observing the process from the outside. A theater company is a small ministry of culture, and the ministry of culture is a very big theater. The job offer was a surprise but I couldn't miss the chance of taking part in something so exciting: to be in the midst of history in the making, even to have a hand in it.” (EUROMASKS, n.1/1990, p. 23)

³ At the beginning of the changes, they all expected Ismail Kadare to be the future president.

power did not change hands. Still, Dobrica Čosić, as a nationalist dissident, with the halo of a victim of the era of socialism, became the President of Yugoslavia in 1992, and Vuk Drašković, starting from a similar initial nationalist position, established the Serbian Renewal Movement political party; however, he maintained the position of a dissident, manifested in a pro-European attitude, which irritated the then regime to such an extent that several assassination attempts were directed against him. There were a number of other writers in the sphere of politics: Slobodan Rakitić, Brana Crnčević, and thus the address where the head office of the Writers' Association of Serbia was located – No. 7, Francuska Street, became a symbol of nationalist cultural policy and the dissemination of hate language (along with the Serbian Radio-Television and the *Politika* and *Politika ekspres* dailies). This, of course, led to new manifestations of dissidentism – first the Belgrade Circle was established, followed by the Serbian Literary Society and the

Writers' Forum (which recruited a new generation of artists and writers who were active in political life after the changes of 2000).

⁴ A period at the beginning of 1995 represented a minor step forward; competitions were announced and value changes were attempted through the TV campaign "It Is Nicer with Culture", which did not rely on national symbols but on a figurine from the Lepenski vir archaeological site (the Neolithic Era). The voice used for the purpose of this campaign was that of the well-known actor Ljuba Tadić, a man of civic and democratic orientation. However, in August 1995, several hundred thousand refugees arrived in Serbia from Croatia, and all the projects and programmes that had been initiated prior to that were suspended.

On the other hand, in Serbia, the search and struggle for a "return" to the national roots and identity meant, first of all, reviving Slavic and Orthodox spiritual connections and constant references to Byzantine traditions and the legacy of St Sava. At the same, a part of Serbian cultural public tried, in the course of the 1990s, to become involved in the processes of European integration by pointing out the common roots of European cultures and that it was necessary for Serbia to turn to the future, which could only be European. This led to a polarisation of the cultural public and to constant oscillations in the conceptualisation of the cultural policies that, in the 1990s, advocated only the former option,⁴ whereas in the first decade of the 21st century the orientation changed several times, depending on the ideology of the

parties in power, especially those in charge of the sectors of education and culture.⁵

The purpose of cultural policy is *the preservation and development of cultural heritage*⁶ and identity, today no longer understood as a monolithic but as a pluralistic cultural identity – that is, cultural identities – which enables not only the coexistence but also the further development of all cultural processes and majority and minority groups on a territory. However, identities are not preserved by protection only, but first of all through the support provided by cultural policy to the *optimum development of creativity* in an environment, for it is only through new cultural “productions” that the achievements of the preceding generations assume their meaning and significance. It is only the third task of cultural policy – *broadening the circles of participation in culture* (inclusiveness) – that truly realises the mission of the preservation of national identities, for it presupposes that cultural values are a part of the everyday life of the broadest circle of people. Hence these three tasks of cultural policy mutually interact, and it is only through their realisation that the traps of identity policies leading to the so-called killing identities (Amin Maalouf) are avoided.

The changed cultural policy discourses testify to the changes of perspectives in contemporary Europe. The nation state concept⁷ has been changed by the notion of the multicultural state, which, in a transcultural Europe, supports cultural diversity and exercising the right to culture, first of all, on the territory that a state is responsible for, not

⁵ www.culturalpolices.net, accessed on September 20th 2009.

⁶ “Heritage reminds us that we belong.” (Samuel Jones, 2009)

⁷ However, it must be said that this concept is still strong within the inherited institutional system. Thus the Venice Biennial is organised so that states are represented by means of pavilions; hence the request submitted by the Institute for an Open Society to organise the first pavilion of Roma artists from all over the world within the framework of the Biennial caused quite a problem. This was a precedent accepted by the Biennial for the sake of “political correctness” in the Decade of the Roma, while expressing anxiety over the possibility that Kurdish artists might also submit a request for a separate pavilion, and that Basque artists might decide on such a request as well. And yet, over the last ten years or so, noticeable changes have occurred within the institutional system and cultural policy, as a result of which today representation of the diversity of identities within a nation state is increasingly becoming the norm.

in relation to the dominant ethnic group (Robins K.). Actually, this territorially based concept of cultural policy (Dragičević Šešić M. and Dragojević S.) is brought into question in Nordic countries, where the parties currently in power are bringing back onto the scene the issue of the establishment of a national *cultural canon* (Duelund P., 2008), that is, an ethnically based cultural policy. It is evident that two processes are currently at work in Europe in the sphere of culture – one that wishes to achieve a Europe of cultural diversity by emphasising the specific characteristics of national culture (through the establishment of a canon), and one that wishes to achieve a Europe of cultural diversity within its own nation state, emphasising the necessity of including acculturation exchange with all the minority groups residing on its territory.

There is another important cultural policy actor in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in the Caucasus region. The fact that numerous Eastern European cultures have preserved their cultural identity, often through their diaspora in the course of the 19th and the 20th centuries (politically imposed migrations, economic migrations),⁸ and that today Western European states give the African and Asian diasporas residing in them full rights when it comes to preserving and protecting their national identities, has reactualised the issue of the importance of diaspora in the contemporary cultural life of European countries. For the most part, this holds true of postsocialist countries (Armenia, Latvia, etc.), but also of some “regions” of Western Europe whose population migrated during the 19th and the 20th centuries on account of economy, but also due to ethnic inequality (Ireland, the Basque Country, etc.). New migration trends additionally complicate this issue, for communities within the

⁸ From the 16th century to the present day, there have been continuous migrations from the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Over the past 70 years, there have been several great “waves”: Hungarians in 1956, Czechs in 1968, Poles and Russians in the 1980s, citizens of the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in the 1990s, made literature written in exile a significant corpus of Eastern European literature. It is even crucial in the case of Polish culture, and contemporary Bosnian culture.

framework of a diaspora are no longer concentrated in particular territories but are dispersed throughout the world.

Therefore, at the beginning of the 21st century international relations are characterised by processes that lead to the establishment of a world system (Thierry de Montbrial, 2006), as well as a great degree of uncertainty and fear of globalisation, which, among other things, changes the role of diaspora. Great theories disappear, new practical models replace them – a new form of international relations engineering. In the sphere of culture, these relations have shifted from spontaneous acculturation processes, through the policy of domination (colonialism, intentional Germanisation, Hungarisation, etc.), to cultural exchange, cooperation, and today, to new forms of partnership and networking, linking not so much states as individuals and groups in different environments. In this sense, the role of diaspora assumed a new significance in international relations, for through civil society organisations, getting involved in various networks, programmes and projects, it can become more important than the official cultural policy in the sphere of international relations that is managed through public sector policies by way of multilateral and bilateral codified forms of cooperation.

The topical character of this issue in Serbia is emphasised by the fact that there is no consensus when it comes to the notion of culture, either within the framework of the national paradigm or within the framework of the concept of social development. These oscillations in understanding values, which form the basis of cultural identity, are illustrated by the oscillations in speeches delivered in the course of Vuk's Gatherings from the 1930's to the present day (Đedović D.). The work of Vuk Karadžić is one of the cornerstones of precisely the broad and diversified Serbian cultural identity, but in each historical-political period this work was interpreted from different angles: from the perspective of the so-called pan-Serbian paradigm (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the narrowly ethnic Serbian paradigm

(World War II and the 1990s) or the social paradigm (during the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), while Meša Selimović analysed only a part of the controversy, and even today, it is open to various interpretations in Serbia, and especially in the region.

“From the first days of Vuk’s struggle for language and orthography reform, right down to the present day, scientists, writers, cultural workers and politicians have steadfastly opted to voice their views in favour or against Vuk and his notions of language and orthography. These confrontations have not ceased for over one hundred years. (...) The reasons for accepting or rejecting Vuk’s, folk, basically peasants’ language have differed in different historical periods: in the first decades of the 19th century, it was part of the struggle for establishing a nation and a free Serbian state; at the time of Nedić, and especially Skerlić, the beginnings of Europeanisation and the increasing urbanisation of Serbia initiated the process of civic emancipation in this area; in our time, the accumulated spiritual and cultural experiences, as well as the necessity of reaching the European, even world level, require a richer, more diverse, more flexible language, capable of expressing the complex totality of life and the world, not only its picturesqueness, nuances and variations, not just the general wholes, the inner form of things, not just their outer image, a higher and more subtle organisation of thought and abstraction, not just their elementary expression. Thus the debate on language has always been revived in times of great changes, when something essential in our social life underwent changes. A summary recapitulation of these

struggles, fights, oppositions, often harsh, almost always severe, is useful even today, when the issue of the language of our time is becoming very topical indeed.”⁹ (Selimović M., 1987)

⁹ The text was written in 1967, author’s note

The nationalisation of culture that occurred in the 1990s, which started as far back as the 1980s, in the so-called period of “national concern”, led to

a national homogenisation that viewed cultural diversity as a problem and paved the way for political populism (Popov N.) and subsequent “ethnic purity”...

Nationalisation was even more emphasised by the idealisation of the national cultural integrity, the national framework as security¹⁰ (Robins, K., 2008) and through the introduction of the very term *national* in everyday life (the national TV, the national news programme, the *State of the Nation* programme, a national institution, etc.). This was actually an attempt at establishing a distance in relation to the so-called “non-national” period, that is, to Yugoslavia, especially the socialist one. Today, the policy of remembering, the policy of preserving heritage and the policy of identity in Serbia neglect and deliberately erase the socialist heritage, even the 19th-century one (the Kragujevac self-management). The baroque Serbian heritage of Vojvodina is neglected and “Byzantinised” (the gate of the Krušedol Monastery, made in 2009, reminiscent of the style of the church of the Žiča Monastery, differs from the baroque style of the monastery church in terms of form and colour).

¹⁰ “A convincing way of presenting social reality.” (Robins, 2008).

In the process of reconstructing national identities that occurred throughout the Balkans, certain scientific-historical interpretations were brought into question (for example, that of the arrival of Slavs in the Balkans, the origin of Albanians, etc.), as was the scientific basis of the Serbo-Croatian language as a single language with a number of different linguistic variants, and the existence of certain minorities and their right to self-identification (Wallachians in Serbia and Romania, Tsintsars in Romania, Macedonians in Greece, etc.); new myths and fallacies were created (a paradigmatic case in point is the appropriation of Alexander of Macedonia and Macedonians from the era of antiquity by the current state of Macedonia). National minorities are given the opportunity to preserve their folklore and language, which results in their self-identification often being very far removed from

the modern identity of their country of origin at the current moment, and periodicals being equally unattractive in the countries where they come into being and in the country of origin.

The policy of oblivion is part of the official policy of a number of states (the genocide of Armenians in Turkey, the civil war in Greece, the atrocities committed by the Četnik forces in Serbia – the above-mentioned topics are not discussed in these countries), and through the policy of promoting and representing “national” artistic production, cultural policy strives to contribute technocratically to the “nationalisation” of cultural identity. Within this policy of identity tradition is reconstructed, with constant reference to new research, especially of neglected historical periods (the Serbian Middle Ages), to historical rights (Hungary: the “64 districts” movement, claiming historical rights to 64 former Hungarian districts, many of which are today in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia...), to international law (Serbia in relation to Kosovo), to the so-called victim figures (the canonisation of Stepinac in Croatia, the search for Draža Mihajlović’s grave in Serbia), etc.

When it is “necessary”, certain historical periods are skipped, so that today Serbia has returned to the mediaeval practice of church/monastery endow- ership, whereas the 19th-century tradition of foundations has been entirely suppressed. Parts of our diaspora contribute to this trend a lot, especially those who left the country during traumatic periods and subsequently developed myths and a policy of remembering around certain aspects of “big” national history, which easily leads to national megalomania and xenophobia, as shown by Jan Józef Lipski in his text *Two Homelands – Two Patriotisms*. On the other hand, a part of diaspora, as well as a part of the cultural public in all the countries of the Balkans, have been working on the processes of cultural Europeanisation, pointing out that, in any case, national identity in European countries was shaped in the 19th century, relying on four sup- porting columns, two of which are common: the heritage of ancient Greece and Italian Renaissance (Makuljević N., 2006), and the other two specific:

language (sometimes the alphabet as well) and ethnic folklore. Thus, from the 19th century to the present day, all the symbols of new nation states have taken over allegorical, symbolic and epic representations common to “older European cultures” (in terms of formation), basing their educational-cultural system on the European tradition in all spheres of art. The history of culture in Serbia shows how Oriental orchestras and instruments were replaced by the Czech *Schlesinger* orchestra, how museums, libraries, theatres, reading rooms, schools were established relatively quickly, all of them based on Western European role models – with a view to forming institutions that “represent” the national cultural identity.

The Bulgarian theorist Alexander Kiossev, provoking the intellectual public opinion of the Balkans that does not bring into question the accepted European values but does spread fear and panic of globalisation and European integrations, introduces the term *self-colonising practices* in order to show that acculturation processes have existed in all the periods of the cultural history of the Balkans, and that they have often been a part of deliberately made decisions on the part of the cultural public (precisely through the above-mentioned establishment of educational systems based on Western European ones, etc.). However, the fetishisation of folklorism and national authenticity and originality, which is supported more in verbal terms than in practice, has not managed to contribute to the nationalisation of everyday life, which is markedly similar (that is, hybrid) in the majority of Eastern European countries on account of being the fruit of mutual influences of many centuries (folklore, family celebrations, cuisine, values and the like). These overlapping Balkan identities can still be used within the framework of national identification practices, even though, objectively speaking, they contribute, through works of contemporary artistic production, to a further spread of an unambiguous image of the Balkans (Kusturica, Bregović; the paradigmatic performance of BITEF 2009 was “The Powder Keg” by a German theatrical company, directed by Dimitar Gochev, a Bulgarian emigrant).

Would it be possible for a new cultural policy – which would no longer be solely ethnically or territorially based, but developed through a cross-border dialogue between the majority populations on this and the other side of a state border, as well as the minority populations, which would also develop their own cross-border forms of cooperation – to include a diaspora dispersed in the global world, a diaspora that, on the one hand, preserves memories of sometimes forgotten cultural values (from the time when their ancestors left the home country), and on the other, being involved through its life and work in various development processes of the contemporary world, can contribute to a great degree to knowledge transfer and to shaping new work strategies in cultural practice. As far back as 1905, Jovan Skerlić observed that there exist three cultural policy models. The first model is that of indifference – an artist is a free man in a free country, and tradition is preserved and created in relation to what artists themselves want and in relation to what citizens are prepared to participate in (the market). The second model presupposes a strong state that manages the sphere of art – it is a traditional, as well as a socialist model. It is only the third model that appears to be modern in the contemporary sense of the term, for it presupposes a free artist and a free culture in a state that, through its cultural policy, supports the practices and trends adopted and shared by the competent cultural public. This, therefore, means that the support will be as diversified as the cultural public itself, and that the inclusion of diaspora and all minority groups within the framework of public opinion would create the preconditions for attaining true cultural diversity, while preserving and developing identity.

The shaping of the public and opening up space for public debates requires a complex and free media system, autonomous cultural institutions that, through their programmes, would manage the cultural policy from below (Dragičević Šešić, 2006) and an educational system in which equal space would be given to preserving memories and to producing new

knowledge. Only when, within a state and a culture, preconditions are created for the development and production of new knowledge, are the conditions for participating in the culture of the world on an equal footing established (Lechner and Boli, 2006). Cultural diplomacy, however educated and professional it may be, cannot help here, for it is limited by the ways and possibilities of communication between different states. Individuals or groups in diaspora have all the freedom for creating networks or entering existing networks, wherein they will pave the way for actors operating in Serbia today to represent their creations, first of all, as cultural or scientific creations, and only then as creations that are part of the national cultural code.

Only when we are rid of the romantic preconceived notion that what is “nationally specific” will represent us best in the world: folklore, the Balkans as a genre (Daković N., 2009), traditional cultural heritage (sacral mediaeval art) etc., but come to realise that our most significant and best creations are those that are relevant within the framework of the world (the poetry of Vasko Popa has always been better received abroad than that of M. Bećković and other poets who are far more popular in Serbia and who cultivate a traditionalist discourse), will the preconditions be created for Serbia to really become involved in international cultural trends, cooperation, exchange and the market economy of culture.

At the same time, care must be taken in order to prevent the nationalist discourse of cultural policy from further isolating a country, which is evident in the case of Armenia, where the victim discourse still predominates both inside the country and in the diaspora, while the country’s cultural policy still focuses all its financial and other resources on the preservation of Armenian heritage, ignoring and forgetting the cultural monuments and heritage of others. The situation is similar in all three Caucasian countries where ethnicity predominates in the characterisation of the personality of an artist, so that the legacy of Sergei Parajanov is praised in Armenia, where he spent the last two years of his

life only, and is neglected in Georgia, where he came from, and in Azerbaijan, whose culture he sincerely respected and promoted.

¹¹ He was exiled as a child, together with other Germans from Banat. He became an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Vojvodina in 2006, but his work remains unknown and unintegrated in the cultural processes in Serbia. <http://vana.org.rs/page.php?84>

¹² http://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabit_Alaudin_U%C5%BEi%C4%8Danin

¹³ http://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%A0ejh_Mehmed_U%C5%BEi%C4%8Danin

¹⁴ A Story from Novi Sad – the Germans of Our City, the City Museum of Novi Sad, September 2008.

¹⁵ The Museum in Timisoara proudly exhibits its new display, which presents Timisoara as a Romanian, German and Hungarian city. When asked how the Museum reflects the presence of Serbs and Roma in the history of Timisoara, its Director replies that Serbs, for the most part, make up the rural segment of the population, and could thus have a place at the Ethnographic Museum, and the same holds true of the Roma (interview conducted in March 2007).

There are many examples of this kind in the Balkans as well, the only difference being that in the Balkans they have more often to do with appropriation (in the case of artists belonging to one of the majority nations in the region such as Meša Selimović, Danilo Kiš, Vladan Desnica, Marin Držić etc.), whereas artists from this region who belong to one of the minority nations are forgotten and completely ignored (for example, the Austrian painter Robert Hammerstiel, originating from Vršac,¹¹ as well as Turkish poets from Užice such as the Sufi poet Sabit Alaudin Užičanin¹² or the folk tribune and chronicler Sheikh Mehmed Užicanin,¹³ etc.).

Within the framework of cultural policy, nationalism ignores the heritage and the contributions of other cultures. Our sizeable diaspora in Israel communicates with the Jewish community in Serbia to a greater extent than with the cultural public as such. It was only following the entry of international foundations that Serbian museums began, at their instigation, to shape a multicultural image of our cities, but even today, it is presented more through specific exhibitions¹⁴ than by way of permanent displays.¹⁵ In city museums in Serbia, in Bor, Negotin... only a segment of the local folklore (national costumes) points to the existence of the Wallachian population, while museums in other cities deliberately suppress memories of the minorities that used to live or still live in these parts. Only the most educated part of our cul-

tural public knows about the contribution of Tsintsars or Jews to the theatrical and cultural life of Serbia. Art histories often conceal an artist's ethnic origin, rarely because the artist in question did not consider it important, more often because cultural workers did not wish to reveal it, and because the desirable cultural history was the history of one people, the majority one.

Conclusion

"Culture establishes our roots in the past and makes it possible for us to imagine and create our own future."

(S. Jones, 2009)

The fear of European integrations felt by nationalists is unrealistic and irrational, for it is based on mythical thought, on fears, as well as a feeling megalomania – the uniqueness of one's own people. And one of the most seductive narratives of nationalism, used and abused in the populist political discourse of numerous Eastern European countries, is the myth about the last European bastion opposing the onslaughts from Asia, as well as the myth about the sacrifice "we" made and the ingratitude of Europe. A part of the Serbian media and cultural space nurtures images of the exceptionality of its own culture and feeds fear of globalisation. It is the very same part that glorifies the work of Nikolaj Velimirović – work that is interspersed with contempt for the European critical tradition and anti-Semitic statements.¹⁶

Nationalism and nationalist cultural policy do not operate with facts, nor are they interested in "objec-

¹⁶ "Europe does not know this. (...) It knows nothing apart from what Jews give it as knowledge. It does not believe anything except what Jews command it to believe. It cannot appreciate anything as a value until Jews give it their own scales for measuring values. Its most learned sons are heathens (atheists), following the Jews' recipe. Its greatest scientists teach that nature is the supreme god, and that there is no other God outside nature, and Europe accepts that. Its politicians, in the manner of somnambulists in a trance, speak of the equality of all beliefs and non-beliefs. All the modern European slogans have been composed by Jews, who crucified Christ: democracy, strikes, socialism, atheism, tolerance of all faiths, pacifism, general revolution, capitalism and communism. (...) It fills one with wonder that Europeans have totally surrendered to Jews, so that they think with a Jew's head, accept Jews' programmes, adopt Jewish Christoclasm, accept Jewish lies as the truth, adopt Jewish principles as their own, walk the Jews' road and serve the Jews' goals." (Velimirović N., 2000, pp. 193–194)

tive” criteria or argumentation when deducing proof. Nationalism in cultural policy has only one purpose, to strengthen the feeling of national affiliation, which can be achieved, first of all, by means of remove, distance from the other, as well as abuse and adaptation of certain events in accordance with the desirable narratives of cultural policy. Nationalism, therefore, has “its own amnesia and selective memory which, even when they are extremely secular, can be deeply distorting and deceptive” (Gellner, 1997).

¹⁷ “As a church and national holiday, St Vitus Day (*Vidovdan*) is a recent phenomenon. The manner in which it has become a red-letter day in the calendar of the Serbian Orthodox Church is rather interesting. It is characteristic that it occurred parallel with the creation of the new St Vitus Day cult, wherein the Kosovo tradition assumes a pseudomythical variant. (...) In the 20th century, evidently, a new St Vitus Day cult was created, as an unexpected conclusion of the national-political process initiated as far back as the era of romanticism. In the 19th century, romantic poets and ideologues of the Serbian nation accepted the Kosovo myth and gave it an exceptional place in the spiritual life of the Serbian people. At that time, it became the core national myth, accompanied by a new slogan, ‘For the honourable cross and golden freedom’.”

Nationalism today, everywhere in the world, demands an absolute respect of faith and rejects any possibility of criticism of religion; this demand was first addressed to the United Nations by Islamic states, and in March 2009, the Human Rights Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution that calls “slanderous religion” a human rights violation. This is one of the issues that is convenient to fundamentalists and nationalists everywhere, including Europe, even though the question of criticism, including the question of criticism of religion, is an important part of European heritage and part of European identity. “Tolerance of criticism of religion has given mankind the works of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza...” (Kišjuhas, A. 2009)

Hence Serbian nationalism uncritically accepts the works of Nikolaj Velimirović, organised the transport of his remains in 1991, and canonised him as a saint in 2003. This connection between the state, religion and nationalism requires a special review today, because the roots of their mutual relations were exceptionally well defined in Miodrag Pavlović’s work – *St Vitus Day and the Honourable Cross*.¹⁷

Nationalism within cultural policy cannot allow itself to be exhausted in itself. In order to feel that it exists, it demands to be seen, recognised as such, special. “To be means to be seen.” (Vuksanović D., 2007, p. 49). Hence a great many “national institutions”, national festivals and events, media operating on the “national” wavelength. The epithet “popular” has entirely lost its significance, as part of a discourse too close to the socialist discourse – that is, at the time of the rule of neoliberalism – an entirely undesirable discourse.

And yet, the demands that are still heard in Serbia, such as the demand of the Progressive Club to define a permanent policy towards Serbs living in other countries in the region and in diaspora, do not indicate that we have reached a moment when cultural policy will truly care about the citizens of Serbia,¹⁸ but that political parties still compete at “patriotically caring” about Serbs outside Serbia. The Serbian diaspora that is not of ethnically Serbian origin (many Walachians and Roma live and work in Germany, Switzerland, Austria...) cannot expect anything from the state of Serbia, unless it is a world-renowned artist like Josef Nagy. Such exceptions to the rule are usually taken as proof of the degree of the adopted intercultural responsibility of the state, even though there are only few real programmes of intercultural dialogue (*Compendium*, 2008). Therefore, it is evident that we are still in the sphere of ethnically defined cultural policy, dealing, first of all, with issues pertaining to the traditionally understood concept of national identity, closely connected with maintaining and constituting narratives relying on Orthodox faith and contemporary church, where a critical review of the past is undesirable. The idealisation of historical phenomena and figures, the development of heroic myths and myths about victims (first of all, the victims of socialism), even when not defined as cultural policy – becomes official cultural policy owing to the tolerance on the part of the state (that is, primarily through its policy of remembering and oblivion).

¹⁸ “First of all, it is necessary to pass a law on citizenship and a law on the Serbian people living outside Serbia”, http://www.napredniklub.org/dokumenti/o_NK.php


Hence, despite the process of European integrations, in the sphere of culture old wars are still being waged – ideological wars – albeit no longer between the left and the right, but between those who idealise tradition, faith and nation in the form defined by the 19th century, and who do not allow criticism and critical thinking about the “values” of Serbian culture, and those who believe that the foundations of the culture of a people should include critical, free thinking, even though it might result in the “down-fall” of some major national figures and in individual questioning of the ethics of church leaders, without being understood as *a priori* positive. That is why divisions into “patriotic” and “traitorous” intelligentsia still dominate in the public, for cultural policy is unable to clearly define its attitude and ensure the autonomy of the cultural sphere – that is, to guarantee freedom of expression in relation to itself (the powers-that-be) and also in relation to faith and the Church (whose interests are defended, much more directly and forcefully, by numerous non-governmental organisations). That is why confrontations in the sphere of culture – instead of taking place within expert circles supported by cultural policy, occur within the framework of the stratified civil society – where the struggle against the fascist and nationalist policies of the *Obraz* [reputation] and *Dveri* [gate] organisations is left over to non-governmental organisations of civil and pro-European orientation (while the authorities issue media statements or, even more often, keep silent and avoid reacting, especially to the nationalist moves on the part of the Church).

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PICTURES IN PEOPLE'S HEADS

For the purpose of this text, we shall proceed from the assumption that collective identity is a changeable category that comes into being through a multitude of discursive stimuli arising in diverse contexts of reality. Thus identity/identities will develop in keeping with the context that predominates in a given society/at a given time, that is, in keeping with the system of values which is almost always determined by the intellectual and political elite. What we are dealing with here, therefore, are symbols of collective knowledge and their interpretation within a particular community, through which it validates itself, makes itself meaningful, where "reality" is interpreted within the framework of the dominant value matrix. The way in which "reality" is seen and interpreted is inseparable from the notion of identity, for the reality defined in this way is not comprehended through experience but through a set of stereotypes that are on offer. In this context, thought is not autonomous, that is, it does not come into being and does not develop in accordance with its immanent laws, which would be realised independently of the social and historical conditions, but is connected with the symbolic universe of the given society and is in correlation with a multitude of outside influences. The issue of identity is, thus, the issue of culture in a broader sense.

Towards the end of the 1980s, this was precisely how the new identity paradigm was defined in Serbia; it was based on nationalist notions and foregrounded a set of stereotypes about the national identity. Through the media intensification of this theme, an entirely new media framework was created, thereby establishing a closed symbolic order wherein any alternative articulation became impossible and undesirable. In accordance with the above, the value-ideological messages that were sent hyperbolised the value and the specific characteristics of the Serbian nation on the one hand; on the other, by inventing enemies and propagating hatred in the context of desirability, a feeling of intolerance to and rejection of everything that deviated from the clichés being offered was spread. The general radicalisation of the political and social scene became a specific characteristic and an integral part of the dominant discourse, as did the ideology of exclu-

siveness, which negated and discriminated against any difference whatsoever, be it on a national, ethnic, religious or any other basis.

The destructive political decisions, mass pauperisation, the specific characteristics of the social structure, the mythologisation of historical and cultural heritage, authoritarian values and the like, led to a general degradation and anomie, that is, led to a change of value-symbolic orientation on the level of the individual. One can freely say that what we are dealing with here are symptoms of a loss of social orientation and the breaking of bonds that used to link people into a single social network.


By monitoring the results of many public opinion surveys from the end of the 1980s to the present day, we shall note an obvious decrease of tolerance towards different ethnic, religious, political and other unacceptable (from a nationalist point of view) groups, the widespread presence of prejudices and stereotypes, a decrease of prosocial orientation and a turning towards utilitarian values. The consequences of this anomie are felt, first of all, in our political, cultural and everyday life, which, owing to the dominant discourse, based on allusions pertaining to Serbian nationalism, still vegetates in its irrationality, self-destructiveness and self-isolation. Accordingly, everyday life in Serbia is characterised by a number of paradoxes, for citizens wading through the mess of paradoxical premises of the dominant discourse can interpret every situation through a collage made up of entirely disparate explanations.

Within the framework of such a constellation of things, the question that arises is what kind of picture of itself Serbia produces and how that picture is perceived abroad. The answer to this question is negative, for the picture of a given society is created on the basis of the messages that this society produces about itself and the world around itself. Western media, for example, can only deal with isolated segments of real events from Serbia and interpret them within a particular context, but that context is never in opposition to the general civilisational standards. The context in Serbia, unfortunately, is opposed

to such standards, so that the picture of Serbia abroad will change only and solely if it is changed inside the country. For that to happen, it is necessary to redefine the national and value standards, which can only be achieved if the state creates such a climate using all the resources at its disposal, thus creating a broader social consensus about what is allowed and what is not. Such a consensus does not refer only to legal definitions of norms but also to defining moral value standards, which have been constantly devastated over the past twenty years. For the sake of comparison, this process lasted 25 years in Germany. In Serbia, it could last even longer, for the generators of anti-integrationist ideas are still present in the public discourse, and thus in the minds of ordinary citizens, at whom these ideas are aimed. An additional problem is that chauvinist ideas have been successfully incorporated into the set of stereotypes about the national identity, which additionally burdens the process of national rehabilitation – elements have been added to awareness of ourselves, that is, of belonging to the nation, which define it in opposition to others – “because everybody knows what they are like”, but contrary to them, we are “good and naive, and easily forgive”, and the like. Such a chaotic discursive-symbolic universe is made up of intertwined meanings that always perceive anew the symbolism of disrespect of otherness and maintain it as a perennial value.

The picture of Serbia, then, depends primarily on the processes unfolding within the country itself, and what kind of picture it will be will depend primarily on what will be determined to represent values and non-values in Serbia.

Dedicated to Brice Taton, a tragic victim of violence



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SERBIAN? HMMM, SOUNDS FAMILIAR...

such a term. I thought I should skip any of these and try to produce a “free style” comment upon Serbian identity.

Of course, all these definitions and various interpretations on the matter of identity (*in extenso*) are now already part of ME. A specific ME, dealing with the Serbian identity/identities is so much different from another SELF dealing with fishing or winter sports or whatever. Then we could stress the finding according to which people can be defined as an “affiliation to...” Yeah, here it is some kind of the first clue on what is all about: Identity as inclusion and exclusion in/from a sham group. Why sham? Simple: because the way in which the *inclusion* or *exclusion* are to be made possible is a process of mere choice. Let’s take the group gathered around the Academy (just for a better perspective). How did this arbitrary selection (as part of a choice) function on the example of the Academy group? First of all it was a selection of candidates. This means that some eligibility criteria were used for the final forming of the group. Nothing good, nothing bad, I’m just debating the mechanism around any sort of selection process based on identity traces. And to some certain extent and beyond the criteria, an arbitrary decision was possible until the end: X and Y and Z are in for the tremendous week in Belgrade, while A and B and C are out. Thus an identity of the Academy group was established – based on inclusion and exclusion.

OK now, maybe this example doesn’t sound too persuasive in its current state, but let’s not forget that in the background of groups (communities, societies, nations and so on and so forth) lays the spectrum of common interest. Despite their differences, a nineteenth century Magyar nobleman and a peasant on his estates shared an identity as the basis for a collective interest. In order to produce a common identity among dissimilar entities

(name it humans or just abstract sociological concepts), a set of artificial instruments was used – based on historical arguments, philological pretexts, myths, values, monuments, geographical features, mentalities or even specific dishes (I'm referring to the birth of nation-states). Thus, the platform for a common identity became accessible. The Acad. group appeared at the interface between obvious dissimilarities of its members and a common interest (which was studying the so many facades of the nowadays Serbian identity). In the same manner/mechanism as shown above, the artificial set of instruments destined to produce a “common interest” was more or less equal to the selection criteria – motivation (letter), professional background, a “Serbian” relevant experience or, alternatively, an affiliation with the Serbian Diaspora. The Acad. group's members were therefore initially impelled to fit into this selection matrix. A lax matrix nevertheless, where everyone eventually involved turned out to be so dissimilar with the others. Still, how come that such different individuals with various approaches and experiences in their backpack, ended up in the same group? Because they all had a common interest. The members of a nation-state were initially impelled to fit into a specific selection matrix, namely the agreement upon certain symbolic items which any nation needs to posses (language, history, costumes, customs, food and so many others). Why? Because they all had a common interest. The term “identity” in itself tells the whole story: agglutinated identical entities! But it is not always the case for identical entities... they can become like this (:identical) by willingness and a constant endeavour to do so, based on that already few times mentioned “common interest”. In this case, *similarity* turns out to be more an effect rather than causality of the entire scenario.

I chose to draw these two parallel and apparently distinct examples just for the sake of that *identity making mechanism* which is in stake. And I find it much more interesting and meaningful when it's about an identity based on fundamental dissimilarities than about an identity based on obvious similarities. And this is because it can show you more clearly what's to be done when

nothing seems to end up in a joint feature. Could this be the Serbian case (?), we'll see...

Secondly, the entire programme of the Academy was heterogeneously enough just to emphasize precisely what I was telling before. How come such various approaches and perspectives could have been harmonized in order to produce a meaningful overall debate on Serbian identity? We've had marketing, philosophical, historical, philological or even anthropological approaches... in one word, we've had them all! The aim was to encompass the large variety of perspectives involved in any debate about the huge concept of "identity". And of course, as any decent and fruitful outcome, we didn't get anywhere in terms of palpable results. And this stresses out indeed the idea of "identity" as an open concept. Sometimes it's useful to rise as many questions as you can, rather than producing definitive and pernicious answers...

*

A good approach towards the IDENTITY cannot start without a definition; or at least without an attempt to define. Hence, the very concept of IDENTITY requires some looking into. The semantics related to the term are not merely what anyone thinks or feels or believes they might be. The decisive defining element is the perception of the other (others). Combined with its plural – IDENTITIES, I think it can better work as an operational concept in this particular way: SERBIAN IDENTITIES = THE SUM OF ALL POSSIBLE FEATURES PERCEIVED BY THE OTHERS! But yet again, what is meant by "the others"? The others are people who don't share the same characteristics as Serbs. I also prefer the plural of the term "identity" because it can better show the so many dimensions involved in it: whether it's about features related to the people, to the country, to the capital (Belgrade), to the landscapes etc. In terms of marketing, an identity is simplified to its very core. Let's take the simplest example. The others about France: champagne, wine, cheese aso. The others about Paris: Eiffel tower, fashion,

city of love aso. Now, back to the topic in stake! The others about Serbia: war, Milošević, even the Hague (well this is at least “hilarious” since a Dutch city is used in relation with Serbia). The others about Belgrade: bombs... hmm, that’s about it! So, it is obvious how the perception of the others is shaping a certain identity. On the other hand, the formation of this specific perception is a bidirectional endeavour: that of the others who might or might not consider upgrading their deepest knowledge about an identity. And that of Serbs themselves who might or might not consider promoting their own identity (as they would like to be perceived) abroad (or among others). Without this bidirectional endeavour, many aspects of the Serbian identity/identities may remain unknown: things as food, music, sports, culture, cinematography, investment opportunities and so on. Still the main input to a better perception upon Serbia is Serbs’ personal effort to do so. And that is because an exterior perception can and should be influenced by the ones who are subjects to this perception.

The conclusion seems a bit obvious: my personal belief is that in order to consolidate a cohesive self-identity and collective project every knowledge discipline needs an “epistemological other” (whether it’s about social sciences of all sorts or marketing related disciplines). These are the real means by which an identity can be predicted and prescribed on theoretical basis. The main task is to create a proper narrative about the Serbian identity/identities. What is it all about? Let’s say like this: if you just take the *Exit festival* and try to produce a meaning by placing this event in a specified category, this cannot possibly make sense on a long term. Therefore it is a need for a special narrative, in a way that this narrative precludes sense-making of a singular isolated phenomenon (or event). This special narrative demands to discern the meaning of such a single event in temporal and spatial relationship with many other events. Thus, a better understanding appears only by interconnecting parts to a constructed network (name it configuration, identitarian constellation or whatever). The “narrativity” transforms isolated *events* into *episodes*. Only by making

Exit an episode (instead of a singular and isolated event), some may achieve significance of the fact. Yes, I think I'm coming already to the point: a coherent narrative about identity equals a national strategy (and this is not a euphemism for a mere branding action, not at all).

Now, let's just give at least four dimensions to this "narrativity":

Ontological narratives – stories that Serbs may use to make sense of their lives (to some certain extent, used to describe who they are). And of course, this is the first step towards another major question such as: what to do (?). This kind of "narrativity" endows individuals with identities no matter how different they look like. This ontological narrative affects consciences, beliefs (aso) and it is affected by these in return.


Public narratives – this is more or less an institutional narrative, a macro-story (sort of speaking) about Serbs (media also plays a huge role in it). In this perspective, public institutions tend to create official and expert explanations upon, to embed it as a "state narrative".

Metanarrativity – this is the overall packing into broad explanatory concepts as totalitarianism vs. democracy, balkanisation vs. europeanisation and so on.

Scientific narrativity – the purpose of this kind is to think up the proper vocabulary in order to construct and reconstruct over time all the other sorts of narratives (mentioned above). This is the most abstract representation of a social narrativity. By using it, we can ascribe great importance to terms as "Serbian actor", "Serbian culture", "Serbian society". This conceptual (or scientific) narrativity is of most relevance and importance because it allows Serbs to capture the right type of discourses through which identities are constructed and social action mediated.

I chose this approach in terms of “narrativity” because it can give a transcending picture beyond the fixity of such a concept as IDENTITY. Any categorical approach towards IDENTITY excludes time, space and analytical relationality. And I believe that only by introducing “narrativity”, such projects as building or re-building a Serbian identity (or Serbian identities) can come to a close. Let’s take another example – it’s always helpful: let’s say for the sake of the argument that after the year 2000, the Serbian people are still “European reluctant and nationalistic”. This is the dominant western narrative and is nevertheless a rigid one. So it’s not shocking why most of the foreigners take this narrative for a grant without any doubtful measure. And here is the point at which a *narrative identity* should interfere and shift a pre-formed prejudice/perception into a spatial and historical broader understanding of this reality: the Milošević’s regime, wars, NATO bombings etc. All four narratives described before should be used in a joint frame, as a state or national project, in order to reconstruct a more adequate Serbian identity. An identity that is always open, that actually never ceased to exist, which deeply needs a re-contextualisation and reaffirming.

And in the end, when all these shall come to an “end” (in terms of transitional studies), everyone on this planet should at least be able to state: Serbian? Hmm, sounds familiar... (in terms of familiarity).



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THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF SERBIAN IDENTITY

During the 1990s no country in Europe had a more problematic image than Serbia, and the consequences of this period are still felt in contemporary politics and society. In order to understand Serbia's identity today we need to explore the process of image

formation during past centuries and in recent decades. Serbia's past and present suggest that trauma has shaped the society relations with Europe, its position within it, and how individuals see themselves. Serbia presents disparate images to the world, which are reflected back on the country from outside. For instance, there is a palpable pride in Serbian cosmopolitanism and knowledge of the world. Many Serbs have travelled extensively in Europe and beyond, and they emphasise their affinity to European culture and desire for European integration. Internationally acclaimed music festivals and a vibrant arts scene rightly attract interest from Europe. This image is one of a modern and progressive country, located firmly in Europe. On the other hand, a small but significant proportion of the population believe that Serbia should turn its back on Europe. This Serbia is backward looking, nationalist, and chauvinist, characterised by corruption, criminality and economic chaos. Reluctance to co-operate with The Hague, stalled EU accession and widespread political apathy are interpreted as signs of a shift away from 'European' civic values. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Serbia's frequently strained relations with Europe are solely rooted in the events of recent decades. In fact, the most recent episodes of Serbian resistance to external interference can be situated in a long history of defiance and ambiguity over the country's position in Europe and the world. Serbia frequently projects two different images, exemplified for instance by the contrast between extreme hospitality and stubbornness, both of which have become the clichés of Western commentary on the Serbian people.

For Western observers, the rawness of Serbia's history is both a source of fascination and a problem. Writers seeking to 'find' the real Serbian iden-

tity are constantly confused by the contradictions they find. In *A Barrel of Stones: In Search of Serbia*, Peter Morgan notes that his time spent in large Serbian urban centres (during the 1990s) was always with the educated members of the Serbian ‘opposition’ - musicians, journalists and artists. These people ridiculed the Milošević regime and other aspects of modern life such as ‘Turbo-folk’ music. At the same time Morgan described his unease

that the conversations he had with this ‘opposition’ belittled other sections of the nation and prevented him from engaging with aspects of ‘everyday’ Serbian existence.¹ This is a recurrent theme in many external observations of Serbia: urban educated people are the exceptions to the true nature of Serbia.

It feeds into ‘Balkanist’ discourses and needs exploring. One must, nevertheless, counter that urban elites in many countries behave the same way towards people they regard as less sophisticated. It is a part of self-image formation, part of the process of defining one’s own identity through articulating an ‘other’.

Serbia today could be described as a ‘post trauma’ society that is still struggling with issues of identity and image. The country differs from many others in the region, however, in that this recent trauma has helped to shape the society’s view of the world. It is impossible to discuss contemporary Serbian identity without analysing the role of negative image formation - or ‘demonisation’ - upon the transition of Serbia’s political culture and society to one that upholds ‘Western’ civic values. The West’s role in image creation cannot be underestimated. Western coverage of Serbia often slips into a familiar pattern of stereotypes: resistance, rebelliousness and resentments. There are tangible impacts of this stereotyping. It is possible to understand how external image formation interacts with traditional Serbian narratives (that stress victimhood) if we look at how Serbs have dealt with negative external imagery. Many Serbs used their negative international image during the 1990s to both identify with, and show re-

¹ Peter Morgan, *A barrel of stones*, Aberystwyth, 1997, p.103

sistance to, the West. At the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the urban population, especially the youth, appealed to Europe to acknowledge their struggle against the Milošević regime, most notably during the 1996 and 1997 demonstrations. The protesters alluded to Western culture in order to highlight their place within it. This contributed in some way towards restoring the battered image of the Serbs, only for the NATO bombardment in 1999 to undo this rehabilitation. Then, instead of resisting as citizens demanding democracy, the protesters self-consciously took to the streets as Serbs, united by NATO bombs. The subsequent demonstrations, as highly spirited as the previous ones, confused foreign observers who either viewed them with admiration or disdain.

Self-awareness within Serbian society of its shared conceptual and emotional frames of reference has fostered a belief that outsiders' attempts to 'understand' the Serbian people are futile and that it takes a Serb to know a Serb. Characteristics such as spite [*inat*] and defiance [*prkos*] are commonly cited Serbian attributes, which manifest themselves particularly during times when the country is being portrayed negatively. It is a way of showing defiance the outside world. Further, this stress on incomprehensibility and irrationality may also be a method of dealing with a traumatic history. Expressing a lack of understanding of one's own society may help to assuage feelings of guilt, or pre-empt criticism. External images of the Balkans often reinforce stereotypes, despite attempts by some Serbs to undermine them. Also, we should not neglect the role of the Serbian in influencing foreign perception of the Serbs and the Yugoslav conflicts.

Serbia's desire for recognition of its historic role in South East Europe as a bulwark against Ottoman expansion, Habsburg provocation and Nazi aggression is equally part of and outside of contemporary trends in the depiction ethnography and history. Nowadays it is more common to see countries portray their history within a broader European con-

text. Portugal and France are two countries that interpret their history and ethnography in this way. Serbia also wants broader acknowledgement of its role in European civilisation, but with many competing interpretations, there is a constant worry that some depictions of the past will antagonise and alienate competing interpretations coming from other countries. This does not just affect Serbia. The media today is also cynical about Croatian and Slovenian attempts to distance themselves from the Balkans and reinvent themselves as progressive, modern European countries that have little in common with their Slavic neighbours. Such was the message in an article published in the magazine *Economist* that described Croatia's "murky and violent underworld."

² The Economist. "Still a Balkan country." 31 October 2008

The article also quoted a Croatian journalist who suggested that Western imagery (Venetian architecture on the Croatian coast and higher per capita wealth) was only skin deep.²

Identities are constructed about what we think of ourselves, what others think of us and how we view history and our position in the world. Portugal is an example of how a country with a peripheral self-image can successfully relate to Europe. During the 1980s a slogan was developed "Let's be the best pupils of Europe". The Portuguese wanted to be 'good' Europeans and tried to match their expectations with what they considered to be European. Other precedents can have unpredictable effects. Countries like Ireland and Portugal considered that they had 'arrived' when they started to attract immigrants, particularly from other parts of Europe. This proved to be good for the countries' self-image. Portugal began to see its emigrants as symbolic of a poor and rural society. They represented a past that many people wanted to forget. Serbia has already begun a process of changing its external image, partly thanks to a vibrant youth culture. Given the likelihood of deeper European integration, an easing of visa regimes, and a gradual reverse flow of skilled migrants, it is likely that this process will accelerate. Today, a similar visit to that un-

dertaken by Peter Morgan would find a similar urban ‘opposition’, perhaps apathetic in the face of continuing economic and political instability, perhaps seeking a new life abroad but also conscious that the country must help itself and there are many opportunities for them to participate in this transition.

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SERBIAN IDENTITY: A BLACK BOX?

Identity is an issue, which is more complicate than we do like it. Identity is fluid and permanently changing, something like “projection screen” of symbolic representations. Every group identity is like a black box. Nobody does exactly know what it is in it, but everybody has his/her own interpretation and perception of it. Every identity is a social construct that is permanently newly constructed, depending on time, space, different circumstances and self-perceptions of every individual member of the group and attributions made by others.

The Serbian identity is like such a black box, too. All individuals and social groups in Serbia are creating different visions and ideas about what is in it, what is important and what is not. And actors from the outside are also constructing their picture of Serbia and are affecting the social construct of the Serbian identity as well.

Currently and in the last few years it has been difficult to find a common agreement about what it should be in this black box and what not. In the context of the recent past it became even more unclear what the term of “national identity” should mean. The main questions to be answered are: To which kind of nation does identity refer? To which interpretation of history / national past does it refer? What vision of nation do we have in common, what do we share? Which kind of heritage, culture, norms and values? Is it historical legacy of the Roman Empire, the Empire of Tsar Dušan until nowadays, or is it the legacy from the socialist past or even the Milošević’s era, or is it the idea of European Serbia? Who is to be included, who and what is to be excluded? Which positive notion is left after the times of crisis during the 1990s, after the backlashes in the aftermath of the so-called “revolution” in 2000 and the assassination of Đindić? What kind of identity definition will be the most persuasive one? Do we define ourselves by ethnic, cultural, geographical or normative belonging? Is a pure “cultural” iden-

ity, the one which does not take the political stands into account, enough to bridge divisions? Or, should we advocate the vision of a political identity?

It seems that the Serbian identity is as difficult to deal with as with the Serbian society in general – a society that is highly divided in cultural, economic, religious and ethnic terms, with an urban-rural separation and with political groups to all extremes. Ordinary people are in a similar confusion. What can be stated at this point is that we hardly can find a common notion or make the consensus on the meaning of “Serbian identity“.

Identity is often defined by alterity. Often, we “activate” our belonging to one social group, when the social group, its perception or position is threatened (in comparison to others). It is the regular way: We always want to belong to the group that is bigger, greater or more successful. We have a need for a positive self-image and in ideal terms that means to be in the most successful group compared to others. Being so, it would be important for the future of Serbia and the whole region to see more features in the black box of the Serbian identity that stress inclusive attributes – and not the ones that are disruptive.

It can be stated that in this turbulent time of transition and being torn by political developments, the Serbian society underwent a phase of paralysis. But the only way to overcome this paralysis is to get active, to begin to do things. Without any questions, it has to be clear that some important steps have to be made in order to enable a positive vision of the Serbian identity: opening a discourse on the past (and thus for the future) and fostering the civic engagement. The discourse on both topics could open a discussion on norms and values that could become a stable foundation of the Serbian society and Serbian identity, as well. The discourse concerning this “quest” for the Serbian identity should be open to everybody; it should take the whole variety of visions and of different individuals into account. *To start a societal dialogue about what should be packed into the box – and what not.*

Contested past, contested identities?

Facing the past in an intra-societal and public discourse is highly important for overcoming the legacies of the Milošević's era. Until today a lot of people do not really know what happened during this time. Still, myths and propaganda manipulate a fair dealing with the past. The legacy of the past is effecting the political, social and economic developments, the relations towards neighbouring countries and towards the "rest of the world". At the same time, political, social and institutional legacies are influencing personal life of individuals, in the form of memory and sometimes even trauma. It's not possible to flee the past. And denial will cause a mental disorder in the long term perspective.

The process of facing the past is closely connected to the permanent transformation and modification of national self-perception – in other words: a process of self-assurance in the context of a changing political framework. This contextualisation is extremely difficult as both, the socialist ideology and the extreme nationalist ideology under Milošević, are widely de-legitimized. Now it seems to be unclear, how this "vacuum of identity" should be filled. The discrepancy between different "identity options" – made by political parties or civil society organizations, actors like the Serbian Orthodox Church and its bodies, organisations of the "New Christian Right" (see Sundhaussen 2008) or, on the opposite site, the pro-European NGO scene – cannot be bigger. There we can find everything – from the concept of the organic philosophy with its patriarchy and its belief in the holy unity of "domaćin", king and god to the anti-national cosmopolitan vision of living in a world without differences and sharing global values.

One of the biggest obstacles for initiating the discourse on Serbian identity is the fact that history still serves as one constitutive factor of identity. And exactly, the issue of how to deal with the Yugoslav wars during the 1990s is still unsolved. None of the governments established since 2000 made a clear stance on the question how a comprehensive approach on this issue should

look like. Mostly, the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was lip service or part of a bargaining strategy for an external policy in the “interest of Serbia”. And even Kostunica’s widely praised initiative of implementing the first *Commission for truth and reconciliation* (“Komisija za istinu i pomirenje”) in the Western Balkans in 2001 seemed only to be made to fail – and to calm down the international community. The proposals and opinions on how to deal with the past are extremely different, ranging from “Don’t touch our national heroes” or the simple explanation “Bio je rat” (meaning that there was a war and everybody was victim and perpetrator, but now it is over and we don’t want to talk about it) to the wish for a radical policy of fact-finding and prosecuting the perpetrators.

What’s the matter with Serbia and the issue of dealing with the past? Different scholars in the academic debate are of different opinion, the “diagnoses” are varying, but at the same time quite similar: Todor Kuljić calls it a “revisionist process of facing the past” that has a restorative character (see Kuljić 2002:I). Sabrina P. Ramet nominates the ambivalent handling of the Yugoslavian wars as “the syndrome of denial”, and defines it as a typical psychological process that tends to an externalisation of guilt (see Ramet 2007). Latinka Perović talks about a widely spread “collective amnesia” (see Perović 2008) and Wolfgang Höpken has noticed a “denied discourse on guilt” (see Höpken 2005). Gordy worked on the attempts and refusals of Serbian institutions and the Serbian society as a whole to face its past (see Gordy 2005) while Nenad Dimitrijević stresses the moral responsibility for doing so. All these diagnoses are not good news. There is a strong relation between self-perception and historical interpretation in a national group like Serbian that is built on its foundation in history. And also the process of facing the past will make an impact on our self-perceptions: Confronting the past brings along a re-negotiation of identities, a transformation of historical perceptions as well as a discourse on societal norms and values. Like Gordy put it: “the greatest implications of the process are on the level of self-perception and identity, and have a bearing on the question of whether

the political transformation in Serbia will lead to a social transformation as well” (see Gordy 2005: 166). The process of dealing with the past is not only a question of guilt as it is much more a question of responsibility, a responsibility for what happened and for all parties and people involved, but also a responsibility towards today’s social and political environment and towards the future. *Deal with the past in order to address the future.* An individual as well as a society has to confront itself with the shadows of the past in order to make it possible to have peaceful, brighter and even lighter future. This process provides the opportunity *to learn from the past...* The injustice from the past will teach us about the moral truth of tomorrow. And maybe the past provides some good values or institutions to rely on and take them into the future.

As the process of facing the legacy of the socialist period and especially of the recent past, civic engagement in Serbia is still weak. Besides from a rather small NGO scene, that is very limited in reach and in capacity and that suffering a bad image, civic engagement and active participation of the society as a whole are widely lacking. People are still waiting for changes in a top-down-approach and hoping that political leaders will ensure a relief of the existing difficulties and challenges. Authority-orientation is widely spread, as well as the idea that changes have to start by external initiatives (see studies made by *Pontis Foundation*; *Transformation Indexes* by *Freedom House*). The picture of the former spoon-fed-society, paralysed and exhausted during the last almost 20 years shows a clear need for civic initiatives and strengthening the self-responsibility. There is a lack of the idea that each individual is born to construct the world in relation to others, that there is a certain responsibility of every single individual to shape the world around him/her. This has to be discussed in (civil) society in order to force state agencies to support civic engagement. *Civic and critical engagement can provide a source for identity.*

Politics takes place everywhere – between individuals, in the spaces “in between”. Why should after all no more than a handful of powerful persons and organisations with the most radical standpoint determine what the future of

Serbia and of its identity should be? Why should a citizen react only on that what “happens to them”? Politics and identity are constructed through societal processes, in a dialogic manner. Be part of that dialog. Start to talk about questions on identity, on future, on culture. Shape your world of tomorrow, play life loudly; in your family, with your friends, in your town, in your daily life; for a positive future and a positive vision of identity.

This is an appeal for a *post-national regime of memory*, a memory that is not geared to the concept of the sake of the nation and that is not fixed on historical interpretation – but the one which allows us to reflect critically (and loudly, not quiet in the corner!) our society and environment, the past, the presence and the future.

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CONSTRUCTING THE WAY FORWARD FOR SERBIA'S PAST

Presenting Serbian Heritage in the "European Way"

language. With each new ruler, fragments of history were either protected, as embodied by beautifully conserved fortresses, destroyed, as evidenced by remnants of pagan temples, churches and monasteries, or left to crumble, as reflected by long vanished imperial palaces.

Today, you can revisit the memories of Serbia's European past, through these distinct phases, discovering their hidden magic. Across serene mountain ranges and at the confluence of spectacular rivers and valleys, ancient civilizations sought out hidden, special places which empowered them to collectively create ideas, build settlements and establish the foundations on which modern Serbia rests (...)." (Milena Dragičević Šešić, 2009)

In this quote from the first page of a brochure issued by the National Tourist Organisation of Serbia tourists are offered the opportunity to 'revisit the memories of Serbia's European past'. Visitors can catch a glimpse of these periods in Serbian history in which the country was part of glorious European empires and ancient civilizations. A visit to the monuments presented, provides tourists with 'a unique purview into the spirit of modern Serbia and shows them Serbia's 'inextricable connection to contemporary Europe.'¹ This introduction is a clear attempt to create an image of Serbia's cultural identity that can be included in the broader concept of European cultural identity. It links up with current concerns to create an image of Serbia's authentic cultural identity within an increas-

"The Balkans, with roots firmly planted in European culture, is a region of diverse history. Though civilisations have perished, their traces have been preserved by geography, culture and

¹ Dragičević Šešić, M. (2009). Serbia Culture Trails. National Tourist Organisation Serbia. Belgrade.

ingly unifying Europe. The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia took up this concern and is, since 2003, involved in a joint project

of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Commission (EC). The CoE and the EC developed a specific regional heritage programme for South-east Europe that aims to stimulate the inclusion of these countries in the European Community, culturally, economically and politically.²

² The countries involved are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

Presenting Serbian Heritage in the “European Way”

The ‘Regional Programme of Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-east Europe’ was launched by the EC and the CoE in 2003. At the beginning, the Project primarily aimed to stimulate intensified regional co-operation between the countries in the Region and, in particular, between the countries of former Yugoslavia. The idea was that a renewed regional awareness could re-connect the Region with the rest of the Europe and create a new frame of reference in the Region itself. Heritage should provide the region with ‘cultural spaces of communication’ where its contribution to the so-called ‘European heritage’ could be displayed. This would offer people within the Region an opportunity to ‘experience’ what it meant to be culturally part of Europe and would give people outside the Region an opportunity to discover this relatively unknown part of Europe, located on the margins of the EU. Over the years the interpretation of the programme gradually changed as a result of changing concerns of the EU and the CoE. Since 2008 it came to be presented as follows:

“This action is a testimony to the continuing endeavour to build bridges between peoples, thereby fostering reconciliation, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. The protection and reattribution to new uses of the built heritage are critical to sustainable development and underline the vital role of the heritage as a generator of social and eco-

nomic capital, bringing tangible benefits to local populations, *inter alia*, by encouraging tourism. [...] It represents a significant potential in focusing attention and encouraging investment on the rehabilitation of historic sites in an area experiencing political, economic and social transition."³

From this quote we can distract that heritage came to be seen as a secret weapon against regional antagonisms still perceptible in the Region as a consequence of the recent war. Second, heritage was regarded as one of the possible solutions for the increasing impoverishment of several parts of Southeast Europe. And finally, in order to safeguard the presence and presentation of the heritage sites in the best possible manner, it was seen as essential to rehabilitate the built heritage in Southeast Europe in such a way that the protection standards could be harmonised with those prevailing in EU countries.

³ CoE/EC (2008) 'IRPP/SAAH. The Ljubljana Process – Funding Heritage Rehabilitation in South-East Europe. A Joint Action of the European Commission and the Council of Europe', [online] Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/Regional/SEE/IRPPSAAH/Ljubljana_preliminary_E.pdf.

What is striking about this description is that the cultural-historical European dimension as depicted by Milena Dragičević-Šešić in the quote at the beginning of this essay, is not mentioned here and its seems that the main focus is directed to values, sustainable development and conservation techniques. So, even though one of the central features of heritage is that it needs a certain degree of attachment in order to be regarded as heritage, this is not taken as point of departure. It is seen as more relevant that the heritage sites offer the possibility to stimulate regional cooperation, to trigger economic development and to implement new conservation methods. These conditions make these heritage sites more 'European' than others. This approach taken by the EC and the CoE is also visible in the way this heritage programme has developed itself in Serbia.

'European Heritage' in Serbia: Senje Coalmine, Bač Diffused Museum, Felix Romuliana

The CoE and EU decided to divide the Programme into several stages so that the countries involved could slowly but steadily work on the transition of their heritage policies towards a more 'European' approach. The Pro-

gramme coordinators in Serbia first of all had to determine which monuments would be included in the Programme. Second they had to verify the likely risks and costs related to the reconstruction and conservation of these sites and finally, they had to make a clear plan for the potential future uses of the monuments and possibilities for funding. Several deadlines were posed to deliver the documents needed and the coordinators had to inform the EC/CoE regularly about the progress made. It soon turned out that the deadlines and conditions posed, were difficult to attain. There were disagreements between different actors in the field about which sites should have priority and which not. Different parties (like the Serbian Orthodox Church, architects and representatives of institutions) had different ideas about the purpose of heritage and its value. Furthermore, in some cases there were local disputes about ownership rights and a general lack of appreciation of heritage. Without people with experience in the field of heritage management the processes initiated by the EC/CoE were therefore often slow and demanding. It turned out that the first list of monuments, compiled in 2003, was too ambitious considering the several conditions that the EC/CoE posed and it was revised and shortened in 2008.⁴ In the end, the decision was made to focus on a few projects only: the so-called 'consolidated

⁴ Sites like Lepenski Vir, Mileševa Monastery, Virminacium, Fruška Gora monasteries, and the old centre of Novi Pazar (with an exception of the hammam) were removed and some other sites were added, like the observatory and glasshouse of the botanic garden in Belgrade and a wooden church in Seca Reka. It is important to notice that next to the problems mentioned in the text, some projects were also removed because they already had obtained funding by other means and thus were no longer suitable for the CoE/EC programme.

⁵ The 'consolidated projects' should become examples of the effectiveness of the new approach taken since the launch of the Ljubljana Process in 2008. With this 'process' the focus turned towards the formation of development strategies, the support of public awareness about heritage and the assurance of funding for a few individual projects which should stimulate sustainable development. Consolidated projects were chosen in all countries included. Serbia is no exception here.

projects'.⁵ The three heritage sites chosen for Serbia were 'Senje coalmine', a 'Diffused Museum' in Bač, consisting of a Franciscan monastery and the Serbian Orthodox monastery 'Bodjani', and 'Felix Romuliana' near Zaječar, which contains the archaeological remnants of a Roman palace.

So why were these three projects seen as best examples of good practice within this European heritage programme? In what respect did they fit in the best with the aims and motives of the EU/CoE in comparison to other monuments included in the programme? These three sites were chosen for a couple of reasons. First of all because local authorities, project leaders and several other institutions involved were able to cooperate in the best possible manner at these sites. Since one of the aims of the heritage project of the EC/CoE is to stimulate regional development, to integrate the local population in heritage management and develop a democratic approach to heritage, these sites seemed to be most suitable in this respect. At these sites enthusiastic and hardworking individuals with openness for new methods and approaches were ready to work with the programme as suggested by the EU/CoE. Furthermore there were the least problems with regard to disputes over property rights, illegal building and diverging priorities. Most of the institutes concerned with heritage perceived the idea of the EU/CoE that heritage could be seen as an economic resource as something that affects the monument in a negative way, endangering its integrity. Furthermore the new ways of presenting heritage in order to obtain funding and the focus on future uses of the monuments was not seen as appropriate by all parties involved. Full cooperation with institutes and individuals turned out to be rare, and these places were chosen where the circumstances were the best. A second factor that influenced the choices made was that these sites were relatively unknown in Serbia (i.e. Senje and Bač). These sites could be moulded and easily fitted into the shape proposed by the EC/CoE without interference of other institutions. Other sites suffered from a competition between actors with different interests and ideas about the representation of the concerning site. The sites chosen were more open for interpretation

and therefore more suitable for the possible display of European values and adaptation to European standards.

The choices reflect a struggle of the coordinators of the programme in Serbia to deal with the pressure of the EU/CoE policymakers, in combination with the several local pressures characteristic for contemporary Serbia with regard to its cultural policies and the valuation of heritage. Serbia suffers from a centralisation of its cultural policy which creates disparity between the Ministry and the several other actors that are active in the field of heritage. Furthermore there is not much trust in the functioning of the Ministry. Different potential partners (like academics, community representatives and ngo's) are not inclined to cooperate. These sites are chosen that will lead to the best results on the short term, with ambitious individuals and where cooperation of the local population can be, at least partially, ensured. Furthermore the programme suffers from a lack of communication between the people working in the field of heritage in which everyone seems to hold on to his or her own agenda's. It should be noted that the regional heritage programme was not perceived as very important in Serbia and thus could certain decisions, like the focus on a relatively unknown monument like the Senje coalmine – which has been a personal interest of the coordinators of the programme in Serbia –, be made relatively easy. Another explanation of the choices made comes from the fact that there is generally not a very clear vision about how heritage should be presented in Serbia. Serbia is still very much in search for an interpretation of its cultural identity within Europe and has not much experience on this matter. So from the start there has not been a clear vision about which sites would fit in the best in this European heritage programme and how to present these monuments.

Revisiting the memories of Serbia's European past

What we can conclude from the above is that the choices made in the Programme, have been based on pragmatic considerations. This can be seen as a result of the tension that emerges when Serbia's local conditions with re-

gard to its heritage policies and the general valuation of heritage, have to be harmonised with the three-folded and quite complex approach of the EC/CoE. What is European in this European heritage programme, amounts to technical measurements and new approaches used at places where the conditions are most appropriate. It does not indicate a clear vision about how Serbia would like to present itself within a broader European context, but gives room for new methods and approaches. So in contrary to what is promised in the brochure with which I started this short essay, it does not offer tourists with a possibility to form an image about Serbia's cultural and historical uniqueness within the broader context of Europe. This does not imply that the development of 'European cultural spaces' is lost, but it remains in the background – at least for the time being.

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Claske was one of the participants at the International Summer Academy (*UN)Limited Identities*.

AN ALMOST (IM)POSSIBLE MISSION

The title says it all! Whether a look at a half-full glass will be that of an optimist or a pessimist depends on your character.

Both looks are legitimate and true when it comes to the identity of Serbia and changing its image in the world. Data and facts justify the impossible mission, whereas the manifested potential justifies the possible one.

This text will provide a brief overview of how much has been done until now when it comes to determining the identity of Serbia and changing its image in the world. The sole source of information has been the Internet, which is certainly not dependable enough for a detailed and all-encompassing analysis, and the media documentation of *EBART Consulting*. Despite the insufficiency of the sources, enough data has been gathered to obtain a thorough picture of how hard-working we have been concerning who we are, what we are, what we are like, how others see us, and what we would wish to be like.

We have examined newspaper articles published between 2003 and 2008 in Serbian daily papers and periodicals. Two key phrases were typed in the search engine dealing with the documentation: the identity of Serbia and changing the image of Serbia.

The state sector

On the basis of the data gathered thus, it seems that the government sector has to a certain extent recognised the importance of changing the image of Serbia in the world, which is confirmed by the establishment of the Ministry of the Diaspora, engaging the services of lobbying agencies or founding the Branding Council. Unfortunately, we can conclude that there has been no systematic approach to resolving this problem.

In the analysis referred to above, what is lacking are evidently the data on what is happening to the Branding Council today, whether any agency

is still working on branding Serbia in the world, who is lobbying for us today, how much the Ministry of the Diaspora has achieved as far as its projects are concerned, whether there is anyone in the Government right now who is planning to do something aimed at resolving this very important problem, and whether there exist long-term and short-term plans of the Government sector.

It is not easy to get answers to these questions, for many campaigns get started but are never finished. Thus, for example, we do know about the establishment of the Branding Council, which at one time was a news item rather bombastically presented in all the media, but we do not know whether it still exists, who its members are now, what that Council actually does or when it was abolished. These are not front-page news items.

The non-governmental sector

The research has lead to the unexpected conclusion that even the non-governmental sector has not done very much in terms of devising projects that could in any way help to resolve this burning problem of Serbia. Organisations are mentioned such as the Centre for Ecology and Tourism, the Serbian Institute for Public Diplomacy, Attaché Conferences and Kulturklammer – the Centre for Cultural Interactions. Still, it would appear that none of the above-mentioned organisations has devised a high-level project with appropriate goals at the moment – pointing out the problem, motivation, awakening and gathering the expert public, as well as educating the young about the importance of solving this problem and how they could contribute to this.

Whether it is on account of the impossibility of this mission, the lack of expert staff or something else, it is certain that what is lacking is a more serious, energetic and all-encompassing pressure exerted by the non-governmental sector upon the ruling political elite to try to provide a systematic and long-term solution to this problem.

The International Summer Academy (UN)Limited Identities

For years, we have contributed to the creation of a negative image of our country in the world either by acting or failing to act. And when someone asks us – who are you, if not a people of whom we have a negative image? We say – we are better than that! But it seems that we do not know why.

The question of the identity of Serbia, raised within the framework of the International Summer Academy (UN)Limited Identities, organised by Kulturturkammer – the Centre for Cultural Interaction, under the aegis of the Ministry of the Diaspora, Erste Bank, the French Cultural Centre and the Austrian Cultural Forum, represents the crucial and the starting point when it comes to resolving the problem of the bad image of Serbia. Young experts from Serbia, from the diaspora and from abroad tried to answer this question and to help Serbia, with their knowledge and experience, to move in the direction of achieving the (im)possible mission. It appears, with good reason, that this Summer Academy provided an excellent foundation for further work, which is confirmed by the coming out of this publication.

To end with...

The final lines definitively indicate that the glass referred to at the beginning of this text is half-empty. The Government and the non-governmental sector of the Republic of Serbia have not done enough to change the image of the country in the world. It is an indisputable fact that the Serbian public wants and deserves a better image of its country in the world.

For all the important changes in a country, it is necessary that the Government should be willing and determined to implement such changes. There may exist a declarative wish to do so, but there is no determination to approach the problem we are discussing in a serious manner. On the other hand, the non-governmental sector has not had enough faith, power and determination to exert any serious pressure upon the government structures and to point to the need for a systematic approach.

After the International Summer Academy (*UN*)*Limited Identities* and in the course of preparing this publication, it has become clear that it is necessary to adopt a thorough, systematic and long-term national strategy that would present Serbia in a much better light over a period of five to twenty years. We need a national plan on this, which is, first of all, the responsibility of the Government. It must gather all the institutions and individuals in our country who can be Serbian ambassadors in the world in any way whatsoever. What is necessary is a clear vision of the future, as well as to win the support of the public, which, it would appear, already exists.

Of course, it is true that a citizen of Serbia who travels abroad and represents him/herself and his/her country in the best possible light significantly contributes to the implementation of public diplomacy. Anyway, any progress in any segment of society results in creating a better image of us in the world. Still, perhaps it is necessary for the state to think about forming a special state institution that would deal solely with this problem and coordinate all the activities to be implemented by the state and its apparatus. Mr Božo Skoko spoke about this idea in the course of his lecture within the framework of the Summer Academy (*UN*)*Limited Identities*. Or the non-governmental sector could seriously approach the forming of a foundation that would work on the creation of such a strategy, which is what Mrs Andrea Brbaklić and Mrs Aleksandra Vesić spoke about in the course of their workshop.

The International Summer Academy (*UN*)*limited Identities* was an event in the course of which various ways of thinking, experiences and impressions were exchanged, following which our gaze is focused on a half-full glass.



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Jelena was one of the participants at the International Summer Academy (*UN*)*Limited Identities*.

IDENTITY IN-BETWEEN

The issue of identity usually comes to the fore when identity is lost or when its existence and meaning become unclear. Great social upheavals, especially traumatic experiences, make it necessary to redefine the identity of a given community and its institutions. However, even though it is necessary and (in a historical and social-political context) extremely utilitarian, the very notion of the existence of a particular original and unique identity of a state, nation or society is to a large extent debatable, if not absurd. If it is to be consistently implemented, it is destined to sink into stereotypes or totalitarianism.

As this holds true of every society, it also holds true of Serbia; if the truth must be told, in the course of the 20th century it was faced with challenges that exceed those faced by many other countries. In Serbia, the modern agit-prop “defence” of (specifically Serbian, national, metaphysical) identity has usually ended up in an entirely uncritical mythologisation of certain historical periods, that is, in a total negation of some other (undesirable) periods of the history of the people and the state. This leads to an extremely banal “cleansing” of history based on the criterion of “desirable” (“truly Serbian”) and “undesirable” (“non-Serbian”, “traitorous”) narratives. Although the reasons for such an attitude towards history are largely rooted in ignorance and/or the abuse of certain narratives, they also have another dimension – the issue of identity, which is manifested in the need for there to exist a clearly defined, rationalised borderline between “us” and “them”, since this borderline is not clear-cut in itself or does not exist at all. Identity becomes a matter of “invention”, constructing narratives according to a particular ideological, utilitarian-political criterion.

The question of what constitutes *my* or *our* identity is also the consequence of abandoning (for any reason whatsoever) the previous identity in order to replace it with a new one. I call this process of identity transition “identity in-between”. One identity has been lost, another one has not been gained yet.

And while this situation is sometimes fruitful in personal terms, it is terribly frustrating on the collective level. It is also connected to the issue of values that shape a certain social reality, and also to the most general social framework that (apparently) invests acting and existing within a collective with *meaning*. That is why I refer to that identity as “in-between”, thereby stressing its origin. In fact, it mainly develops from a “boundary”, that is, a borderline dividing one from others. Borderlines that can serve as the ground for the development of this identity are manifold. They range from geographical, political ones to linguistic, cultural, religious, national, psychological or ideological ones. A boundary, borderline, becomes the framework of the coming into being and the development of identity, thereby necessarily being somewhat xenophobic in character, but also offering the possibility of overcoming a borderline as a means of separation in favour of comprehending it as a point of contact, connection between the entities in-between which the said borderline is situated.

On the other hand, the above overview of the problem of identity does not imply that it is entirely impossible to apply it to any collective. Who has not verified the existence of such things as German systematicness, American superficiality or the quality of Balkan cuisine? The problem lies in the *exclusivist* (I would also call it *illusionist*, and most often totalitarian as well) notion of identity, which can be opposed by relying on the *inclusivist* model. Serbia provides a good example of how this issue can be analysed.

Any attempt at synthesising an “organic” exclusive and ontological (in this case, Serbian) identity and culture, so specific that they cannot be brought into connection with anything else, end up in stereotypes, mythomania, lies and despotism that uses such a narrative as a source of or to legitimise its power.


On the contrary, through an *inclusivist* approach to identity, it is possible to review all the different, sometimes contradictory layers of heritage that make up an integral part of the identity and the culture of a certain space.

If the issue of the current identity of Serbia is placed within this context, the difference in relation to the exclusivist approach becomes quite obvious. The identity of Serbia is transformed, of its own accord, into a “European” identity, in the sense that it reflects “the unity of difference” virtually throughout history. In order to prove this thesis, it is enough to look at mediaeval Serbia, which achieved its “own specific” cultural production and identity by combining elements of the East and the West (for example, the unique “Rascian style”, which emerges from a combination of Byzantine and Romanesque architecture). The first Serbian King was crowned with a Papal crown, but the Orthodox faith remained the dominant religion. Also, the modern state symbols of Serbia (such as the flag and the coat-of-arms) do not possess a single “original” and “specifically Serbian” element (the eagle is a modified Byzantine eagle, the “four Cyrillic s letters” are actually the stylised initial letters of the motto of the Paleologue dynasty – “Βασιλεὺς Βασιλεών Βασιλευών Βασιλευστίν”, that is, “The Emperor of Emperors rules over emperors”, the colours of the national flag are pan-Slavic, etc.), but their specific character lies precisely in the unique combination of diverse influences, cultures and traditions that are interwoven on the territory where Serbs have been living for around 1,500 years. All these layers and cultural heritage, from the prehistoric and ancient civilisations (when this area, in the words of professor Srejović, was “the cultural capital of the world”), through mediaeval (Slavic), Turkish, Austrian and German influences, to modern monarchist, communist and Euro-globalist ideologies, *are our culture and identity*.

If the contemporary Serbian identity is viewed from this perspective, then it transforms from an “endangered”, closed and xenophobic one into a rich treasury that places people living in this area, their identity and culture among this world’s significant cultural factors. That identity is in no danger of being lost, and its confirmation or “defence” does not require mythologisation and artificial construction of partial and virtual identities. Its richness and longevity are evident. And not only that, its existence becomes a

possible contribution and guidance to the European identity, which, being still vague, is still in the phase of articulation and rationalisation.


By way of concluding this brief text, I would like to thank the organisers of and those who realised the International Summer Academy (*UN) Limited Identities* (2008) for making the theme of Serbia's identity today and its perception "from the inside" and "from the outside" topical. The interest manifested by the project participants, and their acceptance of the invitation to participate in the Academy testify to the success of this initiative. In my opinion, the 2008 Academy and this publication should not be understood as the conclusion of a project but rather as the raising of questions that will be further discussed later on.



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Davor Džalto was one of the lecturers at the International Summer Academy (*UN) Limited Identities*.

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
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
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